100th Congress, 1st Session

S. Rept. No. 100-216

Report of the Congressional Committee Investigating the

Iran–Contra Affair

Appendix D: Volume 5
Testimonial Chronology:
Witness Accounts,
Supplemented By Documents

Daniel K. Inouye, *Chairman*
Senate Select Committee

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
And the Nicaraguan Opposition

November 17, 1987.—Ordered to be printed.

Washington : 1988

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United States Senate

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United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 13, 1988

Honorable John C. Stennis
President pro tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to Senate Resolution 23, Appendix D to the final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition.

Sincerely,

Danial K. Inouye
Chairman

Warren B Rudman
Warren B. Rudman
Vice Chairman

United States Senate

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Appendix D

Contents

Vol. 1

Summary Version of the *Testimonial Chronology*
    Index of the Long-Form Version
        Transcript Conversion Tables

Vols. 2-5

Long-Form Version of the *Testimonial Chronology*

- Vol. 2: 1976 through November 23, 1985
  (entry index numbers starting at 76/00/00-000)
- Vol. 3: November 23, 1985 through March 7, 1986
  (entry index numbers starting at 85/11/23-300)
- Vol. 4: March 7, 1986 through October 23, 1986
  (entry index numbers starting at 86/03/07-200)
- Vol. 5: October 24, 1986 through March 25, 1988
  (entry index numbers starting at 86/10/24-080)

Contents

Volume 5

Note on Citations... IX
List of Abbreviations... X
Key to Exhibit Prefix Letters... XI
Preface... XIII
Long-Form Version of the *Testimonial Chronology* (continued)... 1
October 24, 1986 through March 25, 1988 (Entry index numbers 86/10/24-080 through 88/03/25-100)

Note on Citations in this Chronology

Citations appear at the end of each entry in the Long-Form Version of this *Chronology* (vols. 2-5) and refer to a variety of sources available to the Committees. These sources are noted in the corresponding entries in the Summary Version (vol. 1) only by the witness' name or by the document description or its exhibit number. The sources include:

1. JHICI. Refers to the unpublished transcripts, titled Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation, that were issued daily to the Committees while the Iran-Contra Hearings were being held in May through August 1987. All page references given as "[Witness] Testim., JHICI" are to these volumes which are stored in the Committees' archives in Washington, D.C. These transcripts have recently been published by the Committees in a thirteen volume set titled *Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran*, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987-88). A table converting unpublished transcript (JHICI) page numbers to published transcript (referred to in the *Iran-Contra Report* as *Hearings* volumes) page numbers is included at the end of volume I of this Appendix.

2. Executive Session, JHICI. Refers to sworn hearing testimony of John Poindexter or Oliver North taken in closed session because of the classified nature of the testimony. (These witnesses also testified in sessions open to the public.) The transcripts of the closed sessions were publicly released after classified portions of the testimony were redacted. Citations to Executive Session testimony refer to the unpublished transcripts described in the preceding paragraph. These transcripts are available in the Committees' archives in Washington, D.C.

3. Dep. A sworn deposition taken in the presence of one or more Members of the Committees and/or counsel for the Committees, and counsel for the deponent. These deposition transcripts have been published as Appendix B to the *Iran-Contra Report.*

4. Int. An unsworn interview conducted by one or more Committee Members and/or Committee counsel, with counsel for the interviewee present if the interviewee wished.

5. Ex. An exhibit used during the Iran-Contra Hearings ("JHICI Ex.____") or during a deposition ("[Witness] Dep. Ex.____").

6. PROF Notes. Messages generated on a computer system used by the National Security Council staff.

7. Document letter and number codes. Source and document file codes for materials that have been assigned a Senate letter code and stamped page number. These materials are stored in the Committees' archives in Washington, D.C.

8. Iran-Contra Report. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Nov. 17, 1987).

9. Tower Report. *Report of the President's Special Review Board* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Feb. 26, 1987).

10. HFAC, HPSCI, or SSCI. Testimony or statements made by witnesses before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

11. CRS. A numbered report issued by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

Abbreviations

ABA	American Bar Association
AG	Attorney General
ARA	Inter-American Affairs (DoS)
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CATF	Central American Task Force (CIA)
C/CATF	Chief of the Central American Task Force (CIA)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CPPG	Crisis Pre-Planning Group
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CYA	cover your ass
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence (CIA)
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission (CIA)
DDCI	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (CIA)
DDO	Deputy Director for Operations (CIA)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
Dep.	Deposition
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DO	Directorate for Operations (CIA)
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
Ex(x).	Exhibit(s)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Force
FM	Foreign Minister
GAO	General Accounting Office
Gorba	Manucher Ghorbanifar
GPS	George P. Shultz
HAWK	Homing-All-the-Way Killer missile
HFAC	House Foreign Affairs Committee
HPSCI	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
IDEA	Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance
IG	Inspector General
Int.	Interview
IOB	Intelligence Oversight Board
Iran-Contra Report	*Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views* (11/87)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JHICI	Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation
JMP	John M. Poindexter
MOD	Israeli Ministry of Defense
NDR	Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance
NEPL	National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty
NHAO	Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office
NIO	National Intelligence Officer (CIA)
NSA	National Security Adviser
NSB	National Security Briefing
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSPG	National Security Planning Group
OD	see DO
ODSM	Office Directors Staff Meeting
OEOB	Old Executive Office Building
OLN	Oliver L. North
PM	Prime Minister
PROF(S)	Professional Office (Computer) System
RCM	Robert C. McFarlane
RIG	Restricted Interagency Group
RR	President Ronald Reagan
SIG	Senior Interagency Group
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
STTGI	Stanford Technology Trading Group International
TIWG	Terrorist Incident Working Group
TOW	Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided missile
Tower	*Report of the President's Special Review Board* (2/87) (The Tower Board)
UNO	United Nicaraguan Opposition
USG	U.S. Government

Key to Exhibit Prefix Letters

[no prefix]	Richard Secord or Robert C. McFarlane
AC	Adolfo Calero
AH	Albert Hakim
BS	Bretton Sciaroni
C	CIA (from Eggleston Summary, 6/24/87)
C/CATF	Chief of the Central American Task Force (CIA)
CG	Clair George
CJC	Charles J. Cooper
CWW	Caspar W. Weinberger
DoD	Department of Defense (Noel Koch, Henry Gaffney)
DRC	Duane R. Clarridge
DTR	Donald T. Regan
EA	Elliott Abrams
ECG	Ellen C. Garwood
EM	Edwin Meese
FH	Fawn Hall
FIR	Felix I. Rodriguez
GAR	Glenn A. Robinette
GJS	Gaston J. Sigur
GPS	George P. Shultz
JC	Joseph Coors
JKS	John K. Singlaub
JMP	John M. Poindexter
LAT	Lewis A. Tambs
OLN	Oliver L. North
RCD	Robert C. Dutton
RWO	Robert W. Owen
SS	Stanley Sporkin
TC	Tomas Castillo
WBO	William B. O'Boyle

Publications of the Senate and House Select Committees

Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 1 volume, 1987.

Appendix A: *Source Documents*, 2 volumes, 1988.
Appendix B: *Depositions*, 27 volumes, 1988.
Appendix C: *Chronology of Events*, 1 volume, 1988.
Appendix D: *Testimonial Chronology*, 5 volumes, 1988.

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Preface

This *Testimonial Chronology* records the events of the Iran-Contra Affair as recounted by the witnesses who testified before the Congressional Committees, and as disclosed in contemporaneous documents that the Committees gathered. It was prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition as an Appendix to the *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair ("Iran-Contra Report")*. Although this *Testimonial Chronology* is published by the Senate Select Committee, it is based on the evidence gathered by the two Select Committees during their joint investigation.

This *Testimonial Chronology* aims to be thorough, without passing judgment or making editorial comment on the evidence it records. It is intended to serve as a research aid, pulling together the myriad events and disparate threads of the Iran-Contra Affair in the words of the participants themselves. Accordingly, where the evidence contains multiple or differing versions of the same events, the various accounts are summarized or quoted. In every instance, the Committee has attempted to provide an accurate, objective and succinct summary of what the witnesses and the documents actually said—and not how the Committees viewed this evidence. The Committees' subjective views and conclusions are set forth in their *Iran-Contra Report*.

This *Testimonial Chronology*, while comprehensive, is not all-inclusive. The two Congressional Committees gathered hundreds of thousands of documents and took numerous depositions, not all of which could be included here. The primary source material for this *Testimonial Chronology* is the testimony of the witnesses who appeared at the Joint Hearings. Deposition testimony also has been included where the deposition transcripts were released prior to the publication of the *Iran-Contra Report*, or where the deposition transcripts discuss events referred to in the *Iran-Contra Report* or in this *Testimonial Chronology*. The documents quoted or cited were introduced as exhibits during the Joint Hearings or otherwise relied upon in the *Iran-Contra Report*.

Transcript text quoted in this *Testimonial Chronology* is edited only by the use of ellipses (. . .) or by material added in brackets where necessary for clarification or completeness. Such editing has been minimal. Likewise, [sic] has been used sparingly, in recognition of the fact that witnesses gave their testimony orally, not in writing. With this in mind, [sic] has been utilized to note that a quotation which might otherwise appear mistaken is recorded accurately here. Also, where a document or testimony has been quoted inaccurately in other testimony, the accurate text is added parenthetically after the [sic].

The Summary Version of this *Testimonial Chronology* serves as an extended Table of Contents for the Long-Form Version. The Summary Version identifies topic headings in the order in which they appear in the Long-Form Version, and notes the specific witnesses whose testimony is included under each topic, as well as the documents quoted or cited.

Chronology entries are designated by nine-digit index numbers in the left margin before each entry. This number gives the date of each event. For example, 85/11/15-100 means November 15, 1985 (or mid-November 1985). The last three digits after the hyphen (100) were solely for computer sorting purposes; they need not detain the reader.

The dates used are those furnished by the witnesses or the documents; however, certain major topics *(e.g.*, the "diversion") are grouped together for convenience.

Before this *Testimonial Chronology* was released, it was submitted by the Senate Select Committee to the White House for review by a Declassification Committee composed of representatives from the various executive departments. This is the same Declassification Committee which functioned throughout the Congressional investigation of the Iran-Contra Affair. The Senate Select Committee expresses its gratitude to the members of the Declassification Committee, and in particular, to Brenda Reger of the NSC staff, for their diligent work in reviewing this *Testimonial Chronology* and helping the Senate Select Committee insure that all critical evidence was disclosed with due regard for considerations of national security and U.S. foreign relations.

This *Testimonial Chronology* is largely the work of Isabel McGinty, Esq., an Assistant Counsel on the Senate Select Committee staff. Ms. McGinty spent enormous hours—including long days, long nights and weekends—throughout the past year to compile this *Testimonial Chronology* and prepare it for publication. Although the task was extremely difficult and painstaking, Ms. McGinty saw it through to completion, long after the *Iran-Contra Report* had been issued and other staff members had departed for their homes. The Senate Select Committee expresses special gratitude to Isabel McGinty for her dedicated service in producing these volumes.

It is the Senate Select Committee's hope that this *Testimonial Chronology* will contribute to the public's understanding of the complex events which made up the Iran-Contra Affair.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/10/24-080 SUMMER - NOVEMBER 1986		THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION AND POINDEXTER'S CONTACT WITH MEESE ABOUT THE IRAN INITIATIVE MEESE ACCOUNT: The Attorney General testified in his opening statement: "As the testimony of others before these committees has indicated, there were only two occasions that I can recall in the summer of 1986 when Department of Justice matters prompted a conversation between me and Admiral Poindexter that related to the Iranian initiative. On both occasions I acted in my capacity in those matters as the country's chief law enforcement officer. "The first arose as the result of an inquiry from within the Department of Justice concerning a criminal investigation originating in New York, relating to arms smuggling to Iran. The suspects in that investigation alleged that the United States Government had authorized their arms sales. "Criminal Division attorneys had asked that I check to be sure that no such authorization existed. I therefore called Admiral Poindexter and received his assurance that the arms sales in question had not been authorized and were not connected with the Iranian initiative. A declaration was subsequently filed in court, I believe, that stated this fact. "The second incident occurred around the end of October 1986. Admiral Poindexter telephoned me and inquired about a Federal investigation which included an air carrier known as Southern Air

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Transport. He advised that the airline was involved in efforts concerning the Iranian initiative that were at a critical stage. He therefore asked whether it might be possible to delay a scheduled visit of investigators to Southern Air for around ten days so as not to disrupt this activity relating to the Iranian initiative. "I informed Admiral Poindexter that we obviously could not impede, weaken or interfere with the investigation, but that I would check with FBI Director Webster to ascertain if it might be possible to delay certain non-urgent aspects of the inquiry. "Through Associate Attorney General Trott, who handles the criminal matters within the department for me, I was informed by Director Webster on the 30th of October 1986 that the delay could probably take place without in any respect adversely affecting the investigation. "I have since been advised by Director Webster that this is precisely what occurred, that the investigation of Southern Air Transport resumed on November 26th and that it was in no way prejudiced by that delay." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 9-10.)
86/10/24-085 SOMETIME IN LATE OCTOBER 1986		THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT INVESTIGATION AND POINDEXTER'S CONTACT WITH MEESE ABOUT THE IRAN INITIATIVE MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. VAN CLEVE. . . . I had a couple of additional factual questions that concern the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			investigation of Southern Air Transport. Now, your opening statement referred to the circumstances under which Admiral Poindexter contacted you and asked for a delay in the pending investigation of Southern Air Transport, and I had some specific questions about your conversations with Admiral Poindexter on that subject, and the first one was: Did Admiral Poindexter ever tell you during those conversations that Southern Air Transport, to his knowledge, was involved in the contra resupply operation in some fashion? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't believe that that was discussed at all in his conversation with me. His conversation with me was more to determine whether there could be a brief delay in the visits of FBI agents, as I recall, to Southern Air Transport's headquarters or one of their offices, because my impression was that the people involved who were to be interviewed or were to produce[] records, whatever it was entailed, were needed because of a critical aspect of the Iranian Initiative, and that--this occurred before any of this had been made public, and this was the only aspect that I knew of, and it was on that basis that I said that, as I mentioned in my opening statement, that we could not do anything to impede or interfere with the investigation, but that if a temporary delay in that particular phase, where I believe he wanted ten days, could be undertaken to the satisfaction of the FBI without in any way weakening or damaging their investigation, that that would be agreeable to me. "So that is why I did commence through the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			usual channels the inquiries to the FBI, and I think perhaps the best way to give the full picture is to make reference to the memorandum that was made at the time by William Webster, the Director of the FBI, and I believe you have that as an exhibit. "That memorandum, dated the 31st of October, 1986, to Mr. Clark, who is the head of Investigations, Criminal Investigations in the FBI, says regarding Southern Air Transport, 'this confirms my telephone conversation with you late yesterday afternoon. Associate Attorney General Stephen Trott called on the secure line at the request of the Attorney General to ask that we suspend for ten days any non-urgent work in the Southern Air Transport Neutrality Act investigation. Apparently there is some sensitive hostage negotiations now underway that could possibly be prejudiced. He emphasized the Attorney General did not want to do anything which would wreck the investigation but simply to present a good climate for the negotiations to the extent possible. You informed me we were just at the preliminary stages and this should present no difficulty. And I would like to know' --he goes on to say, 'I would like to know if these instructions create problems for us at any time.' "I think that probably memorializes best the general tenor of the conversation which I transmitted through Mr. Trott and the action that was taken, and, of course, the full aspect of the investigations was resumed shortly thereafter. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. I have just a couple

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			additional questions on that line. The first is: Did Admiral Poindexter ever tell you that Colonel North had had dealings with Southern Air Transport through either General Secord or Colonel Dutton? "Attorney General MEESE. No, he did not. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. And as of October 1986 did you personally have any reason to know that White House officials were in one form or another connected with Southern Air Transport? "Attorney General MEESE. Connected-- "Mr. VAN CLEVE. In the sense they were engaged in the type of operation which has since been testified to, using Southern Air for part of the services? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I do not believe I knew anything about that at any time prior to November, prior to the inquiries later on in November." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 203-06; JHICI Ex. EM 14 [Webster memo to Clarke, "Southern Air Transport," 10/31/86].)
86/10/24-100 OCTOBER 24, 1986		THE HASENFUS CRASH: REPORT OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ABRAMS reports that he has just learned from head of CIA Latin America Division that one of its operatives (probably in region) was involved in HASENFUS operation. ABRAMS says he believes that Head of CIA's Central America Task Force and CLAIR GEORGE did not know. Says Chief of Central America Task Force assured him that CIA clean, but someone is lying within CIA." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/11/25-895. See 86/10/23-100 [Abrams learns of U.S. involvement].)	
86/10/24-401 OCTOBER 24, 1986			FURMARK'S COMMENTS ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION CASEY MEMO, Part 1: Casey, in a memo to Poindexter, titled "Roy Furmark's Comments on the Hostage Situation," discusses a meeting among Charles Allen, George Cave and Roy Furmark to talk about the claims of Canadian financiers for repayment of sums advanced in Iran arms sales (see 86/10/17-100 through -102): "1. Charles Allen and George Cave went to New York on 22 October 1986 to meet with Roy Furmark. This was an extremely interesting meeting in that it revealed that the financial backers of Ghobanifar [sic] have been aware of the operation since its inception and may actually have played a key rôle in getting it moving, possibly for altruistic reasons, but almost certainly for their own profit. Roy himself admitted serveral times during the evening that profit was certainly a motive but that the group did see their efforts as leading towards stability in the region and the release of the hostages. Roy appeared to be very open during the course of the evening and everything he told us tracked with what we know. The only doubtful answer he gave was in reply to a question as to whether some of the principals were involved in the sting operation. Roy said that none of the principals were involved, however, one of the players, lawyer Samuel Evans, was the major

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			indictee and is free on $4.5 million bond. Roy claims that Evans owes him $200,000. "2. Khashoggi has been involved in this from the beginning as Ghobanifar's financier. Everything started in January 1985 with a meeting in Europe, Frankfurt apparently, involving Ghobanifar, Khashoggi, Roy, and others. This was followed up by subsequent meetings in Paris and London. These meetings culminated in a meeting in August 1985 in Tel Aviv. Roy went to Tel Aviv with Ghobanifar and while there they stayed with Nimrodi in his house. During the course of these meetings, Roy met Amiran [sic] Nir. At this meeting it was decided that it was necessary to get Washington's approval for the overall plan. There were two basic objectives; one, get release of the hostages, and two open up a dialogue with Iran. Schimmer [sic] was sent to Washington to obtain this approval. Roy is uncertain as to whether he discussed this with North or MacFarlane [sic] in Washington. Ghobanifar represents the line held by the Prime Minister which Roy describes as 'Moderate.' (We did not tell him that the Prime Minister could not be considered as Moderate.) By way of personal relationships, Roy said that he has known Khashoggi since 1966 and trusted him. Roy added that Schimmer and Khashoggi are close. Roy thinks this points up Khashoggi's breadth of vision. Roy pointed out that Schimmer had actually returned from a visit to China to make the August meeting." (JHICI Ex. OLN 315 [= Ex. JMP 63]. Text of memo continues in next 2 entries. Date of memo

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			[10/24/86] is supplied in Charles Allen testimony; see handwritten note on Ex. OLN 315.)
86/10/24-402 OCTOBER 24, 1986		DIVERSION: FURMARK NOTIFIES CASEY CASEY MEMO: ". . . Ghobanifar [sic] told Roy and Khashoggi that he believed the bulk of the original $15 million price tag was earmarked for Central America. In this regard, Ghobanifar told Roy that he was relieved when the $100 million aid to the Contras was passed by Congress." (JHICI Ex. OLN 315.) See col. 3.	FURMARK'S COMMENTS ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION CASEY MEMO, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "3. The first transaction was in September 1985 and was for 500 TOWs. The cost of the TOWs was $5 million. Khashoggi put up the money because he believes in Ghobanifar [sic]. The cost to Iran was $6 million. This allowed for $1 million to cover profit and expenses. The first shipment of TOWs was defective, so a second shipment was sent. There was a subsequent $5 million deal that went off in the November-December timeframe. Khashoggi told Roy that they were not involved, but Roy is certain that this was a Khashoggi/Ghobanifar organized deal. "4. Roy said that prior to the next deal, there was a meeting in the Paris airport hotel; he forgets or never knew exactly who was involved in this meeting. The meeting concerned Hawk spare parts. The deal for the Hawk spare parts began to be put together in April 1986. Khashoggi raised $15 million to cover the deal[,] $5 million from an Arab financier, and $10 million from two Canadians. Khashoggi raised the money on 15 May. A group of Americans went to Tehran and took with them seven percent of the Hawk spare parts which consisted mainly of nuts and bolts. With regard to this deal, the financiers, Ghobanifar, and Nir met and agreed that $3 million would be added to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			the price to cover profit and expenses and also another $2 million would be added to cover monies owed to Nir. The price to the Iranians would then be $20 million. (Why did Ghobanifar charge $24.5 million and with Nir's knowledge?) Neither Roy nor the financiers apparently know anything about the raise in the price by Ghobanifar, although they are aware that the Iranians objected strenuously to the price. Ghobanifar told Roy and Khashoggi that he believed the bulk of the original $15 million price tag was earmarked for Central America. In this regard, Ghobanifar told Roy that he was relieved when the $100 million aid to the Contras was passed by Congress. "5. The above requires clarification. In Tehran, Ghobanifar took Cave aside and told him that the Iranians would be questioning him about the price of the Hawk spare parts. Ghobanifar told Cave to insist that the price of $24 million old dollars is correct. When asked about the huge jack up in price, Nir gave a long circumlocution on why the price of over $24 million was correct. We were so concerned about this that we considered telling Ghobanifar exactly how much he could charge on any subsequent deals. From Roy's comments, it is clear that the 20 percent interest Ghobanifar told us about is in fact the gross profit margin agreed upon." (JHICI Ex. OLN 315 [= Ex. JMP 63]. Text of memo continues in next entry.)
86/10/24-403 OCTOBER 24,			FURMARK'S COMMENTS ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION CASEY MEMO, Part 3:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986			[Continuing from preceding entry:] "6. Roy said that Ghobanifar [sic] told them that he received two payments, one for $3 million and the other for $5 million. As originally agreed upon, the Arab investor was supposed to get back $6 million for his cut and the Canadians would get back $11 million. The other $1 million was to go to Khashoggi. Ghobanifar's cut was to come out of the $1 million. To the $8 million that Ghobanifar received, he added $100,000 of his own funds. The Arab investor was paid off ($5 million). The two Canadians received $1.1 million. Roy was not sure but presumably the $2 million went to Nir. Originally, the Canadians were given a check by Khashoggi in the amount of $11 million to cover the $10 million they provided Khashoggi. The monies to cover the Hawk shipment were paid into an account of a company called Lakeside which is an off-channel company. The Canadians believe that the money was stolen and this is giving Khashoggi heartburn. (Note: This does not square with what we know. We know that Ghobanifar received $4 million from the Iranians in July. He also received $8 million into his Swiss bank account on 21 August. These two payments were cash. He may also have received a check for $6 million between these two payments. The Iranians raised a big stink about the price of the Hawk spare parts and Ghobanifar offered them a $6 million deduction. According to [redacted] the $8 million payment on 21 August squared their accounts with Ghobanifar by mutual agreement. In fact, according to [redacted] $7 million covered

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			the remainder of the deal, the other million was to help Ghobanifar finance the next deal.) "7. Roy's suggested solution to the problem is to let Ghobanifar handle the shipment of the remainder of the Hawk spare parts. Proceeds from this deal would allow them to ease the Canadian pressure. Then it would be 500 TOWs for one hostage and another 500 TOWs for a second hostage. "Sincerely, "William J. Casey" (JHICI Ex. OLN 315 [= Ex. JMP 63.].)
86/10/26-100 OCTOBER 26, 1986			SHULTZ' RESPONSE TO LEDEEN'S MEETING REQUESTS DoS CHRONOLOGY: "HILL advises LEDEEN that GPS will not see him." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran] ends at 86/10/31-100.)
86/10/28-100 OCTOBER 27-28, 1986			TOWs TO IRAN SUMMARY: After North, Secord, and an Israeli official work out the details of the weapons delivery at a Geneva meeting on October 22 (see 86/10/22-100), Secord retains a flight crew which arrives in Israel on October 27. The next day, an Israeli plane flies from Israel to Iran with the 500 TOWs rejected by the Israelis in May 1986. The Israelis receive 500 newer TOWs from the United States. (Iran-Contra Report, at 259 [citing Israeli Historical Chronology]. For Secord account of the delivery, see 86/10/30-000.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/10/29-100 BEFORE OCTOBER 29, 1986			THE INSCRIBED BIBLE NAPIER ACCOUNT: Shirley Napier, staff assistant at STTGI, testified about the Bible: "Q. You mentioned before delivering a Bible to the Old Executive Office Building. "A. Yes. "Q. When was that? "A. That was, I believe, in September or October of '86. "Q. Would you describe for us how that happened? "A. Mr. Hakim was in town, and he and Mr. Secord had been out of the office, returned, had the Bible. They were trying to find an appropriate inscription for the Bible, and then he asked me to deliver it to the Old Executive Office Building, to give it to Fawn. "Q. To Fawn Hall? "A. Yes. "Q. Did Mr. Hakim ask you if you knew a suitable inscription? "A. Yes he did. "Q. What did you tell him? "A. I told him no, I didn't. "Q. Did he tell you the purpose, what the Bible was going to be used for, who it was going to be given to? "A. That is was going to Iranian friends. "Q. Okay. And what did you do with it? "A. I put the Bible in a brown envelope and sealed it up, wr[o]te Fawn's name on the front,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			and 'NSC,' took it down to the Old Executive Office Building, and went in and left it in the mail room. And then I called Fawn and told her that it was down there. "Q. And did you wait for her to pick it up? "A. No." (Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 42-43.)
86/10/29-250 OCTOBER 29, 1986			MAINZ MEETING: THE SECOND CHANNEL SUMMARY: For a summary of the meeting of North, Secord, Cave, and Hakim with the Iranian contracts known as the Relative and the Engine, see Iran-Contra Report, at 259-61; Tower Report, at B-170 to 171. (On the code names the Relative and the Engine, see Iran-Contra Report, at 249, 254; and entry 86/01/11-180.)
86/10/29-600 OCTOBER 29, 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: THE PERSIAN RUG DECLINED BY NORTH NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. COURTER. . . . It was suggested a few days before you came here that you were engaged in plans to become rich; we know that it is not the case now. And that you had taken money that wasn't yours; we know that is not the case now. "Albert Hakim testified, I think quite remarkably, about an incident where you were in Iran and you were given the opportunity to walk away with the $8000 rug. Do you recall that incident? "Mr. NORTH. It was in, I believe, Mainz,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Germany, that that event occurred. But it was an Iranian who offered the rug, yes, sir. "Mr. COURTER. When did that event occur and what happened there? "Mr. NORTH. My recollection is it occurred in one of the meetings during the summer or autumn of '86. The Iranian intermediary of the second channel brought the rug with him to the meeting, a beautiful Persian carpet, and offered it to me, and suggested that it was an appropriate gift from a person who cared deeply about reopening a relationship with his country. "And I simply told him that that was something I couldn't do. I couldn't accept it. He offered me a handful of pistachio nuts, which are something grown a lot of in Iran, and I took them and I ate them. "Mr. COURTER. Did you eat them all? "Mr. NORTH. I did, sir, and they were good nuts." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 13-14.)
86/10/30-000 OCTOBER 30, 1986			TOWs TO IRAN SECORD ACCOUNT: 500 TOWs are sent to Iran. The Iranian $3.6 million actually buys 500 new TOWs for Israel. The Israelis then send the Iranians the 500 replacement TOWs they had acquired the previous May. The Israelis had "rejected them due to their age." A few days after the old TOWs leave Israel, 500 newer ones are sent in by Secord. David Jacobsen is then released in Lebanon [on November 2, 1986]. (Secord Testim., JHICI,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			5/6/87, at T02-04.)
86/10/30-010 DURING 1986, AND OCTOBER 30, 1986			TOWs TO IRAN: WEINBERGER'S KNOWLEDGE WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. In late October of 1986, there was a shipment of 500 TOWs in connection with the release of a hostage. Did you know-- "Secretary WEINBERGER. That was part of the original direction, so to speak, and was still within the so-called 4000 that we had been told would be sent and were part of the President's order, and I assume, I don't have a specific memory now, but I assume I was told that this other order had gone under the same set of conditions that we were delivering the first group. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Mr. Secretary, you have testified about various meetings that you had as this initiative was developed leading up to the finding on January 17th of 1986. Were there any meetings among the similar group of people after that time where there was any discussion about whether it was time to close down the operation, whether it was time to stop-- "Secretary WEINBERGER. I made the point repeatedly to Admiral Poindexter, who by that time had taken over, that I thought it wasn't working and that I also thought it was an extremely bad way to go about anything to transfer the arms and sort of hope for the best. I think I told him that I preferred using the equivalent of an escrow or title company, and if we didn't have that, then I told him that I thought that there should not be

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			anything more done until all the hostages were returned to the United States unharmed, since that seemed to be what the thrust of it was becoming. "He promised two or three times that that would be the case. But that later, when I asked him about it again, many times he would just say he was unable to keep that promise. "Mr. EGGLESTON. You don't recall, though, a meeting with this similar same group of people to discuss whether or not the time had come to stop the initiative. "Secretary WEINBERGER. Not a meeting of the same group, no. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Did you ever talk to the President directly about whether or not the initiative should be stopped? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I talked to Mr. Poindexter so many times, and I don't remember whether the President was present at some of those meetings or not. I think he may well have been, but I am not sure of that. But the continued objection was made all through that year with repeated--my repeatedly calling attention to the fact that it wasn't working, we were getting the usual violent anti-American statements from Iran, nothing was happening, we weren't getting any hostages, nothing was working, and it should be stopped. I don't recall whether the President was present at those specific times or not, but there were many of those types of discussions I had with Admiral Poindexter." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 124-26.)

86/10/30-100
LATE OCTOBER
1986

TOWs TO IRAN: DUTTON ROLE
DUTTON ACCOUNT:

Dutton testifying on his further involvement in weapons delivery to Iran:

"Mr. DUTTON. General Secord sent me to Geneva with the KL-43. I picked up an amount of cash, and then went into Tel Aviv. I met the Southern Air Transport air crew there, and we flew--the next day, we flew a TOW missile delivery into Iran. And a return.

". . . .

"Mr. BALLEN. Now, sir, before returning to the United States on that journey, did you travel to Lebanon?

"Mr. DUTTON. Yes, I did. To Beirut.

"Mr. BALLEN. And what were the circumstances behind your traveling to Beirut?

"Mr. DUTTON. Because I had the KL-43 with me, General Secord and Colonel North wanted somebody in Beirut when David Jacobsen was released. I went to Cyprus, was briefed there, and then flew in on Army helicopters to the Embassy.

"I met Ambassador Kelly . . . . Spent the night. Colonel North came in the next morning, got to meet the hostage he had worked so hard to get released, and he gave him a quick briefing on what was going to happen when we got back to Larnaca, and what would be happening over the next few days, and we flew out and that was the last I saw of them.

"Mr. BALLEN. And, sir, did you use in fact the KL-43 to communicate?

"Mr. DUTTON. Yes, I did.

"Mr. BALLEN. And did you send a message to General Secord that said that the captors of the hostages would not release any hostages on this trip, and that they wanted the next delivery before releasing another hostage?

"Mr. DUTTON. Yes, that is correct.

"Mr. BALLEN. I take it that means that they wanted another delivery of weapons to Iran before they were willing to release another hostage; was that your understanding?

"Mr. DUTTON. Yes. When I was in contact with both General Secord and with the White House Situation Room from the Embassy in Beirut, I was told that we were hoping to get three hostages out, not just one or two.

"By the time I was there, of course, we had the one, they were still hoping to get the two others. In the debriefing, David said that from his information, he didn't believe that we would get the other two until another shipment was made, and I am passing this information, I believe it was to General Secord, who was in London, but I may have also sent this to the White House Situation Room."

(Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 102-04. See id., 5/27/87, at 148-51 [Dutton obtained $40,000 in cash from Willard Zucker in Geneva during his October trip: "I [sc. Dutton] went to CSF. He [sc. Zucker] went to the bank, came back with the money, I counted it and signed a receipt for it." Dutton did not have written authorization from Hakim to get the $40,000. Asked by Sen. McClure

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			how he was able to withdraw the money if Hakim controlled the account, Dutton stated, "[T]hat was something between General Secord and Mr. Hakim and Mr. Zucker."].)
86/10/31-100 OCTOBER 31, 1986			SHULTZ IS TOLD THAT HOSTAGE RELEASE IS ANTICIPATED DoS CHRONOLOGY: "POINDEXTER advises GPS that release of DAVID JACOBSEN is imminent." (JHICI Ex. GPS-B. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100.)
86/11/01-000 EARLY NOVEMBER 1986			TOWs TO IRAN AND HOSTAGE RELEASE SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord and North travel to Beirut after the 500 TOWs are sent to Iran. They spend three hours with embassy personnel to brief them on the upcoming release of hostage David Jacobsen. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 104.)
86/11/01-150 LATE OCTOBER - EARLY NOVEMBER 1986			HOSTAGE RELEASE: U.S. EMBASSY INVOLVEMENT KELLY MEMO: Memorandum from John H. Kelly, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, to Amb. Nicholas Platt, on "American Hostages in Lebanon: NSC Involvement": "As you requested there follows my account of the events including Robert McFarlane, Oliver North, and others and the release of American hostage David Jacobsen in Lebanon. I request that you forward this to the Secretary. ". . . Throughout the entire affair I operated under the belief that the Secretary was

being kept informed by Poindexter. I regret profoundly that this appears not to have been the case. Because of Poindexter's oft repeated injunction to communicate to the White House only through [redacted] and the occasional statement to me that 'State was being taken care of,' I believed that I was following the proper course.

"On August 8[, 1986,] . . . McFarlane told me that the President had decided (no date was given) to authorize negotiations with Iran which would involve the sale of American arms in exchange for the release of American hostages in Lebanon. McFarlane told me that the Secretary of State had opposed such a policy, that other Cabinet members had been involved, but that the President had made his decision. McFarlane used words to the effect that this was a 'close hold' operation involving an extremely restricted number of individuals.

". . . .

"I heard nothing more on the subject until Thursday, October 30, when I received a message in Beirut to telephone 'Mr. Goode' at a phone number in Germany at about 1:30 p.m. Mr. Goode turned out to be Oliver North, who advised me that things were moving and I should prepare for visitors. . . .

"I believed that Admiral Poindexter was keeping the Secretary informed. . . .

". . . .

"At about 11 p.m. [on October 30] North, [redacted] and Secord arrived by helicopter. . . .

"North told me that two hostages were expected to be released . . . . North reinterated to me

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that I should send no messages to the Department of State implying (but my memory is unclear) that this was on the order of the President. . . . ". . . . "At 7:45 a.m., Sunday, November 2, I was informed by my security officer that Jacobsen had been released . . . . At about 8:15, the armed motorcade departed and returned within 45 minutes with David Jacobsen who was delivered to my residence. I then instructed my staff to send a FLASH cable to State informing the Department of Jacobsen's release. Subsequently, I was informed by Earl[] that Admiral Poindexter was most displeased that I had violated his instructions to communicate only with him. "About 1:15 p.m. a local radio station broke the story of Jacobsen's release. The State Operations Center called me on a non-secure line to ask for details of what was going on. I told them that I could not speak on a non-secure line. I then called Earl[] on secure, told him about the inquiry from State, and asked that appropriate people at State be briefed. I think I also asked that JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] be informed because of the movements of military helicopters and the possible need for a military MEDVAC flight, but I may have made that request the preceding day. I was told several times by Earl[] or Coy that State and JCS 'had been taken care of.' I interpreted this to mean that appropriate personnel had been informed and/or had been receiving copies of my cables to Poindexter. ". . . .

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"[Redacted] Bob Dutton arrived on a helo from Cyprus and joined Jacobsen. "On 11/4, as best I can remember, I received a final message from Poindexter which told me I could stand down from alert status, but reiterated that any further communication on these matters should be 'EYES ONLY to him' [redacted]." (JHICI Ex. GPS 48 [memo from Kelly to Platt, 12/10/86].)
86/11/01-153 LATE OCTOBER - EARLY NOVEMBER 1986			HOSTAGE RELEASE: U.S. EMBASSY INVOLVEMENT SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. Now, the actions that Ambassador Kelly in Lebanon took, working with Colonel North, were totally unknown to the department; is that correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. That's correct." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 189.)
86/11/01-155 AFTER EARLY NOVEMBER 1986			HOSTAGE RELEASE: U.S. EMBASSY INVOLVEMENT SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. FASCELL. Now, when you found out about the back-channel operation by Ambassador Kelly operating with Colonel North, that was a disaster. It just--I was thunderstruck. I am sure you were. "You recalled him. You brought him back here as it totally destroyed the whole system of operation to the Department of State. "Did you want to fire him. Did you want to get rid of him? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I wanted him to know that I didn't appreciate what he had done, the fact that he had been briefed by Mr. McFarlane and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			by somebody--I forget who in the White House about this operation, and was told that I was opposed to it, but he didn't have to talk to me about it because they would talk to me about it, and he accepted that, and then took directions from them. I didn't appreciate that at all. And he knows that. "But he is basically a very good man and I hope he's learned his lesson. ". . . . "Secretary SHULTZ. . . . And so I think that with all of the problems that we have talked about with respect to Ambassador Kelly, we also have to say he's out there. He is literally on the front line, and he's doing a good job. "Mr. FASCELL. He is on the front lines, Mr. Secretary. And I certainly do not demean his service in any way. I simply am making the obvious point that the Secretary of State doesn't have control over ambassadors the way he wants to. He's got a problem. It's called politics, and that's in the best sense, not the worst sense, and the White House. You cannot move the pegs around at your will because you have the Congress to deal with, that all-powerful United States Senate, and then you've got the White House to deal with, and then you've got domestic politics to worry about. "So if you really wanted to move your pegs around, you'd have a big problem anyway. That's the only point. I'm sure you agree with that? "Secretary SHULTZ. You and I are both old enough to remember Jimmy Durante. Remember what he used to say? It's the way I feel as Secretary

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			of State: 'Everybody wants to get into the act.' "That's the way it is." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 214-16.)
86/11/02-100 NOVEMBER 2, 1986 (SUNDAY)			HOSTAGE RELEASE: David Jacobsen is released in Lebanon.
86/11/03-110 NOVEMBER 3, 1986 (MONDAY)			PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE McFARLANE TRIP AL-SHIRA' ARTICLE: Lebanese paper Al-Shira' publishes an account of the McFarlane trip to Tehran. The article starts with an account of the arrest of Mehdi Hashemi in Iran and includes a report attributed to Hashemi's follows of "an incident which Al-Shira' publishes only to present the other side objectively": "They relate the following incident: A secret U.S. envoy, Robert McFarlane, visited Tehran secretly at the beginning of last month (September) and stayed at the Independence Hotel (formerly the Hilton Hotel). He held extremely important talks with envoys from the Foreign Ministry, the Consultative Assembly, and the Army. Among these envoys were Dr. Mohammad Lavasani, head of the Political Department for Asia and Africa, who had worked for 10 years for Aramco in Saudi Arabia; Dr. Mohammad 'Ali Hadi, deputy chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Consultative Assembly; and a senior Army officer. "The talks between McFarlane, who served for a time as an assistant to National Security Council

Chief Brzezinski [sic], and the Iranian delegation centered on the Gulf war and what is termed international terrorism.

"The tale as told by Hashemi's supporters goes on: Iran asked two things of Washington, which its envoys proposed very clearly: one was a halt to military, material, and political support for the Iraqi regime; and the other was the sale of spare parts to Iran for its U.S.-made aircraft, tanks, radar, and other weapons. In return, the United States, through McFarlane, asked Tehran to stop supporting liberation movements in the world on the pretext that they are terrorist movements and to guarantee the security of Arab Gulf states.

"The tale ends with the conclusion of the deal. Hashemi's supporters say: Washington responded quickly to Iran's demands, sending four C-300 planes from a base in the Philippines carrying some of the needed spare parts for Iran. These contributed to a large extent to improving the Iranian air defense system, which last week downed three Iraqi planes, one a Sokhoi and two MiG-23's. The shipment also strengthened the defense of Tehran and improved Iranian radar operations.

"Tehran's response came with the arrest of Hashemi and the accusations that he had deviated from the logic of the state and had tried to involve it in disputes with a Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Syria, as indicated by the two incidents.

"This is what Hashemi's group and the official Iranian statements are saying. While it is not

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			our place to direct or accept accusations of this party or that, we can still relate available information on this question. "Hashemi's supporters believe that this entire incident unfolded without the knowledge of Imam Khomeyni, who was bed-ridden after suffering a heart attack that required a long rest. With regard to his call to let justice take its course, they do not doubt this at all, because they, too, want justice to take its course." (Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, 11/6/86, at 11-13.)
86/11/03-120 DECEMBER 1985 - NOVEMBER 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: STATUS OF THE OBJECTIVES WHEN THE INITIATIVE WAS PUBLICLY DISCLOSED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. HEFLIN. Now in regard to the evolution of the finding from December[] the 5th, . . . 1985 to January 17th, 1986, you have said it required a good deal of staff work, and you felt that it ought to be in the law to straighten it out. I just wondered if at that particular time--considering that the new strategic opening with a moderate element in Iran was one of the significant reasons--if at that particular time was any staff work required as to how many arms sales might be required before the achievement of a significant relationship with the moderate element would have to occur? "Mr. POINDEXTER. We didn't have a good enough crystal ball, Senator, to predict exactly how that was going to go. We had a rough idea of how far we were willing to go, but it was more qualitative

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			than quantitative. "Mr. HEFLIN. You went to some consideration of that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Oh, yes. "Mr. HEFLIN. All right. Now, as the matter progressed and it was relative to this moderate element, was any follow up done on staff work as to timeframe, whether or not the demands would increase; for example, would we be called upon at a certain stage to supply Stingers if we were going to be able to arrange some type of a Summit between the Vice President and the Speaker of the House over in Iran--was any consideration given as to how far this might go and to the extent that we might be involved relative to the type of weapons and to the amount of weapons and to the number of sales that might be required to achieve this goal? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Senator, as has been testified to both by me and others, the major objective of this phase was to establish a reliable channel into the Iranian Government to set up--essentially to set up the process. In November, when Mr. McFarlane's trip to Tehran was exposed, we had just about, in my view, reached the point where we had set up the process. It would have required numerous additional meetings, and as I have testified earlier this week, we would have involved State Department representatives and a future high-level meeting, as has been described, would have been quite a distance in the future. And so a lot of the items that you are talking about, really, we didn't get to the point of having to address those.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Certainly if we had continued without exposure, we would have addressed that issue. "Of course, our major objective was to end the war, and we thought we were having some impact on that. And so whether there would have been these additional sales is highly speculative." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 9-11.)
86/11/03-150 SOMETIME IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1986			SHULTZ FINDS OUT ABOUT THE ARMS SALES TO IRAN SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary, when were you first informed that this nation had sold weapons directly to Iran? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it depends upon what you consider being informed; but when this all started to break in very early November, 1986, there were press reports of arms sales that seemed authoritative; and so that was my information literally on an arms sale from the U.S. to Iran. "Mr. BELNICK. Prior to then, prior to those reports in the press, had any member of the United States Government informed you that the United States had sold weapons directly from the United States to Iran? "Secretary SHULTZ. No." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 7-8.)
86/11/04-100 NOVEMBER 4, 1986 (TUESDAY)			PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE ARMS SALES: DoS REACTION DoS CHRONOLOGY: "Lebanese press discloses U.S. arms sales to Iran. GPS cables POINDEXTER advising that all the key facts be promptly disclosed." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/06-040.)
86/11/04-105 NOVEMBER 4-10, 1986 (TUESDAY - MONDAY)			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: SHULTZ' KNOWLEDGE SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. Sir, in the period November 4 to roughly November 10, when you attended the meeting at the White House . . ., there are indications in the records . . . of you expressing the view, in substance, that you weren't deceived or weren't cut out of events. . . . "In light of the facts, as you began to get them after November 10 and have them now, is that still your view? "Secretary SHULTZ. We were discussing, I believe, what my role was, and people said, 'Well, you didn't know anything about this.' I said, 'Yes, I did know something about it, I knew quite a bit about it.' Because, after all, I had been--you have related quite a few things that took place in 1985, 1986 that I knew about and weighed in on, I didn't want to say I was uninformed, I was informed. I said my information at some point along here was fragmentary and sporadic or some such words, and, of course, I now know that was the under-statement of the year. "But, at any rate, I didn't ever take the position and wouldn't have taken the position that I was totally uninformed, because that was not accurate." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 98-99. See id., 7/24/87, at 194 [Shultz: "You listed the things that I knew about, which are accurate, and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			I have never said that I was uninformed, oh, quite the contrary. I have said that my information was sporadic and fragmentary, I said that very early on, and as I look at the record of what was done, I can only say that that was the understatement of the year."].)
86/11/04-300 BETWEEN OCTOBER 13 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1986		NORTH'S LEDGER NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified that he kept a detailed account "of every single penny" of the traveler's checks he got from Adolfo Calero and of the cash from Secord. The traveler's checks started to come in very late 1984 or early 1985 and totaled "probably in excess of $100,000 or thereabouts." He also had fifty to seventy-five thousand dollars in cash. Others in the Administration knew North had access to this money. North testified, "The fact that I had those funds available was known to Mr. McFarlane, to Admiral Poindexter, to Director Casey, and eventually to Admiral Art Moreau over at the Pentagon. It also came to be known to others . . . ." As for how the funds were used, North stated initially they "were used only to support the Nicaraguan program, but eventually it was broadened to include other activities as well." Eventually "a whole host of Nicaraguan Resistance leaders" were being supported, along with Europeans who aided in public relations and arms acquisition. The Indian movement and activities inside Managua were also funded, as well as the	

DEA operation "and the assistance of another European who[m] we have agreed not to talk about."

North testified, "[M]eticulous records were kept of all of this. I kept a detailed account of every single penny that came into that account and that left that account. All of the transactions were recorded on a ledger that Director Casey gave me for that purpose. Every time I got a group of traveler's checks in, I would report them, and I would report them when they went out, even going so far as to record the traveler's checks numbers themselves.

"The ledger for this operational account was given to me by Director Casey, and when he told me to do so, I destroyed it because it had within it the details of every single person who had been supported by this fund, the addresses, their names, and placed them at extraordinary risk."

According to North, he destroyed the ledger in early November: "My sense is that it was probably destroyed along about the 4th or 5th of November, and I say probably because the initial discussions I had with Director Casey about this operation coming unraveled began right after the Hasenfus shoot-down, which was early October, I think it was the 4th or 5th of October, and then the discussions that he had shortly thereafter with Mr. Furmark who told him that, 'Oh, by the way, a lot of people happen to know that Ollie North has been using money from the Iranian arms transactions to support the contras', or words to that effect.

". . . .

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"I believe that it was right after I returned from one of my early November trips I had a meeting with Director Casey, Director Casey said, 'Look, this revelation that is either occurring or about to occur is the end.' At that point in time, he also told me, 'You ought to go out and get a lawyer.' "Now, from one of the guys who is one of the best lawyers in the world by my book . . . Director Casey told me to get a lawyer because there was probably going to be a civil suit against me by associates of Mr. Furmark to recover their money. "And so in that whole process, somewhere between what I would judge to be the 13th of October and the 4th of November, he told me specifically[,] 'Get rid of things, get rid of that book because that book has in it the names of everybody, the addresses of everybody. Just get rid of it and clean things up.' And I did so." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 105-12.)	
86/11/04-310 BEFORE NOVEMBER 4, 1986		NORTH'S LEDGER OWEN ACCOUNT: Owen testified that North "had a ledger that he kept track of every traveler's check that he gave me, from the serial numbers to the amount and where it was going." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 4.)	
86/11/04-330 BEFORE MAY 1986		NORTH'S LEDGER HALL ACCOUNT: Hall described the ledger kept by North:	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. BELNICK. Did you know at any time while you worked for Colonel North that Colonel North was in any way involved in paying or otherwise transferring funds to any of those contra leaders or contra supporters? "Ms. HALL. I don't know that to be a fact. I do have a recollection of once seeing a spiral notebook Colonel North kept. I believe I saw him writing in it once or twice. It had names and dollar amounts in it. "Mr. BELNICK. This was a ledger you saw Colonel North writing in in his office? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Just describe what it looked like, please. "Ms. HALL. The way I remember it, it was very similar to something you might buy in a Hallmark Card store. It was a manila colored spiral square type calendar. I believe if my recollection is right that he flipped to the back of it where they allow you to write notes. That is where the ledger was kept. "Mr. BELNICK. Where did you see the ledger? "Ms. HALL. The last time I remember seeing it I believe is in Room 392. "Mr. BELNICK. Which would have been before May 1986? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. You saw Colonel North writing in the ledger? "Ms. HALL. I believe so, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. And you remember seeing a page open with names and columns on it?	

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall any of the names?

"Ms. HALL. I don't have a specific recollection, no, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you have any recollection?

"Ms. HALL. My feeling, my assumption is it had to do with Central America.

"Mr. BELNICK. The contras?

"Ms. HALL. Yes."

(Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 233-34.)

86/11/05-210
NOVEMBER 5,
1986
(WEDNESDAY)

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE McFARLANE TRIP
MUSAVI ANNOUNCEMENT IN TEHRAN:

IRNA issues a report from Tehran:

"Prime Minister Hoseyn Musavi said Wednesday that the major aim behind the under-cover visit of a U.S. delegation to Tehran was to resume relations with the Islamic Republic.

"In an interview with IRNA after Wednesday's Cabinet session, Musavi said that any talks, however unofficial with this clandestine delegation, would be interpreted as unofficial resumption of Tehran-Washington relations, which result, he said, the White House had sought.

"Iran has friendly relations with many countries, but negotiations with the U.S. in the light of its crimes against the Islamic Revolution will never take place, said the premier.

"Musavi said that Tehran and Washington do not maintain any official or unofficial contacts except on disputes now being arbitrated at the International Court of The Hague within the framework of the Algiers agreement.

"On moderation of stances of several pro-U.S. countries including Saudi Arabia and Turkey towards Iran, Musavi said that following Iran's victory in the Val Fajr-8 offensive, launched last February, a relenting of their previous positions was indeed felt by Iran.

"The prime minister attributed their revised stances to Iran's steadily increasing strength and the power of the Muslim combatants at the war fronts. 'As the Islamic Republic emerges as a regional power, it naturally expects some moderation on the part of neighboring and world countries,' he said.

". . . ."

(Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, 11/5/86, at 13-14.)

86/11/05-250
NOVEMBER
5-24, 1986

WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY AS THE IRAN INITIATIVE BECOMES PUBLIC

REGAN ACCOUNT:

"Mr. JENKINS. . . . It appears to me, from listening to all the witnesses, including yourself, that the overriding concern really of the White House during this entire operation to and until the diversion was discovered was to put the best light on the situation to prevent the perception from being that it was an exchange of arms for hostages. Would you generally agree with the concern--

"Mr. REGAN. Yes, the story wasn't known until about November 4th or 5th, and in the period between November 5th and November 24th, you are correct.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. JENKINS. It appears to me from the various witnesses and the documents that everyone was concerned about making sure that as this story is released, we place the President in the position that he is not exchanging arms for hostages. Am I correct? "Mr. REGAN. You are correct, but you have to remember a slight addition to what you just said because the reason we wanted to do that was because that was what the President actually wanted, the opening with a contact with Iran, which was his number one problem. "Mr. JENKINS. I understand that from your testimony yesterday, although you indicated that it developed into an exchange of arms for hostages, in fact. "Mr. REGAN. That is correct. By October of 1986, it had dwindled into that." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 52-53.)
86/11/06-040 NOVEMBER 6, 1986 (THURSDAY)			WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY AS THE IRAN INITIATIVE BECOMES PUBLIC DoS CHRONOLOGY: "POINDEXTER responds that now is now the time to go public because it would 'complicate efforts to secure the release of other hostages.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/10-070.)
86/11/06-100 NOVEMBER 6, 1986		WATSON-RODRIGUEZ CONTACT GREGG CHRONOLOGY: Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National	

Security Adviser to the Vice President, notes contact between Felix Rodriguez and Col. Samuel Watson, Gregg's deputy:

"On November 6, 1986, Mr. Rodriguez delivered a speech at the National War College on low intensity conflict in El Salvador.

"On November 6, 1986, Colonel Watson and Mr. Rodriguez had dinner in McLean, Virginia."
(Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for preceding entry in Gregg chronology, see 86/10/05-160; chronology continues at 86/11/07-050].)

86/11/07-000
NOVEMBER 7,
1986
(FRIDAY)

McFARLANE REVIEW: "THE TRUTH"

McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, expressing McFarlane's concern that Donald Regan is blaming him for the whole Iran initiative.

"It might be useful to review just what the truth is.

". . . [W]hen the Israelis first approached us in June '85, I presented the idea of engaging in a dialogue with the Iranians -- no mention at all of any arms exchanges . . . .

"We then heard nothing until August when the Israelis introduced the requirements for TOWs. I told Kimche no.

"They went ahead on their own but then asked that we replace the TOW[s] and after checking with the President, we agreed."
(JHICI Ex. 47 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Current Events," 11/7/86]; McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 196.)

86/11/07-001

McFARLANE'S REVIEW OF EVENTS, AND THE

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
DURING NOVEMBER 1986			WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. You were asked to participate in those chronologies by Admiral Poindexter? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. What were you told was the purpose of the chronologies? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe that it was to serve as the foundation for administration officials who would be making either public or congressional statements or testimony about it to use. "[Mr. LIMAN.] Now, before you were asked to participate, did you send Admiral Poindexter a PROF note, which is marked as Exhibit 47, and was sent on the 7th of November 1986, and which expressed your concern that Don Regan was blaming you for the whole Iran initiative? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It sounds familiar. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, in that PROF note you said, 'It might be useful to review just what the truth is.' "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And you said to Admiral Poindexter, 'We then heard nothing until August when the Israelis introduced the requirement for TOWs. I told Kimche no.' Was that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It is correct except for timing. The account there, which was three days after the news broke and before I had any access to my calendar, stretched out in this PROF note from July to August to September. In fact, those events occurred in only 30 days time, but the

original people, the introduction of a hundred TOWs, the final approval of the President and then the release of Weir, is sequential as it is reflected here, yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. But this goes on to say, 'After you told Kimche, no, they went ahead on their own, but then asked that we replace the TOWs and after checking with the President we agreed.'

"I take it that the correct fact is that before they shipped TOWs you had checked with the President, and you had told the Israelis they could go forward?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, am I correct that if you look at Exhibit 55 that that is the chronology that you were working off of when you gave [y]our insert?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think it is. I think the one I was working off was a CIA product that has much of the same information, but I am familiar with this.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you then gave . . . your own version of the chronology, am I correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 196-98; JHICI Exx. 47 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Current Events," 11/7/86], 55 [White House Chronologies, 11/17/86 2000 (Maximum Version)].)

86/11/07-030
AFTER
NOVEMBER 3,

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE McFARLANE TRIP
REGAN ACCOUNT:

"Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . Your contemporaneous

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986			notes [for November 1986] indicate that you were a proponent of going public with this information-- "Mr. REGAN. Absolutely. "Mr. SMILJANICH. --early on. "Mr. REGAN. Absolutely. "Mr. SMILJANICH. All right. What was your reasoning there? "Mr. REGAN. Well, here's a breaking story that, whether it's breaking in Beirut or breaking anywhere, that I would see was not going to stop. I recall discussing with other members of the staff, 'The cover is blown here. We have got to go public with it. We have got to tell the Congress, we have got to tell the American public exactly what went on so they are aware of it.' "Mr. SMILJANICH. What did Admiral Poindexter recommend? "Mr. REGAN. Absolutely not. It was later reported in local papers here that we had a shouting match. We didn't have a shouting match, we did have a difference of opinion--a strong one. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Vigorous. "Mr. REGAN. His reasoning was a good one, that Jacobsen had just come out as a hostage, North was preparing to go to London and actually did go to London that first weekend in November--what was it, the 8th or 9th, in through there--and there's a possibility of two more prisoners coming out, two of the original ones, and maybe even the additional three, the later ones. And why blow that chance? We got to keep the lid on this, we got to deny it, we're endangering their lives.

"And then I might add here, a very dramatic thing happened. I recall it vividly. Jacobsen had a Rose Garden ceremony welcoming him back. He had said in his remarks he had cautioned the media about discussing this. On the way back, as the President and he were mounting the steps to the colonnade to go back into the Oval Office, there were shouted questions from the media about, 'What are you going to do about the hostages, what about the others that are there?'

"And Jacobsen turned and very emotionally said, 'For God's sake, don't talk about that, that is exactly what I have been saying, you are endangering lives of the people I love, these are my friends.' That made quite an impression on the President. And even though that same day I urged him again to get this story out, he said, 'No, we can't, Don', he said, 'We can't enganger those lives.' And he didn't.

"I did get a promise, though, that on November 10, Monday, we could have a meeting to discuss just how much we could reveal.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. And that meeting was held on November 10?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes."

(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 54-56.)

86/11/07-050
NOVEMBER 7,
1986

THE RESUPPLY OPERATION: RODRIGUEZ' DESCRIPTION TO GREGG AND WATSON OF HIS INVOLVEMENT

GREGG CHRONOLOGY:

Chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, records a meeting of Felix Rodriguez, Gregg, and Col. Samuel

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Watson, Gregg's deputy: "On November 7, 1986, Mr. Rodriguez met with Mr. Gregg and Colonel Watson in Gregg's office. Mr. Rodriguez described his role in El Salvador as having been primarily directed toward the insurgency in that country. Mr. Rodriguez also indicated that he, himself, had been able to assist the Contra resupply effort." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for preceding entry in Gregg chronology, see above at 86/11/06-[illegible]; chronology ends at 86/11/11-100].)	
86/11/07-100 NOVEMBER 7, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE IRANIAN INITIATIVE: DoJ INVOLVEMENT AND LEGAL ISSUES COOPER ACCOUNT: Attorney General Meese pulls aside his assistant, Charles Cooper, at a DoJ management meeting. He tells Cooper that he needs to have research done on the legal issues relating to the recently-disclosed Iran arms initiative. Meese tells Cooper that NSC counsel Paul Thompson will be contacting him. (Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87, at 6-8.)
86/11/07-110 NOVEMBER 7-10, 1986 (FRIDAY - MONDAY)			THE IRANIAN INITIATIVE: DoJ AND LEGAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Either at the meeting or following the meeting [on November 10, 1986], . . . did you ask anyone in the Department of Justice to commence legal research into potential legal issues that might arise as the result of the publicity? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I had already

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			given a warning order I believe sometime the previous week, on or about the 6th o[r] 7th of November, I think Admiral Poindexter had talked to me about possibly needing some legal advice, or at least some help on legal issues. It was anticipated at that time that there would probably be testimony and questions raised in Congress, and he alerted me probably we would need some legal assistance. "So the 7th of November, 1986, at a management planning conference that we were having, that was a Saturday, I believe, or Friday, actually, I asked Mr. Cooper, just briefly, I alerted him to be prepared that he--and I suggested he have one other trusted person in his section be prepared to do some legal research on this, and I may have even mentioned at the time that he might be hearing from Commander Thompson, who was the Assistant to Admiral Poindexter and I believe served generally as the legal counsel for the National Security Council staff." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 42-43.)
86/11/07-300 SOMETIME IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1986			PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ON IRAN: ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. VAN CLEVE. . . . In November, 1986, after the press disclosures began concerning the Iran operation, did there come a time when you received a phone call from a representative of a very high Israeli government official who expressed concern about the public position of the United States on disclosing the fact of the McFarlane trip to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Tehran? "Mr. NORTH. I believe I did, yes. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. And what did that individual advise you should be the position of the President of the United States? "Mr. NORTH. Well, if my recollection serves me rightly, we agreed to stay with no comment. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. . . . [T]here were a number of calls, day and night, at that point in time. Our principal focus, I do remember, vividly, was to keep the second channel alive and get as many hostages out as we could before it all came crashing down." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 115-16.)
86/11/07-305 EARLY NOVEMBER 1986			PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ON IRAN: ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . You remember when the newspapers leaked the story in early November '86 of Bud McFarlane having been in Tehran? "A. Yes. "Q. You remember that? "A. Yes. "Q. Do you recall being informed shortly thereafter by Colonel North or Colonel Earl that the Prime Minister of Israel had directed Mr. Nir to contact Colonel North with a message for the President to the effect the President should deny to the American press Bud McFarlane's having been there or there ha[ving] been any type of plan whatsoever?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"A. I don't recall it. "Q. You don't recall Colonel North telling you about that? "A. You know, he may have. It just doesn't leave any -- "Q. Do you have any recollection what they were hoping Israel would do in reaction to that news story breaking? "A. I don't think I knew what their reaction was. The only thing I can recall at the moment is what I have testified to this afternoon, that I was concerned the latter part of November that the Israelis not be surprised when the transfer of funds to the contras came out. Other than that, I don't recall any other's reaction." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 101-102.)
86/11/07-315 DURING NOVEMBER 1986		THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES SUMMARY: See col. 3.	THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES SUMMARY: For a narrative account of the drafting of the multi-versioned White House (or NSC Staff) Chronologies, see Iran-Contra Report, at 298-300; Tower, at D-1 through -11.
86/11/07-320 SOMETIME IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1986			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: HOW THEY DEVELOPED EARL ACCOUNT: Robert Earl described the reaction within the Administration as the Iran Initiative came to be uncovered in the press: "[T]he posture that was adopted by the Administration, by those in the box that were familiar with [the Iran Initiative], was to [say]

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			. . . no comment where possible, what I call a very carefully crafted, artful truth, where possible or necessary or, if there is no other way, outright denial -- in other words, cover story to protect the box and not to divulge what was in the box. That was the posture. And this is what I have in my own putting together of the phases of this month, November, called Phase I of the operation. "And that seemed to be generally recognized by all concerned, and it was the initial posture. As the story picked up momentum, it seemed that there was some realization that this was a little more than previous leaks and it might not go away as easily and that it might lead to a different posture, so that there was a modification, if you will, to Phase I, which was on a contingency basis to develop the facts, the chronology of what happened on the entire relationship. "So that the factual document, which would pull together the bits and pieces of this from all the players and all the people who were knowledgeable, and that no one person knew everything because it transcended time, national security advisors, Colonel North's involvement was later and so forth, so that there was a document that people who needed to know the story would know it. "And then if the decision was taken at that point to brief Congress and notify the people[,] that that source document could be used to develop testimony, that it was, to my belief, never any intention to share everything in that factual

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			document with the American people or Congress, . . . but that the logical beginning point was to at least get all the facts together so that those who were doing the briefing knew the complete history of it." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/30/87, at 43-44.)
86/11/07-321 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1986			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: HOW THEY DEVELOPED EARL ACCOUNT: North tells Earl that their office is to put together a "chronology" or "narrative" of events on the Iran Initiative. After a delay and with North away, Earl starts to put a chronology together using his own notes and knowledge, and CIA sources and North's documents. Earl puts together a 2-page chronology, which North edits and adds to on his return. North then works on the "more ambitious . . . gargantuan task" of putting together a 17-page narrative of events, a project that takes two weeks. Earl and Craig Coy help, "but not really as . . . knowledgeable participant[s], but as . . . third party help." Earl testified, "But this ten, 12, 14-day period, whatever it was, when we were developing the chronology and the narrative, there would be people coming and going to help out with parts of this and would come into the office and sit down at the conference table in Colonel North's office and read through whichever version we had at that point and mark it up with corrections and changes, additions, and those people who from time to time would participate

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			would include George Cave, General Secord, Howard Teicher, Bud McFarlane. I'm not sure if Charlie Allen did or not. "Q. How often do you remember Cave participating? "A. I would say a few times. More than once would be my recollection. My recollection, for example, of Bud McFarlane was only once or twice, very limited. Cave I would put more often than that or more time frame. [Sic.] "Q. General Secord? "A. Would be even more than George Cave. Teicher would be down around Cave, kind of a lower level participation maybe. Well, no. It was more than Bud. "Q. Do you remember any issues that arose in connection with this chronology? "A. There was some discussion of the 1985 period and that this was a problem, that as people put it together I don't think people knew it was a problem until they had pieced it together and realized that it was a problem. "Q. A problem in what sense? "A. That it was before the Finding, that there was a Finding in January and everything that followed from that would seem to flow. "Q. That was authorized. Let me just be very blunt with you. Did there come a point in doi[ng] this work where people became concerned that the activities before the Finding could be criticized because there wasn't a Finding? "A. I think that is probably accurate. I would phrase it that --

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Q. Well, you phrase it the way you saw it. You were there; I wasn't. "A. I would phrase it that there was some sort of problem with the 1985 period, that it was not explainable in the same way to the Congress as the 1986 period was, and that there was uncertaint[]y as to what actually had happened then and who did what to whom. And there was considerable confusion about that, as well as concern on how to present all of that to the Congress." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/30/87, at 42-49.)
86/11/07-325 DURING NOVEMBER 1986		THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: NO REFERENCE TO DIVERSION EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: NO REFERENCE TO DIVERSION EARL ACCOUNT: "Q. At any point did you have a discussion of whether the chronology or narrative should lay out how the money was channeled for the support of the contras? "A. Did we have a discussion about that? "Q. Yes. "A. No, sir, I don't think we did. "Q. Well, what instructions, if any, did you have as to whether you should include that fact in your chronology? "A. I don't think there were any specific instructions on that. "Q. And you made a decision then that in your version you would not include any reference to the contra support in your chronology? "A. No. I don't think it even got to the point of taking a decision one way or the other,

and the way I approached it, which was searching for dates that I could attach specific decisions or events or things to, nothing came out from that associated with a date.

"Q. But when you said the dates, you were getting the dates from documents?

"A. The dates from documents and people and my notes.

"Q. But did you ask any people as to when it was that the money was given for the support of the contras?

"A. No, I did not.

"Q. So it really comes down to the same thing, that you made a decision, either consciously or subconsciously, that you were not going to seek that information to include in the chronology.

"A. Well, subconsciously. I just have trouble saying it was a decision.

". . . .

"Q. You were trying to tell the story in an abbreviate[d] form of what happened with the initiative, the Iran initiative; is that correct?

"A. Yes, sir.

"(Counsel conferring with the witness.)

"Q. Well, then why, in telling the story of what happened to the Iran initiative, did you not include a reference to the use of the funds for supporting the contras, or did you include it?

"A. No. Again, that question, it is kind of foreign to me. I never really considered it. It just didn't come up in the course of my development of that two pages that I did. It

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			wasn't one of those that leaped out to me as a singular event to have a date attached to it and put it in the chronology. "Q. But, Colonel, it was a singular event in that when you heard it you realized it was extremely secret and confidential, correct? "A. When I heard it, yes, that it was very sensitive, yes. " . . . . "A. . . . [C]ertainly in this beginning period where I was working on the abbreviated chronology myself . . . I wasn't in the mode of trying to stress all of the benefits that were strategic benefits to the United States of this relationship. "In my mind, that is later in the exercise as we get into the narrative and what Colonel North was doing. Mine was just an initial very rough, not even intended to be comprehensive first cut at a draft that somebody else who knew more about it could play with." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/30/87, at 81-85.)
86/11/07-330 DURING NOVEMBER 1986			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: HOW THEY DEVELOPED COY ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. There comes a time when there is a decision made among the NSC staff to prepare a chronology of the events that had taken place from 1985 -- maybe 1984, 1985, and 1986. Do you know when that decision was made or when you were first advised of that decision? "A. I can't remember the date, but the direction I understood was that Ollie asked Bob to

get started on something, and then Bob didn't have all the information. So, we [sic (he?)] wasn't able to do too much, and it shifted over. So, Ollie was put into the -- the direction was that Poindexter wanted one document, or one piece of paper that would outline and describe the Iran initiative, and the direction was to put all the information into it initially, and then sensitive information, classified information could be scrubbed out so that you could start with a document that had everything and scrub it down to, at some point you had a public document that would -- that you could release.

"Q. Go ahead.

"A. That got to be tough to do, because the first draft --

"Q. Let me stop you. I would like to, if I can, sort of narrow down some things before you get into the substance of the drafts . . . .

". . . The Beirut newspaper article comes out, I think, around November 3. I take it this has not started as of the date of the Beirut newspaper article.

"A. No.

"Q. Or the date Jacobsen is released?

"A. No.

"Q. On November 13, the President makes a speech which is sort of the culmination of all the press turmoil after the Beirut article. I take it it is well underway by the time the President makes his speech; is that right?

"A. Yes, I think it is. I am pretty sure it would be.

"Q. I would think at least one of the reasons the chronology had to be prepared is that someone had to brief the President on the details about what had really happened so the people could get together a speech and get together some public response to the revelations of the Beirut magazine article.

"A. Yes.

"Q. Do you have any recollection when in that time period this decision was made?

"A. Not by date or anything.

"Q. Was there a meeting that you attended where Poindexter ordered various people to do various things?

"A. No, I didn't attend the meeting.

"Q. Do you know that such a meeting took place?

"A. I don't know. I assume, because Ollie came back.

"Q. Right. From something?

"A. From across the street, I assume, or thought, from Poindexter's office[.]

"Q. Do you have any idea who attended the meeting?

"A. No.

"Q. And Ollie comes back and says, 'We have to start getting this chronology together'?

"A. Yes."

(Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 87-89.)

86/11/07-331
DURING
NOVEMBER 1986

THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: HOW THEY DEVELOPED
COY ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Q. It is your testimony that he [North] initially assigns this task to Earl? "A. Yes, because Ollie was -- "Q. Still trying to get the other hostage out? "A. Still trying to do other things, get the hostage out. He asked Earl to get started on it. Earl made some attempt, I guess, to work on it. And then it was picked up and turned over to Ollie. "Then, at some point -- and, again, I can't fix a date on it -- Ollie came back and said that Poindexter directed him to do all things with Iran in preparation of the chronology, and that Bob and I were to stay out of it, that we were supposed to do the rest of the office stuff, keep the office going and just let Ollie devote full time to the Iran business. "Q. In fact, you remain involved in the preparation, don't you? "A. I remained invo[lv]ed in the sense I was there while it was being done, with redrafts. I would be up in my office, come down. People would be scribbling notes. I would read it. Initially, I was reading it to try to get started, thinking I would finally understand what the heck was going on in the whole thing. So, I would read it for grammatical reasons, see if it made any sense. "Q. Do you know whether there was a CIA chronology? "A. Yes, there was. "Q. Was that prepared prior to the first draft of Ollie's chronology?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"When I say 'Ollie's' I should say the NSC chronology that your office was working on. "A. I don't know if it was before or simultaneously. My vision of it was it was more simultaneous. But I don't know when it was -- I don't know anything about when it was started. I know there was one. ". . . . "Q. Could you just describe generally who was it who was involved in the actual preparation of the chronology? "A. Substantively? "Q. Yes. "A. Ollie, Secord, Cave, Charlie Allen, McFarlane, Teicher did a little bit, and then it went to Poindexter. "Q. Do you know how the work on the chronology was divided up, if it was, the different people assigned to do different parts of it? Or is everybody working on the whole thing? "A. I didn't see any division of labor on the thing other than Ollie was -- seemed to be doing most of the writing. He would hand it to Fawn, Fawn would type it, and it would come back in. People would look at it, make corrections. So, you ended up with a number of different drafts, trying to get it all put together. So that is the way it worked. "Q. Were documents also used? "A. Documents used? "Q. In the preparation, as I take it, everybody wasn't just relying on their own memory. Were there documents used?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"A. Ollie had notes and papers. I didn't have any." (Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 89-92.)
86/11/07-332 DURING NOVEMBER 1986			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: HOW THEY DEVELOPED COY ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Was the chronology substantially done by the time of that press conference [11/19/86]? "A. I suppose so, yes. "Q. . . . [H]ow many days was Secord there working on the chronology? "A. I don't know. I would guess two or three. "Q. Two or three? "A. Something like that. Maybe more. I can't -- I don't know. "Q. And how about Charlie Allen? "A. He maybe came over once or twice. "Q. How about Cave? "A. Same thing, little bit more. ". . . . "Q. Who else did you say had been involved in the substantive drafting of the chronology? "A. Teicher came in and took a look at it, had some thoughts or -- read it from his perspective. "Q. Did McFarlane come to the NSC offices to work on it? "A. You know, I read that in the Tower report, and I got to tell you, I don't remember him coming in to work on the chronology. "I remember him coming in to work on a speech.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Q. The November 13 speech? "A. Yes. But I don't recall him coming in to work on the chronology. He could have. I just don't remember that. "Q. Now, since you have read the Tower Commission report, you know that he sent a long PROF note about at least one of the drafts of the chronology. "Did you know that at the time? I think it was November 18 that he sent the note. "A. No, I don't think I knew that. "Q. You don't know? "A. No. "Q. Are you tell me that you basically had no substantive role in the drafting of the chronology? "A. I had the substantive role I inputted to it, was [sic] -- there is a portion at the beginning that talks of what other countries sold to Iran. I provided some of that information. "Q. How did you know that information? "A. I knew that information because Poindexter had asked Ollie to put together a paper on what other countries were selling to Iran, to try to give it some perspective. "Ollie asked me to prepare it. I called CIA and asked for some information. They provided me the information and I made up a large paper, and from that paper I got some of that information. "Q. Do you recall during the course of the preparation of this chronology any disputes about factual issues? "A. Yes. I believe it was -- I don't

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			remember any specifics. It was, you know -- because I wasn't there the whole time, you get the sense that somebody would read it, somebody would say, 'No, this happened; no, this happened this way,' trying to resolve everybody's memory on exactly how it all worked out. "Q. Do you remember who was having those disputes? "A. Not directly, other than Ollie would be involved in them because he was prime drafter of the thing. He would write something. Somebody would say, 'I don't think this is the way it was. I think it was like this.' I would be changed. "Q. Do you know what role Secord had in the drafting? Do you recall any substantive input Secord had? "A. I couldn't point to anything in there that he did." (Coy, House Dep., 3/17/86, at 93-96. See Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 6, 10-11, 43-44 [Coy on the drafting of the White House Chronologies].)
86/11/08-700 NOVEMBER 8, 1986			GENEVA MEETING: THE SECOND CHANNEL SUMMARY: North, Secord, Hakim, and Cave meet in Geneva with the Second Channel Iranian called "the Engine." (See Iran-Contra Report, at 262; for code names of Iranian contacts, see 86/01/11-180.)
86/11/10-010 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			CONTINUATION OF IRAN EMERGENCY: PRESIDENT'S NOTICE: "On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order No. 12170, the President declared a national emergency

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the situation in Iran. Notices of the continuation of this national emergency were transmitted by the President to the Congress and the Federal Register on November 12, 1980, November 12, 1981, November 8, 1982, November 4, 1983, November 7, 1984, and November 1, 1985. Because our relations with Iran have not yet returned to normal and the process of implementing the January 19, 1981, agreements with Iran is still underway, the national emergency declared on November 14, 1979, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1986. Therefore, in accordance with Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency with respect to Iran. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. "Ronald Reagan "The White House "November 10, 1986 "[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 10:02 a.m., November 12, 1986]" (JHICI Ex. OLN 210. On the Order of November 14, 1979, see above at 79/11/12-100.)
86/11/10-030 NOVEMBER 10, 1986			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE MEESE NOTES: The Attorney General's 3 pages of notes are marked at the top "NAT'L SCTY MEETING, 10 Nov 86, 11:30 am [Oval Office]." The attendees noted by Meese are "RR, VP, GPS,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			JMP, EM, WJC, DTR, CWW, Keel." Among the points made at the meeting are the following: "RR - no bargaining or trading for hostages "not trade anything in return for hostages "JMP - Long term strategy in re Iran "objs[:] "1 - contact w/ moderate Iranian elements "2 - stop Iran support of terrorism "3 - obtain release of hostages ". . . . "McFarlane trip to Tehran May '86 "Arms Tx "1000 tow missiles "500 [508 written above that] shipped by Israel - told after fact "500 from Israeli stock - approved in advz [sic? (advance?)] "240 types Hawk missile battery parts "shipped US [to (designated by arrow pointing right)] Israel [to] Tehran "Paymt Iran [to] Israelis [to] US "NOTE: All Defensive weapons ". . . . "Iranians using influence w/ Hezbollah; they are influential but do not control "Rationale: not paying ransom "Terrorists do not profit "RR - not violated laws or our policies "GPS - (1) Policy of non-dealing w/ terrorists is to protect all US citizens "(2) Juxtaposition of arms transfers + hostages being released

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"(3) Cannot overassert that arms involved were small + inconsequential "Lives of those w/ whom we deal (e.g., in Iran) could be jeopardized" (JHICI Ex. EM 17.)
86/11/10-035 NOVEMBER 10, 1986			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE REGAN NOTES, Part 1: Donald Regan takes 15 pages of handwritten notes at the November 10 meeting. The notes are marked at the top with a list of attendees -- "Pres, VP, GS, Cap, Ed, Bill, Al K., DTR" [note: Poindexter is noted as a speaker on page 1] -- and "11:30 AM, Nov 10, 1986." At the beginning of the meeting, the President stated, "As result of media, etc[.] must have statement coming out of here[.] We have not dealt directly w/ terrorists, no bargaining, no [word might be "ransom"] . . . ." Poindexter "reviewed what has transpired," including the "major objective" to "contact more moderate elements looking to future. Anti-Soviet." He also reviewed "Jan '86 finding." After mention of the May 1986 Tehran trip and opening of the Second Channel, Regan records: "Demand - release of 17 Dawa prisoners in Kuwait. Pres said no. No dealing, will not put any request to Emir of K--. "Bud in Tehran in May '86 - only trip. Sold to Iranians by Israel for cash 1000 TOW missiles, 240 Hawk missile battery spare parts (small shipment) "1st 500 TOW shipped by Israelis to Iran. We

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			told after the fact Pres did agree to replenish those for Israel. We were paid by Israelis who we [sic] "Battery parts shipped to Israel then to Iran. Iran pd Is. who paid us "500 more TOWs sent last week from Israel; we OKd in advance - will replenish "All are defensive weapons, are min[u]scule amts. Good faith shown by us "One meeting in U.S. by Rafsanjani's [redacted] to show legitimacy of operation ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. DTR 41-A.)
86/11/10-036 NOVEMBER 10, 1986			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE REGAN NOTES, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] Regan's notes continue: "Various questions about hostages, who holds, where, etc. Cap, Ed, George, John answering. Bill occasionally. "Iranians are not holding hostages[;] can influence those holding at times, and not quickly. "Shultz - be careful of linkage between hostages and defense equipment "Meese - we have not dealt directly with terrorists "Pres - Terrorists have not profited. We let Iranians [buy? (indecipherable)] supplies and they influenced. No benefits to terrorists. We working with moderates hoping in future to be able to influence Iran after Khomeni dies. "Shultz - It is ransom. But we have made more

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			good contacts in Iran than he was aware of. Should pursue. But must not gild lily. Some undesirable effects of these actions. We are paying a high price. "Afraid of technically correct statements that are not fully descriptive - could get us into trouble. "Cap - Q on reliability of Rafsanjani. His statements blew us out of water in one way. "Ans - we are not relying on him as being 'our man'. But our CIA experts have been participating, [redacted.] It is clear they are trying to find a way out. "Bill - All of people are convinced these are best to work with - but don't go all out to rely on Raf - We are feeling him out. "Bill - We have a good public position if we put it out in a simple way. "He read a prepared statement putting emphasis on long range relationships with Iran reason for contacts[;] deemphasize hostage[;] deny arms sales that tip balance balance Iran/Iraq. "Pres - We should put out statement[;] show we do want to get hostages back, but Iranian contacts were for long range, won't deal with terrorists, nor ransom "But cannot get into q + a re hostages so as not to endanger them "Shultz - Agree our responsibility to look after citizens[.] Don't deal with hostages so as not to expose others to kidnapping[.] Juxtaposition of hostages and arms shipments must not be shown[.] Don't know exact linkage.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Caution on over assertion that arms shipments were small and inconsequential. Can't keep others in line if we OK sale. Thinks Israeli suckered us into this so we can't complain of their sales. "Thinks statement should be issued, + is a good one. "Use Daniloff as an example of non linkage. "Meese - each of these is a set of complex incidents, not related[,] no ransom, no money to Hizballah trying to help moderates in Iran who also tried to help us." (JHICI Ex. DTR 41-A.)
86/11/10-037 NOVEMBER 10, 1986			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE REGAN NOTES, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Pres - We must say something but not much "John - If we go with this we end our Iranian contacts "DTR - Must get a statement out now, we are being attacked, and we are being hurt. Losing credibility "JP - No statement needed, news has peaked, no hearings until Jan, so should not say anything "Pres - Must say something because I'm being held out to dry. Have not dealt with terrorists, don't know who they are. This is long range Iranian policy. "No further speculation or answers so as not to endanger hostages. We won't pay any money, or give anything to terrorists.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"JP - Say less about what we are doing, more about what we are not doing "Cap - Be careful of Raf. + Israel + blackmail "What we say will be repudiated. "Ed - We are saying only what we did and know has happened. "No violation of laws + policy "VP - Is NY case a private or public endeavor to sell arms to Iran "Ans - probably private with gov't knowledge. "VP - Israel may try to squeeze us. "Shultz - Finding was not known to me from Jan to Nov - amazing "JP - came as result of meeting in Quarters in Jan. Everyone gave his opinion. Drawn up by NSC, CIA, DOJ thru John, Bill, + Ed + their lawyers. "Sent to Pres + signed in Jan. (DTR [illegible: found?] out last week in conv. w/ JP) "Geo - Asked question about what if they ask for more than what they have received. "JP - Cannot tie hands that way. "DTR - Should answer Geo's question later in week. "Geo - No debriefing - what to say "Pres - Support Pres' policy but say nothing else due to danger to hostage "Geo - Support Iran long range policy of contact "Know [sic] support for weapons for hostages "Pres - Side with mil superiority will win. We want to have things even. This helps Iran

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			which was weaker. "Geo - Keep things in these channels that are more or less official + keep secret "DTR - Let[']s face it - we kept secret. Iranians released info. "All - Try to get statement to face as many facts as possible. "adjourned 1:05 P.M." (JHICI Ex. DTR 41-A.)
86/11/10-040 NOVEMBER 10, 1986			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE WEINBERGER NOTES, Part 1: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD "SUBJECT: Meeting on November 10, 1986, with the President, Vice President, Secretary Shultz, DCI Casey, Attorney General Meese, Don Regan, Admiral Poindexter, and Al Keel, in the Oval Office "[Redacted.] The President said we did not do any trading with the enemy for our hostages. We do need to note that [redacted] (Khomeni) will be gone someday, and we want better leverage with the new government and with their military. That is why we felt it necessary to give them some small defensive weapons. "We can discuss that publicly, but no way could we ever disclose it all without getting our hostages executed. (We must make it plain that we are not doing business with terrorists. We aren't paying them or dealing with them.) We are trying to get better relations with Iran, and we can't discuss the details of this publicly without endangering the people we are working through and

with in Iran. I pointed out we must bear in mind we have given the Israelis and the Iranians the opportunity to blackmail us by reporting selectively bits and pieces of the total story. I also pointed out that Congress could [--] and probably would -- hold legislative hearings. Admiral Poindexter pointed out that we do want a better relationship with Iran.

"In Jan 1986, the President apparently made a formal finding under Section 501 of the Arms Export Control Act which directes [sic] the DCI not to notify Congress until further notice, and authorizes discussion with friendly groups which are trying to get a better government in Iran. I had not know[]n of this finding before [handwritten: "Nov [illegible] 1986 [illegible]"] -- Shultz said he had not known of it either. We needed to help those elements to get a more pro-U.S. government in Iran. Poindexter continued that we assisted Israel initially because we found Israel was sending arms to Iran [redacted] and also wanted the Iran-Iraq war to end as soon as possible. Admiral Poindexter said that McFarlane went to Iran in May 1986, and that was the only trip he made, and then we started working through [redacted] of Rasfanjani. Previously we had used an Israeli agent called Gorbanifar [sic]. We also used many channels to try to get the hostages back. [Redacted] others proved no good because the Iranians always insisted that the Da[wa] - prisoners held by Kuwait be released. We finally did authorize the release of 500 TOWS sold by Israel to Iran, and another 500 were sent last

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			week. This was all arranged as a result of a meeting with Rasfanjani's [redacted] came here to show that he was a legitimate representative of the government. Poindexter reported there were several meetings in Europe and elsewhere. "I reminded John that he had always told me that there would be no more weapons sent to Iran, after the first 500 TOWS, until AFTER ALL of the hostages were returned, but unfortunately we did send a second 500 because it 'seemed the only way to get the hostages out', according to Poindexter. "Poindexter pointed out the hostage taking had stopped for a year. I pointed out that they took three more quite recently. Poindexter pointed out that this was not done by the same people or Iranians." (JHICI Ex. CWW 28 [= EM 18; emphasis in original].)
86/11/10-041 NOVEMBER 10, 1986			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE WEINBERGER NOTES, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "[Redacted] publicized Rasfanjani's contacts with the U.S. Rasfanjani then felt he had to speak out against the U.S. and the McFarlane trip. Because of the obvious errors in Rasfanjani's speech, Poindexter thinks he is sending a message that he 'wants to work with us.' Colonel North thinks we can get two more hostages out by the weekend. I don't. (We didn't.) We have told all our friends in the Mid-East, and according to Poindexter they agree, they would like a negotiated settlement and the war to end.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			[Redacted.] "The President said this is what you had to do to reward Iran for the efforts of those who could help. Actually the captors do not benefit at all. We buy the support and the opportunity to persuade the Iranians. "I again pointed out we will have to answer many questions and have Congressional hearings. The President said we need to point out any discussion endangers our source in Iran and our plan, because we do want to get additional hostages released. Mr. Shultz spoke up for the first time, saying that it is the responsibility of the government to look after its citizens, but once you do deal for hostages, you expose everyone to future capture. He said we don't know, but we have to assume the captors will get someone. He said he felt the Israelis sucked us up into their operation so we could not object to their sales to Iran. He pointed out there will be a lot of questions after any statement, even after a statement such as Mr. Casey proposed to read. The President said we should release the statement, but not take any questions. Mr. Regan said we are being hung out to dry, our credibility is at stake, and we have to say enough. Shortly thereafter the meeting adjourned on the note that revised drafts of the Casey proposed statement will be sent to us." (JHICI Ex. CWW 28 [= EM 18].)
86/11/10-045 NOVEMBER 10,			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE KEEL ACCOUNT:

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986			Alton Keel, Poindexter's Deputy, records by hand 9 pages of notes of the November 10, 1986 meeting. (JHICI Ex. EM 19 [= DTR 41, EM 19].)
86/11/10-070 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE DoS CHRONOLOGY: "POINDEXTER tells GPS that while GHORBANIFAR channel shut down, new channel is open. GPS says 'we should shut it all down.' "Meeting at the White House among PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, POINDEXTER, REGAN, KEEL, CASEY, WEINBERGER, MEESE, SHULTZ. POINDEXTER briefs group on operation, mentions January 1986 Finding. GPS says this is the first he had heard says of it; WEINBERGER says the same. POINDEXTER says a total of 1000 TOWs and 240 Hawk spare parts were sold to Iran. GPS criticizes the operation, says it sounds like arms for hostages. PRESIDENT disagrees. POINDEXTER says, 'How else will we get hostages out?' GPS argues that operation should be shut down. "Later in the day, en route to Guatemala for OAS meeting, GPS receives draft press guidance from White House describing as unanimous the current and past support for the Iran arms shipments by the PRESIDENT'S senior advisers. GPS tells POINDEXTER to delete the claim of unanimity, since not accurate. GPS supports the PRESIDENT, but not the shipments. POINDEXTER agrees to the deletion. "GPS tells HILL that he (GPS) must tell the PRESIDENT that his advisers are distorting the

record."
(JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/12-050.)

86/11/10-073
NOVEMBER 10,
1986
(MONDAY)

MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE
SHULTZ ACCOUNT:

"Mr. BELNICK. Let's move then to the meeting on November 10, 1986, at the White House, which you attended with the President; the Vice President; Admiral Poindexter; Don Regan; Mr. Keel, who was Admiral Poindexter's Deputy; Director Casey; Secretary Weinberger and the Attorney General. And at [Ex. GPS] 39, Mr. Secretary, is a set of Mr. [Keel's] notes of that meeting which we have previously made available to you and, if I am correct, you think is a fair summary of what transpired at the meeting.

"Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. And it is reasonably consistent with the notes that I gave to my Executive Assistant.

"Mr. BELNICK. And if I may for the sake of time summarize what we understand from you in those notes: Admiral Poindexter gave a briefing concerning the operation with the President present, as I said, and he informed all of you at that time that a total of 1,000 TOWs and 240 Hawk spare parts were sold to Iran and also told you that this whole operation, as you said before, had started when an Israeli arms warehouse was located in Europe. That comports with your recollection?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Yes.

"Shortly thereafter at another briefing he

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			said there were 2,000 TOWs, so I was very uneasy about these briefings. "Mr. BELNICK. And at this first briefing on November 10, as you listened, notes indicate that you criticized the entire operation saying that it sounded like Hawks for hostages no matter what face was put on it, is that correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct. "Mr. BELNICK. But the President said that he disagreed with that view at that time. "Secretary SHULTZ. The President's view, as I have heard him express it, and I believe that he felt very clearly, was that this was basically about an initiative toward Iran and that as an aspect of it, we would get our hostages back and that a small sale of arms to Iran as a token of good intentions might or might not be part of that package, but he had no objection if it were. That is the way his mind was arranged on this, and I have heard him talk about it, and I am sure that is what he does believe. "Mr. BELNICK. Later in the day, after the meeting-- "Secretary SHULTZ. And I think it's perfectly possible to see it exactly that way. The only trouble is, as you look at particular things that happen when you get down into the dirt of the operational details, it always comes out arms for hostages and, at least as I saw it right from the beginning, that was what was going to happen, and that's why I objected to it so much." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 99-101; JHICI Ex. GPS 39 [Keel's handwritten notes of 11/10/86

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			meeting].)
86/11/10-080 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. Now, I take it then during the week of the third of November 1986 some newspaper reports appeared making reference to this initiative. "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And I think that the record reflects that initially the President indicated publicly that these were without foundation, or words to that effect, but the articles continued, and there was a meeting of various members of the National Security Council on the 10th of November 1986. Do you have a recollection of that meeting? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall statements by the President that you have characterized, but I do recall the meeting on the 10th of November, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Was one of the topics of that meeting the question of what the press ought to be told about the initiative? "Attorney General MEESE. Let me first state, Mr. Nields, that the meeting on the 10th of November I believe you characterized as the National Security Council meeting. "Mr. NIELDS. I think you said various members of the National Security Council were present. Was it a National Security Council meeting? "Attorney General MEESE. It was not. That is the point I wanted to make. It was a meeting in which a few members of the National Security

Council were gathered in the President's office, in the Oval Office, I believe, rather than where the National Security Council or National Security Planning Group would normally meet, which is the Cabinet room or the Situation room.

"At that meeting, and if I may, I will refer--I believe you have an exhibit that has some notes of mine on the 10th of November. If I may look at the--

"Mr. NIELDS. I think you are referring to Exhibit Number [EM] 17.

"Attorney General MEESE. Okay.

"Mr. NIELDS. We would appreciate if you would, for the time being, use that solely for purposes of recollection refreshing.

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I am now referring to Exhibit 17, which characterized, interestingly enough, I have characterized it as a National Security meeting, not a National Security Council meeting, I think that may have a significance I mentioned to you, in the Oval Office on the 10th of August [sic] at 11:30. I am looking now at my notes to refresh my recollection.

"I see a note I took that says 'Washington, D.C., too much talk', which may have to do with press accounts, and I see here my notes that say 'Lives of those with whom we deal, for example, in Iran could be jeopardized', which I am sure was at least possibly in reference to how they should be handled with the news media. I don't have any other notes, but I am sure that at least a part of that meeting was involved with how this should be handled with the press.

"Mr. NIELDS. What was the President's position on that subject at that meeting?

"Attorney General MEESE. I think his position, as best I can recall, was that we should be very careful in statements to the press for a variety of reasons. He was concerned about the hostages who were still in Lebanon, he was concerned about the elements in Iran because at that time I believe there was some discussion that at least the communcation with those elements could perhaps continue.

". . . I also have a note on my--a notation here on the second page of my note that says 'North, two more hostages by this weekend', which leads me to believe there was still hope we would get hostages out even in the course of this revelation.

"So I believe the principal concern that the President had in regard to the way in which this was treated by the news media was to do nothing that would endanger either the hostages or the people in Iran."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 37-41; JHICI Ex. EM 17 [Meese notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)

86/11/10-081
NOVEMBER 10,
1986
(MONDAY)

MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE
MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. There is another set of notes that relates to this meeting, which is Exhibit [EM] 19, they are Mr. Keel's notes. On page 7 of them, the President--it is attributed to the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			President. We don't talk TOWs, don't talk specifics. Is that consistent with your recollection of the position that the President took at the meeting? "Attorney General MEESE. I will assume it's here. I can't find it. As a matter of fact, I hardly read it. But in any event, I don't have any recollection one way or the other whether he said that specifically. I do know that the more details that were given, such as TOWs, the more danger there would have been to the people in Iran and presumably to the hostages as well, so that would not be inconsistent with what I recall as the general tenor of the meeting. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you recall any other contrary views being expressed? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I do not. As a matter of fact, I think that was the general sentiment of most of the people there. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. I take it at that time you were aware that there had been a Presidential finding signed on the 17th of January? "Attorney General MEESE. I am not sure that I knew it had been signed. I knew it had been prepared, because I had been part of the preparation on the 16th. And so I assumed it had been signed, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it, based on your familiarity with the prior opinion of Attorney General Smith, and from having read the statute, you felt comfortable that the transactions that had been done pursuant to that finding were

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			appropriate? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Mr. NIELDS. Were you at that point in time aware that there had been these earlier Israeli transactions which had occurred prior to the time of any finding? "Attorney General MEESE. I am not sure that I was aware on the 10th. I would have to look back at my notes, which are Exhibit [EM] 17. And I don't remember whether we were told on that day as to what the time sequence was, or whether this was in 1985 or 1986 or whether we were told at all. I do know that, my notes show that Admiral Poindexter talked about our--well, the meeting started with the President saying there was no bargaining or trading for hostages, and he said we would not trade anything in return for hostages. "Admiral Poindexter said it had to do with our long-term strategy in regard to Iran and listed the objectives, which I have already referred to, and then talked about the 17th of January, 1986 finding--so the finding was actually referred to in the meeting on the 10th--and then talked about Israelis, talked about a warehouse . . . [in another country], talked about a McFarlane trip to Tehran in May of '86, and talked about the arms transactions including the number of arms that had been shipped and the different shipments. "It is interesting to note that at that time he talked about 1,000 TOW missiles. Later on, in subsequent meetings, it was learned that that number was too low, that it was erroneous, it was twice that number, it was over 2,000 TOW missiles

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			and so on. So I don't know here whether in fact anything was mentioned specifically about 1985 in that meeting. "I did ultimately learn that there were transactions that took place between the Israelis and Iran in 1985. But whether I knew them on the 10th, I am not sure." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 41-44. See JHICI Exx. EM 17 [Meese notes of 11/10/86 meeting], EM 19 [Keel notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-082 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. While we are on that meeting on the 10th, you might want to refer to Exhibit Number [EM] 19, the second page, those are Mr. Keel's notes. . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Up near the top of the page there is a little 1 with a circle around it. And opposite that, it says 'First 500 TOWs went', and it looks like 'without permission. We found out eventually. Reimburse Israel.' And then it says 'Ed, we didn't sell', and in parentheses 'Israel sold', and it looks like 'was multi-phased transaction.' "Attorney General MEESE. Right. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, first of all, do you have any recollection of that interchange? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I don't have any recollection of it. I don't know whether that was a question I asked or a statement I made. "Mr. NIELDS. But it would appear from the

notes that the subject of the earlier Israeli transaction came up and you either knew something about it or were asking a question about it.

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, I don't know that I knew anything about it. I do know that even--whether this was an earlier transaction or a later transaction, because it was originally described in our meeting on the 7th of January we would--this multi-phased transaction was the suggestion of the israelis.

"That is what had been explained to us initially, even for the 1986 transactions, and I am not sure that I knew which of the three alternatives had ultimately been adopted by the President because I had never seen that memorandum that Admiral Poindexter sent to the President, which you described earlier as--I believe it is Exhibit--

"Mr. NIELDS. [EM] 9.

"Attorney General MEESE. --Exhibit 9, which is the memorandum dated the 17th of January. So I may have had in mind, when I asked that question, the original plan of the Israelis, because it said in these notes here, it says at the top of the page, Bud went in May 1986, the only trip. And then after that it says sold 1,000 TOWs and sold 240 types of Hawks.

"So I don't know whether we were told actually any of this had taken place in 1985 at that point in the meeting.

"Mr. NIELDS. In any event, I take it sometime within a matter of days after the 10th of November you became aware there had been these pre-finding

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			shipments by the Israelis? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. I believe Mr. Cooper actually told me that, that he had learned that from Commander Thompson. "I may have learned that from other sources, as well." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 44-47. See JHICI Exx. EM 9 [cover memo for the 1/17/86 Finding, from Poindexter to the President], EM 16 [Meese notes of 11/10/86 meeting], EM 19 [Keel notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-085 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Turning now to the meeting on November 10, 1986 that you testified about this morning and of which you have notes and we have notes by Ambassador Keel, my distinct impression of those notes is that Admiral Poindexter made a presentation at that meeting that sort of recapped the history of the Iran initiative for the benefit of the participants; is that a fair description of what happened? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. That is my recollection of the meeting also. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Based on your recollection, would it be fair to say that Admiral Poindexter glossed over the details of the initiative up to that point? That is, if you look at the notes themselves, you can see that he introduces the January 1986 finding and only then begins to talk about any of the details of the shipments. "Attorney General MEESE. That is my best

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			recollection and that is what is indicated on the notes that I took on that occasion. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. I take it that really in that context on November 10th the basic position that the President was taking was that he was still very concerned about the lives of the hostages, still thought it was a possibility that discussions with the Iranians could continue, and that therefore he did not want there to be any specific comment about the details of the initiative in any event. "That was basically the position he wanted to take; is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. So that from the point of view of the participants in the meeting, they didn't need a detailed blow-by-blow as to the precise initiative at that point; is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. I think that is probably correct in one sense. On the other hand, there was a considerable amount of information given, including the quantities of the missiles and so on, but as you point out, it was all presented in the context or at least in the way it was narrated as related to or following the 17th of January 1986 finding." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 184-85; JHICI Exx. EM 17 [Meese notes of 11/10/86 meeting], EM 19 [Keel notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-100 NOVEMBER 10, 1986			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE REGAN ACCOUNT: Regan advocates "going public" with

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			information on the Iran Initiative. In his view, "[t]he cover is blown here. We have got to go public with it . . . to tell the American public exactly what went on . . . ." Poindexter disagrees with Regan's view, and following Jacobsen's passionate plea to the public to stop talking about it, the President sides with keeping information quiet. The situation is then discussed at a meeting on November 10. "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . And at this meeting, Admiral Poindexter, toward the beginning, gave [a] general history of this operation for the assemblage, is that right? "Mr. REGAN. That is right. "Mr. SMILJANICH. And in this presentation to the group, he said that a total of 1,000 TOW missiles had been shipped to Iran, which included the original Israeli shipment which the United States would have to replenish, is that correct? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, that was incorrect information, wasn't it? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. The Attorney General stated at that meeting that the Israelis had sold these TOW missiles to Iran instead of the United States. Now, that was incorrect, wasn't it? "Mr. REGAN. Again, I am not a lawyer, so I don't want to be too strong on these points, but in point of fact the Israelis did sell because the money went from Iran to the Israelis to our bank accounts. So technically speaking, I think that is correct.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. SMILJANICH. Where did you receive this information about the money flow in connection with these missiles for the February TOWs, for the May Hawk parts and for the October, 1986 TOW missiles? "Mr. REGAN. From the hearings of these Select Committees. "Mr. SMILJANICH. The presentation by Admiral Poindexter-- "Mr. REGAN. Incidentally, it's ironic that they would have had all of th[ese] machinations about foreign finance and the one guy in the White House who knew a little about foreign finance was never consulted. "Mr. SMILJANICH. The presentation by Admiral Poindexter also included the fact[] this whole operation or initiative had started when someone had stumbled across Israeli shipments coming out of a warehouse in a European country, is that correct? "Mr. REGAN. That is correct. "Mr. SMILJANICH. That is not how the operation started, is it? "Mr. REGAN. No. "Mr. SMILJANICH. It was also said in that meeting that Lieutenant Colonel North still had a chance of getting two hostages released, is that right? "Mr. REGAN. That is right. "Mr. SMILJANICH. All right. So even with the revelations that had reached the press to that date, it was your understanding that this hadn't affected our relations with our contacts in Iran

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			and the possibility of moving forward with this? "Mr. REGAN. No, that was explained at that meeting that these contacts wanted to continue discussions. "Mr. SMILJANICH. What was . . . the outcome of that November 10 meeting? "Mr. REGAN. It was really not a clear-cut decision. It was left that we would continue our efforts to get these hostages out, but the President said that he had to have some type of statement, we were going to have to brief the Congress, and we had to know just how much in the way of facts that we could release without endangering these hostages. There was to be another meeting, I think it was two days later, with leaders of Congress to fill them in on all of the--as much as we could, because at that point it was rampant speculation in the press. "So I was urging at that point that either the President go on TV or that he hold a press conference and go through the whole thing, but that was ruled out as, well, if you get into a press conference you are going to blow the whole thing, so you had better not do that, and how about a sanitized TV speech? Well, perhaps we can explain it to the nation, but it was left as really no firm decision came out of the meeting." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 54-59. See JHICI Exx. DTR 41 [Keel notes of 11/10/86 meeting], 41-A [Regan notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-110 NOVEMBER 10,			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE REGAN ACCOUNT:

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986 (MONDAY)			"Mr. RODINO. A while ago, . . . you were referred to Exhibit [DTR] 41-A [see 86/11/10-035 through -037], which is a copy of your notes of the November 10 meeting, and . . . we get clear there that you are trying to suggest that there be a statement, that it be brought out quickly and that the reason you are suggesting that is that we're losing credibility. ". . . Then there is, as you will read, John Poindexter, I believe, is saying, 'Say less about what we are doing, more about what we are not doing' and then turning to page 12, it says, 'Cap' --I guess that is Secretary Weinberger-- 'be careful of Raf. and Israel and blackmail. What we say will be repudiated,' and then there is a notation, 'Ed.' And this is what I would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary: Ed is, according to your notes, saying, 'We are saying only what we did and know has happened, no violations of laws and policy.' "Now, this, Mr. Secretary [sic], is 11 days before the Attorney General was given his charge to conduct a fact finding and it was nine days before he ever saw a chronology according to his own testimony. What I'm confused about is, . . . on what basis could the Attorney General have concluded no violations of laws and policy? "Mr. REGAN. Well, quite obviously, I can't tell you what was in the mind of the Attorney General and on what basis he said that, because I have not discussed that with him, nor did I at the time that he said that. I assume that what he meant was that as far as he knew, as of that

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			moment on November 10, there had been no violations of law and policy. That is from what he had been told by, up to that point, by the National Security Adviser or had read in whatever publications any of this news had appeared. "Mr. RODINO. Wouldn't it seem to be, though, a prejuding of the facts that he was going to look into and then have to go before the American people? "Mr. REGAN. Well, again, you got to refer that back to what Cap Weinberger has been saying in the notes here, 'What we say will be repudiated,' and he is saying, Look, all we're saying is what we did, what we know has happened. Now, if he didn't know of the fund diversion, if he didn't know, and I don't believe he did, I think he so testified, at that time on November 10, that there had been a Hawk shipment known to the President on November 25 of the previous year, then he was speaking only from what his knowledge was as of that moment." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 230-32; JHICI Ex. DTR 41-A [Regan notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-115 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. NUNN. . . . I refer you to your notes of the November 10 meeting . . . Exhibit [DTR 41-A; see 86/11/10-035 through -037] . . . . "Mr. NUNN. Sir, if you could look down at the bottom of the page, 'pres' is the President, is that right? "Mr. REGAN. That is correct.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. NUNN. Could you just walk us through those last three or four entries down there telling us what you mean by those notes, where it says 'George and the President', 'George and the President'? "Mr. REGAN. George, referring to Secretary Shultz, is talking here about how do we handle the matter from a public point of view, and what the President is saying, that what he should say in public is that he supports the present policy, all of us should say that. "Policy, quite obviously, as I explained yesterday, w[as] the four points: one, contact with Iran because of its geographical and geopolitical importance; two, the question of making certain that it was neutral if not anti-Soviet; three, that--to get the Iranians to use their good graces to reduce terrorism; and four, to see what they could do, if anything, about contacting the kidnappers to get our hostages back. "That was the President's policy. But he said--notice the President says 'say nothing else because there is danger to the hostages', in other words, don't get on and speculate, stick to that. "Mr. NUNN. That takes us to the next sentence, and I am interested in the next few sentences if you could tell us what George said and what the President said there and what they meant by that. If you could perhaps read those last couple of entries. "Mr. REGAN. There is a misspelling here. I think that is what has happened. I am not such a

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			great note-taker. "George says, 'I will support and have always supported the Iranian long-range policy of contact with Iran.' "And then he says, 'I have never supported, there is no support--' --I spelt 'no' k-n-o-w; I should have spelt it n-o-- '--no support for weapons for hostages.' "That is Shultz explaining defending or restating what was well-known to us, he did not support that policy. "Mr. NUNN. So that is entirely consistent with his other statements. "Mr. REGAN. That is correct." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 32-33; JHICI Ex. 41-A [Regan notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-116 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF U.S. POLICY ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 1: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NUNN. How about that last entry there, is that the President? [See 86/11/10-037.] "Mr. REGAN. The President again. "MR. NUNN. Could you just read that and tell us what it means. "Mr. REGAN. 'The side with military superiority will win. We want to have things even. This helps Iran which was the weaker of the two sides.' "In other words, in the Iran-Iraq war, our policy was and, as far as I know, still is that that war should end in a stalemate, neither side

being the winner, try to get it to a halt. But if one side has military superiority over the other side, obviously it is going to win.

"Mr. NUNN. Well, my problem with that is that the wrong side was the one the President used there. That was not the position of our Government. Our Government's position, and I went over this with Secretary Shultz, was that the Iraqi side was deteriorating and that the Iranian side had the long-range advantage, and this is November the 10th, this is just four or five months ago, or at least six or seven months ago, and this is November 10, 1986, where you have the President of the United States saying that he believes the Iranian side is losing. Is that right?

"Mr. REGAN. That is correct.

"Mr. NUNN. Did anybody correct him in that meeting?

"Mr. REGAN. No. Because Shultz immediately picked up that he wanted things kept in channels, that is, the State Department should be running the Iran endeavor, and it shouldn't be run out of the NSC.

"Mr. NUNN. We had Secretary Weinberger at that meeting; is that right?

"Mr. REGAN. I believe so.

"Mr. NUNN. Secretary Shultz was at that meeting?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes, he was.

"Mr. NUNN. You had the Vice President at that meeting.

"Mr. REGAN. He was.

DATE GENERAL CONTRAS IRAN

"Mr. NUNN. Director Casey at that meeting?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. NUNN. I believe you were at that meeting?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. NUNN. Of course, these were your notes, obviously. Admiral Poindexter was at that meeting?

". . . And here you have the President of the United States giving what is essentially erroneous policy in a policy statement, it wasn't a small detail, it was a question of who our Government believed was winning that war. And he was stating what the Secretary of State has testified before this committee was not the policy of the United States and what we have classified reports from the whole community, including intelligence, including defense, including State saying exactly the opposite of this, and the President makes this statement which is obviously fundamentally conflicting with the policy of our--supposed policy of our Government and nobody corrects him; is that what happened?

"Mr. REGAN. As far as I know. My notes don't reflect anyone having corrected him.

"If, indeed, that was the fact. I don't know that that was the fact."

(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 33-36; JHICI Ex. DTR 41-A [Regan notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)

86/11/10-117
NOVEMBER 10,
1986

THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF U.S. POLICY ON
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 2:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(MONDAY)			[Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NUNN. Well, if I am correct, the policy of the United States Government then was that the Iraqis had the long-term problem and that their position was deteriorating, don't you find it alarming that the President could be under a total misinterpretation of what the U.S. Government believed about that war? "Mr. REGAN. Well, there is a lot of this that is classified information . . . . "Mr. NUNN. Were you under the impression that the Iranians were deteriorating and losing the war? "Mr. REGAN. I have a problem here, Mr. Chairman. This is very sensitive, classified material that we are discussing here in public. "Mr. NUNN. . . . I have checked with the State Department very carefully on this and I know exactly what is classified and I know what is not. "I won't push Mr. Regan on this, but it is not classified that the United States Government position at that time was that we felt the Iraqi position was deteriorating. That is not classified. "I found this very, very disturbing, that we could have this kind of fundamental misunderstanding by the President on an issue this key and obviously very much in his mind, and obviously very much of the policy. I just suggest to you, Mr. Regan, that was November 10, 1986, and four or five months later we were basically agreeing to flag Kuwaiti vessels, which is a tilt towards Iraq and here the President is on November

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			10, 1986, saying we had to help the Iranians because the sides weren't even. "Mr. REGAN. I was trying to keep things even-handed, Senator. We can't help one side or the other. If we give help to one, we have to give help to the other. "Mr. NUNN. Flagging vessels, shipping arms, is that a balanced foreign policy? "Mr. REGAN. As I explained to you, we want neither side to win, you can't help just one side. "Mr. NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 36-37.)
86/11/10-120 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCCLURE. Let me refer you to . . . page 10 of Exhibit [DTR 41-A] which is I think your notes of the meeting on November 10. . . . I read from your notes on that page, and this is referring to what Secretary Shultz said at that meeting: 'Thinks Israelis suckered us into this, so we can't complain of their sales.' [See 86/11/10-036.] Do you remember that conversation? "Mr. REGAN. Yes, I do. "Mr. MCCLURE. What was it he said? Is that all of what he said? "Mr. REGAN. That is my interpretation. I don't think the Secretary actually used those words, but I at times talk and take notes in the vernacular. His point was that since the Israelis were so close to us in this deal and they, in point of fact, were already shipping arms to Iran,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			we could not consistently agree in private with them to be a participant in that and then publicly condemn any arms shipments they might be sending to Iran. "I don't think it is a Top Secret that the Israelis seem to, in one type of deal or another, to favor Iran over Iraq in that conflict. "Mr. MCCLURE. You were careful to say you were not sure those were his words, but I refer you back to Exhibit Number [DTR] 41, which is Al Keel's notes of the same meeting, and he uses precisely the same words. "Mr. REGAN. Then I think the Secretary must have said it if two of us recorded it that way. "Mr. MCCLURE. You are an accurate reporter? "Mr. REGAN. Better than I thought." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 21-22; JHICI Exx. DTR 41 [Keel notes of 11/10/86 meeting], 41-A [Regan notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-190 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)		WHETHER DIVERSION WAS DISCUSSED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. FOLEY. On November 10, 1986, during and after the NSPG meeting, did you discuss the diversion issue with anyone? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Which meeting? "Mr. FOLEY. After the November 10th meeting of the NSPG, November 10, 1986. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I don't remember the November 10th meeting, but I did not discuss the, what you call the diversion with Director Casey at any time." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI,7/21/87, at 146-47.)	WHETHER DIVERSION WAS DISCUSSED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/10-200 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE WEINBERGER ACCOUNT, Part 1: Secretary Weinberger testified on his memorandum for the record (Ex. CWW 28; see 86/11/10-040, -041) of the November 10, 1986 meeting called after the public exposure of the Iran Intiative: "Mr. EGGLESTON. . . . [In the memorandum] you have stated, 'I pointed out we must bear in mind we have given the Israelis and the Iranians the opportunity to blackmail us by reporting selectively bits and pieces of the total story. I also pointed out that Congress could and probably would hold legislative hearings.' "Do you recall the context in which you were discussing that? "Secretary WEINBERGER. This meeting was the first time at which there had been a general exposition and report by Admiral Poindexter of the whole nature of this transaction and series of transactions, and it was called, as you say, when there were beginning to be some reports coming out of the Middle East, and these were points that were made then at the meeting. "And the President made the point that even though there were these reports coming out, we should be very careful to bear in mind that we had been dealing with some people in Iran whom it was still hoped by people present at that meeting, but not by me, that would--with whom we could form a useful relationship. "And the President was very concerned about

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			the fact that these contacts that we had in Iran would probably be executed and that the hostages might very well be executed as a result of public discussion of this whole matter, and that I was making the point that we were having--we were in a situation in which it was a very unfortunate situation to be in, that had been predicted much earlier, and that we should get full discussion of that matter out in one way or another, and that it was probably, as I recall it, too late to worry about whether we were endangering the lives of the contacts in Iran. But the President was very worried about that. "He was also very properly worried about whether or not retaliatory action would be taken against the hostages themselves. "Mr. EGGLESTON. The sentence which I just read seems to echo what you have indicated you argued in December of '85. "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. I have a tendency to repeat myself, I'm afraid. "Mr. EGGLESTON. It echoes the blackmail concept? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Was it your argument that by this, indeed, you were seriously in danger of being blackmailed? "Secretary WEINBERGER. That's right, that various demands were being made on us and that in order to prevent publicity, there might be a temptation to agree to them, and that we shouldn't follow that course. "Mr. EGGLESTON. The fact, I take it, that the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Iranians or the Israelis or whoever could reveal which the United States would not want revealed is the fact that we had sold missiles in order to get the hostages back and whatever? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. "Mr. EGGLESTON. You felt that we would be blackmailed as a result of that? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 136-39; JHICI Ex. CWW 28 [Weinberger Memorandum for the Record, 11/10/86 meeting in the Oval Office].)
86/11/10-201 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE WEINBERGER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. EGGLESTON. Was it your advice, if you recall, to get the story out or to not get the story out? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I think the meeting was called to discuss a specific proposed statement that was to be issued, I don't remember whether by the White House or who[m] it was, but it was to be--it was a meeting that was called to discuss that statement, and before that could be discussed very intelligently, I think George Shultz and I both asked to have some kind of statement as to what had actually happened, and that was occasion for Admiral Poindexter giving this full rundown. "A lot of the discussion revolved around the proposed text of that statement, which I don't have, and I was making a lot of suggestions for changes in that statement. So that basically the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			decision to make a statement about it and to report it publicly had been made and I agreed with that, that there should be that. "I didn't agree with a lot of the things in the statement, and we were trying to get revisions in the statement. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Were you surprised at the recitation of facts? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, I was pretty horrified by it all. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Was Secretary Shultz similarly-- "Secretary WEINBERGER. He seemed to be, yes. He was particularly concerned, as I remember, that neither of us had known there was a finding until that time. "Mr. EGGLESTON. If you could turn to page 2 of this document [Ex. CWW 28], I want to direct your attention to the top full paragraph. It reads: 'I reminded John, Admiral Poindexter, that he had always told me that there would be no more weapons sent to Iran after the first 500 TOWs until after all of the hostages were returned, but unfortunately we did send the second 500 because it seemed the only way to get the hostages out, according to Poindexter.' "Did you have an exchange of words about this? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. This attempts to report correctly what happened, and I dictated it after I got back to the office. "Mr. EGGLESTON. So . . . I take it, though, you had known, because . . . you had owned, I guess, the missiles. You had known that these

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			series of missiles had been transferred without the release of the hostages? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, each time he reported that he was unable to keep that promise, each time that we talked with him before we sent another shipment, and that the direction to send them was still in effect. "Mr. EGGLESTON. The second paragraph indicates that he had told you that the hostage-taking had stopped and you responded to that. What was your response? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, he said there hadn't been any hostages for a year and I said they took three a couple of weeks ago, or quite recently. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Did he have an explanation for that? "Secretary WEINBERGER. He said, I believed different people had taken those three. I believe I said somewhat caustically that it didn't make too much difference who actually took them; the fact was the hostage-taking hadn't stopped." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 139-41; JHICI Ex. 28 [Weinberger Memorandum for the Record, 11/10/86 meeting in the Oval Office]. See Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 67-70 [the 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-205 NOVEMBER 10, 1986			PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF U.S. POLICY ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCCLURE. Several references have been made to the question of the report with respect to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			the deteriorating position in the war with Iraq, and I think in earlier testimony with Mr. Regan, there was reference made to a meeting in which the President made the remark that Iran was losing the war, or was about to lose the war. [See 86/11/10-037, ·116.] I have forgotten the exact quotation of the President in that meeting. And I believe it was represented that both you and Secretary Shultz were at that meeting, but neither of you undertook to correct the President's statement. Do you remember that? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't recall the President ever making a statement of that kind, Senator, no. "Mr. MCCLURE. You don't recall that? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No. "Mr. MCCLURE. If a meeting had come up in that timeframe and the President had made that remark, would you have undertaken to correct him? "Secretary WEINBERGER. It is pretty hypothetical, but I would certainly think so, because I think any statement of that kind would be very wide of the mark, as I understand the relative military situation between the two countries then." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 231-32. See id., 7/31/87, at 244-45; JHICI Exx. CWW 28 [Weinberger notes of 11/10/86 meeting], CWW 57 [Regan notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-206 NOVEMBER 10, 1986			PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF U.S. POLICY ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WEINBERGER ACCOUNT:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. RODINO. . . . Mr. Secretary, you testified you were seriously concerned that the President wasn't getting accurate information about the intelligence information being given to him concerning the Iran-Iraq war and about the balance of that conflict, and I recall, however, that at the November 10, 1986, meeting in the White House at which you were also present, and this meeting was called to discuss how to deal with the press in the event the story broke about selling arms to Iran, Don Regan's notes reflect that the President stated, and I quote, 'Side with military superiority will win. We want to have things even. This helps Iran, which was weaker.' "Was that statement correct at that time? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, Mr. Rodino, I made notes of the meeting after I got back as best I could recall it. I do not recall a discussion about that aspect of it at the meeting. "Don Regan frequently would be with the President before and stayed afterwards, and it is conceivable his notes may have reflected something of that kind, or it's perfectly conceivable it may have reflected something at the meeting which I didn't make notes on. I don't take shorthand and that may have been something that was said while I was making notes of a previous sentence. I don't recall that previous subject coming up. "Had it come up, I would have disputed it very strongly because I never felt Iran was losing the war, or weaker. Indeed, one of the points I made in the comment I made on the original suggestion of this back in June or July of '85 was that one

of the--that the thing seemed to me to be absurd for a number of reasons, but one was that it was based on some assumption that Iran was about to fall and that I thought this was absolute nonsense. It was totally contrary to all of the other information and intelligence I had with respect to the relative strength of the forces and so on, particularly given Iraq's obvious intentions.

"Iraq had said, and virtually has acted for a long time as though they do not want to win the war militarily. They have not used their air superiority, for example, in a way that would indicate that they planned to win the war. And so, they also have a much smaller population base, something like, oh, I don't know, 42 million to 11 million people, and the Iranians also use these children in their assault waves, 13, 14, 15-year-old children, and that gives them an enormous military advantage, and it's a ghastly way they operate, but that's the way they do things.

"And so from every point of view, there wasn't the slightest suggestion that I had ever heard that Iran was about to fall, and I'm quite sure that if I had heard that at that meeting, I would have contemplated it. That is not to say it didn't take place, but I don't have it in my notes, Don Regan does, and I'm sure, therefore, at some point, this point was made.

"Mr. RODINO. In other words, you're stating you don't recollect--

"Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. RODINO. --whether or not that was an issue at that time-- "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir. "Mr. RODINO. --the intelligence was accurate or not? "Secretary WEINBERGER. The only intelligence point[s] I had except the one report that was attached to the June '85 memorandum were the other way. It was stalemated. Basically the conclusion was it was stalemated, but there was never any slight suggestion that Iran would fall. "There are always a lot of people who thought the government was going to change in Iran and that would bring about a change. I don't see any slight possibility of that myself." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 8/3/87, at 38-41. See JHICI Exx. CWW 28 [Weinberger notes of 11/10/86 meeting], CWW 57 [Regan notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-209 DURING 1986			PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF U.S. POLICY ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WEINBERGER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NUNN. . . . [Y]ou have already gone into this a couple of times, but it still bothers me. "In your testimony on the opening day, you were asked by counsel: Question: 'Was it the view of the Department of Defense that Iran had a deteriorating position in the war with Iraq?' "Your answer: 'No, quite the contrary, it wasn't my position or anybody's opinion that I talked to.' [See 86/01/17-250.] "Do you recall that?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir. "Mr. NUNN. Now, on January 16, 1986, Admiral Poindexter sent the President a cover sheet with the finding and in that cover sheet he cited the Israeli position that Iran's military position was deteriorating. "You remember going into that? That was a prelude to the question I just quoted. "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. NUNN. . . . Admiral Poindexter testified, without trying to quote his exact words, but he testified that he had the opinion that the Israeli position was the correct position. [See 86/01/17-215.] "He also testified that Director Casey had that opinion. So Director Casey, according to Admiral Poindexter, and Admiral Poindexter, had an opinion that was exactly the opposite of your opinion. "Now, my understanding of every other agency in Government is that they shared your opinion. The intelligence community, the State Department, the Interagency Task Force, as of January of 1986, every other agency shared your opinion. "My question to you is: Did you talk to Admiral Poindexter or to Director Casey ever about this; and did you understand that you both had such diametrically opposed views? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, sir, I can't say that we did. I cannot to this moment recall Admiral Poindexter or Mr. Casey stating that as their own view, that that was the way that they

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			felt, Iran was in a deteriorating situation or anything of that kind. "I don't see how anyone could have felt that way. They may have been relating the Israeli intelligence view, but they also related the strong Israeli desire to participate in one way or the other in some of the activities that were--we are talking about here. "But I don't recall them ever stating in my hearing--and I obviously don't recall anybody else, because all of the briefings I had every day, every morning, the summaries, the various orders of battle, the correlation of forces, whatever you want to call them, always showed that there was a very large Iranian basic advantage not only because of their huge population base, but in every way except in the air. "The Iraqis had clear air superiority, but the Iranians have a degree of fanaticism and willingness to use these children and things of that kind that could give them a major, rather horrible ground advantage. "The situation was basically stalemated, but there wasn't the slightest suggestion of any offensive activity by the Iraqis or anything of the kind that I ever came across that would indicate anything of that sort. "That is why I was so caustic, if you like, in that comment about the proposed NSDD that came out in June of 1985. "Mr. NUNN. Well, I agree with you completely. Does it bother you that here the President of the United States signs a finding in January of 1986

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that is premised on information that is totally wrong as far as the assessment of the United States goes? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I didn't know about that finding. There are lots of things about that finding that bother me. That is certainly one of them, yes. "Mr. NUNN. Do you believe there were any other policies like that, not necessarily related to this, where the President was making a decision based on Admiral Poindexter's advice which was directly contrary to the opinion of the rest of the Government? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, I don't. I don't know of any other finding that was made or has been made. . . ." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 8/3/87, at 49-52. See JHICI Ex. CWW 20 [cover memo for the 1/17/86 Finding from Poindexter to the President].)
86/11/10-210 DURING 1986			PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF U.S. POLICY ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WEINBERGER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NUNN. . . . You say you don't recall the November 10, 1986 meeting where Don Regan's notes show that the President himself said that we want to have things even if this helps Iran which was weaker. [See 86/11/10-037, -116.] "You don't recall that? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, I don't. I was at that me[e]ting. I made notes of it. It does not appear in my set of notes. I don't have any

memory of that conversation or that subject being raised.

"Mr. NUNN. If you had heard that, would you have voiced your objection at that point?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. Oh, yes. If anything was directly contrary to what I believed, I would certainly have taken the point up. One is not shy about presenting views that seem to me would be in opposition to what I thought was something that was clearly wrong.

"Mr. NUNN. Mr. Secretary, did you ever give the President a net assessment as to the effect of these arms sales to Iran on the balance between Iran and Iraq or the balance in the region?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. We went into that on Friday [see 86/01/17-750 and 87/07/31-100]. Net assessment is a technical term, and I did not give a net assessment in the technical term which would require asking the net assessment people and waiting a year or so for their conclusions and so on.

"What I did, however, do was to emphasize the fact that these were obsolete weapons and--the TOWs, and that our stocks were perfectly sufficient and that none of this contravened or changed my basic feeling that we shouldn't be sending weapons.

"I think that there was a very minor short discussion of whether or not there was any--would be any effect on the military balance and my own feeling then, as far as I can remember now, is that that did not have any effect on the military balance."

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			(Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 8/3/87, at 52-54. See JHICI Exx. CWW 28 [Weinberger notes of 11/10/86 meeting], CWW 57 [Regan notes of 11/10/86 meeting].)
86/11/10-325 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			MEETING TO DISCUSS THE IRAN INITIATIVE: 1/17/86 FINDING MENTIONED SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [W]hen were you first informed that the President of the United States had signed a covert action finding authorizing the sale of U.S. arms to Iran? "Secretary SHULTZ. On November 10, 1986, at a meeting in the Oval Office with the President's principal adviser during a briefing by Admiral Poindexter on what had transpired over the past year or so." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 6.)
86/11/10-800 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY)			WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [Ex. GPS] 38-A[] is a draft press guidance that you received after the meeting on November 10 from Admiral Poindexter as you were en route to an OAS--Organization of American States--meeting in Guatemala. "And in that proposed press guidance the statement was made that as has been the case at a number of similar meetings with the President, referring to the meeting earlier that day, . . . with his senior advisers on this matter, there was unanimous support for the President's decision.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"You found that statement misleading, correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. That statement wasn't misleading; that statement was inaccurate. "Mr. BELNICK. And you told Admiral Poindexter to take it out? "Secretary SHULTZ. I got--this meeting that we talked about earlier was in the morning, I think, on November the 10th. "Mr. BELNICK. Yes, sir. "Secretary SHULTZ. And I was leading our delegation to an OAS meeting in Guatemala and left in the late afternoon sometime, and this proposed press statement was cabled to me on the plane. I got it on the plane and responded from the plane. "Mr. BELNICK. And your response essentially was to tell Admiral Poindexter, as you said, it was inaccurate, take it out, that you supported the President and that could be stated, but it could not be stated that there was unanimity on the decisions regarding the Iran initiative; is that a fair summary? "Secretary SHULTZ. That's correct. I think I said in the meeting itself, somebody said, well, we should all go out and say we support the President's decision as we have in the past, or something like that, and I said, no--in the meeting, said I support the President, you can say that any time you want, because I surely do support the President, but I didn't support that decision so don't--and this--it was part of the concern I had going back to the press guidance that I got when I was in Vienna, I guess is when I got that, that there's a tendency to put out

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			statements that are misleading and are false, and that's the way you get yourself in a jam, so don't do it; get the facts out and get them out accurately. "So that's what was in my mind here when I objected to this seemingly innocent press guidance. "Mr. BELNICK. And did Admiral Poindexter tell you that your objection was most unfortunate? "Secretary SHULTZ. I said--he said this had been cleared by everybody who w[as] at the meeting and they were coming to me and I said I won't clear it and it has to be changed, and he said that's very unfortunate. But they did change it. "I wasn't altogether comfortable with the way it was changed, but anyway it was changed." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 103-05; JHICI Exx. GPS 38-A [draft press statement, containing phrase "there was unanimous [word garbled] for the President's decisions"], GPS 38-B [final version of press statement, containing phrase "there was unanimous support for the President"].)
86/11/10-810 NOVEMBER 10, 1986 (MONDAY, 5:00 p.m.)			WHITE HOUSE PRESS STATEMENT ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION: "The President today met with his senior national security advisors regarding the status of the American hostages in Lebanon. The meeting was prompted by the President's concern for the safety of the remaining hostages and his fear that the spate of speculative stories which have arisen since the release of David Jacobsen may put them and others at risk.

"During the meeting, the President reviewed on-going efforts to achieve the release of all the hostages, as well as our other broad policy concerns in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. As has been the case in similar meetings with the President and his senior advisors on this matter, there was unanimous support for the President. While specific decisions discussed at the meeting cannot be divulged, the President did ask it be reemphasized that no U.S. laws have been or will be violated and that our policy of not making concessions to terrorists remains intact.

"At the conclusion of the meeting, the Pre[si]dent made it clear to all that he appreciated their support and efforts to gain the safe release of all the hostages. Stressing the fact that hostage lives are at stake, the President asked his advisors to ensure that their departments refrain from making comments or speculating about these matters."
(JHICI Ex. GPS 38-B [press statement, final version].)

86/11/11-100
NOVEMBER
11-12, 1986
(TUESDAY -
WEDNESDAY)

GREGG AND WATSON CONTACT WITH RODRIGUEZ AND BUSTILLO

GREGG CHRONOLOGY:

The final entry in the chronology prepared by Donald Gregg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President, describes contact in November 1986 of Felix Rodriguez and Gen. Bustillo, commander of the Air Force of El Salvador, with Gregg and his deputy, Col. Samuel Watson:

"On November 11-12, 1986, Mr. Rodriguez was

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		again in Washington, this time accompanying General Bustillo. They had dinner on November 11 with Colonel Watson and on November 12 met with Mr. Gregg. At that time, General Bustillo made it clear that he would welcome Mr. Rodriguez' return to El Salvador to continue his assistance in the counterinsurgency operation." (Gregg Dep. Ex. 1 [for start of Gregg chronology, see 83/11/03-100; for preceding entry in chronology, see 86/11/07-050]. For later contact between Gregg and Rodriguez, see entries starting at 86/12/15-100.)	
86/11/11-300 NOVEMBER 11, 1986 (TUESDAY)	-		NORTH'S PROPOSED MESSAGE FOR RAFSANJANI NORTH KL-43: On November 11, 1986, Hakim asks North to "create something for Rafsanjani to say." North drafts a statement which he sends Hakim by KL-43 computer to be transmitted to the Engine (on the Engine's identity, see Iran-Contra Report, at 254; see also 86/01/11-180). North adds instructions that the statement be issued "from Iran." He says it will "help with the Kuwaiti situation on which we are now working." In North's proposed statement, Iran proclaims "the enduring reality of its Islamic Revolution," its interest in peace, and "His Holiness the Imam['s] . . . gracious[] command[] that acts of terrorism are not acceptable to advance the aims of the Islamic Revolution." North asks that the Engine "carry this message for me as a personal favor for the cause we both believe in . . . ." (North notebook entry, 11/11/86 [Committee

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Document Q 2618]; North KL-43 to Hakim, 11/86 [Committee Document N 8090]; Iran-Contra Report, at 262.)
86/11/12-000 SOMETIME BEFORE THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 17, 1986			PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ON IRAN: SECORD'S ATTEMPT AT INPUT SECORD ACCOUNT: "Before the Presidential speech, I [sc. Secord] took the position that the President should make a firm speech which clearly laid out what the objectives were and some of the operational details, and to make no bones about it that it was his operation, that he was responsible for it, had directed it, endorsed it, tried, we failed and were going to try again. . . . I was so concerned about it that I actually drafted a speech -- maybe a bit presumptuous of me -- and I sent it to Admiral Poindexter through Colonel North on the [KL-43]. The line was thought to be too hard, however." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 106-07.)
86/11/12-050 NOVEMBER 12, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)			PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ON IRAN: SHULTZ' SUGGESTIONS DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS urges REGAN to assist him in persuading the PRESIDENT to turn Iran policy over to State and end arms sales to Iran. GPS gives REGAN draft statements for PRESIDENT's use announcing end of arms sales." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/14-100.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/12-100 NOVEMBER 12, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)			DoJ ACTIVITY COOPER ACCOUNT: Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper meets with Poindexter and NSC counsel Thompson at Poindexter's office. The DoJ, at this point, is to begin examining the legality of the arms sales to Iran. Cooper sees the original of the January 17, 1986 Finding and cover memo. Cooper asks for the details of the Iranian operation. Thompson says he does not know them, but will provide Cooper with a copy of an NSC chronology then in preparation. On the evening of November 13 or 14, Meese receives a paper on the legality of the Iranian arms initiative prepared by Cooper and John McGinnis. (Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87, at 9-23.)
86/11/12-200 NOVEMBER 12 OR 13, 1986 (WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY)			BRIEFING OF CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. CHENEY. . . . What I would like to do, if I might, is ask you to hark back to a meeting last November, shortly after all of these events began to unfold. "My recollection is that the election was on November 4th, that about the 4th or 5th of November was the first disclosure in the press in Lebanon alleging that the U.S. was involved in selling arms to the Ayatollah; is that your recollection?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. POINDEXTER. I believe that's correct. "Mr. CHENEY. Following that, I think I am correct in saying that the first meeting at which members of Congress were notified or briefed about all of this happened, I think, on November 12 in a meeting in the Situation Room attended by Senator Byrd, Senator Dole, Speaker Wright and myself. Do you recall that meeting? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I thought it was on the 13th, but my recollection is that the President was going to give a nationwide speech on the evening of the 13th. I thought we had you down on the afternoon of the 13th. It may have been the 12th. "Mr. CHENEY. 12th or 13th. "I recall present at the meeting also were the President, the Vice President, Attorney General Meese, I believe, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, Director Casey, Don Regan, the White House Chief of Staff, and yourself. "We met in the Situation Room and for the first time members of Congress, the leadership, were offered background information, if you will, or a briefing on these events. "I am curious about the decision to call the meeting, about what the background of the meeting was, and also what the efforts were to prepare for it. "Mr. POINDEXTER. In the early days of November, I guess it would be the period of time from Election Day or the day after when we began to focus on the problem, from then until the 13th, I believe, the President felt, and I certainly—

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			agreed with him and encouraged the position that we continue to withhold as much information as possible about the project because we still felt at that point that we could salvage something out of it. "We thought that there was still an opportunity to get more of the hostages back. We thought that there was still an opportunity to make progress through the second channel into the Iranian government. "The second channel was--continued to make contact with some of Bill Casey's people on a nearly daily basis. They were trying to explain to us what had happened to get us not to overreact, and because of these considerations the President felt, and I certainly agreed with him--and, as I said, encouraged it--that we continue to withhold as much information as possible. "But, in my view, I think shared by the President, there was overreaction in the press that egged on members of Congress. In fact, I can recall a conversation with one member of Congress who had written me about it and I called him back as soon as I could talk to him about it, and he frankly wasn't very concerned and said that the only reason that he had made the statement that he had in the press was because the press was putting pressure on him. "Now, as time wore on, this pressure began to build up and it became obvious that--and we knew this from the beginning, that we wanted to hold off as long as we could. But it became obvious

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that the President needed to go before the American public and explain in broad, general terms what it was we were trying to do. "Before we did that, we obviously wanted to talk to the congressional leadership so they would not be surprised at the content of the President's speech." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 48-50.)
86/11/12-201 NOVEMBER 12 OR 13, 1986 (WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY)		BRIEFING OF CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Well, as I have testified before, it was my plan to continue to withhold the connection with the contras, and so I readily accept responsibility for that." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 52.) See col. 3.	BRIEFING OF CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: Poindexter's testimony on the information he gave to Congressional leaders continued: "Well, as I have testified before, it was my plan to continue to withhold the connection with the contras, and so I readily accept responsibility for that. "But with regard to the rest of the Iranian project, I tried to present to you and the three other congressional leaders in a short period of time the general outline of what it was we were trying to do, and I think that that was accurate, as I recall it now, and as I recalled it at that time. "Again, maybe the use of an aircraft to describe the volume was an unartful way of doing it, but what we were trying to do was to knock down the idea that there were shiploads, very large amounts of all sorts of arms, involved in the project. "And as I recall, in my--in the meeting that you are describing in the Situation Room, we did

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			get into the number of weapons that were involved. I don't think--I don't believe that I covered at that time the aborted Hawk transfer, but that was simply not intended to mislead you; it was simply at that point I did not recall that those Hawk missiles had been transferred and then returned." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 52. See id., 7/20/87, at 57 [Poindexter on the President's speech following the briefing of Congressional leaders: "I think with regard to the Iranian project, in his speech that he made to the country, the statements were accurate, in my view. I still feel they were accurate. We weren't telling everything that we knew at that point, and that was very deliberate."].)
86/11/13-002 NOVEMBER 13, 1986 (THURSDAY)			THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS: DRAFTING COY ACCOUNT: Coy testified on the drafting of the President's speech of November 13, 1986: "A. It was the same kind of process where we were tasked with coming up with the first draft of a speech that had to go to the President's speech writers by 5:00 o'clock in the morning or something, the morning of the 13th. "So, we would sit around and sketch up outlines and drafts of a speech and pass it around and try to make corrections to it. That is when McFarlane came in and tried to craft his own [see 86/11/07-332] -- "Q. McFarlane came in? "A. Yes. He tried to craft out his own suggestions on how the speech would be written.

And he started writing out in longhand. He went over to North's PROF terminal and typed it out on that and had it printed out.

"Q. And this is now preparation for the November 13 speech?

"A. Yes. That is why I say I don't remember him coming in for the chronology, although I read that in the Tower report. I just don't recall that incident.

"Q. The Tower report, at least according to it, has him coming in on the evening of the 18th and seeing you furiously pasting and cutting and putting things together.

"A. I don't recall that incident.

"So, I could have been there; I could not have been there. I just don't recall him coming in other than for the speech.

"Q. Do you recall the dispute with McFarlane over the speech? Were there any substantive disputes about what should be in the speech?

"A. I don't recall disputes.

". . . .

"Q. I thought you indicated that the only time you remember McFarlane coming in and having a disagreement about what might go in the speech was --

"A. It wasn't disagreement on substance. It was more style, what should be said, how it should be said, that type of thing.

"Q. Do you recall what his suggestion was and how it differed from the draft that --

"A. I don't recall.

"I know we ended up submitting a draft, and he

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			had typed out a draft in his PROFs. The only way I would know is to put them side by side now. "Q. By submitting a draft, you mean it was -- there was ultimately a draft submitted to the President's speech writer. "A. Yes. "Q. Do you know whether any of McFarlane's ideas [were] incorporated into that draft? "A. Into the speech? "Q. Into the draft speech? "A. That we submitted? "Q. Yes. "A. I would say some of his ideas were put into it. But, as I recall, the speech that we submitted and the one that came out of the speech writers, at least in my view, w[ere] different." (Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 97-99. See id. at 104-10 [Coy on the President's speech].)
86/11/13-010 NOVEMBER 13, 1986 (THURSDAY, 8:01 p.m.)			PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS: The President addressed the nation from the Oval Office: ". . . . "I wanted this time to talk with you about an extremely sensitive and profoundly important matter of foreign policy. For 18 months now we have had underway a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran. That initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons: to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody 6-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			return of all hostages. Without Iran's cooperation, we cannot bring an end to the Persian Gulf war; without Iran's concurrence, there can be no enduring peace in the Middle East. "For 10 days now, the American and world press have been full of reports and rumors about this initiative and these objectives. Now, my fellow Americans, there's an old saying that nothing spreads so quickly as a rumor. So, I thought it was time to speak with you directly, to tell you firsthand about our dealings with Iran. As Will Rogers once said, 'Rumor travels faster, but it don't stay put as long as truth.' So, let's get to the facts. "The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, that the United States undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists. Those charges are utterly false. The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And we will not. The United States has not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for the return of American hostages. And we will not. "Other reports have surfaced alleging U.S. involvement: reports of a sealift to Iran using Danish ships to carry American arms; of vessels in Spanish ports being employed in secret U.S. arms shipments; of Italian ports being used; of the U.S. sending spare parts and weapons for combat aircraft. All these reports are quite exciting,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			but as far as we're concerned, not one of them is true. "During the course of our secret discussions, I authorized the transfer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for defensive systems to Iran. My purpose was to convince Tehran that our negotiators were acting with my authority, to send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace the animosity between us with a new relationship. These modest deliveries, taken together, could easily fit into a single cargo plane. They could not, taken together, affect the outcome of the 6-year war between Iran and Iraq nor could they affect in any way the military balance between the two countries. "Those with whom we were in contact took considerable risks and needed a signal of our serious intent if they were to carry on and broaden the dialog. At the same time we undertook this initiative, we made clear that Iran must oppose all forms of international terrorism as a condition of progress in our relationship. The most significant step which Iran could take, we indicated, would be to use its influence in Lebanon to secure the release of all hostages held there. "Some progress has already been made. Since U.S. Government contact began with Iran, there's been no evidence of Iranian Government complicity in acts of terrorism against the United States. Hostages have come home, and we welcome the efforts that the Government of Iran has taken in the past and is currently undertaking.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			" . . . ." (22 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 1559-60 [11/17/86]. See Fuller, House Dep., 3/30/87, at 41-42 [Fuller on his role in preparing the President's speech of 11/13/86: "I had no formal role. We did receive a draft of the speech. In discussing the draft with the Vice President, there were phrases in there that described the shipments to Iran as shipments that would fit inside of a cargo plane, and I cautioned Mr. Buchanan about making sure he understood that that was an accurate description based upon what little knowledge I had from my July meetings and discussions with the Vice President. That was the only role I had."].)
86/11/13-011 NOVEMBER 13, 1986 (THURSDAY, 8:01 p.m.)			PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS (cont'd): "There is ample precedent in our history for this kind of secret diplomacy. In 1971 then-President Nixon sent his national security adviser on a secret mission to China. In that case, as today, there was a basic requirement for discretion and for a sensitivity to the situation in the nation we were attempting to engage. "Since the welcome return of former hostage David Jacobsen, there has been unprecedented speculation and countless reports that have not only been wrong but have been potentially dangerous to the hostages and destructive of the opportunity before us. The efforts of courageous people like Terry Waite have been jeopardized. So extensive have been the false rumors and erroneous reports that the risks of remaining silent now

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			exceed the risks of speaking out. And that's why I decided to address you tonight. "It's been widely reported, for example, that the Congress, as well as top executive branch officials, were circumvented. Although the efforts we undertook were highly sensitive and involvement of government officials was limited to those with a strict need to know, all appropriate Cabinet officers were fully consulted. The actions I authorized were, and continue to be, in full compliance with Federal law. And the relevant committees of Congress are being, and will be, fully informed. "Another charge is that we have tilted toward Iran in the Gulf war. This, too, is unfounded. We have consistently condemned the violence on both sides. We have consistently sought a negotiated settlement that preserves the territorial integrity of both nations. The overtures we've made to the Government of Iran have not been a shift to supporting one side over the other, rather, it has been a diplomatic initiative to gain some degree of access and influence within Iran -- as well as Iraq -- and to bring about an honorable end to that bloody conflict. It is in the interests of all parties in the Gulf region to end that war as soon as possible. "To summarize: Our government has a firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist demands. That no concessions policy remains in force, in spite of the wildly speculative and false stories about arms for hostages and alleged ransom

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			payments. We did not -- repeat -- did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages nor will we. Those who think that we have gone soft on terrorism should take up the question with Colonel Qadhafi. "We have not, nor will we capitulate to terrorists. We will, however, get on with advancing the vital interests of our great nation -- in spite of terrorists and radicals who seek to sabotage our efforts and immobilize the United States. . . . ". . . ." (22 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 1559-60 [11/17/86].)
86/11/13-015 1985-86			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: WHAT THE PRESIDENT RECALLED IN 11/86 POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Did anyone ever ask Ronald Reagan whether he recalled there were Hawk missiles on the airplane in November 1985 or whether he knew about it as of the time? "A. I did not ask him." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 122.)
86/11/13-022 DECEMBER 1985 - NOVEMBER 1986			PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS, AND THE 12/5/85 FINDING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NUNN. I believe that you testified that in November 1986 you had forgotten about the finding on the Iranian initiative the President signed in December of 1985. "Specifically, your testimony on that is, reading from the July 15, 1987 morning session,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			page 45-46, and I am going to read it, Counsel, here, 'But anyway, after this finding was signed, it was retained in my immediate office and at some point after it was []signed, I had apparently given it to C[o]mmander Thompson, my military assistant, to put in an envelope in his safe to keep. I had, as I said, completely forgotten about it.' "I am not asking you whether that is an accurate reading of the transcript, but is that an accurate recollection-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is an accurate recollection. "Mr. NUNN. Did the President ever remind you—or bring this finding to your attention? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I am certain that he had forgott[e]n about it. "Mr. NUNN. And this is the same finding that you later destroyed; is that right? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. NUNN. Is it fair to say that findings are rather important documents, Admiral? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes; they address important issues. "Mr. NUNN. Is it fair to say that this finding described only the arms-for-hostages part of the Iranian initiative and you felt it was, therefore, not completely accurate? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. It did not give a fair picture of the--it wasn't a fair picture of the entire situation. "Mr. NUNN. And I believe that is the reason you destroyed it, one of the principal reasons?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. NUNN. You also testified, Admiral, that the President 'reads everything you give him'; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, maybe a bit of exaggeration, but he does read most everything I give him.

"Mr. NUNN. And, therefore, you believed the President did read that December 5th finding before he signed it, you testified to that already?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't have any doubt but what he read it. He doesn't sign something without reading it.

"Mr. NUNN. Despite the fact that according to your testimony the President signed the finding [and] he read the finding[,] on November 13, 1986, he said to the American people, 'The charge has been made that the U.S. has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon. Those charges are utterly false. We did not trade weapons or anything else for the hostages.'

"Admiral, my question to you is, to have made this statement truthfully, the President would have had to have forgotten that finding, would he not?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I don't think so. As I explained to you, the President's thinking on the subject, with which I agreed--he did not consider that as arms for hostages.

"Mr. NUNN. So you believe that November 13th statement was accurate?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I do. "Mr. NUNN. Even looking back on it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I do. "Mr. NUNN. [']The charges are utterly false[']--do you think that is a correct impression for the American people? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The impression that was in the press was that the only thing we were doing was swapping arms for hostages. That was not what we were doing." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 126-29.)
86/11/13-023 DECEMBER 1985 - NOVEMBER 1986			PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS, AND THE 12/5/85 FINDING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NUNN. Without getting bogged down in that again, do you believe that the President had a keen memory of that particular finding that said nothing but arms for hostages when he delivered that statement on November 13th? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I am sure he didn't, because although he agreed obviously at that point, looking back on it, with the CIA assistance on that particular project, that did not represent a total picture of what he was willing to do and to approve, and so he wouldn't think about it in those terms. "Mr. NUNN. . . . [T]his . . . November 13th speech was before Commander Thompson had brought this finding in, before your memory had been restored on that subject-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is true. "Mr. NUNN. And, therefore, you had not seen

that memo at that stage, since, of course, the original signing of it?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. NUNN. So the President at that state would have probably not had that memorandum in mind?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I am certain he didn't. In fact, the only one I think that he would recall would be the final one on 17 January, because there was much more discussion about that. As I said, one of the--one of the regrets that I have is that the 5 December finding was not well staffed, it was probably not thoroughly discussed.

"In fact, I don't recall the conversation with the President about it, so I don't have any reason to believe that he would have any lasting memory of that any more than I did.

"Mr. NUNN. I believe a while ago you testified that you were pretty certain he had forgotten about that particular finding.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes.

"Mr. NUNN. Well, Admiral, if the President had forgotten a finding which by your own statement was rather important, and he had read it before he signed it--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think I said--well, maybe I did say it was important.

"Mr. NUNN. I asked you if findings were important.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Findings were important. I don't think that one was important.

". . . .

"Mr. NUNN. So you think findings are

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			important, but you don't think this one was important? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have testified, I think, Senator, it was a preliminary version of what finally culminated in the 17 January finding. "Mr. NUNN. But it governed the covert activities of the U.S. in that respect, from that date, December 5 until the subsequent finding in January[--]for a 30-day period it did have that applicability? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is right, but other than discussions, nothing transpired during that time period. "Mr. NUNN. And it also was retroactive? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is right, but I have also testified that I was never comfortable with that concept of retroactivity. The key question is, did the President approve it before. "Mr. NUNN. Well, if it wasn't important, why destroy it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Because it could be misinterpreted, Senator, as it has been misinterpreted. "Mr. NUNN. You believe that when the President made his statement on November 13 to the American people that he had indeed forgotten about that finding, whether it was important or not important? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I am almost certain that he did. I had certainly forgotten it. But even if we had known of its existence or recalled its existence at that time, that would not have changed that statement."

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 129-32.)
86/11/13-024 DECEMBER 1985 - NOVEMBER 1986	POINDEXTER'S MEMORY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, Admiral, you are a man who prides yourself on memory, is that fair to say? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I have a reasonably good memory, but I have also--I have up until my year as National Security Advisor, I have never been hit with so many issues in such a short period of time. There was a lot of activity that had happened over that previous year and the events of November of 1985 until November of 1986 were very far from my current memory." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 71.) "Mr. NUNN. Admiral Holloway has described you as 'a brilliant and very effective aid[e], totally loyal and trustworthy and a thorough briefer who rarely interjected his own viewpoints.' "Would you agree with that assessment[?] "Mr. POINDEXTER. I agree with that assessment. "Mr. NUNN. Admiral Holloway has also stated, quoting him again, 'Captain Poindexter'--this was when you were a Captain--'Captain Poindexter has a spectacular mental capacity. He reads and understands every paper or report that comes into the office. Furthermore, he retains fully, recalls accurately, and evaluates with a keen sense of what is important and what isn't.' "Would you agree with that assessment? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think that is a little bit		PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS, AND THE 12/5/85 FINDING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NUNN. If you had forgotten the finding at that stage and the President of the United States had forgotten the finding at that stage, is it not also possible, Admiral Poindexter, that both of you had forgotten those five memos relating to diversion of funds for the contras? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I suppose that is possible, but--he certainly would have no reason to forget because he never saw anything, Senator. I deliberately did not send or talk to the President on anything related to the diversion. "Mr. NUNN. How do you know he didn't see those memos, since you don't remember seeing them yourself? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Because nothing went up to the President in my area unless it came through me. "Mr. NUNN. He couldn't have gotten them otherwise? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think so. "Mr. NUNN. So it is possible that you could have forgotten those five memos? "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. Senator, would you repeat the last question, please? "Mr. NUNN. It is possible that you forgot those five memos? "Mr. POINDEXTER. What I have testified to is

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	elaborate. You must have been reading from a citation or something, a fitness report? "Mr. NUNN. Fitness report. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. "Mr. NUNN. Moving on . . . ." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 109-10. See id., 7/21/87, at 81-82 [Poindexter's elaboration on the fitness report].)		that I don't recall seeing them, and that is the fact. "Mr. NUNN. Is it possible that those memos were delivered to the President by someone other than yourself? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I doubt that seriously. There was a very hard and fast rule that anything of substance, and this clearly would have been of substance, was not to go to the President unless I saw it. "Mr. NUNN. What about from Bill Casey--is it possible since he was dealing with North and you didn't know about him dealing with North that he may have seen these memos and delivered them to the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Senator, I have no indication from what I have heard in testimony that Bill Casey saw any of those memos." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 132-34.)
86/11/13-025 1985-86			NO ARMS DELIVERIES BEFORE HOSTAGES RELEASED: RECAP POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. One last question on the Iran venture. When the venture started it was the firm position, was it not, of the President and you that . . . no arms should be shipped unless the hostages were released? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And by the time the venture ended, am I correct, sir-- "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. LIMAN. --that we shipped 1500 TOWs

directly--that is not the Israeli shipment--that we shipped some 225 Hawk parts, we shipped some medicine, and we entered into that nine-point plan; that we got back two hostages--one had come back as a result of the Israeli venture--and that--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. But that was really all part of the same.

"Mr. LIMAN. But that was another 500 TOWs earlier which I am not counting. And that three more hostages were taken, though apparently, so far as your understanding was concerned, it was by a different faction?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. Just explain to the committee how we came to go from the position which was vetted at the time the January 17 finding was signed of no arms without all the hostages to what actually did happen?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, obviously when you lay out a plan to start a project, you lay out some final objectives that you want to reach, and the various milestones that you hope to meet in getting there. In reality, most real-life events don't happen exactly according to plan.

"You have got to adapt for that. The President's objective was to get them all back in one group. That clearly was the safest way in terms of the physical danger to the hostages.

"It also was a safer political way, because you know, the President was under no misconceptions back in December as to what the public reaction would be if this leaked out. In fact, my recollection is that he said that if we get all of the hostages out, we will be heroes; if we don't, we will have a significant problem.

"And we are seeing that problem today. So--

"Mr. LIMAN. In fairness to him, the problem was compounded by a decision that you--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That I made.

"Mr. LIMAN. --did not disclose to him?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is exactly right. And I don't mean to conceal that, obviously. But as time went on and we were unable to get them all out in one group, because of the President's desires to get them back, plus--and I don't think we should minimize our longer term objectives that we had in mind once we got over this first hurdle, he was unwilling to give up, and I agreed with him."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 181-83.)

86/11/13-027
NOVEMBER 13,
1986
(THURSDAY)

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS: LEVELS OF WITHHELD INFORMATION

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. BROOKS. On November 13, 1986, the President, said, 'As President, I have always operated on the belief that given the facts, the American people would make the right decision. I believe that is true now.'

"Now, Admiral, can you explain how the American people can get the facts if the President himself is denied access to those facts by his own staff?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think the President is absolutely correct as the results of these

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			hearings are understood by the American people. I think they do understand and I think they are supportive of what we were trying to do. "I don't think the American people necessarily[,] unless it is to resolve this overblown issue that Senator Hatch referred to, the American people don't want to know those details of how the President goes about implementing foreign policy. "Mr. BROOKS. But you didn't let the President make that decision. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Excuse me, Mr. Brooks--on the 13th of November, the President still wanted to withhold a lot of the details of the project, because we still felt that there was a possibility to get additional hostages out and we still thought there was a possibility to preserve the second channel." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 189-90.)
86/11/13-030 NOVEMBER 13 AND 19, 1986			PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS (11/13/86) AND NEWS CONFERENCE (11/19/86) POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. . . . I want to follow up, Admiral, on some of the questions posed to you a while ago by Senator Boren concerning the news conferences of the President on November 13th [see 86/00/02-653] and then again on November 19th. "Did you prepare the President in any way for any of those new conferences? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, the speech that he gave on national television on the 13th, I and my staff participated with other elements of the

White House to prepare that speech, and before the President's press briefing on the 19th, as I recall, we had at least one or two sessions prior to that to go over what we thought the questions would be; with the President.

"Mr. RODINO. You knew, of course, that what the President was about to tell the American people was absolutely not only misleading, but deceptive; isn't that not [sic] the case?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I don't think it was, Mr. Rodino. What part are you referring to?

"Mr. RODINO. Well, on November 13th, the charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. We didn't think then, nor do I think now, that that is an accurate--I mean, saying that we were shipping arms as ransom for hostages is not an accurate description of what we were doing. I still believe that.

"Mr. RODINO. And when you say that the United States has not swapped boat-loads or plane-loads o[f] American weapons for the return of American hostages and we will not, and that again is a statement of the President, that again is not misleading?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have testified, Mr. Rodino, the President's view, and I agreed with it, was that it was not a swap of arms for hostages because the people that we were dealing with were the Iranians, they were not the captors of the hostages, they did not have control, total control, over those captors, and it is just as if you would go to another third country and ask them to intervene for you.

"Mr. RODINO. You think that is the way the American public understood that statement?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, so far, Mr. Rodino, I have received probably a couple thousand telegrams since these hearings began, my appearance before you, and all but about 12 or 15 o[f] those, the people say they understand, they support what we were trying to do, and I think it is very clear to them. I don't think that they feel misled.

"Mr. RODINO. Notwithstanding the fact that the President stated time and again that it was American policy not to deal with terrorists and not to trade arms for hostages--you still insist on that position?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that he had, prior to November of 1986, had ever addressed the question of arms for hostages. But he has stated--

"Mr. RODINO. You mean that was not the stated American policy?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, the issue didn't come up before that. That is all I mean.

"It is and has been our policy not to compromise with the terrorists that take the hostages, and we didn't think we were doing that. And that was--the President--that was very clear in his mind.

"In my preparation with him for the speech and for the press backgrounder, there was no need to go over that point with him. That was firm in his mind from the very beginning.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Now, I am telling you the way he thinks about it. Now, some of the Cabinet officers that objected to it did not see it that way, and they argued with the President and he argued right back that he was comfortable in viewing it the way he did. "And so from his own heart and mind he did not see it as ransoming hostages by providing arms." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 144-47.)
86/11/13-050 NOVEMBER 13, 1986 (THURSDAY)		POINDEXTER'S CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. POINDEXTER. . . . But I do admit readily that I was withholding the information about the transfer of residual funds. Any other errors that may have been committed were either due to lack of time or lack of recollection, at least on my part, of what I--what may have been left out." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 225.) See col. 3.	POINDEXTER'S BRIEFING OF CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. STOKES. Now, this morning Mr. Cheney made reference to some of the leadership that was invited down on the 13th to a meeting. [See 86/11/12-201.] On the evening of the 13th I was in a group that was also invited down, Les Aspin on this committee--Senator Ted Stevens, Senator Strom Thurmond and some others of us were invited down on the 13th and you gave us a briefing at that time--do you recall that?--in the same room. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I had forgotten about that, but I believe you're right. "Mr. STOKES. That's right. And at that time you withheld information from us, too, didn't you? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think the meeting on the 13th, we were still in the process of trying to sort out all the facts. I believe that that was cast as a general briefing to go over the highlights of the project. We didn't have all that much time. And it wasn't a matter of deliberately withholding anything from you. There

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			may have been a problem as to what we knew at the time or what we had recalled at the time. But that was a much more general briefing, knowing that there would be further briefings as time went on. "But I do admit readily that I was withholding the information about the transfer of residual funds. Any other errors that may have been committed were either due to lack of time or lack of recollection, at least on my part, of what I--what may have been left out." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 224-25.)
86/11/14-100 NOVEMBER 14, 1986 (FRIDAY)			SHULTZ ALERTS THE PRESIDENT OF HIS VIEWS DoS CHRONOLOGY: "At his regularly scheduled meeting with PRESIDENT, GPS makes arguments against arms for Iran." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/15-500.)
86/11/14-200 NOVEMBER 14, 1986 (FRIDAY)			MEESE-LEDEEN MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Did you have a meeting with Mr. Ledeen on the 14th of November? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I did. I believe so. And I believe we have an exhibit that relates to my notes or my calendar that indicates that. "Mr. NIELDS. That should be Exhibit [EM] No. 25. "Attorney General MEESE. All right.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Yes. This is from my daily--kind of a spiral notebook that I keep--dated the 14th of November 1986, and it shows that Michael Ledeen at 2:05 p.m. met with me in my office. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, Mr. Ledeen was--based on the information that is available to the committee--was involved in the transactions in 1985 and then stopped being involved sometime prior to the January 17 finding. "Do you recall what you were discussing with Mr. Ledeen and what the reason for the meeting was? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. Mr. Ledeen asked to see me because he said he wanted to talk to me about some matters relating to terrorism. "And at the start of the meeting, he said I want to talk--he said I want to mention about Iran. He said, my notes reflect here--he said we can still work with the original Iranian group with which he--Mike Ledeen--initiated the original contacts. And he mentioned Ghorbanifar and others. "Then I put a note at the side. It says Mike claims to have worked with McFarlane in 1985. And he had referred to something called channel one. Channel one had been referred to in the meeting, I believe on the 10th, that there had been two channels that had been worked, although I did not know the time sequence, I don't believe, with each of them. "And then he got on to the business that he had actually come to see me about. There were two items basically. One was he said that there was a

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			lot of information in the hands of journalists that was not getting to the FBI, about terrorism, and he felt that the FBI should be more aggressive in talking to journalists particularly who had been overseas, who would have information and knowledge. "I don't remember this without having refreshed my recollection from the notes that are deleted from this memo prior on this meeting, I might add. "And the other thing he talked to me about was that he was available to help the Administration in any way in matters relating to terrorism. "I might say parenthetically as to this item on Iran, I did not pursue that with him. I didn't know how much he knew, I didn't know how much he was authorized to know, I didn't know what his connection was, so I just dropped the subject and we went on to talk about what he had come to see me about, which was terrorism generally. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you recall if he made reference to arms transfers in 1985? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall that he did and I don't have any notes that say that he did, other than he claims to have worked with McFarlane in 1985, presumably in regards to some relationship with the Israelis." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 47-49; JHICI Ex. EM 25 [Meese notes, 11/14/86 meeting].)
86/11/15-000 NOVEMBER 15, 1986		McFARLANE ON WATERGATE McFARLANE PROF: See col. 3.	McFARLANE ON WATERGATE McFARLANE PROF: McFarlane PROF to Poindexter: "A final

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(SATURDAY)			comment. I lived through Watergate, John. Well-meaning people who were in on the early planning of the communications strategy, didn't intend to lie but ultimately came around to it." (JHICI Ex. 53 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Perspective," 11/15/86]; McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 203.)
86/11/15-002 NOVEMBER 15, 1986		McFARLANE ON WATERGATE: See col. 3.	McFARLANE ON WATERGATE: "Mr. LIMAN. This is the last question, and I obviously take no like in asking it, but it was raised in virtually every opening statement. "Do you remember, Mr. McFarlane, that you wrote, and this is Exhibit 53, you wrote a memo to Admiral Poindexter on November 15, that was before you asked to work on the chronologies; do you recall that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And you urged that there be a policy of letting the facts come out? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And you said, 'A final comment. I lived through Watergate, John. Well-meaning people who were in on the early planning of the communications strategy, didn't intend to lie but ultimately came around to it.' "You wrote that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. I guess the question is that here you, with a career devoted to public service, a man [who] prides himself on comments and principles[ ]like that, ended up participating in that chronology, and some of the other events we

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			have talked about, and the question is how did it happen? What is the lesson? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think, Mr. Liman, that that is at the heart of the purpose we share here. You deserve a thorough answer that is utterly missing from any that has been made today. "I feel strongly about it, and I will be glad to do it. Today's testimony, while necessary, has provided no context nor perspective in which any of these events can be comprehensible, and I am astonished, and I will be glad tomorrow, if you have time, to provide some context that I think didn't mitigate but makes more clear just why this did happen. "Mr. LIMAN. Thank you. "I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 203-04; JHICI Ex. 53 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Perspective," 11/15/86].)
86/11/15-100 NOVEMBER 15, 1986 (SATURDAY)			McFARLANE ON WATERGATE: "Mr. RUDMAN. One last question. A very interesting note that you wrote on 15 November '86 to Admiral Poindexter, it started out with a personal reference that you were heading to Chicago for a family event and it is an analysis of what is happening with the whole Iran initiative coming apart. You referred to it tangentially in your earlier testimony. It says a final comment--this is to John Poindexter--I lived through Watergate, John. Well-meaning people who were in on the early planning of communications strategy didn't intend to lie but ultimately came

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			around to it. I don't know how--it says Regan will--R-e-g-a-n--will tend. He might choose two courses, either push it off on someone outside the White House, which is fine with me, or he might go ahead with a 'Sell it on its merits strategy'. If the latter is the course followed it must not be confrontational but open and candid. I assume that is Don Regan you are referring to there, or is it Ronald Reagan? It says R-e-g-a-n. "Mr. MCFARLANE. It is Mr. Regan, but I don't want to impugn him. "Mr. RUDMAN. I just wanted to know [w]hat that mean[t]. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. The point was to say that there had been ten working days since the story had broken, and there was no evidence on the public record of the adoption of a strategy for dealing with this very serious matter, and that just from experience it seemed to me that for as long as paralysis endures, the prospects for a flawed decision increase and that I thought they ought to get on with it and get the full story out. It seemed to me that to be fair to Mr. Regan and the President chose [sic] the right course ultimately of trying to get the right story out and dealing with it. I did say if they chose on the other hand to blame it on me on the outside, that that was fine with me as well." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 213-14; JHICI, Ex. 53 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, 11/15/86, "Perspective"].)
86/11/15-500			SHULTZ ALERTS THE PRESIDENT OF HIS VIEWS

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 15, 1986 (SATURDAY)			DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS at Camp David gives draft paper to REGAN that would return control of Iran policy to State and end arms sales to Iran. REGAN tells him (GPS) he understands State's position, but White House is not in a position to adopt it." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/16-100.)
86/11/15-514 NOVEMBER 10 THROUGH LATER NOVEMBER 1986			THE BATTLE ROYAL AT THE WHITE HOUSE SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. And as I understand from the notes and discussions, during that period from November 10 on in various conversations with the President and his advisers, . . . you continued to argue that the record would not support an assertion other than that this was arms for hostages, or at least the record would not support an assertion that it was not arms for hostages. "Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct. But the President felt that he didn't authorize an effort that was simply and purely an effort to trade arms for hostages, and so we went back and forth on that quite a bit. "Mr. BELNICK. And did you begin developing the view, particularly as of November 10 . . . that the President's advisers were misleading him and not giving him the facts concerning what had actually transpired in the Iran initiative? "Secretary SHULTZ. I developed a very clear opinion that the President was not being given accurate information and I was very alarmed about

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			it, and it became the preoccupying thing that I was working on through this period, and I felt that it was tremendously important for the President to get accurate information so he could see and make a judgment. "His judgment is excellent when he is given the right information, and he was not being given the right information, and I felt as this went on that the people who were giving him the information were, in a sense--had--I think I even used the word with some of my advisers, they had a conflict of interest with the President and they were trying to use his undoubted skills as a communicator to have him give a speech and give a press conference and say these things and, in doing so, he would bail them out. "At least that's the way it was--I don't want to try to attribute motives to other people too much, although I realize I have, but that's the way it shaped up to me. "So I was in a battle to try to get what I saw as the facts to the President and get--and see that he understood them. "Now, this was a very traumatic period for me because everybody was saying I'm disloyal to the President, I'm not speaking up for the policy, and I'm battling away here, and I could see people were calling for me to resign if I can't be loyal to the President, even including some of my friends and people who had held high office and should know that maybe there's more involved than they're seeing. "And I frankly felt that I was the one who was

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			loyal to the President, because I was the one who was trying to get him the facts so he could make a decision, and I must say as he absorbed this he did, he made the decision that we must get all these facts out. "But it was--it was a battle royal. "Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary, in that battle royal to get out the facts which you waged and which the record reflects that you waged, who was the other side? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I can't say for sure. I feel that Admiral Poindexter was certainly on the other side of it, I felt that Director Casey was on the other side of it, and I don't know who all else. But they were the principals." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 101-03.)
86/11/15-515 NOVEMBER 12-15, 1986 (WEDNESDAY - SATURDAY)			THE BATTLE ROYAL AT THE WHITE HOUSE SHULTZ ACCOUNT (cont'd): "Mr. BELNICK. On November 12 the record reflects that you asked and urged the President's Chief of Staff, then Don Regan, to assist you in persuading the President to turn Iran policy over to the State Department and . . . end sales of arms to Iran. "On November 13 the President made his speech concerning the Iran initiative, and on November 14 you met with the President after the speech. "Do you recall the substance of that meeting between you and the President on November 14, the day after he spoke to the nation? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I would have to--I

need to go back and look at my notes to refresh myself on that particular meeting. But I imagine it was more of the same.

"There was a constant back-and-forth between me and the President and I sought him out to change this around. And going back to something you read out from an earlier cable about the compartments that were being created, I didn't want to become in one of Admiral Poindexter's compartments, I wanted to get this out where I could see it for myself and get it managed right.

"So that's what I was driving for, and to get the statement made flat out, no more arms sales.

"Mr. BELNICK. And continuing with that, on November 15, which was a Saturday, you gave a draft paper to Don Regan to give to the President, again calling for an end of arms sales, and Regan informed you that he understood the position but the White House was not then in a position to adopt it, correct?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Correct.

"Earlier, as we had been discussing this, I had been asked by the White House to respond favorably to an invitation to appear on 'Face the Nation,' and I was very reluctant to appear because I didn't see quite what I was going to say about the arms sales question, and at the same time I wanted to support the President, and this is--this is one thing, you are investigating this in great detail about Iran and I want to at some point in this hearing, if I can, to at least register the fact that there are other things going on in the world that are very good and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			represent a strong, positive, effective foreign policy that the President has structured. "But, at any rate, Don Regan said, well, please go on, we need to have an Administration spokesman and so on, and so I said okay, but I kept battling about this. "Now, the Saturday that you mentioned, Mrs. Thatcher was a visitor to the United States and she met with the President in Camp David, and so I went up for that meeting. And Mrs. Thatcher likes to have meetings with her opposite number and she doesn't need anybody else around. So she likes to meet with the President by herself. ". . . . ". . . I think one of the messages that we can get from Mrs. Thatcher is that the Government ought to work by the accountable people in it talking to each other and not having everybody and his brother's staff talking to everybody all the time, and that's her-- "Anyway, to go back to this story, we go up to Camp David and of course most of us stand around and talk to each other, the staff, me, and the President and Mrs. Thatcher meet and then they come and join us and we have further discussion, and there was a nice luncheon and then left. "So I had no real shot at talking to the President, but I knew that Don Regan would probably get a word with him. So I wrote out and I gave it to Don, I said see if you can't get this cleared, and he said no--I felt he agreed with me but he said I can't make it. "So there I was, appearing on the television,

and I was asked--I thought the interview was--many people said it was a tough interview. I regarded the interviewer is doing actually an excellent job because that's their job, to smoke out the story, and I said on that interview, yes, in my opinion there should be no more arms sales to Iran under current conditions, and then she said, well, do you speak for the Administration, and I had to say no, I don't.

"It was a sad day for me, very sad. But it was the truth.

"However, the next day the White House put out the word that I did speak for the Administration and there would be no more arms sales to Iran.

"But this was the kind of battle that was going on."

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 105-09.)

86/11/15-516
MID-NOVEMBER
1986

THE BATTLE ROYAL AT THE WHITE HOUSE:
THE OPPOSING SIDES

SHULTZ ACCOUNT:

"Mr. COHEN. You mentioned yesterday the Battle Royal that took place in November of 1986, and I believe you indicated the participants were Admiral Poindexter, and I believe Director Casey. Earlier in your testimony, in December of 1985, you indicated you thought that Donald Regan was really sort of on your side and that of Secretary Weinberger.

"I take it that following December, sometime in January, 1986, Mr. Regan tended to side with the President on the issue as to whether to go forward, is that correct?

"Secretary SHULTZ. What I testified to was that in the meeting in January, where Secretary Weinberger and I argued against this initiative, that it seemed to me all of the other people in the room, which included Mr. Regan, had a different view, but I don't remember precisely what he said or if he said anything, but that was the impression I got.

"Mr. COHEN. Let me go back to the Battle Royal then. In November of 1986, did the people who were urging you to sing this false song to the American public about what had happened include just Admiral Poindexter and Director Casey, or were there others who were urging you to come on board or get off the ship, one or the other? Did it include Mr. Regan, for example, did it include the Attorney General, did it include Secretary Weinberger? Who else was involved in that royal battle?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, there were a lot of people outside the government who were after my scalp, which people are always after my scalp. There is not much left of it up here.

"Mr. COHEN. That has been true since you have been here, though.

"Secretary SHULTZ. I am used to that.

"Mr. COHEN. On that day or those days when you were debating the issue of not going forward or letting the President go out on the stage and give a speech to the American people with incorrect or indeed false information, who was waging that battle against you or with you?

"Secretary SHULTZ. I was in favor right from the beginning of full disclosure of the facts. So I wasn't opposed to the idea of a Presidential speech or press conference or anything, although I think there was obviously a need for a better assessment. It was more a question of what was the content. That was the problem as I saw it.

"Mr. COHEN. Well, were you the only person arguing during that debate that the contents should be changed? Were there other people, allies, on your side to say, 'Mr. President, you can't go out with information like this and present this to the American people'?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I don't know. I just am able to testify about what I did, and what other people may have done--

"Mr. COHEN. Who else was there?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, at the meetings, I had my own meeting with the President on the afternoon, I think, before he had his press conference, and I expressed myself, I forget who was there, either the--Mr. Poindexter was there, Admiral Poindexter or his deputy, who by that time was Al Keel, but somebody was always there when I met with the President, and I believe Don Regan may have been there. Don Regan was present in the family corridors when I had a lengthy meeting with the President on it. I preferred to have somebody present.

"Mr. COHEN. Did Director Casey suggest that you resign if you couldn't support the position that we all unanimously supported, the initiative so-called?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Not that I knew of. I didn't know of anybody going to the President and saying that he should fire me other than what you have read in the papers about the advice he might have been getting from people outside the government.

"Mr. COHEN. Are you now aware that Director Casey actually wrote to the President suggesting he needed a new pitcher?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I have seen that letter."

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 20-23.)

86/11/15-520
DURING
NOVEMBER 1986

THE BATTLE ROYAL AT THE WHITE HOUSE:
THE PRESIDENT'S ACCESS TO INFORMATION
SHULTZ ACCOUNT:

"Mr. RUDMAN. Mr. Secretary, this morning in the course of one of your answers you made the point that if you present the President of the United States, this President, with facts, and all of the facts, that his instincts are good and he makes the decision based on those facts, he is not one to back away from decisions. Am I correct?

"Secretary SHULTZ. That is right. He is comfortable with himself. He is decisive, he steps up to things, and when he decides, he stays with it. And sometimes you wish he wouldn't, but anyway, he does. He[] is very decisive, and he's very strong.

"Mr. RUDMAN. You also testified that at the time following the disclosure of this entire matter, which in many ways, at least to me, is as disturbing as the issue itself, that you felt that the President did not have the facts in his

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			possession that would enable him to be his usual forthright and direct self to the American people. Am I correct in that? "Secretary SHULTZ. He was forthright and direct, but he was not, I don't think he was given the correct information. "Mr. RUDMAN. Well, forthright, correct and accurate in what he said. "Secretary SHULTZ. I felt that the intelligence he was getting during that period was faulty about Iranian terrorism, I felt that he was not being--having described [to] him accurately, the operational aspects of arms for hostages--he had a perfectly good idea in his mind that was the basis for his decision to begin with. He had every right to make it, a perfectly good decision. I didn't agree with it because I felt underneath it was arms for hostages. "But nevertheless, that's what you got to do when you get elected President, you make those decisions, his decision to make, perfectly proper. People continued to try to sell him on that; when the time went by and he wasn't being given I felt the right kind of information--and I also feel that the intelligence that was the basis for the original recommendation was faulty and that it was tied in with policy. ". . . ." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 161-62.)
86/11/15-530 NOVEMBER 15, 1986			SHULTZ ALERTS THE PRESIDENT OF HIS VIEWS REGAN RESPONSE TO SHULTZ: "Mr. COHEN. You indicated earlier that the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(SATURDAY)			Secretary of State had the opportunity any time to go directly to the President. Secretary Shultz testified before this committee that there came a point in time in which he was quite agitated that the President wasn't getting the correct story, and that was during the November timeframe when Mrs. Thatcher was visiting, and that he asked you to set up a meeting with the President and that you indicated that that could not be done. "Why was that? "Mr. REGAN. Well, Mrs. Thatcher was leaving. He wanted to meet with the President then and there, or he wanted me to meet with the President actually. I was part of the motorcade, part of the--had a seat on the helicopter. I didn't want to miss it, and I told him, I said, 'I don't think there is going to be time, George, I just can't do that.' "So I didn't on that Saturday that Mrs. Thatcher was at Camp David. "Mr. COHEN. But as a result of his not having some access during that timeframe, the President then held a press conference in which he made a statement that would prove to be inaccurate? "Mr. REGAN. The Secretary of State, while I was Chief of Staff, had 99 meetings with the President of the United States. He could have had more if he needed them. He usually had them alone. "Finally, after all of this affair started, after the first of December of '86, he asked me to sit in. He realized I was not participating in these things and had been cut out. There was

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			ample time for the Secretary of State to make his views known to the President of the United States, in my judgment. He was never shut out of seeing the President. "Mr. COHEN. Except at that time when he felt-- "Mr. REGAN. When he wanted me to go. It wasn't a time for himself with the President. He wanted me to tell the President about his concerns. I said[,] 'I can't do that now.' I did discuss it with the President the following Monday. "Mr. COHEN. . . . [A]fter Attorney General Meese talked to you that morning? "Mr. REGAN. Yes." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 130-32.)
86/11/16-100 NOVEMBER 16, 1986 (SUNDAY)			SHULTZ ON "FACE THE NATION" DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS appears on 'Face the Nation.' Says that he believes there should be no more arms sales to Iran, but also states he does not speak for the Administration." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/17-100.)
86/11/16-200 NOVEMBER 16, 1986 (SUNDAY)			IRAN ARMS TRANSACTION: POINDEXTER ON "MEET THE PRESS" POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. SARBANES. Would you turn to Exhibit [JMP] 65, please? This is a transcript of the press conference you did with 'Meet the Press' on

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			November 16th of 1986, I think some nine days before you submitted your resignation. "On the last page of that--on the last page of that transcript, right in the middle, you state, 'The only shipments that the United States Government authorized were those that the President described the other night, which taken in toto would fill a single cargo aircraft. That is the extent of the U.S. involvement with Iran on this issue.' "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Sarbanes, if we may, I think to give a fair impression, I would like to have the previous question and answer read as well as the next question that comes out with the full answer. "Mr. SARBANES. Fine. The Admiral can use it in his response. But the question I want to put to you, that was out-and-out false, was it not? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I don't think so. Let me read the preceding question and answer. "Mr. BECKLER. The questioning is by Andrea Mitchell. "Mr. POINDEXTER. It is, 'Admiral, can I just clear up one fact about the kinds of weapons. The Defense Minister, the Defense Minister, Mr. Rabin, has said that nothing was sent by Israel, no American weapons that were not directly approved by the United States. Is that true?' "I answered, 'I don't care to answer that question in public. Our relations with all of the third countries that may or may not have been involved in this should be private.' "Question, 'Can you at least deny the reports

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that have come to us from very authoritative sources in Israel that they did ship offensive arms parts for jet fighters?' "My answer, 'The point that the President has made and that I have made before on this issue is that the only shipments that the U.S. Government authorized were those that the President described the other night, which taken in toto would fill a single cargo aircraft. That is the extent of the U.S. involvement with Iran on this issue.' "Now, the point here is that there were all sorts of rumors floating around out there about ship-loads of arms from Israel to Iran, the business about parts for jet fighters had been a longstanding speculation. "I have some personal views on that, but we, frankly, have very little concrete evidence. The point about the 2,008 TOWs and the 240 spare parts for the Hawk missile system, we wanted to get across the point that the amount of arms that were sold to Iran under this project was a very small amount. When we got into the issue in early November, I asked Colonel North to estimate in some way that the public would understand that the volume would be. "We wanted to get away from this idea that there were ship-loads of arms being provided to Iran. And he came back to[ ]me after talking to General Secord and said that the cubic volume of the 2,008 TOWs and the 240 Hawk missile parts would fit in a C-5 aircraft. "Now, I didn't sit down and do the calculations.

"Now, on the 16th of November, which is the date of this meeting or of this appearance on 'Meet the Press', I personally had forgotten about the Hawk missiles. Now, even taking--and I am not quite sure, because I am [sic] simply haven't talked to Colonel North--I don't know how they took the Hawk missiles into account.

"But in my mind, the statement is still reasonably accurate from the standpoint of trying to describe the small volume of weapons that were provided to Iran, because after all, the 18 Hawk missiles, although they were transferred, they came right back and so those Hawk missile had nothing to do and didn't have any impact on the war effort."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 36-39; JHICI Ex. JMP 65 [Transcript of Poindexter interview on "Meet the Press," 11/16/86].)

86/11/16-201
NOVEMBER 16,
1986
(SUNDAY)

IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: POINDEXTER ON "MEET THE PRESS"
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. SARBANES. So you continued to take the position that the extent of the U.S. involvement with Iran on this issue in terms of the shipment of arms w[as] arms in the quantity that they would have fitted in a single-cargo aircraft; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That characterization was meant to describe 2008 TOW missiles and 240 Hawk missile parts--Hawk missile battery parts.

"Mr. SARBANES. In other words, it was not

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			meant to describe all of the arms that had been sent? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, as I have testified, on the 16th of November, 1986, I did not recall the episode with the Hawk missiles in November. "With hindsight, even taking them into account, it seems to me that that is still effectively an accurate answer in that the 18 Hawk missiles, although they were delivered to Iran, they were also taken out of Iran. So the net of all of that is 2008 TOW missiles and 240 Hawk missile battery parts." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 36-39; JHICI Ex. JMP 65 [Transcript of Poindexter interview on "Meet the Press," 11/16/86]. See 85/09/14-200 [Poindexter's testimony on his awareness of Iran arms transactions].)
86/11/16-203 JULY 21, 1987			IRAN ARMS TRANSACTIONS: PRIOR ISRAELI SALES POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCCLURE. Admiral Poindexter, are you aware of prior arms and war materials shipments by Israel to Iran that were not a part of this initiative? "Mr. POINDEXTER. We had intelligence reports over the years that I was in the White House that there were such arms transfers. Various U.S. officials had talked to the Israeli Government about this, and the Israeli Government always denied it. I don't recall that we had absolutely had evidence that indeed [t]hey were, but it was certainly a suspicion on our part. "Mr. MCCLURE. I have read reports that they

had a very large arms industry and a very large arms trade with Iran at the time the Shah was in power and that they continued to protect that trade and that economic base in their country after the Shah fell from power.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't doubt that.

"Mr. MCCLURE. You testified yesterday in response to Mr. Sarbanes that you had some personal views on the prior arms shipment. I really am interested to know just what those views are and how extensive that trade may have been.

"[Counsel conferring with witness.]

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Senator, can you put that in context a little more? I don't recall what you are talking about.

"Mr. MCCLURE. I am talking about prior arms and war material shipments by Israel to Iran.

"Mr. BECKLER. I think the reference to personal views is what is confusing here.

"Mr. MCCLURE. Look at yesterday's transcript [7/20/87], page 37, lines 857, 858. [See 86/11/16-200.]

". . . .

"Mr. MCCLURE. . . . If you will start at line 853, and you are saying, 'I think now the point here is that there were all sorts of rumors floating around out there' --

". . . .

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Okay, I see the context now. I think that is the answer I have already given you, Senator. My personal views are that the Israelis were probably shipping larger quantities of arms to Iran earlier, which were not authorized

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			by the United States. "Mr. MCCLURE. You heard General Secord's testimony, I take it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. It has been some weeks ago. ". . . . "Mr. MCCLURE . . . . On my question to General Secord and his response, it starts on the bottom of page 273 [of published transcript (= Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/8/87, at 24).] ". . . 'Mr. McClure: So there was a pattern of resupply to Iran of spare parts for equipment that had at an earlier time been supplied from the United States sources to Iran.' "Mr. Secord's answer, 'Yes, sir.' "Do you have any personal knowledge concerning that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall right now the exact content of the various intelligence reports that we had, but General Secord's statements there are consistent, I believe, with my suspicions at the time. The thing that I am a little uneasy about and want to be careful as to whether we really had hard intelligence on this or whether it was just our analysis as to what was happening." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 174-77.)
86/11/17-000 WEEK OF NOVEMBER 17, 1986			OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane testifying on his failure, a year later, to recall the details of the November 1985 shipment from Israel to Iran: "Mr. NIELDS. Did you during the week of

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			November 17, 1986 discuss with North or Poindexter the fact that each of you w[as] going to say that your understanding of the November 1985 shipment had been that it was oil drilling equipment? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 63.)
86/11/17-020 NOVEMBER 17, 1986 (MONDAY)	POINDEXTER-MEESE CONTACT POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOREN. . . . Your records indicated on November 17th you received a message from Attorney General Meese at 9:43 a.m. You returned that call at 6:30 p.m., November 17th, 1986. "Can you recall what you discussed with Attorney General Meese during that conversation? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Let's see. As I recall, the 17th, I believe, was on a Monday. I think that may have been about the fact that I was going to call Bill Casey and ask him to come back early. "I really can't recall that specific telephone call, but during the month I had several conversations with Ed about the issue. I remember one call I asked him if he could have one of his assistants prepare a legal paper on the President's authority to postpone notification to the Congress. It could have been that issue." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 134-35. For Poindexter testimony following this entry, see 86/11/21-004].)		
86/11/17-040 NOVEMBER 17, 1986	POINDEXTER-MEESE CONTACT POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. FOLEY. On November 17th you received a		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(MONDAY)	message from Attorney General Meese marked 'Urgent' at 9:43 in the morning. Do you recall that? ". . . . "Mr. FOLEY. Do you recall that telephone call? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I do not. I just simply don't recall it. "Mr. FOLEY. Admiral-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. I recall talking to the Attorney General numerous times during the month of November, but what we discussed in that particular phone call I am sorry, I have no way of remembering that." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 147.)		
86/11/17-100 NOVEMBER 17, 1986 (MONDAY)			WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT: NO FURTHER ARMS SALES DoS CHRONOLOGY: "SPEAKES announces that the White House has no further plans for arms shipments to Iran. He also confirms that the SECRETARY OF STATE is Administration's chief foreign policy spokesman." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues 86/11/18-090.)
86/11/17-400 NOVEMBER 17, 1986 (MONDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES COOPER ACCOUNT: Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper receives a draft chronology from the NSC. Meese apparently has not yet received it. Cooper learns for the first time that arms had been transferred to Iran prior to the January 17 Finding.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE | GENERAL | CONTRAS | IRAN

Cooper calls Meese to tell him of this discovery. Meese says that he was unaware of the shipment of U.S. arms to Iran by any party prior to the January 17 Finding.

Cooper and John McGinnis begin research into the Arms Export Control Act and notification issues raised by pre-January shipments. (Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87.)

86/11/18-020
NOVEMBER 18,
1986
(TUESDAY)

THE IRAN INITIATIVE: LEGAL CONCERNS
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. I'm going to show you [Poindexter Dep.] Exhibit 55, which is a document dated November 18, 1986, with questions and answers regarding United States policy towards Iran. Have you ever seen this document before?

"A. I don't know whether I've seen this before or not.

"Q. Do you know what it is?

"A. I know what it is.

"Q. What is it?

"A. It is a series of questions and answers that were prepared -- at some stage of preparation. I don't know what, but it is a typical format in preparing press guidance.

"Q. For whom?

"A. For probably somebody in the White House. But I can't tell whether this is a draft or final version, or what it is.

"Q. It refers, Admiral, in a question on page 6, to 'Did the shipment of arms to Iran violate the Arms Export Control Act or any other law?' And the reference is that it did not.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Do you know whether prior to the date of this exhibit, which is the 18th of November, you had obtained -- "MR. BECKLER: Wait a minute. "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. -- you had obtained legal advice from the Attorney General on whether these shipments had violated the Arms Export Control Act? And particularly the November shipment. "A. Well, it is not clear to me the question addresses the November shipment. "Q. Let's take my question. Did you have any legal advice prior to November 18 on whether the November Hawk shipment violated the Arms Export Control Act? "MR. BECKLER: You mean, did John Poindexter have any advice? "MR. LIMAN: As National Security Adviser. "THE WITNESS: The only thing I can remember related to your question, not necessarily the question that is here on the paper, is that, as I've testified before, at the meeting in my office on January the 16th, 1986, when Ed Meese made clear that he thought that the best way to do the finding was to have the United States go directly to Iran with the sales rather than through Israel so that we avoided the reporting requirement that would have been necessary under the Arms Export Control Act when a country like Israel transferred arms to a third country. That's the only thing that comes close to the answer to your question. "BY MR. LIMAN: Q. In November, prior to November 18, 1986,

was there any discussion about whether the shipment of Hawks violated the Arms Export Control Act?

"A. I don't recall any.

"Q. Did you seek any advice from the Attorney General or the Attorney General's office on whether you had a legal problem?

"A. I don't recall any --

"Q. Admiral --

"A. -- prior to the 18th."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 69-72; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 55 [Memo, "Questions and Answers Re U.S. Policy Toward Iran," 11/18/86; Committee Documents N 36719 through 36728].)

86/11/18-040
NOVEMBER 18,
1986
(TUESDAY)

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S HELP TO THE WHITE HOUSE AS THE IRAN STORY BREAKS

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. NUNN. . . . We talked before lunch again about this transcript of the telephone conversation between you and Director Casey [see 86/11/20-534 -535; 86/11/22-506] . . . .

". . . .

"Mr. NUNN. You read this morning a part of that, the third page, . . . you state here, this is John, we could do it--uh--however you like--uh--want to, I would like to spend some time just the two of us but if Ed Meese indicated--uh--he should want to be helpful, and so he would like to be in at least one of these meetings.

"Do you recall that?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I do.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. NUNN. A question I have is what did Ed Meese mean, this is on November 18th before there was a factfinding mission by him, what did Ed Meese mean by wanting to be helpful? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I testified many days ago Ed called me very early in the month of November after we came back from the West Coast and the story began to break and he offered his assistance in helping prepare to discuss the issue with the Congress. He recognized very early on that at some point in the not too distant future we would have to brief Congress on the finding. He of course was well aware that the President decided to postpone notification under the finding but it was pretty clear to all of us that at some point as I say in the not too distant future from the first of November, we were going to have to brief the Congress and Ed was clearly the expert on addressing the question about the President's statutory and constitutional authority to postpone notification. "Mr. NUNN. So he wan't getting into the Hawk missiles and that kind of thing? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, not at all. "Mr. NUNN. And-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. By the way, one other point I would like to make, and that is that Ed Meese during the time that I was National Security Adviser and that he was Attorney General, he really had two hats. I think I have testified at least in the deposition about this. He was a member of the NSPG because the President wanted him to remain in that capacity because he had been

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			in that position when he was Counselor to the President. He was a member of the NSPG not as the Attorney General, but as essentially a Special Counselor to the President. "The President--the way we set up the NSPG, he could invite to those meetings who[m]ever he wanted. So often Ed would provide advice and counsel to the White House that was not strictly Justice Department business." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 189-92.)
86/11/18-080 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			WHITE HOUSE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S LEGAL ADVISERS SOFAER ACCOUNT: White House meeting called by the White House counsel on the Iran arms issue. Attending: Wallison (White House counsel), Cooper (DoJ), Thompson (NSC), Doherty (CIA general counsel), Sofaer (DoS legal adviser), and several others. The meeting is called in preparation for the President's press conference. It becomes clear to Sofaer, as the meeting gets underway, that Cooper, Thompson and Doherty know more about the arms sales than Wallison. Cooper mentions, and Thompson acknowledges, the January 17 Finding. No other Finding is mentioned, however. Thompson tells the group that the White House will brief the Intelligence Committee; but when the others press Thompson for more information on the briefing, at least, he refuses. Thompson says that Poindexter has instructed him not to give information to anyone who doesn't need to know.

Sofaer and the others continue to press Thompson. "Our position," Sofaer testified, "was that, in order to advise our clients on the legal issues involved, we did need to know it. And at a minimum, we should be told what was going to be told to staffers." But Thompson continues to "[f]latly refuse[], with considerable embarrassment."

According to Sofaer, Thompson "said that from the political point of view that things seemed calm and the committees seemed to be accepting the position of the White House and there was really no need to get the issue more broadly briefed."

Thompson mentions a September shipment of arms by Israel to Iran. Sofaer understands from Thompson that this shipment, only, precedes the January 17 Finding.

Since that shipment would fall under the Arms Export Control Act, Sofaer asks whether the President had approved it. Thompson doesn't answer. He does say that the total value of the shipment is about $14 million.

After the meeting, Sofaer talks to Wallison. Sofaer tells Wallison "[t]hat we had not been briefed, and that they were going to say things to Hill staffers that they weren't telling us -- shocking. And that it was particularly serious from [Wallison's] point of view because he was the President's counsel and that he should act accordingly."

Wallison tells Sofaer he agrees, and Sofaer leaves. (Sofaer, Senate Dep., 7/16/87, at 8-20.)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/18-090 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: DoS SEEKS INFORMATION DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS tells ARMACOST and HILL that State must have access to all the facts concerning the Iran initiative. "State LEGAL ADVISER SOFAER attends General Counsels' meeting at White House. Reports back that NSC Counsel THOMPSON declined, under instructions, to give full story." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/19-270.)
86/11/18-150 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (EARLY AFTERNOON TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: McFARLANE INVOLVEMENT McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane has lunch at Poindexter's office with Alton Keel and Poindexter. Poindexter says he is "under the gun to get an accurate chronology of events in the Iranian initiative prepared and that Colonel North was asked to put it together." Poindexter asks McFarlane to review it. (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 166.)
86/11/18-155 DURING NOVEMBER 1986		THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: NO REFERENCE TO DIVERSION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "[T]he chronology was never intended to be a public document. It was intended to represent all of the facts of the Iranian project less the contra connection." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 226.)	THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: HOW THEY DEVELOPED POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Okay. Now you wanted to say something about the chronologies? "A. On the chronology, it is important again for me to reiterate that the chronology was never intended to be a public document. It was intended

DATE	GENERAL	CCNTRAS	IRAN
		See col. 3.	to represent all of the facts of the Iranian project less the contra connection. It went through several drafts. In fact, the final version that has whatever markings on it it has, I never considered the final version. "The discovery of the contra connection occurred before I felt that we had a finished product. I knew there were errors in it. I frankly -- you know, again the big problem that I was having in November of 1986 was trying to reconstruct exactly what had happened in July, August, September, October, and November. I knew what was on there wasn't accurate, but I also -- I didn't know what was accurate in terms of everything that had transpired; and it simply, in my view, when we left, it did not represent a finished product. "I had very little time during that hectic period to review it; and Mr. McFarlane, when he had called me, and I think it was probably when I called to invite him to come to lunch with me early the week of the 10th, I believe it was, because I wanted, I asked Colonel North to talk to him, but I wanted to reiterate, and I thought he ought to prepare a memorandum for the record. "Dr. Keel attended that lunch. At that point, in the telephone call with Mr. McFarlane, he said that he thought that the Chief of Staff, Don Regan, was putting out the word to the media that he, Bud, was responsible for the whole thing and trying to put it off on him. I told Bud, to the best of my knowledge that was not true, and that I did not think Don Regan was doing that. And told

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			him that I certainly wanted to lay out the facts. "Out of the lunch that I had with Bud, he did not agree and also did not disagree to produce the memorandum for the record. But as a matter of fact, he never did. "And so, without that information, we really couldn't get all of the facts straight for that first time period. "He sent me some drafts, but frankly, I didn't think that the drafts were complete." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 225-27.)
86/11/18-160 NOVEMBER 1986		THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: NO REFERENCE TO DIVERSION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "And when I tasked Colonel North to prepare the chronology, either at that time or within a day or two later, I made it clear to Colonel North that the chronology should be factual and lay out what happened with the exception of the contra -- the transfer of funds to the contras, which I viewed at that point as a separate, although obviously related, but as a separate issue. That was never intended to be in there." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 75-77.) See col. 3.	THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: POINDEXTER'S TASKING NORTH, AND THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Did you participate in the preparation of inaccurate chronologies in order to protect the President? "A. No. I did not. The chronology was prepared at my direction. I read in the Tower Report that Don Regan thinks that he requested it. He may have at some point, but when we came back from California in early November of 1986, and I saw that it was going to be a problem, and because we had minimized the written record at my direction, on the whole Iranian project, because of the danger that I saw of leakage to a very sensitive project here that involved human lives, the possible opening to the Iranian government, which would have clearly mixed reviews, it was important that we prevent leakage and premature exposure of it. But once the information began to

leak out of the Middle East, due to the factional infighting in Iran, I realized that we needed a source document in the White House that laid out as best we could precisely what had happened.

"So my direction to Colonel North was to prepare a chronology that was an accurate reflection of what happened.

"Now, both he and I were at a disadvantage of not being directly involved in the first few months of the Iranian project, starting from the time period in July of 1985 through November. So I asked him to contact Mr. McFarlane and try to get from him his best recollection of the first few months of the project.

"And when I tasked Colonel North to prepare the chronology, either at that time or within a day or two later, I made it clear to Colonel North that the chronology should be factual and lay out what happened with the exception of the contra -- the transfer of funds to the contras, which I viewed at that point as a separate, although obviously related, but as a separate issue. That was never intended to be in there. The chronology was prepared not to be a public document. It was still classified. It went through several iterations.

"You know, if you recall the time period, we were being beaten about the head and shoulders in the press and we didn't have many written records. I frankly don't believe that Colonel North recalled that he had the -- that he had saved the PROF's notes. My personal policy was that about once a month, I erased all of my PROF's notes

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			because I always considered the PROF system as a working document system, not part of the official record, and routinely about once a month went in there and erased it. I assumed other people were doing the same thing. "So preparing the chronology was not an easy task." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 75-77. See id., 5/2/87, at 43-48; id., 6/17/87, at 288-91 [the PROF system].)
86/11/18-161 NOVEMBER 1986			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY •POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Admiral, the chronology put forward the notion that oil-drilling equipment was shipped in November, didn't it? "A. That what? "MR. NIELDS: Oil-drilling equipment. "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. That oil-drilling equipment was shipped in November; correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. You knew that it was Hawks; correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. For whose protection was that cover story put in the chronology? "A. Well, let me make one main point. That is that I never felt that the chronology was a finished document during the whole time. In fact, I had not had an opportunity to thoroughly read the chronology before I left the White House.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Now, the issue -- we thought and the President thought that he could remember what had happened on the early shipments in August and September of 1985. And, in fact, in press backgrounders that I gave during that time period, in one of the press backgrounders, I indicated that there had been one prior shipment that we had acquiesced to; but, frankly, when I gave that press backgrounder, for example, I could not -- we are talking about events that happened a year before. I had not been directly involved in setting them up. "My memory of that time period was very fuzzy. But the week of 17 November, as we were preparing to brief the Hill in more detail on what had happened, it became clear that Mr. McFarlane's recollection as to what had happened in November of 1985 was different from Secretary Shultz' recollection. "So on Thursday the 20th of November, Ed Meese -- I asked Ed Meese to join Director Casey and I [sic] as we sat down to go over our respective briefings of the two Intelligence Committees the following day, on Friday. "At that point, we realized that we didn't have all the facts on what had happened in November of 1985. It was clear to me that it wasn't -- at that point, it was clear to me that it wasn't oil-drilling equipment but we frankly -- I did not have it at my fingertips at that point, all the facts. "So in the meeting, we decided that the following day, on Friday, that Director Casey and

I would both say that there had been some shipments by the Israelis in November of '85. We still weren't clear on all the facts and we were still investigating that. So that part of the chronology was not used.

"Q. That's really not what I am getting at, Admiral. . . ."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 77-79.)

86/11/18-162
NOVEMBER 1986

THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 3:

[Question continuing from preceding entry:]

"[Q.] Admiral, you pride yourself on the fact that you have a relatively good memory; is that fair to say?

"A. Fair. I can't remember specifics sometimes.

"Q. But you were personally involved in some aspects of that Israeli Hawk shipment; is that correct?

"A. Right. That's correct.

"Q. And that --

"A. At least from the standpoint of -- well, it would be helpful probably at this point for me to go over --

"Q. Let me just ask. You were told in November [1985] that the Israelis were shipping Hawks; am I correct?

". . . .

"[A.] Yes. With hindsight, as I can explain to you in a little bit, I was aware in November of '85 that Hawks were being shipped.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Q. And that was not an everyday occurrence in terms of your responsibilities? That the Israelis would send Hawks to Iran? "A. Well, that's certainly true. "Q. Are you saying that in November of '86, you had forgotten it? "A. That is the honest fact. I could not remember -- I mean a lot of water had passed over the dam since then. I had been heavily involved in working on other issues, arms control, U.S.-Soviet relations. I could not remember what had happened in November of '85. "In November of '85, as I pointed out earlier, we had the Geneva summit. Mr. McFarlane was in Geneva with the President. I was holding down the office back here. One day I recall getting a call from Commander Thompson who was with Mr. McFarlane at the time and saying something to the effect that Mr. McFarlane had called Colonel North and asked him to help with an Israeli aircraft problem. And, as I recall, Commander Thompson was talking on a non-secured line so it was a very cryptic conversation. I had -- after that, I asked Colonel North to come over to find out what it was and part of this that I am recalling to you now was based on a refreshing of my memory by Colonel North in November of '86, a year later. "But because he had a -- he had one of his notebooks in which he -- an old notebook in which he was briefing me on a conversation that he had had with me in November of '85. From that conversation -- from his debriefing [in] November of '86 of the conversation in November of '85, a

year previous, it was clear that we knew that there were Hawk missiles in that shipment. But when I did the press backgrounder, and when the early version of the chronology was prepared, I frankly could not remember what had happened in November of '85; but, as I said, on that Thursday, prior to Director Casey and I talking to the Hill, it was clear that -- see, because at that point Mr. McFarlane was saying that we didn't know weapons were aboard. At that point, I think that I knew that we did have weapons aboard, and Secretary Shultz -- his recollection of the conversation was that we knew. So because neither Colonel North and I had been directly involved in the events of early November, '85, and exactly what was known ahead of time, Director Casey and I decided that the best thing to do on briefing the committees on the following day was simply to say that we knew there had been a shipment in November of '85 but we were still trying to collect all the facts on it.

"Q. Are you --

"A. So it was at that point I knew that the oil drilling part in the chronology was not correct, but again the chronology at that point was not intended to be a finished document and it certainly wasn't intended to be a public document.

"So at least as far as I am concerned, Mr. Liman, there was no effort on my part to create a fictitious story in that chronology with that particular entry."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 79-82. See id., 5/2/87, at 104 [Poindexter testified he

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"really became dissatisfied" with the White House Chronologies "when I learned that Secretary Shultz' recollection of the events of November '86 [sic], disagreed with Mr. McFarlane's."].)
86/11/18-163 NOVEMBER 198			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY, AND McFARLANE INVOLVEMENT POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 4: "Q. . . . Are you saying that in November of 1986, that you thought that what was in the shipment to Iran were oil-drilling parts? "A. What I am saying, Mr. Liman, is that up until -- I did not have access to this PROF's note in November of 1986. As I said, my policy was to erase my PROF's notes about once a month. What I am saying is that in the early weeks of November of 1986, I could not recall what had happened in November of 1985. "Again, you know, part of the reason for that, I am sure, is that I was not involved with the decisions with the Israelis at that point. I was not involved in discussing the matter with the President. I had missed a major NSPG meeting in August of 1985, because I had been on leave during -- during an important NSPG meeting that discussed this issue. "So even though acting in Mr. McFarlane's stead, while Colonel North and I were back here, I did get involved in November of 1985. In the early weeks of November of 1986, I could not remember this series of events. "Q. So you are saying that this left no imprint on your memory?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"A. No. Clearly it was part of the Iranian project. I obviously was very familiar with the Iranian project from December of 1985 on; but those first few months of the Iranian project did not leave an indelible image on my memory as to what happened. "Now, as the days of November of 1986 wore on, and Colonel North did go back at one point and dig out one of his old notebooks and read to me some briefing notes that he had used, we did not pull up, for instance, this old PROF's note in November of 1986. As I said, I doubt seriously if Colonel North realized that all of his PROF's notes were still saved. "Q. But I am not asking you about PROF notes in terms of what you pulled out. I am asking you about your memory. Because even if this PROF note didn't exist, the question is whether this was an unusual enough event in your career that it would have left some imprint on your mind in 1986? "A. You know, it clearly didn't. I must say that the statement about the oil-drilling equipment also didn't ring any bells, and I doubt seriously if that was accurate. "The chronology, as I said, went through several iterations. The first version of the chronology I can recall getting at about 30 minutes before I was to be down in the situation room with the President to brief the congressional leadership on the general outlines of the program; and I did not have time to read that version of the chronology before that briefing. "With the press of other events, as things

went on, I never had a chance to sit down and go through this until that Thursday that Ed Meese and Bill Casey and I met to discuss the briefings to the congressional committees the following day.

"And at that point, I realized that the chronology was very delinquent in that area. I frankly was annoyed about it, because I had not only told Colonel North to work with Mr. McFarlane on figuring out what had happened in 1985, but I had made it a point of inviting Bud down to a lunch in the White House at which Dr. Keel, my deputy at the time sat in on the lunch. The whole purpose of the lunch was to ask Bud to prepare a memorandum for record that would have covered the first few months of the project in 1985.

"For one reason or another, Bud had declined to do that. He didn't tell me he wouldn't do it. But, as a matter of fact, he didn't do it. I felt very inadequate in terms of laying out what the facts were during July, August, September, October and November of 1985."
(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 86-89.)

86/11/18-164
NOVEMBER 1986

THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY, AND NO COVER STORY

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 5:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. Admiral, even after the shipment of Hawks took place --

"A. Right.

"Q. -- did you not get reports from Colonel North in 1985 and in 1986 that the Iranians were unhappy with the Hawks they received?

"A. Absolutely.

"Q. So that this shipment had not only run into logistics problem in [redacted] but had ended up creating a problem in Iran; correct?

"A. Absolutely. In fact -- maybe I haven't made myself very clear here. But in November of 1986, I was aware that Hawk missiles had been shipped by the Israelis to Iran in November of 1985. But what we were trying to lay out in the chronology was the sequence of events that happened. I wasn't sure in the first few weeks of November of 1986 that indeed we were aware when the shipment was being planned that they contained Hawks. As my recollection improved during November of '86, and especially after Colonel North had pulled out one of his old notebooks, it was clear that in November of '85, that we knew well ahead of time that there were Hawk missiles aboard. But, you know, it was -- I guess this isn't a very good excuse, but November of 1986 was a very confusing time for us.

"Q. Was there any effort in November of 1986 to put out a cover story?

"A. Not as far as I was concerned, Mr. Liman.

"Q. Whether it was to protect the lives of the hostages or protect anything else, was there any desire that you expressed to anyone to put out a cover[] story?

"A. There was no effort to mislead anybody that I endorsed or initiated in November of 1986. Now, there was concern about the hostages. There was a concern on my part of the damage that the revelation of this was going to do in terms of the possibility of preserving the channel that we had developed to the Iranian government; and so during the first few weeks, the President's press conference, and the speech that he made on national television, yes, there was an effort there not to lay out all the details. We wanted to -- especially during -- the point of the speech which I recall came first, we wanted to withhold the fact that -- of Israel's direct involvement and to put out frankly as little information as we could in those early days of November.

"Yes. That was clearly an effort, because we were concerned about the safety of the hostages and I was concerned about preserving that channel to the Iranians.

"In fact, as November wore on, we continued to maintain contact with the Iranians even as late as after the President's press conference. We were nurturing that along, hoping to manage it in such a way that we wouldn't completely damage the channel. And so there was a concern on our part at least in terms of public statements of laying out all the facts; and so to that extent, yes, we were withholding information. But there was never any effort on my part to mislead or deceive anybody.

"You know, you or somebody else could interpret withholding information as misleading, but -- I guess that's a judgment call." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 89-91.)

86/11/18-166

THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: COVER STORY ABOUT

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN--CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 1985 - NOVEMBER 1986			OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOMFIELD. You have testified, Mr. Regan, that you heard or were told that in case of a breach in security over the Iran arms initiative, reference to oil-drilling equipment would be a cover story. "Who told you to use the oil-drilling story as a cover, and when did you learn of the need for a cover story? "Mr. REGAN. I believe it was told to me [in November 1985] in Geneva by Bud McFarlane at the time he was describing, as I called it, an intricate maneuver involving those 80 TOWs [sic (HAWKs)]." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 208.)
86/11/18-170 DURING NOVEMBER 1986		THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: NO REFERENCE TO DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "I specifically told him [sc. North] to leave out the transfer of funds to the contras. I considered that a separate issue, and that--at that time we didn't feel would leak out or be connected, so I didn't want that issue in the chronology. But I expected the rest of it to be accurate." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 54-58.) See col. 3.	THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, there then came a time when the Iranian initiative was disclosed first in Lebanon and then it became the subject of a great deal of controversy in the United States? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you request that chronology be prepared? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Are you aware of Colonel North's testimony last week that you were--these were his words--'witting' of the fact--'witting' is his word [see 86/11/18-400]--of the fact that these chronologies were being falsified to cover up the United States' involvement in the Israeli TOW

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			shipment in September and the Hawk transaction? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, as again I have testified on May 2nd, I was aware that the chronologies were inaccurate. I have testified to that before. "I also was not sure what the right answer was. There was a great deal of confusion in November of 1986 as to what had actually transpired in all of these events. And when we were on the west coast--when I was on the west coast with the President election day and the story in Al Shiraa came out, I realized that we needed to prepare a chronology or a narrative as to what had actually transpired in the whole project; and shortly upon returning to Washington, I tasked Colonel North to prepare a chronology of the facts. "I specifically told him to leave out the transfer of funds to the contras. [See 86/00/02-653.] I considered that a separate issue, and that--at that time we didn't feel would leak out or be connected, so I didn't want that issue in the chronology. But I expected the rest of it to be accurate. "Colonel--I also told Colonel North to talk to Mr. McFarlane about it because he was the one that was intimately involved in the early phases. I was very fuzzy at that point on the actions of July, August, September, October and November of 1985. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you, other than the instruction to leave out the diversion, did you ask him to make these chronologies inaccurate with

respect to the United States' involvement in the Israeli shipments?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. To answer your specific question, Mr. Liman, I did not.

"The problem that we had was that at that point, we didn't realize--I certainly didn't realize, and I don't think Colonel North realized we had all of these old PROFS notes. We had purposely limited the amount of paper on the issue, and I was very fuzzy on the initial stages. The chronology went through him, many drafts. I saw some of them.

"I invited Mr. McFarlane to lunch at the White House on the 18th. The specific reason for inviting him to lunch was to encourage him to prepare a memorandum for record as to what had happened in the early stages of the project. I had asked Colonel North to do that earlier, and very frankly, Colonel North was having some difficulty in getting Mr. McFarlane to recall exactly what had happened.

"Mr. LIMAN. You said that you were aware that the chronologies were inaccurate in some respects?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. That's correct. Some versions and some aspects.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . [W]hen you just said a moment ago you were aware that there were inaccuracies, what did you have in your mind?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. What I had in my mind was that the section in the last version that was prepared before Colonel North and I left--and I think it is dated the 20th of November, as I

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			recall--the section about the Hawks I felt was inaccurate at the time, in November of 1986. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, Admiral-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. The problem was that I didn't know what the right answer was at that time. "Mr. LIMAN. Did anybody at the White House ask you to prepare inaccurate chronologies? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely not. That was not my objective and nobody suggested that. "Mr. LIMAN. No one gave you that charge? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Nobody." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 54-58.)
86/11/18-175 DURING NOVEMBER 1986		THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: NO REFERENCE TO DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: NO REFERENCE TO DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. . . . Admiral Poindexter, you testified that you directed Colonel North to leave out of the chronologies he was preparing on the Iran arms transactions any mention of the diversion of funds to the contras, is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. BOLAND. Did you give Colonel North any other instructions with respect to items to be left out of the chronologies? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 45-46.)
86/11/18-177 DURING NOVEMBER 1986		THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: NO REFERENCE TO DIVERSION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:	THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. You indicated before that you wanted

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		See col. 3.	accurate, factual chronologies. Do you recall that? "A. That is correct. "Q. And that the one thing that was not to be in the chronologies was the diversion? "A. That is correct. "Q. Did you tell that to Oliver North? "A. I believe I did. Certainly that was my intent. I think I communicated it to him. "It is important, I think, in terms of the circumstances that existed in November that -- the thing that had leaped out was the Iranian project, so all of the focus of the chronology and a narrative of the affair was oriented towards Iran, not towards the contras, which I always considered a separate issue. "Q. You considered a separate issue as to how the money that was generated by the arms sales was spent? "A. That is correct." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 12-13.)
86/11/18-250 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES, AND THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON IRAN McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . [O]n the 18th, Admiral Poindexter and I and Dr. Keel had lunch in Admiral Poindexter's office. He told me that he was under the gun to get an accurate chronology of events in the Iranian initiative prepared and that Colonel North was asked to put it together. He wanted to know if I would be willing to review it and add or check the accuracy of it. I said that I would.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"That evening I had a call--late afternoon--Colonel North, I believe, saying that they were going to have something ready by about 8:00 and could I come, and I did. And when I got there, in Colonel North's office, there were two items being worked on. The first was an opening statement that I was told would be used by the President in a press conference the following night, the 19th, and would I look at that, too. So I did, and it seemed to me to be incomplete in a number of respects. "So I sat down and, using Colonel North's machine, PROFs machine, prepared a three-section draft for consideration by Admiral Poindexter, and I was told that he had gone home, and I sent it to him at his home. He had a machine at home. "And in the process of working on the third section, I had an answer from the Admiral basically saying that he agreed with the first two sections and, at any rate, I spent about an hour and a half, perhaps more, writing that revised opening statement. "I got up hoping to leave and was asked if I would look over the chronology. The chronology was being worked by four or five staff officers in the office there, and they were adding bits and pieces, in a not unusual cut and paste kind of process. "There was a basic document which Colonel North called the master that he was working from, which I was told had been prepared by the CIA officer from the Middle East Section, and he asked me to look over it, and I began to go through it

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			and found right at the beginning a number of mistakes and pointed them out to him, and it was understandable, because the CIA officer involved had not been himself involved in the early stages of the Iran opening. "Mr. LIMAN. Was this the occasion on which the next mention was made to you of the use of the proceeds of the Iranian sale for-- "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. I am getting to that. I am sorry to be a little deliberate in approaching it. [See 86/11/18-650, 86/11/19-250.] "Mr. LIMAN. You were saying that the CIA had been working on the chronology. I am sorry. And that they were not fully familiar with the early events? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. But I pointed out to Colonel North a number of places where I thought it needed changing. He said 'Fine. We will take care of that.' I came to the place in the master where it treated the President's involvement in the original decision. It seemed to me not quite accurate. "And I asked those there who had written it and who had written other contributions which were lying on the table there, and no one seemed to know. I took one that had been proposed as an insert to the text there, and it had two paragraphs on it, one of them treating the President's decision, and it said, in so many words, that the President did not approve the September second arms shipment. "Well, that is technically a true statement, but it is not a complete statement to the extent

that his authority approved in August was given for Israel to negotiate sales without any need to come back to him for approval of each specific one.

"And so, to say that he did not approve the September second shipment is technically accurate, but misses the point that he did provide the original authority that allowed them to do it.

"The second paragraph on this draft that was there treated how the President reacted when he was informed about the Israeli shipment and of Reverend Weir's release as being one of upset and that he directed someone to have me express his upset to Israel. [Sic.]

"Well, he never said that to me, and yet I couldn't--I didn't know whether he might have said it to someone else, but it was a rationalization on my part. In short, I couldn't disapprove what was on the paper, and it was not technically wrong.

"So, I took it as a foundation, and I set down myself to prepare what I thought were improvements to that treatment, and others in the chronology, and I spent probably the next 30 to 45 minutes in working on that, punched it up with copies to the Admiral and to Colonel North and his secretary, and left.

". . . ."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 166-69; JHICI Exx. 55 [White House Chronologies, 11/17/86 2000 (Maximum Version)], 56 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Chronology," 11/18/86]. See 86/11/18-348.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/18-290 AROUND NOVEMBER 18, 1986			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: SECORD INVOLVEMENT SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord is called and asked to come to North's office in the OEOB "to help them, the staff . . . to compile a chronology for the use of the [DCI] in his upcoming testimony to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees." He returns the following day but leaves after a disagreement over the contents. (Secord Testim., JHICI, at 107-09.)
86/11/18-345 DURING NOVEMBER 1986			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MITCHELL. . . . Isn't it true, Mr. McFarlane, that you and Colonel North and other officials deliberately falsified the chronology, you particularly, with respect to the question of whether or not the President had authorized the shipment of TOWs from Israel to Iran in August of 1985? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir, it is not." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 138.)
86/11/18-346 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT: [For McFarlane testimony preceding this entry, see 86/11/07-001.] "Mr. LIMAN. Have you said at some time or the other that you thought the exercise was to g[]ild the President's motives? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. What did you mean by that and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			where did you get that idea from? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I got it from the remarks of the office[r]s gathered on the evening of November 18 that seemed to me devoted in loyalty to preventing the President from being damaged, just by the tenor of what they had to say and by four or five of the typed pieces of paper on the table there that seemed to be cast in a way as to put the best face on things and to minimize the President's role. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you then participate in that type of exercise? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And it is the way that you participated by, in your chronology, indicating that the President had said no to the Israeli proposal? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I acceded to a reference that had been drafted that he did not approve the September second shipment, although I typed in and sent to Admiral Poindexter at the same time the events as they occurred. "This was the second of what I assumed would be 13 or 14 drafts. And the next day when I went by his office, I pointed out that there are still a number of problems with that chronology, but that is correct; yes. "Mr. LIMAN. The chronology that you sat down and typed out on the professor's [sic (PROFs?)] machine indicated that you told the Israelis that he, the President, could not authorize any transfer of military material, and then after the Israelis again came back to you, in this

chronology, you repeated he, the President, could not approve any transfer of military material at that time. This position was conveyed to the Israeli diplomat. And that is the g[]ilding that you referred to?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. It is in a PROF's note. I am sure it is your book somewhere.

"Mr. LIMAN. It is Exhibit 56. I apologize for the printing, but it is printed also in the Tower Report, D-5, D-6, and you have that in front of you. That will be easier on your eyes.

"If you look on page D-6, the paragraph is on the right-hand side of the page, Mr. McFarlane.

"It is the third paragraph that begins there, it says 'Mr. McFarlane elevated this proposition to the President and at a meeting within days that included the Secretary of State, Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence.

"[']The President stated that while he could understand that assuming the legitimacies of the interlocutors, they would be quite vulnerable and ultimately might deserve our support to include tangible material, that at the time, without any first-hand experience in dealing with them, he could not authorize any transfers of military material. This was conveyed to the Israeli.'

"Then it goes on to describe another contact with the Israeli diplomat, and goes on to the top of the next page, and it says, 'Again the President stated that while he could imagine the day coming when we might choose to support such elements with material, he could not approve any transfer of military material at that time. This

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			position was conveyed to the Israeli diplomat.' "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 198-201; JHICI Ex. 56 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Chronology," 11/18/86]. On the 8/6/85 meeting to discuss the Israeli proposals, see entries starting at 85/08/06-020.)
86/11/18-347 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . I take it we are all aware that in January of 1986 there was a Presidential finding authorizing the sale of arms to Iran. I take it from your testimony yesterday that there were two transactions in 1985 that preceded the finding and were not covered by it, is that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And one of them involved a shipment of Tows in August and September of 1985? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And one of them involved a shipment of Hawk missiles in November of 1985? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Those 1985 shipments were by Israel? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it from your testimony yesterday that Secretary Weinberger had indicated that there was a legal problem with the United States approving those shipments? "Mr. MCFARLANE. He had concerns about the legal nature of it, yes.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. NIELDS. And his concerns were that it would be illegal for the United States to approve shipments to Iran by Israel of U.S. weapons? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, he said that he believed that there might be a legal problem, and I believe that he made a reference to the Arms Export Control Act, and as I recall, Mr. Casey said that the authority of the President to proceed under a separate finding ought to be explored, but it was inconclusive. "Mr. NIELDS. And there never was such a finding in '85? "Mr. MCFARLANE. There was never a written finding in '85, no. "Mr. NIELDS. I think in response to some questions from Mr. Liman yesterday you were not sure whether the subject of deniability was discussed in '85? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. But that you were sure that it was discussed that it was the Israelis that were that were doing these sales? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And then again in response to some questions by Mr. Liman at the end of the day yesterday, you indicated that in November of 1986 when you were working on the chronologies, that was essentially the story that you put out--namely, that it was the Israelis that did it in '85? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Without our approval? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Perhaps I missed the point.

"Mr. NIELDS. The point is that in '86 when you were working on the chronologies, the story that you put out through the gilding chronology [see 86/11/18-346], as I think you put it yesterday, was that the Israelis did it without our approval.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think I put that out. I have seen that portrayal of it in drafts of the chronology, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Perhaps you could turn to exhibit 56. Do you have that in front of you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Is that a PROF message?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, it is.

"Mr. NIELDS. And was that done by you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And was that done while you were reviewing an earlier draft of the chronology.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 11-13; JHICI Ex. 56 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Chronology," 11/18/86].)

86/11/18-348
NOVEMBER 18,
1986
(TUESDAY)

THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES
McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. And is it the case that the earlier draft of the chronology stated that the September transfer of Tows had been approved at the highest level of our government?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't know.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well then, let's turn to exhibit 55. Do you have that in front of you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And is that a draft chronology with the date 11/17/86?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, but this is not the chronology from which I was working.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, does it say 11/17/86?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, but that has nothing to do with what I was working from.

"Mr. NIELDS. And does it say 2000 in the upper right hand corner?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Moving back to the exhibit 56, I ask you to look at the first page of the exhibit.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Does it say at the beginning of the second paragraph, 'it seems to me I ought to limit my input to what I recall from my involvement before January '86 and from the May meeting.' In that context the 'I had recommended eliminating all the materials starting at the 11/17/[86]2000 version at page 3.' Does it say that?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Is that a reference to the chronology which is exhibit 55 that says 11/17/[86]2000 in the upper right hand corner?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. It appears so. I said that in working through the chronology on the evening of the 15th that there was a CIA master, it was called, from which I was making my own additions and subtractions.

"Mr. NIELDS. I understand, but I take it in this PROF that you are writing, which is exhibit

56, you make reference to the chronology which is exhibit 55?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I take your point, Mr. Nields. My point is that it was just as possible that version applied as well to the CIA copy that I was working with. I don't know that, but I am--

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, let's pursue that. Again, looking at exhibit 56, which is your PROF, I take it----

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Right after you make reference to the 11/17/[86]2000 version at page 3, penultimate paragraph, and then you write i.e. in '85, a private . . . . Would you turn to page 3 of exhibit 55? Does the penultimate paragraph on that page begin, 'In '85, a private----[']

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Does that help you understand whether this is the document that you were working from when you wrote your PROF?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. It was very likely the one. Probably.

"Mr. NIELDS. You think it is probably the one?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Probably.

"Mr. NIELDS. Okay. Well, I will ask you then to turn to page 4 of exhibit 55, which is the chronology from which you believe you were working when you wrote your PROF message. Do you have page 4 of exhibit 55?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 13-16; JHICI Exx. 55 [White House Chronology, 11/17/86

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			2000 Maximum Version], 56 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Chronology," 11/18/86].)
86/11/18-349 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. There is a paragraph about half-way down the page that begins as follows: 'On August 22, 1985, the U.S., through the U.S. citizen intermediary, acquiesced in an Israeli delivery of military supplies, 508 TOWs, to Tehran.' "You see that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And then at the end of that paragraph it says, 'U.S. acquiescence in this Israeli operation was based on a decision at the highest level.' "Do you see that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. That was the description of the U.S. approval that was contained in the November 17, 1986 version of the chronology. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. You then, reviewing that chronology, suggested in your PROF message that it be changed; isn't that true? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you, indeed, drafted the changes, and they are in Exhibit 56? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And turning to the bottom of page 2 of your draft, I will read to you from the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

second to the last paragraph: 'Mr. McFarlane elevated this proposition to the President at a meeting within days that included the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President stated that while he could understand that, assuming the legitimacy of the interlocut[o]rs, that they would be quite vulnerable and ultimately might deserve our support to include tangible material, that at the time without any first-hand experience in dealing with them he could not authorize any transfers of any military material. This was conveyed to the Israelis.'

"Then you refer to a conversation with the Israelis in which they make a proposal, and at the end of the next paragraph you write, again, 'The President stated that while he could imagine the day coming when we might choose to support such elements with materi[a]l, he could not approve any transfer of military materi[a]l at that time. This position was conveyed to the Israeli diplomat.'

"That is the way in which you suggested the chronology be changed; isn't that true?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I am trying to track the text here for a minute.

"The sum and substance of the PROF note as written there, which was expressing recollections at the time without any access to my own records--and I still haven't had that--was intended to contain in the discourse between me and Mr. Kimche the reality that in saying that they could expect to purchase weapons from the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			United States, as they had for generations and would continue to be able to, that that would continue and they need not have any concerns about being able to purchase replacements from us. "In elevating it to the President--and what is missing from this text right here--the President declared that he couldn't authorize any U.S. transfers of weapons at that time." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 17-19; JHICI Exx. 55 [White House Chronology, 11/17/86 2000 Maximum Version], 56 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Chronology," 11/18/86].)
86/11/18-350 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, my question for the moment, Mr. McFarlane, isn't what actually happened. My question is what you wrote in your PROF as a suggested revision of the chronology. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And am I correct that the chronology stated affirmatively that the U.S. had acquiesced in the Israeli transfer and that that acquiescence was approved at the highest level? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And my question, then, is you suggested that new language be substituted and you drafted it. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you put it on the PROF, which is Exhibit 56. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. NIELDS. And there is no reference to U.S. acquiescence in the Israeli transfer anymore, is there? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I thought I was--that I was what I have just tried to convey here, that when Mr. Kimche and I talked about this and made clear on my side that Israel could expect to be able to buy weapons into the future without restrictions, that they could expect that their concerns about being able to replace them were taken care of. "Now, in the later reference to the President considering it and concluding that he was not able to authorize U.S. transfers of weapons, that doesn't foreclose Israel being able to purchase them themselves. "Mr. NIELDS. Any reference to U.S. acquiescence has been deleted from your version; isn't that true? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, that is right, and my point is not to defend the literal meaning of a close reading of this PROF's note. "Mr. NIELDS. Substituted in its place are two declarations that the President did not approve any transfer of materiel at that time. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I guess we disagree on the interpretation of the entire paragraph in context, but I am not trying to deny that it is not an accurate portrayal of the President's approval of these shipments which, indeed, occurred. "Mr. NIELDS. You are saying it is not an accurate portrayal. "Mr. MCFARLANE. It is not a complete

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			portrayal. "Mr. NIELDS. And in substance what you are doing here is saying the Israelis did it and not disclosing that we approved. "Is that a fair statement? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I am trying to take responsibility that I, indeed, made clear without any equivocation to Mr. Kimche that if they did it they could expect to have their arms replaced, which is the case. "Mr. NIELDS. I understand, but I am not asking you now about what actually happened. I am asking you about how you portrayed it in your PROF message. "My question is, isn't it true that in your PROF message, which was a proposed revision of the chronology, that you, in effect, were saying the Israelis did it and concealing the fact that the U.S. Government had approved? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think I agree with you. Again, what I am basing this PROFs note on is, first of all, not the Exhibit 55 which you have referred to here; I am basing it upon a separate input that had already been prepared to go in place of that there in Colonel North's office that evening. "Now, that replacement item had an even more absolute statement of non-approval by the President of the September 2 shipment, and it seemed to me just not to be even as full as this one is, and so working from that and not from Exhibit 55, I prepared this PROFs note." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 19-22;

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			JHICI Exx. 55 [White House Chronology, 11/17/86 2000 Maximum Version], 56 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Chronology," 11/18/86].)
86/11/18-351 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 5: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Mr. McFarlane, I am actually leading up to something else, and that is, I take it that with respect to the November shipment of Hawks, you couldn't solve the problem simply by saying that the U.S. Government didn't approve; it was impossible to say that with respect to the November shipment of Hawks, isn't that the case? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I am missing a point. I agree the U.S. did approve. "Mr. NIELDS. And not only did they approve but, unlike the TOW transaction, the U.S. Government actually assisted in the transportation. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And not only did the U.S. Government supply or obtain the planes to carry the Hawks which [sic (but?)] you personally intervened with a third country in order to obtain transit rights? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. So it was impossible with respect to the November Hawk shipment to take the position that the U.S. Government hadn't approved of the shipment. We actually delivered the Hawks. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Okay, I would like, then, to

take a look at how the story of the Hawks developed through the various drafts of the chronology. I would like you to turn again to Exhibit 55, which is the 11/17/1986 draft of the chronology.

"Do you have that in front of you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. I will ask you to turn to page 5.

"At the top of page 5, the chronology states: 'In late November, 1985, the Israelis, responding to urgent entreaties from the Iranians, provided 18 basic Hawk missiles to Iran in order to improve the static defenses around Tehran. The Israeli delivery of Hawk missiles raised U.S. concerns that we could well be creating misunderstandings in Tehran and thereby jeopardizing our objective of arranging a direct meeting with high-level Iranian officials. These missiles were subsequently returned to Israel in February, 1986, with U.S. assistance.'

"Now, that statement in the chronology is substantially true, is it not?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think so.

"Mr. NIELDS. Then I would like to turn to your revision, which is Exhibit 56. Would you turn to that, please? Before I go to that, I take it exhibit--the chronology that we have just looked at--is not only true but makes express reference to the fact that Hawk missiles are being shipped.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. I will ask you to turn to the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			third page of your re-write. Do you have that in front of you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. It addresses the subject of the November shipment in only one place. Isn't that the case? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And that is in the middle of the page where it says, at the end of paragraph, insert the following, and now I am going to quote what you propose to insert. 'We subsequently learned that in late August, the Israelis had transferred 508 TOW missiles to Iran. Later in the fall, other transfers of equipment were made between Israel and Iran, although some of the items were returned to Israel.' "That is all you say about the Hawk missiles, isn't it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you refer to them as equipment. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 22-25; JHICI Exx. 55 [White House Chronology, 11/17/86 2000 Maximum Version], 56 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Chronology," 11/18/86].)
86/11/18-352 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 6: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. I would like you to turn to Exhibit . . . 58--which has the words 11/20/86, 2000 at the top. Do you see that?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. I would like you to look at page 6 of that exhibit.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And there it describes the November transaction in the following words. 'In mid November, the Israelis, through a senior officer in the foreign minister's office (Kimche) indicated that the Government of Israel was convinced that they were nearing a breakthrough with Iran on a high-level dialogue. The Israeli contacted a U.S. official (North) and asked for the name of a European-based airline which could discre[et]ly transit to Iran for the purpose of delivering passengers and cargo. He specifically noted that neither a U.S. carrier nor an Israeli-affiliated carrier could be used. We were assured, at the time, that the Israelis were beginning [original document reads "going," not "beginning"] to "try oil-drilling parts as an incentive," since we had expressed so much displeasure over the earlier TOW shipment. The name of the proprietary' --and it is blanked out-- 'was passed to the Israeli, who subsequently had the aircraft chartered through normal commercial contract for a flight from Tel Aviv to Tabriz, Iran, on November 25, 1985. The Israelis were unwitting of the CIA's involvement,' and so on.

"Then the next paragraph begins as follows: 'In January, we learned that the Israelis, responding to urgent entreaties from the Iranians, had used the proprietary aircraft to transport 18 Hawk missiles to Iran.'

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Now, that statement in this chronology is untrue, is it not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think it is, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Because the fact of the matter is that we knew in November of 1985 that it was Hawk missiles that were being transported by the CIA proprietary. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, you were a-- "Mr. GARMENT. I hope it is clear that the chronology we are referring to is the draft chronology. It was not the chronology that was prepared by Mr. McFarlane. "Mr. NIELDS. I was just about to ask him. "Mr. NIELDS. You were aware, were you not, of this change in story concerning the November Hawk shipment? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, Mr. McFarlane, this is dated the 20th. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. On the 21st, you were interviewed by the Attorney General of the United States? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you told the Attorney General of the United States, did you not, that in November of 1985 it was oil drilling equipment that was being sent to Iran? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I believe that I told him that there were reports of oil drilling equipment being considered and being of value in Teheran and that I couldn't be certain then

whether I had learned that in an intelligence report or from Colonel North. But that I had, I agreed, learned of it one way or another that there were in fact Hawks while in Geneva, and that the Secretary of State and the President were advised and made known of it, and you have seen here--in fact you drew our attention to my contribution to this part of the chronology--which was a very cursory line that equipment was transferred.

"I think if you will go ahead and exhibit what is a note that even follows this to Admiral Poindexter from me, in which I report to him that I have contributed to this chronology some of it coming to me for the first time. I have no recollection about a November shipment which is still a little fuzzy in my mind. I think you have that in your book someplace here. [Ex. 59.]

"My point is this, that in November when these chronologies were being made, my own recollection of the November shipment at all of weapons or of oil parts or whatever, was very, very dim, and I said as much both to Admiral Poindexter and what I contributed on the night of the 18th was just a cursory reference to equipment. But this portion of this document that you are referring to here is not my contribution to that version on the 20th of November."
(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 25-28; JHICI Ex. 58 [White House Chronology, 11/20/86 2000 Historical Version].)

86/11/18-353

THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES

82-746 0 - 88 - 8

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 18-21, 1986 (TUESDAY - FRIDAY)			McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 7: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Let's take one step at a time. The first version of the chronology describes a shipment of Hawks in November. Your proposed revision makes no reference to Hawks but refers to equipment. "The later version says that we were told it was oil drilling equipment and we didn't find out that it was Hawk missiles until January 1986. "Then you go down to the Attorney General's Office on Friday, November 21--is that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you were interviewed by him? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And I think you said earlier that the notes of that interview would reflect what you had said? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Before we get to the notes of that interview, you had had, I take it, during the course of the week of November 17th, a number of conversations with Mr. North? "Mr. GARMENT. Mr. Nields, I think it would help the general guidance if you would add to the respective date the year, because we are moving back and forth. "Mr. NIELDS. Good point. "I am not [sic (now)] in '86. You had a number of conversations in the week of November 17, 1986 with Colonel North, did you not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I expect so, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you were down in his office?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	[illegible]
			"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NEILDS. Reviewing the chronology? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. On November 18th. "Mr. NIELDS. And then I think you said you came down on another day and reviewed it a second time. "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe to Admiral Poindexter's office the next day. "Mr. NIELDS. And you had conversations with Admiral Poindexter? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Colonel North knew that Hawk missiles had been transported to Iran in November of 1985? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you were working on a chronology that was supposed to set forth the collective understanding and knowledge of the people who had participated in November of 1985? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is right. "Mr. NIELDS. And you went down to the Attorney General's office on Friday at the end of the process of getting all these stories together and I would ask you to turn to exhibit 67. These are the notes of your interview with the Attorney General. I think you indicated that Mr. Cooper was present, and I think you indicated he was taking notes. These are his notes. I will ask you to refer to the bottom of the third page. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. It says November Hawks. I take it that was you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I imagine, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. This is [sic (says?)] he first learned of it when briefed for a trip to Iran in May.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, in fact you learned of it in November, didn't you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, but I assume that you are implying that according to conversations with North or Poindexter in that same week I had learned of the Hawk transfer. Is that the point?" (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 28-31; JHICI Exx. 55 [White House Chronology, 11/17/86 2000 (Maximum Version)], 56 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Chronology," 11/18/86], 58 [White House Chronology, 11/20/86 2000 (Historical Version)], 57 [Cooper notes of McFarlane-Meese Interview, 11/21/86].)

86/11/18-354
NOVEMBER
18-21, 1986
(TUESDAY -
FRIDAY)

THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES
MCFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 8:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. I am right now . . . asking you what you told the Attorney General. You told the Attorney General that you first learned of the Hawks in May. Then on the top of the next page of the notes, it says November 16 and 17, at summit in Geneva, learned that Israel had shipped oil equipment. So you told the Attorney General on Friday November 21 that you were told in November that it was oil equipment and didn't find out it was Hawk missiles until May. Is that correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And that is exactly the story

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that was written in the last version of the chronology that we just looked at. Isn't that true? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Where is that? "Mr. NIELDS. That is exhibit 58, at page 6. "Mr. MCFARLANE. My copy of that says that, starts out in January we learned that the Israeli responding to urgent entreaties from the Iranians, had used the proprietary aircraft to transport 18 Hawk missiles. Is that the reference you have? "Mr. NIELDS. Yes, and up above--we read this into the record already and I don't want to burden the record--referring in the paragraph above, referring to the November 1985 shipment, it says we were assured at the time that the Israelis were going to try oil drilling parts as an incentive, then the next paragraph says, 'in January we learned that the Israelis had used the proprietary architecture [original document reads "aircraft," not "architecture"] to transport 18 Hawk missiles.' "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. What I am asking you [i]s, isn't it true that what you told the Attorney General the next day, namely, that in November you were told it was oil drilling equipment and didn't find out it was missiles until May, conforms to the version of the facts which is in this November 20 version of the chronology[?] "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, what is missing from this, Mr. Nields, is that I stated in November on the 18th, that subsequently, and it is in written notes to me from Admiral Poindexter--this is 1986

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			now--that I had no clear recollection of the November Hawk shipment at all[,] which is true. "When I went to the Attorney General, I was still in that same basic condition but in our discourse there in the Attorney General's Office he and I talked about that. I mentioned that I had heard of some peripheral mention of oil parts perhaps being tried, that I wasn't sure that they were in fact shipped then, that I had no clear recollection of it. "But then finally when he mentioned to me George Shultz has contemporaneous notes that he says you talked to him about the Hawks, and I said, I can understand that, and I will accept it. I have no clear recollection of it. "But there wasn't any effort to deny. It was simply to say that I didn't recall what had happened. I could accept that the Secretary of State jotted that down, that he would right, and that is fine. "I don't deny that, nor did I contribute to this November 20 Chronology." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 31-34; JHICI Exx. 58 (White House Chronology, 11/20/86 2000 (Historical Version)], 67 [Cooper notes of McFarlane-Meese Interview, 11/21/86].)
86/11/18-355 NOVEMBER 18-21, 1986 (TUESDAY- FRIDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 9: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Mr. McFarlane, we will return in a moment back to November 1985, and exactly what you knew and what your participation was then. I

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			just want the facts to be clear. I think you have testified that Mr. North participated in preparing this chronology. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And the last version of the chronology says that the U.S. was told that it was oil drilling equipment. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And Mr. North knew that it, in fact, had been Hawk missiles? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I assume so. "Mr. NIELDS. And he knew that in 1985, did he not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. In November? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Mr. Poindexter participated in this chronology. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And he knew in November 1985 that it was Hawk missiles? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. You had participated in this chronology? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you knew in November 1985 that it was Hawk missiles? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. NIELDS. And all three of you put out a story that it was oil drilling equipment and that that is what you had been told in 1985? "Mr. MCARLANE. I disagree with that. First of all, your tracking of these versions of the

chronology from the 18 to 20th assumes that in the 18th version which does not mention any oil parts, to the 20th, that that changed by contribution, and it isn't. Beyond that, the fact that in 1985 I had been informed about these 18 Hawks being shipped, which is quite true, and is a matter of record in my notes with the Secretary of State, in 1986 I didn't recall that and that is what I said.

"But in the same conversation with the Attorney General, when reminded that there had been indeed Hawk shipments made, I said, fine, I accept that. I didn't recall it, and I wrote down that I didn't recall it in my note back to Admiral Poindexter. [Ex. 59; see 86/11/21-315.]

"Mr. NIELDS. So you are saying that after a week of working on these chronologies which moved from a version in which it was clearly stated that Hawk missiles had been transported in November 1985 to a version which you then passed on to the Attorney General that we were told it was oil drilling equipment, throughout that week you never remembered that you had known in November 1985 that Hawk missiles were shipped.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think I see what the problem is, Mr. Nields. First of all, I didn't work on these chronologies all the time. On the 18th I was asked to come over but on the night of the 18th, I spent most of my time on the opening statement.

"I think that is obvious from the length of the cable I finally ended up writing. It was on the opening statement.

"I did, however, then turn my attention to the chronology that was being worked on. I didn't go all the way through it. I didn't read it all.

"I did go down and in several places made some changes to it and pointed out errors and others that I was assured would be taken care of.

"But I didn't get into all of them. I did, and I have testified, focused [sic] on the President's involvement in the original decision." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI 5/12/87, at 34-37; JHICI Exx. 55 [White House Chronology, 11/17/86 2000 (Maximum Version)], 56 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "Chronology," 11/18/86], 58 [White House Chronology, 11/20/86 2000 (Historical Version)], 67 [Cooper notes of McFarlane-Meese Interview, 11/21/86]. See 86/11/21-333 [McFarlane comments on Nields' questions about McFarlane's role in preparing the White House Chronologies].)

86/11/18-400
NOVEMBER 18,
1986
(TUESDAY)

THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: WHO WAS WITTING
THE CHRONOLOGIES WERE FALSE

NORTH ACCOUNT:

North testified on his awareness that the White House Chronologies were inaccurate:

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you say to Mr. McFarlane, 'That's not the truth'?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't have a specific recollection of that conversation. I do know that at one point, in trying to determine who was where and when, I had in my office General Secord. When General Secord saw that version -- and again, I may not be recalling it correctly, but I think Mr. McFarlane may well have been there at that point -- General Secord said, 'That's not true. I'm not going to help any more on this. I'm leaving.' And he got up and left. And I continued to work on this version because I believed that that's what needed to be put out, because that's what Mr. McFarlane had given me.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. My question, sir, did you raise with Mr. McFarlane or any other person the fact that this version of the chronology was false?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, I believe I did. Again, I do not recall the specific discussion, but I came to believe -- came to be convinced that there were good and sufficient reasons why that version had to go the way it was.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. I don't want there to be any unclarity in the record on this point, Colonel North, because it is an important one. I think you've answered it, but I want to make sure.

"Did you bring to Mr. McFarlane's attention prior to being persuaded that the version he asked you to put out was false?

"Mr. NORTH. Again, Mr. Nields, I do not have a specific recollection of that, 'Hey, look, boss, this thing isn't tracking with reality.' I believe I did. I don't recall the specific discussion.

"I came to believe that there were good reasons for that. Now, I want to make --

"Mr. NIELDS. And these --

"Mr. NORTH. Counsel, let me finish this, please.

"He lived through this thing just like I did.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Okay? He knew what I knew. I knew, I think, what he knew. Admiral Poindexter knew. There was at the time a record. We didn't have the specific PROF's notes there before us. I don't even think I had within my office at that point in time my notebooks that reflected that. But I knew enough about what -- I could remember enough about what had transpired back then to know that this version was wrong and that he knew that it was wrong, and that others, to include Mr. McFarlane, knew that that version was wrong. And I came to believe that there were good and sufficient reasons. "My reason, as I have said to you, my reason was principally the concern for the safety of the hostages and the Iranian second channel. I believed that if the proper version showing U.S. complicity and U.S. support and U.S. activity in the November, '85, Hawk shipment came to be known to the Iranians, that the American hostages could be killed and the second channel could go the same way. "I was also concerned that there may well have been in that transaction such a clear indication that the original decision had been based soley on arms for hostages, that it could in turn mean enormous international embarrassment to the administration and the President, and could well work a domestic disaster, as we now see before us. "So those were my -- in order o[f] priority -- those were my concerns. I do not know what motivated others to start creating a chronology that was radically different from the facts. I have given you my reasons. I did not hear from

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			them their reasons. "Mr. NIELDS. Was it Mr. McFarlane who made the decision to put the chronologies out in this form or was it some other person? ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. Well, again I don't know who the ultimate decision-maker was. I don't know who found this ultimate version on their desk, or this perhaps final version, as you put it, because it is the last one I had a chance to prepare. "But there is no doubt that Admiral Poindexter was witting of this and, in my understanding, and my recollection of the facts of 1985, there were other people who knew that this was incorrect. Director Casey knew that this version was incorrect. If I remember the events of 1985 correctly, there was a whole cabinet of people who met in November of 1985 and December of 1985, to include the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General and others who participated in those activities. "So I didn't consider myself to be the lone wolf out here creating paper that nobody else knew about." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 79-85.)
86/11/18-410 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Colonel North testified that I directed the White House chronologies be altered to say that everyone in the United States Government believed in November, 1985 that 'oil drilling parts' were

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			being shipped by the Government of Israel. This is not true. Colonel North advised me on the evening of November 18, 1986, on the one brief occasion when I was involved in the chronology process at all, that no one in the U.S. Government was aware that Hawks were involved in that shipment until January, 1986. I have no clear recollection of the matter, having spent the entire period variously in Geneva, Rome, Paris, London, California, but not Washington. "Accordingly, my addition to the chronology on this subject, which is contained in a November 18, 1986 PROF note to Admiral Poindexter--that is Exhibit 56 to my testimony--states only what I knew to be accurate. It states that in addition to the shipment of TOW missiles in the summer of 1985, 'other transfers of equipment' were made in the fall. It is a subsequent version written after I left town the next day, specifically the November 20 version, that discusses 'oil drilling parts'. "Apparently language similar to Director Casey's prepared testimony with which I had nothing to do whatsoever. [Sic.]" (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 204-06.)
86/11/18-415 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: McFARLANE'S ROLE McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Mr. MCCOLLUM. . . . [W]ith regard to these shipments in November 1985, these Hawk shipments, [North] said that he initially wanted to put . . . a truthful chronology out, but he specifically

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			said . . . that this version was altered at your request. "Do you recall that and is that consistent with your recollection? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I recall the statement very well and it is a very clear and sharp disagreement between Colonel North and myself. It simply isn't so." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 271-72.)
86/11/18-420 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified how the Arms Export Control Act figured in revising the White House Chronologies: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . So wouldn't it be fair to say, Colonel North, that you . . . or whoever is drafting these chronologies, on the 18th, is trying to deal with the issues raised by the Arms Export Control Act that had been brought to your attention during the course of the day? "Mr. NORTH. I am sure that is the case. "Mr. NIELDS. And then it was two days later that the narrative version was changed completely so as to deny any knowledge of the Hawk transaction and to assert our belief that it was oil drilling equipment. "Mr. NORTH. I believe that the Director's testimony was changed to reflect that the CIA was told-- "Mr. NIELDS. I am referring you to the chronology now.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. NORTH. Okay. Yes." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 122-23.)
86/11/18-500 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY, 6:00 p.m.)			SOFAER AND ARMACOST MEET WITH POINDEXTER AND THOMPSON SOFAER ACCOUNT, Part 1: Poindexter meets at the White House with Sofaer and Armacost of the DoS to brief them on the Iran Initiative. Thompson also attends. Poindexter refers to a chronology but does not show it to Sofaer and Armacost. They ask to see it, "and we were told we could not . . . . He didn't say we couldn't ever see it. He conveyed the impression that right now it wasn't complete, and we got the impression that in due course we would be seeing it." Poindexter mentions only one pre-1986 arms transfer to Iran -- the September 1985 shipment. He shows Sofaer and Armacost the original January 17, 1986 Finding. No other Finding is mentioned. Sofaer's description of his meeting with Poindexter continued: "Q. Was there any discussion with you of any proposed or actual finding that had been submitted to the President in 1985? "A. No. there was some discussion about whether the President had approved the September 1985 shipment. "Q. And what was said about that? "[Off the record.] "THE WITNESS: We had a discussion about what McFarlane said and what the President knew about this policy. And McFarlane said he expressed to

the Israelis--this is what Poindexter was telling us--he made clear that the U.S. would not trade arms for hostages, refused expressly to sanction the shipment, the first shipment. Then McFarlane said, he had a strong interest in establishing a channel to Iran.

"And in response to a question from Kimche, he opined that the U.S. government would not stop selling arms to Israel if a transfer occurred. Then Poindexter said that he, McFarlane, apparently informed the President of this action.

"Q. And as best you recall, that's what was said at that meeting concerning pre-January Presidential approval of the transfer?

"A. Right. And from that I would infer that the President had approved of the policy that McFarlane had articulated. That is, we're not approving of any of your specific arms sales, but if you do it we're not going to cut you off; Congress is not going to cut you off.

"Now there was also mention of Hawks. You'll see that in my notes. But, if anything, it indicated that no missiles were involved. It was parts, 240 line items, spares, et cetera, for Hawk air defense batteries, which, Poindexter said, U.S. experts believe will prove useless.

"Q. But no mention that actual Hawk missiles themselves had been shipped?

"A. Correct.

"Q. And just so the record is absolutely clear, no mention by Poindexter or Thompson of any transfer pre-January 1986 other than the September transfer of TOW missiles via Israel to Iran?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"A. Correct." (Sofaer, Senate Dep., 7/16/87, at 20-26 [continued in next entry].)
86/11/18-501 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY, 6:00 p.m.)		SOFAER AND ARMACOST MEET WITH POINDEXTER AND THOMPSON SOFAER ACCOUNT: Poindexter does not mention the diversion. See col. 3.	SOFAER AND ARMACOST MEET WITH POINDEXTER AND THOMPSON SOFAER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continued from preceding entry:] " . . . . "Q. Did Poindexter or Thompson tell you at the November 18 meeting anything about the involvement of private parties like Richard Secord or Albert Hakim in this transaction? "A. No. "Q. I believe there is a reference, if you look on the last page of Sofaer Exhibit 1, your memcon page 3, that apparently Admiral Poindexter said . . . 'Iran paid in advance for these shipments to Israel which paid the U.S. government through a proprietary. Poindexter assumed that the arms merchant took his profit, but does not know how much was paid by Iran, only how much was paid to the CIA and DOD.' "Did Poindexter tell you anything more about who the arms merchant was? "A. No. " . . . . "Q. Did he tell you anything more about the pricing of the arms, other than what's reflected in this paragraph? "A. No. "Q. And he did not tell you on November 18, I gather, that any portion of the proceeds of the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Iran arms sales had been diverted to or for the benefit of the contras? "A. No. "Q. Nothing like that came up? "A. Nothing like that. "Q. And the only finding he told you about and led you to believe existed was the finding of January 17, 1986? "A. Correct. "Q. When that meeting was over did you feel that you then had the whole story? "A. No. "Q. Why not? "A. Because I've heard lots of whole stories in my life." (Sofaer, Senate Dep., 7/16/87, at 27-28.)
86/11/18-650 NOVEMBER 18, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE DIVERSION ISSUE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane tells North, either on Nov. 18 or 19, that a problem remains with the channeling of funds to the Contras. See col. 3.	THE DIVERSION ISSUE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane brings up with North the diversion of funds to the Contras. This is his first mention of the money since North commented to him on the tarmac in Israel where the profits were going. (See 86/05/24-001, -002; 86/05/29-011.) McFarlane testified on May 11, 1987 that he is unsure whether the conversation occurred on the night of Nov. 18 or on Nov. 19. McFarlane reconstructed the scene on Nov. 18: "Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . [A]t the end of the session, Colonel North said, 'It looks to me like what we are putting together here will assure that the President isn't hurt by this, and there won't

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			be a problem.' "Well, either this or the following day, in the company of the same group of people [apparently "four or five staff officers in the office there"; Poindexter had long gone home], Colonel North, Mr. Teicher, upon hearing of Colonel North's statement that we don't have a problem, I said, 'You have got a problem with that channeling of money to the contras.'" (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 170-72.) But McFarlane also testified the exchange may have occurred the following day, after Poindexter had called him to come over to pick up a copy of the President's statement for the press conference. As McFarlane reconstructed this setting: "Upon arriving, there was a meeting in progress in his [sc. Poindexter's] office of Dr. Keel, Admiral Poindexter [neither of whom was present the night of Nov. 18, as McFarlane just reconstructed it], Howard Teicher, and Ollie, and I was told to go in. And I went in. Everybody got up and started to leave. . . . Ollie said, 'Okay, I think that will be fine, and we don't have a problem.' "Well, it could have been there, with essentially the same people involved, and I said, 'You have a problem with the channeling of money to the contras.' And Ollie kind of winced and he and Mr. Teicher went out the door . . . and Ollie came back in and said, 'Howard doesn't know about that.' And I said, 'Well, the long and short of it is that you have got a deal with that,' and I

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			was given a copy of the [President's] opening statement that night, and I left the office. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you at that meeting or conversation ask him on whose authority he had channeled the money to the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. I had mentioned it there in the company of Admiral Poindexter and Dr. Keel [if the meeting is placed on Nov. 19, not Nov. 18?] and Mr. North, so the issue could not have been ambiguous, at least between the Admiral and Colonel North." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 170-172.)
86/11/19-100 SOMETIME DURING NOVEMBER 1986			LEDEEN'S ROLE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. When you were working on the chronologies in 1986, November of '86, did you speak to Ledeen at any time? "A. My recollection is that he tried to call me, but my recollection is I don't think I ever returned the call. I asked Colonel North to talk to him and my recollection is that his report to me was that Mr. Ledeen was thinking about going public with his version of the case, of the project. I did not want to do that because, frankly, I didn't know what Mr. Ledeen would say. "I also suspected that he had some hard feelings about being cut out of it and I believe my best recollection is that I talked to Mr. McFarlane also about talking to Mr. Ledeen to try to convince him not to go public at that point. And this was probably in the time frame before the President's speech on the 19th.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"You know, one point I'd like to add right here is that this detail -- I've had a lot of time since November of 1986 to go back over and think about all of this, so what I recall now is more detailed than I could recall in November of 1986." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 364-65.)
86/11/19-200 NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord returns to the White House to work on the Chronology. Present on both days are North, Robert Earl, Howard Teicher, and George Cave. Secord questions a change in the Chronology, on "whether or not the President had approved or acquiesced in the sale or the transfer of the Israeli arms in 1985. And the version on Tuesday, which I had helped out on, laid out the facts as I understood them. . . . Which were that the President had acquiesced in these transfers. But on the version which I read on Wednesday this had been changed to indicate that the President had not approved, which was not consistent with my understanding of the facts." North tells Secord "that Mr. McFarlane had drafted that section himself . . . the night before." Secord stops reading the Chronology at page 5 of the 11/20/86, 2000 Historical Chronology (JHICI Ex. 7) and leaves. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 108-15.)
86/11/19-250 NOVEMBER 19, 1986		THE DIVERSION ISSUE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane stops by Poindexter's office to pick	THE DIVERSION ISSUE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(WEDNESDAY)		up a copy of the President's opening satement for his press conference. In the presence of Poindexter, Keel and Teicher, McFarlane tells North a problem remains over "the channeling of money to the contras." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 170-71; but see 86/11/18-650 [McFarlane unsure whether conversation occurred late the 18th or the afternoon of the 19th, and he leaves unclear whether Poindexter and Keel were present].)	
86/11/19-260 NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)	McFARLANE LEAVES WASHINGTON BRIEFLY: After leaving Poindexter's office, McFarlane leaves town "to get away from the telephone, frankly, so as to work on some policy initiatives that I had discussed with Admiral Poindexter." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 174.)		
86/11/19-270 NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)			(1) SHULTZ ALERTS THE PRESIDENT OF HIS VIEWS; AND (2) THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS directs that HILL brief ARMACOST and SOFAER on GPS' knowledge concerning arms sale to Iran. GPS tells PRESIDENT that PRESIDENT is not fully informed. GPS says 'we have been deceived and lied to. . . . And you have to watch out about saying no arms for hostages.' GPS says MCFARLANE once told him that planeload of arms would go to Iran if hostages released. PRESIDENT says he knew of this. GPS says he had been told in Tokyo (6/86) that it had all stopped. PRESIDENT says that GPS is 'telling me things I

don't know.' GPS says, 'Mr. President, if I'm telling you something you don't know -- I don't know very much -- so something is wrong here.'

"GPS then calls REGAN and expresses concern about PRESIDENTIAL press conference scheduled for that night. He says PRESIDENT has been misled on the facts.

"PRESIDENT's Press Conference.

"GPS calls PRESIDENT. Tells him of factual errors in the press conference. Reiterates that PRESIDENT is not getting the full story. PRESIDENT asks GPS to identify the factual errors."

(JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/20-700.)

86/11/19-275
NOVEMBER
18-19, 1986
(TUESDAY -
WEDNESDAY)

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: PRELUDE
SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. BELNICK. Sir, on November 18, you gave directions to the Un[der] Secretary of State, Mr. Armacost, and your executive assistant, that your Department had to get access to all of the facts concerning the Iran initiative. Notes reflected this was part of your continuing concern that those facts were being twisted and misrepresented.

"On the same day, the State Department Legal Adviser, Judge Sofaer, attended a general counsel's meeting at the White House and his testimony before the panel has indicated, and your notes show, he reported back to [sic (that?)] the NSC's Counsel, Commander Thompson, had declined per instructions from Admiral Poindexter, to give the full story either to Judge Sofaer or to the President's Counsel, Mr. Wallison, who also attended that meeting.

"On the next day, the 19th, the President was set for a press conference that evening; and your record reflects that you spoke to the President earlier the day before the press conference and told him, 'We've been deceived and lied to and you have to watch out about saying no arms for hostages.'

"Do you recall that meeting with the President before the press conference?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. That was--I think it was one of my regular meetings, and I used the meeting to focus on this, and I think it was at that meeting the President said to me, he said, 'You are telling me things that I don't know, that are news to me.'

"And I remember saying, 'Well, Mr. President, I don't know very much, but if I am telling you things that are news to you, then you are not being given the kind of flow of information that you deserve to be given,' or something like that.

"I think it was at that meeting that I said that, because I made a note afterwards.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall also at that meeting that you said to the President that Mr. McFarlane had once told you, alluding back to the November 1985 conversation that you had with Mr. McFarlane in Geneva, that Mr. McFarlane had once told you about a planeload of arms that would go to Iran provided that the hostages were released.

"This in connection with your point that it was dangerous to say that this did not involve arms for hostages, and that the President replied to you . . . that he had known of that proposed shipment and had approved it?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I don't know whether it was at that meeting or one subsequent to his press conference, but I did use that illustration because I didn't know about the structure of the various deals and still don't know them clearly, but I used that illustration to say now here is one, and this is arms for hostages.

"And he said, 'Yes, I knew about that,' or 'I know about that,' or something like that.

"The President with me--as he discussed--was always very ready to say, 'Yes, I knew this, I didn't know that,' and so on."

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 110-12. See id., 7/24/87, at 111-18 [Shultz on preparations for the President's press conference].)

86/11/19-276
NOVEMBER
19-20, 1986
(WEDNESDAY -
THURSDAY)

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: POSTLUDE
SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. BELNICK. The press conference was that evening.

"What was your reaction to what you heard?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I called him after the press conference.

"Mr. BELNICK. Called the President?

"Secretary SHULTZ. I always do, and I knew that he had been urged to have this press conference, and I told him that I thought it was personally a very courageous thing to do and to take on these subjects, but that I felt there were many statements that were wrong or misleading.

"So I thought it was a very unfortunate press conference from that standpoint; and I said, 'If you would like, I would welcome a chance to come around and go through it with you, and I will go through these points and tell you what I think is wrong with them and why.'

"Mr. BELNICK. And what did the President say?

"Secretary SHULTZ. He said, 'Well, I welcome seeing you.' So I--the next day, I met with him in the family quarters. It is a little more--a good setting for that kind of discussion [rather] than in the office.

"I asked Don Regan to be with me. I went through the things that I thought were wrong in the press conference with him. It was a long, tough discussion, not the kind of discussion I ever thought I would have with the President of the United States.

"But it was bark off all the way.

"Mr. BELNICK. Did the President say he disagreed with you?

"Secretary SHULTZ. The President--he didn't disagree with me. He corroborated things like the November 25 things, very open, strong discussion, but he had in his mind that what he authorized and what he expected to have carried out was an effort to get an opening of a different kind to Iran and the arms and the hostages were ancillary to that. [T]hat was not his objective.

"And that--and I am sure that is what the President felt. He wasn't just saying that. That was his idea, and I kept trying to say, 'Well, I recognize that, Mr. President, and that is a good objective, but that isn't the way it worked,' at least insofar as I could see.

"So we--and then there were other things that were [s]aid that I was very concerned about. He was being given information that suggested that Iran was no longer practicing terrorism. That was wrong. And I don't know, various other things, but the gist of it was that there were things that he had been given as information from the people who were briefing him and providing him with the information and the press conference preparatory sessions that were not, in my view, correct.

"And I don't think that the people doing that were serving the President. In fact, I know they weren't serving the President, and I was trying to get that point across in as strong a way as I could with not just sort of listing the arguments, but saying, 'You have got to look at these facts.'"

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 112-14.)

86/11/19-296
NOVEMBER 19,
1986
(WEDNESDAY)

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON IRAN:

The President states at a news conference:

"[T]he responsibility for the decision and the operation is mine and mine alone. . . . I deeply believe in the correctness of my decision. I was convinced then and I am convinced now that while the risks were great, so, too, was the potential reward."

(22 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 1583 [11/24/86].)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/19-300 NOVEMBER 18 OR 19, 1986 (TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY)			PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. The President had a press conference on the 19th of November? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you have any part in briefing him for that press conference? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I don't believe that--I know I didn't have any part in the briefing. I don't know whether any information was asked of us for the briefing. It may have been for someone in the Justice Department, but I had no personal participation in the briefing. "Mr. NIELDS. I want to ask you about that second part of your answer, and you might want to turn to Exhibits [EM] 30 and 31. "Attorney General MEESE. Right. I see an exhibit marked 30, and I don't see the date. The date can't be made out, but I think it may be the 18th or the 19th. "Mr. NIELDS. I believe it is the 19th. It looks like the 19th of November stamped in the upper right-hand corner. "Attorney General MEESE. It would show I received a phone call from Peter Wallison, White House counsel, at 9:15 in the morning, and one of the topics we talked about--the second topic, according to my notes--was a briefing to the President on the legal aspects of the Iran arms situation, and I presume that he did that. "Mr. NIELDS. Was he seeking some input from you on this subject?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't know. I can't recall what the conversation was. By looking at Exhibit [EM] 31, I see that at our staff meeting on the 13th of November a matter came up regarding the briefing of the President for the news conference on Justice-related issues so it is entirely possible I was calling him to say our people were available to provide any information he might need for the briefing of the President.

"He would have been participating in the briefing and I wanted to, I may have wanted to let him know that our people were available on the legal aspects. He may have asked me about it, I can't tell from my notes.

"Mr. NIELDS. So you know the issue was raised with someone at the White House in connection with the press conference, and you don't recall exactly how--

"Attorney General MEESE. Either raised with them by me or he raised that issue with me, one of the two.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you listen to the press conference?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I was working late that night and so I listened to a part of it in the car going home. I think it was at 8:30 or nine o'clock, whatever time it was. I listened to a part of it in the car.

"I missed a part of it going f[ro]m the car to the house and then picked it up where my wife was watching it on television.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you hear anything that

caught your attention or needed further attention?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I had heard or seen one of the two, that the President had, I believe, mentioned that there had been no third countries involved, or words to that effect.

"Mr. NIELDS. And did you do something as a consequence?

"Attorney General MEESE. Actually, my feeling at the end of the news conference was that I felt the President had not been properly briefed based upon all the information even that was discussed at our prior meeting on the 10th. Because the President is very good with facts and with details if he has received the proper information, and so I was concerned that what--the way, the answers that he had given on the 19th were not consistent with him having been thoroughly briefed for that news conference, including, particularly, this matter of no third country being involved." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 50-53. See JHICI Exx. EM 30 [Meese notes, 11/18 or 11/19/86], EM 31 [Meese notes, 11/19/86].)

86/11/19-301
NOVEMBER 19,
1986
(WEDNESDAY)

PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE
MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . [O]n the left-hand column [of Ex. EM 32 at p. 1586] there is a question: 'Mr. President, I don't think it is still clear just what Israel's role was in this. The questions that have been asked about a condoned shipment. We do understand that the Israelis sent a shipment in 1985 and there were also reports that it was the Israelis that contacted your Administration and suggested that you make contact with Iran. Could you explain what the Israeli role was here?'

"And his response is, 'No, because we, as I say, have nothing to do with other countries or their shipment of arms or doing what they are doing.'

"And the answer continues.

"Attorney General MEESE. Right.

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it that [was] one of the answers that you had in mind when you were listening to the broadcast.

"Attorney General MEESE. That was one of them. I also, looking up higher in that page, I see questions about a thousand anti-tank missiles and saying it is a shoulder-carried weapon. I wasn't that acquainted with TOWs at that time, but I had questions in my mind whether, in fact, it was a shoulder-carried weapon.

"And also, the other parts happened to be spare parts for an anti-aircraft Hawk battery, and as I say, all those weapons could be very easily carried in one mission.

"There were a lot of issues that had not been discussed at the meeting on Monday and I had some questions whether that had been properly briefed to the President as well.

"Mr. NIELDS. I think then on the next page, 1587, there is another question and answer on the Israeli subject at the bottom of the left-hand margin, left-hand column, there is a question, 'Mr. President, going back over your answers

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			tonight about the arms shipment and the numbers of them, are you telling us that the only shipments with which we were involved were the one or two that followed your January 17 finding and that whatever your aid[e]s have said on background or on the record, there were no other shipments with which the U.S. condoned?' "And the answer is, 'That is right. I am saying nothing but the missiles that we sold.' And then the answer continues. "Attorney General MEESE. Right. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it those are the answers that prompted some action on your part and, if so, what action did you take? "Attorney General MEESE. I called Admiral Poindexter. It was primarily the reference to the third country, but this also was a question. And I was concerned about all of the answers, that they didn't seem to be the usual crisp, clear way the President has when he is in possession of all the facts, and so I called Admiral Poindexter that night, immediately following or within a few minutes following the television program, and asked him what had gone on, the news conference had not gone well and I didn't think the President had been properly briefed, or words to that effect. "Admiral Poindexter said the White House was issuing a clarification or a correction within a few minutes on the third country aspect. And I believe it was in that conversation he told me that the next day they were going to go over the testimony that was going to be presented to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Congress on Friday about these matters and asked me if I would attend a meeting in his office. "I was supposed to be away that day, I was supposed to be at West Point the following day for an all-day trip and so I told him I would delay my trip long enough to attend a meeting in his office in the afternoon. "Mr. NIELDS. The record should reflect there was a correction reflected on the third country issue . . . ." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 53-56; JHICI Ex. EM 32 [text of President's news conference, 11/19/86].)
86/11/19-320 NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)			PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: PREPARATIONS AND AFTERMATH REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 1: Regan described the briefing of the President for the November 19 press conference: "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . Now, you knew at the time that this was ongoing that the President in September of 1985 had been informed of the 500 . . . TOWs that had been shipped by Israel. "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. And [the President] had indicated at that point that he would not completely rule out the possibility of replenishing those TOWs? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. And you also knew at that time that the Israelis' delivery of TOWs was tied to the release of Benjamin Weir? "Mr. REGAN. Yes.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

"Mr. SMILJANICH. You knew of the Israeli shipments in November, the Hawk shipments in November of 1985, because you and the President had been informed of that?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. All right.

"And no one in connection with those November 1985 shipments had ever indicated in any way that oil drilling equipment was being shipped to Iran; isn't that correct?

"Mr. REGAN. I recall that was to have been a cover story if discovered, it was to have been said that these were oil drilling parts.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . [I]n other words, you and the President understood that Hawks were involved in that November 1985 shipment but that--

"Mr. REGAN. Certainly.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. --oil drilling equipment was a cover story?

"Mr. REGAN. Sure.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Now, did you not remind the President--in connection with his preparation for these speeches of the September TOWs--of the November Hawks, in his preparation?

"Mr. REGAN. Not during the preparation as such.

"Maybe I should sort of set the stage there for a couple minutes so you will understand how a presidential briefing for a press conference goes.

". . . .

"All of the foreign policy questions--or the answers, rather--are prepared by the National Security staff. When it comes to the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			interrogation, the President is asked the questions, then the National Security Adviser is the first one who starts a critique of the President's answers, as to whether they are right or wrong. "During this time the President was getting conflicting advice as to how much he could say and what he shouldn't say. As a matter of fact, there were many in the room who had no knowledge of the shipments, and Admiral Poindexter was trying to be oblique in referencing, A, Israel, and, B, the type of munitions that had been sent, so that the people in the room wouldn't be aware of what was going on. "I think this sort of confused the presidential mind as to what he could say and couldn't say and what he should say and what he shouldn't say. "There are many times, I think, when you have a lot more knowledge than the questions--if I understand anything from lawyers, it's that you only answer the question that is put to you, don't volunteer a lot more information. "Accordingly, the President was on guard that night as to how much can I say vis-a-vis Israel, and he did get the answer botched." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 60-64.)
86/11/19-321 NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)			PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: PREPARATIONS AND AFTERMATH REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, during the speech and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			during the press conference one of the matters that the President did volunteer was the statement that all of the weapons shipped to Iran could easily fit into a single cargo plane with plenty of space left over. "Now, obviously the President had to be told something like that in order for him to make a statement like that. "How did that particular information come to his attention? "Mr. REGAN. Somewhere in these notes I think you may find it. Somewhere in here are notes that have been furnished to this committee. "This was during a meeting where, discussing with Poindexter and Keel, the President--I'm not sure whether the Vice President was there or not--we were discussing just how much had been done. "And the President said, well, we have only sent them a small amount. Poindexter volunteered the information, oh, hell yes, a very small amount. I said, well, you know, like that old 'What's My Line' type of questioning, you know, bigger than a breadbox. "I said, John, how big is it, can you tell me how big it is, I have no idea. I fought a different war--what a bigger TOW missile is, let alone how big spare parts for Hawks are. "He said, oh, hell, they'd fit on a small plane, a couple pallets. "So I said, well, can you find out the answer, and he came back and--a little red-faced--and said, well, make it a C-5. But it literally could

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			fit on a C-5. "So that's where the statement came from, it all could fit on a plane. Most people think of it as a 727 or something--no. They are talking about a C-5, and I doubt even at that they would fit, but that's something else again. "Mr. SMILJANICH. I think the record will probably reflect eventually they would have a lot of difficulty getting into a C-5. Perhaps it could be done with a shoe horn. I'm not certain. "At any rate, when you first asked this question and Admiral Poindexter gave you his opinion about how big a TOW missile was, do you recall that you were in the Oval Office and he said every one they shipped could probably fit in that office? "Mr. REGAN. Yes, I think he did say something like that. ". . . . "Mr. SMILJANICH. After all of this preparation that you have described and after the press conference that the President held on November 19th, there had to be a correction made immediately after the press conference? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. And that involved the issue of whether or not a third country had been involved in these shipments. "Mr. REGAN. Yes" (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 64-67.)
86/11/19-322 NOVEMBER 19,			PRESIDENT'S NEW CONFERENCE: PREPARATIONS AND AFTERMATH, AND THE NSC CHRONOLOGY

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986 (WEDNESDAY)			REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. SMILJANICH. Now, during discussions that were held immediately after the press conference, did any information come to your attention about a chronology or any paperwork that the NSC staff was using in connection with the compilation of these facts? "Mr. REGAN. Well, after Admiral Poindexter had scribbled out a correction and we had gone over it with the President, that was in the Blue Room right outside the East Room where the press conference had been held, and Speakes was given that final copy to release to the press, I walked over to the elevator with the President, bade him good night and walked back, and on the way to my office went through the Roosevelt Room. "There w[as] a group of staffers still in the Roosevelt Room, some NSC, some the White House staff, and they were discussing what had happened and why the President had misinformed the public about--you know, inadvertently, not deliberate--and I noticed that North was leading the discussion. "And after we got a little way along in the discussion I decided to leave to go back to my own office to pack up to go home, one of--another White House assistant walked out with me and he said to me, did you recognize what North had there, what he was quoting from. I said no. "He said he's got a chronology. I said a chronology of what. He said it has to be of all these events. I said, well, get me a copy of

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that. "So the next morning this same staffer reported back to me that he couldn't get a copy of it. I asked Poindexter for a copy. I said North has a chronology, let me see it. "An hour or so later he brought a copy over to me. Two or three hours later he came back and requested that I give it back to him; he said it was incorrect. "I didn't. I held onto it. It's part of your records now. "I had shown it--I gave it immediately to the President's counsel, Peter Wallison, and said look this over, there's something screwy here, take a close look at this and see what your eye detects. "And so we didn't give a copy back to Poindexter." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 67-68. See JHICI Ex. DTR 49 [3-page chronology dated 11/20/86. Regan: "It was the type of chronology I received. Whether it was the specific one, I couldn't say."].)
86/11/19-323 NOVEMBER 19-21, 1986 (WEDNESDAY - FRIDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: REGAN'S DOUBTS REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. In your deposition, you indicated that you learned of the existence of the NSC chronology on November 19, 1986; you asked for a copy of it on the 20th and it was provided by Admiral Poindexter to you on the 21st. Later that day, on the 21st, Admiral Poindexter asked that the chronology be returned for revision and you did not comply. Why?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. REGAN. First of all, I had turned it over to the President's counsel and told him to take a close look at it. He gave it a cursory going over, and when I got back from some other meeting I had attended, he said to me, 'This doesn't hang together, Don; be careful.' I said, 'You hang on to that and check it out.' "So when Poindexter asked, I did dissemble with him. I said, 'I can't find it right now, John. I'll get it to you at an appropriate time.' I let time expire and went home without giving it to him. "Mr. BOLAND. So I take it you were not concerned that changes might have been made to conceal the facts if you returned it? "Mr. REGAN. Well, what I did know--I knew something was wrong, but what I didn't know, and that's what I was trying to find out, and I was afraid if I let the document go back again, I won't be able to see all the facts on several pages [sic]." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 28-29.)
86/11/19-325 NOVEMBER 19-25, 1986 (WEDNESDAY -TUESDAY)			THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: HOW THE PRESIDENT WAS PREPARED REGAN ACCOUNT: Mr. RUDMAN. . . . Secretary Shultz testified . . . talking about that period, [November] 21st to the 25th, or maybe a bit before that, that people who were advising the President on facts had a conflict of interest. You said, relating that same period, that you discussed it with the Secretary of State, and you had said that you

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			thought the President was ill-used, to use your term. "Do you agree with the Secretary's contention that people who were advising him on facts had some sort of conflict of interest and that they were not sharing with him the facts? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. RUDMAN. And, as a matter of fact, isn't that really the story of probably the most, probably the only inept major speech or press conference this President has had during his seven years, that he did not have-- "Mr. REGAN. I would have to say it was one of the worst from his point of view, yes. "Mr. RUDMAN. I think everybody would agree on that, and the thing that was the most disturbing is--would you agree with me--even on facts that the President turned out to be accurate about, that he seemed very unsure of the information that he was giving the American people. Would you agree with that characterization? "Mr. REGAN. That is correct. "Mr. RUDMAN. As a matter of fact, you described, for the first time it has been described by anyone, the interesting briefing session in the family theater, and I think what I got from that testimony this morning was a view that Admiral Poindexter was still keeping his compartments in place, that the compartmentalization of information for some reason was not even being opened to the President when the President was preparing for that news conference. Is that an accurate statement?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. REGAN. Yes." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 224-25.)
86/11/19-326 UNTIL THE PRESENT TIME			THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: HOW THE PRESIDENT WAS PREPARED, AND HOW HE VIEWED THE IRAN INITIATIVE REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. And would it be fair to state that the emphasis in all of these [briefings prior to the President's press conference on 11/19/86] was on something other than arms for hostages? "Mr. REGAN. Oh, yes. The points were made continually, and the President literally did believe that. I still think he probably believes it today, that he started . . . out this way believing that it was an initiative to Iran, he wanted to keep it on that track, that the arms for hostages was a by-product of this. He felt, and he has used this description in my presence several times, I am not sure it is a good analogy, but at least I will tell you his way of thinking. "He says that if one is unfortunate and has a member of one's family kidnapped, if there is a demand for ransom and you decide you are not going to pay it, but if a third party comes along and says[,] 'I think I may know who the kidnappers are, I may have some influence, do you want me to do it for you?' And then that person, in turn, says, 'And, by the way, would you do this, that or the other thing for me?' And you say, 'Yes, I will', and then he, in turn, tries to contact the kidnappers for you, that you really have not dealt with the kidnappers themselves.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"His reasoning is that the money that was spent was Iranian money for arms. None of the proceeds went to Hizballah, or whoever it is who are the captives [sic] of these people. He also feels that the missiles themselves ought to be used by Iranians, not the Hizballahis, some by the Mujahedeeh. "Accordingly, to the President, he has not dealt directly with kidnappers, terrorists. "Mr. RUDMAN. And that has a great deal to do with the character of the briefings that were furnished to him based on information this committee has looked at. Don't you think that is an accurate statement? "Mr. REGAN. Oh, yes, there is no doubt about that." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 226-28.)
86/11/19-330 NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)		DIVERSION AUTHORIZATION, GENERALLY: HOW THE NSC STAFF SERVED THE PRESIDENT REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE AND DIVERSION AUTHORIZATION, GENERALLY: HOW THE NSC STAFF SERVED THE PRESIDENT REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. . . . Do you think it is fair to say that the President's staff[,] . . . the National Security staff, not only ill-served the President by not advising him of the diversion scheme and allowing him to make that choice himself, but in fact did not adequately brief him on, during and after these events took place? "Mr. REGAN. Well, this may be an unkind characterization of them, but nevertheless, it's the way I feel. I do think they should have discussed this with the President, allowed him to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			make the decision to divert funds or not. "Secondly, knowing of that, that this money had been done but yet knowing that the cover had been blown and this would eventually come out, they should not have allowed this President to go to speak to this nation without revealing that fact, among others. That would have put a whole new light on the situation. "They also did him a very much grave[r] disservice, hurt him badly by allowing him to go before the nation's media or its representatives, and not know that these deeds had been done. What if somebody that night had challenged the President, an enterprising reporter had found this information out one way or another? What would the President's embarrassment have been? As it so happened, it was the Attorney General that found it or one of his people, and the President himself was allowed to make this announcement. I say 'allowed.' There was no choice. I mean, the man wanted to do it. But it was certainly embarrassing to the President. "Now, that to me was a grave disservice that the National Security Advisers did to the President in knowing that and nobody spoke up." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 228-30.)
86/11/19-331 NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)			PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: THE ISSUE OF AUTHORIZATION OF SUMMER 1985 ARMS SHIPMENTS REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. . . . Exhibit [DTR] 48, which is [the President's] press conference, . . . on page 6 . . . the question is: 'Mr. President, going

back over your answers tonight about the arms shipments and the numbers of them, are you telling us tonight that the only shipment[s] with which we were involved were the one or two that followed your January 17 finding, and that whatever your aides have said on background or on the record, there were no other shipments with [sic] which the United States condoned?'

"And the President: 'That's right, I'm saying nothing,' et cetera.

"And then there is a question: 'Mr. President, to follow up on that, we have been told by the Chief of Staff Donald Regan that we condone, this government condoned an Israeli shipment in September of 1985. Now, it seems to me'--then the President goes on to say, 'Well, no, I have never heard Mr. Regan say that.'

"We do know that you have already made reference to that being a disastrous conference, but is this again an indication of the President being ill-served, that he wasn't properly prepared, he was given facts that weren't right? Because it seems to me that he is not acknowledging the fact that there were shipments in 1985, only acknowledging the fact that there were past January, 1986, findings.

"Mr. REGAN. I think this question caught him off guard. Remember what I told you earlier this morning, sir. In that briefing he had been told a lot of things of what to say and what not to say, particularly as regards Israel. Do we tell all? Do we tell nothing? Do we even admit that there is a third country, that Israel has been involved in this?

"There were many saying no, no, no, you don't talk about that. You're going to have too much confusion in the Middle East with allies, Israel itself, with other people if you start talking about that. So he has it in his mind during that conference, let's be careful now what we say about Israel.

"All of a sudden, he is told his Chief of Staff has already said we did condone, which happens to be the fact, that we did condone a shipment by the Israelis. The question had it a little off; it wasn't September of '85, it was August of '85 the shipment had been made. So what he says is, 'I've never heard him say that, but I'll talk to him about it,' meaning I'll get to see the SOB and find out why he said that.

"He hadn't realized I had confirmed it.

"Mr. RODINO. It was suggested that there were advisers who probably had inaccurately advised him and wanted to make certain certain facts didn't get out.

"Mr. REGAN. Well, I don't deny--in fact, I have stated explicitly, that there was confusion even in the minds of the National Security Advisers who were briefing on Israel as just how much to say. Some thought we could go, you know, as far as admitting this. Others didn't even want the name of the country mentioned.

"Mr. RODINO. I have the impression that the President was concerned with probably disclosing too much which might jeopardize the hostages, but then I can't put together, because if he

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			acknowledges the fact that there were shipments following the January 17 finding in 1986, then what difference would it make? Since there already had been-- "Mr. REGAN. I get the drift of the question, Mr. Rodino. I notice the questioner is saying the President condoned an Israeli shipment shortly before the release of the hostage Benjamin Weir. Direct tie-in. One caused the other. The President has been denying this all along, that there was a direct tie-in. "All of a sudden, he is confronted with this question. There is a direct tie-in. Israel sold arms, out came Benjamin Weir. "What are you going to say about that? Well, I never heard about it. Your Chief of Staff said it happened. All right. I will go check my Chief of Staff and find out why he said that. That is the interpretation I give to this. I don't think there was any dissembling by the President or desire to mislead anybody. It caught him off guard. "So it was a very delicate subject. The President was trying to walk that tightrope between saying too much and saying a wrong thing." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 232-36.)
86/11/19-332 SUMMER 1985 AND NOVEMBER 19, 1986			PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: THE ISSUE OF AUTHORIZATION OF SUMMER 1985 ARMS SHIPMENTS REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCCLURE. . . . [In] the President's press converence on November 19th, . . . the question was asked this way by Andrea Mitchell.

"'Mr. President, to follow up on that, we have been told by the Chief of Staff, Donald Regan, that we condoned this--we condoned, this government condoned an Israeli shipment in September of 1985.' It would appear that this recitation is contrary to testimony of yourself, of John Poindexter and references to Mr. McFarlane's testimony, all differing from the background which she stated in her question to the President on November 19th. Can you help us clear that up?

"Mr. REGAN. I hope so, Senator.

"The use of the word 'condone', I take it to mean exactly what I testified to yesterday [see 85/09/00-013]. That is, the Israelis did it without our knowledge, but once they had done it, we did not then go back and make them undo it or in any way condemn them for it.

"And by the fact that we didn't protest except privately for McFarlane to his contacts, whoever that might have been, we didn't make a big deal out of it or a big case out of it, and I think that is why the use of the word 'condone'.

"Mr. MCCLURE. It did not intend to imply we had given prior approval?

"Mr. REGAN. No. And you recall that later we did refurbish their supply.

"Mr. MCCLURE. Well, again, referring to your testimony yesterday . . . [about] what was said at that meeting in September of 1985 about the replenishment of the missiles that Israel had shipped to Iran, and your answer was, and I quote, 'The President was quite upset that his hand was being forced in this way. He still wasn't certain, because he had told McFarlane in the August 6 meeting to go slow on this and let's make sure we know who[m] we are dealing with before we get too far into this, as a result to have his hand forced that way was quite upsetting, and he said as far as my replenishment is concerned, we will cross that bridge later. I am not going to do anything about that now.'

"Mr. REGAN. That is correct.

"Mr. MCCLURE. And the President was upset?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes, he was very upset.

"Mr. MCCLURE. What do you mean by the Israelis having forced his hand that way?

"Mr. REGAN. Well, they had gone ahead and made an initial transaction in this channel and were drawing the United States Government into it, because they shipped these arms. Word came out the deed was already done, and we really hadn't had time to put this whole matter before an NSPG, or what have you, and go over it in any detail. They did it for us without our advance, our knowledge in advance.

"Mr. MCCLURE. And we did later agree to the replenishment.

"Mr. REGAN. Oh, yes.

"Mr. MCCLURE. There is one other little fact that ties in with that that might help us if we get it into perspective, and that is later on when the Israelis were trying again to get us to go forward with this project, they offered, even though we had agreed to the replenishment, they said 'Go ahead, if it doesn't work, we will even

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			give up on the replenishment of the 500 TOWs,['] the initial shipment, which would indicate to me that maybe they hadn't really expected to get replenishment. "Mr. REGAN. I can't offer any additional information on that, I don't know. "Mr. MCCLURE. At the beginning they had no approval-- "Mr. REGAN. As far as I know, they had no approval or no assurances that if they did it, it would be replaced. "Mr. MCCLURE. And even after there was an agreement for replenishment, they offered to go ahead without replenishment. "Mr. REGAN. That is a fact I learned later. I didn't know that at the time." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 17-21 [quoting id., 7/30/87, at 29-30]. See 85/09/00-013.)
86/11/19-351 NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)		THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. RODINO. Let me conclude by reminding you, Admiral, that on November the 19th the President, in that news conference, concluded by saying that he was going to issue a directive or direct that all information concerning the Iran initiative be provided to the appropriate members of Congress. "Now, that was a directive from the President on the 19th, and yet, Admiral Poindexter, you are saying to me that notwithstanding that directive to inform the American people, you decided that

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			you would not, countermanding the directive of the President that the people should know. "Mr. POINDEXTER. We tried to get out as accurately as we could the information about the Iranian project less the way that the private agent was using the residuals in his logistics support operation to support the contras. In my mind, that was an unrelated issue. The source of the funds was incidental to the whole issue. "The information that we were trying to get out-- "Mr. RODINO. But, Admiral, wasn't that a directive of the President-- "Mr. BECKLER. May we finish our answer, please, Mr. Representative? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The information we were trying to get out was why we had tried to open the channel to the Iranians, how we were trying to get the hostages back and the contra issue, in my mind, was a separate issue." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 157-59.)
86/11/19-352 NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)		THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. RODINO. Admiral, I have got to state that while I want to believe you, and respect the position you hold, but, you know, I read, and I am reading from the President's news conference of November 19, 1986, and this, this statement is made here, 'I have further directed that all information relating to our initiative be provided

to the appropriate members of Congress.'

"Notwithstanding that, you destroyed the finding on November 21st, you didn't tell the people, since you say that you wanted to assure that you protect the President.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Rodino, you are--I just don't agree with your assessment.

"Mr. RODINO. Well, you don't agree with what the President directed you to do.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I agreed very well with what the President said, Mr. Rodino.

"Mr. RODINO. Admiral, well, do you believe that you carried out his directive?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. To the best of my ability.

"Mr. RODINO. And you gave all the information that he wanted provided to the American people?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think he said to the Congress. At that point, we were preparing to meet with the congressional committees on the following Friday, on the 21st, and to provide all the information, and to the best of my knowledge at the time, what we provided was accurate.

"Now, it turns out there were some inaccuracies in that, but that wasn't because we were trying to withhold information at that point. That is everything, less how the profits or residuals from the Iranian project were being used to support the contras.

"Mr. RODINO. Well, Admiral, I want to thank you very much, but it strikes me as difficult to believe that after the President makes a statement of this sort, which is clear on its face, that he is directing that all information that--

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			notwithstanding that, you take this position and I find it rather difficult to believe that you were prepared to provide all the information when two days later you tore up the finding. "Mr. POINDEXTER. The finding was very incidental to this whole issue. I have explained that I didn't go through a long, detailed analysis as to whether to keep the finding or not. I saw that as supporting the view that this was simply an arms for hostage arrangement which was not the case, and that the finding, taken out of context of the whole operation, could be used to damage the President. "And I just thought that we didn't need it at that point." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 159-61. On the President's news conference held on 11/19/86, see entries starting at 86/11/19-270.)
86/11/19-400 NOVEMBER 19, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)			THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE AND DoJ ACTIVITY COOPER ACCOUNT: The President holds a press conference on the Iran matter. Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper calls Cmdr. Thompson, the NSC counsel, immediately after the press conference. Cooper seeks to have corrected the President's misstatement that there was no involvement of third parties in the arms sales to Iran. Thompson assures Cooper that the NSC knows of the misstatement and that actions are underway to correct it. (Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87, at 32-36.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/19-600 AROUND NOVEMBER 19-21, 1986 (WEDNESDAY - FRIDAY)		SHREDDING AT STTGI NAPIER ACCOUNT: Shirley Napier, staff assistant at STTGI, described the shredding at that office during "the first part of December" 1986: "Q. Would you describe as best you recall it what happened on that day? "A. Mr. Secord came in and decided we needed to go through our files. I think he actually went through our subject files and took anything out that he wanted destroyed or put into the storage boxes. "I went through the telex files and my files and took all the summary sheets from telephone bills, telex bills, travel, and put those in the boxes. And the telexes, I took out anything that had company names, a person's name, anything that referenced money, or I think I took out things that referenced part numbers, lists of part numbers, gave those to Mr. Secord to go through. "Q. And then what happened? "A. Anything he wanted destroyed, he gave back and we shredded them. "Q. There was a shredder in the office? "A. Yes. "Q. Where was that located? "A. It's in our little kitchen area. "Q. Who participated in shredding the documents on that day? "A. I did, Joan Corbin, and Bob Dutton. And I don't believe I ever saw Mr. Secord shred anything. I was not standing there. But again,	

that was in another room.

"Q. But Mr. Secord was telling you to shred the documents?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Did Mr. Secord tell you, then or any other time after, why he wanted those documents shredded?

"A. No.

"Q. Have you ever discussed the shredding with Mr. Hakim?

"A. No.

"Q. . . . [H]as Mr. Dutton ever said to you why the documents were shredded?

"A. No, he hasn't.

"Q. Did the document shredding take place on more than just that day in December that you've described?

"A. Yes, it did.

"Q. How many days after?

"A. I don't know, maybe a couple of days. It was just, I had steno books that I had kept ever since I worked there, that I made all my notes on. Those were destroyed. I'm not sure they were destroyed on the same day.

"We destroyed telephone log books, where you had a copy of who called in, phone messages. Those were destroyed.

"It was just over a period of days. It was not just one day standing there shredding." (Napier, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 66-68, 104-06; Napier Affidavit, 5/11/87 [setting date of shredding c. Nov. 19-21, 1986]. See 86/11/27-000, -020 [Dutton and Corbin accounts]. See also

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/7/87, at 117-22 [Secord on shredding at STTGI].)	
86/11/19-710 AROUND NOVEMBER 19, 1986		DIVERSION: NOTICE TO CASEY AND THE C/CATF C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Carome. . . . When did you first learn of the fact that funds had been diverted from the arms sales in Iran to the contras? "[C/CATF.] The morning of bombshell Tuesday, I think it was the 25th of November, the morning that the Attorney General announced the -- made his announcements on television at noontime. "Mr Carome. I ask you to turn to [C/CATF] Exhibit 41. This is the last exhibit I will ask you to look at today. This is excerpts from your testimony before the Tower Board. "Here you tell the Tower Board that you had been on a trip in Central America with Director Casey in the middle of November. I'm looking at the middle of page 40. And that while you were on that trip, a courier came down who was coming down to meet him with his briefs and such so he could do his work on the airplane, and get ready for his testimony. And the courier said to him, you know, there may be a problem on diversion and that was eight or 10 days before it broke in the newspapers. "[C/CATF.] He said there may be a problem. I didn't consider it definitive and I recall that -- frankly, I didn't recall that either in my deposition but he did make that point and I think he referred to some [redacted.] I have subsequently asked him, was it the smoking-gun	DIVERSION: NOTICE TO CASEY AND THE C/CATF C/CATF ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		memo or [redacted] that Ollie has referred to here. I suppose you could say that is a glimpse of foreknowledge, I don't deny that, and I forgot that. "The first time I knew it in spades was when I was told by Clair George on the 25th that Meese was going to make announcements. "Mr. Carome. This would have been the Wednesday before the Director testified, is that right, around November 19th? "[C/CATF.] It was a Thursday. No, it was a Wednesday. "Mr. Carome. That would have been November 19th, some six days before the public announcement. Who was the courier? "[C/CATF. Answer redacted.] "Mr. Carome. Do you recall whether he specifically used the word 'diversion'? "[C/CATF.] No. I don't recall the conversation. It was something like there may be a problem with the money; [redacted] more money than we got, something like that." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 63-64; JHICI Ex. C/CATF 41. See C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 70-72 [discoveries between the Hasenfus crash and 11/25/86].)	
86/11/19-712 AROUND NOVEMBER 19, 1986		DIVERSION: NOTICE TO THE C/CATF C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Rodino. I am going to refer you to [C/CATF] Exhibit 41, which is . . . an excerpt from your interview by the Tower Board and you stated that a courier met Director Casey in	DIVERSION: NOTICE TO THE C/CATF C/CATF ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

Central America some time in the latter part of November of '86[,] probably around the 19th or so, to deliver materials so that Director Casey could prepare for his upcoming congressional testimony.

"And according to your testimony, this courier whom you identified this morning [see 86/11/19-710] as I believe [redacted] said that [sic] Director Casey at that time, you know there may be a problem on diversion. My questions -- what did Director Casey say when [redacted] made that remark?

"[C/CATF. Redacted] said it to me. He said [redacted] it looks like there may be a problem with Iran money. There is intelligence that indicates that more was paid in than came out. I just looked at him and said wow, or something like that. I don't know that he told Director Casey that.

"Mr. Rodino. Was Director Casey in your presence?

"[C/CATF.] No. He was on the airplane and [redacted] and I were standing off to one side. We were on the tarmac[] at the airport [redacted.] So I don't know that Director Casey ever heard that one way or the other.

"Mr. Rodino. What did you take [redacted] comments to mean?

"[C/CATF.] What I said, that there might be a problem out there with the Iran program. I didn't know much about it. When I heard that I suspected that there might be a problem with it.

"Mr. Rodino. After hearing that did you make queries about it?

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"[C/CATF.] I did not because I didn't know anything about the Iranian initiative and I kept my mind on trying to get [redacted] and I really didn't pay that much attention to it. "Mr. Rodino. Did you report this to Casey? "[C/CATF.] No. He took off on an airplane to come back immediately, I stayed in Central America and continued the trip and subsequent to that I may have had only one more meeting with Director Casey before he died. "Mr. Rodino. Did you report it to anyone else in the Agency? "[C/CATF.] No. No. "Mr. Rodino. So there was no follow-up at all? "(Counsel conferring with witness.) "[C/CATF.] No, I didn't -- no, I knew that it was being followed up in the context of this thing, in the context -- "Mr. Rodino. What do you mean? "[C/CATF.] I knew the Director was coming back and was to testify, and others were looking at this thing, and I didn't -- it was not my portion of the pie, and I didn't focus on it. [Redacted.] "Mr. Rodino. This didn't give you any concern when he said there is a problem with this? "[C/CATF.] It gave me a concern, but I [redacted.] I was [redacted] and didn't follow up on it. I didn't know anything about it, and with those things you have to have one or two pieces of data out there to be able to link something together. It was a passing comment, and it just	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		was a passing comment." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 178-81; C/CATF Ex. 41. See C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 239-41, 257-58 [the courier's message about diversion].)	
86/11/19-714 DURING 1986		DIVERSION: NOTICE TO THE C/CATF C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. Nunn. . . . I understand you have already testified you did not know of the diversion of funds . . . to the contras from the Iranian arms sales. "[C/CATF.] Yes. "Mr. Nunn. When did you first learn of that? "[C/CATF.] In spades, in definitive terms, on the Tuesday, it was just -- just before it was announced by the Attorney General. There was one indicator, as Congressman Rodino pointed out some days earlier, in that there was a discrepancy that may be looked at, but I did not assign significance to that at that point in time. "Mr. Nunn. Did you ever have a conversation either before or after that time, that Tuesday, that you learned of the diversion, did you ever have a conversation about the diversion either before or after that period with Director Casey? "[C/CATF.] No. "Mr. Nunn. Did you ever have anyone tell you that Director Casey knew about the diversion? "[C/CATF.] No. "Mr. Nunn. You have never had a conversation with anyone in the CIA about whether Director Casey knew about the diversion?	DIVERSION: NOTICE TO THE C/CATF C/CATF ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"[C/CATF.] The discussions I had about it were after we returned from the trip to Central America, as best I can recall them, and it was, I was a peripheral sort of inflow addressee is the best way to put it, about the Roy Furmark letter or the Roy Furmark claims, the [redacted] claims, and those other sorts of things that went back and forth.

"But I never had a specific conversation with Director Casey about it, nor do I recall having specific conversations with anyone else. I was the sort of kibitzer on the side of the main action.

"Mr. Nunn. Let's strike the word 'specific conversation' and leave the adjective off and ask whether you have had any conversation with anyone in the CIA about the diversion.

"[C/CATF.] I just said yes, that we talked about the Furmark memos and talked about the [redacted] memos and so on and so forth. But it's all kind of a melange in time, and I don't know exactly when it happened. My recollection would be in December when things were sorting out and stuff was coming down.

"Mr. Nunn. December of 1986?

"[C/CATF.] Yes.

"Mr. Nunn. Well, has anyone, either in or outside the CIA or inside or outside the U.S. Government, told you that Director Casey knew about the diversion?

"[C/CATF.] Not -- I have heard what I have heard in the context of these hearings. No one else has ever told me anything about that except

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		after December the letters, the Roy Furmark meetings, and those sorts of things that I learned about sometime in December, but no one ever came up to me and said Bill Casey knew about it prior to that time or didn't know about it. No, I am pretty specific about that. "(Witness conferring with counsel.) "[C/CATF.] Prior to this, and I don't know when it was, but one time, and I have been searching my memory, it's sort of like the computer going round and round and round trying to dredge things up, I do recall the Director asking me, saying, ['Redacted] what do you know about where this money from [sic] the Resistance is coming from, and do you know about it?' I said, 'I don't know much about it,' and he said 'Neither do I.' I kept away from it. I haven't asked the questions on purpose, and that kind of left it there. That was about the only time the Director ever really raised those issues with me." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 200-02.)	
86/11/19-715 DURING 1986		DIVERSION: NOTICE TO THE C/CATF C/CATF ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Nunn. About what time[ ]frame would that have been? "[C/CATF.] Sometime in '86. I couldn't put my finger on it. It was one of my meetings with the Director. I would put it in the -- I am guessing -- but I would say sometime in the April to June time[ ]frame of '86, and that is a real guess.	DIVERSION: NOTICE TO THE C/CATF C/CATF ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Mr. Nunn. That would have been before the letter came from the Canadian businessman and so forth?

"[C/CATF.] Yes, I am certain before that.

"Mr. Nunn. Tell us again as nearly as you can what Director Casey said about that.

"[C/CATF.] What it was, I was standing getting ready to leave the room, and he said ['Redacted'], he said, 'what do you know about those, about the funding for the Resistance Forces?' And sort of how it's being done and what Ollie is doing. And I said, 'Not very much, I don't know where it's come from, I have stayed away from it.'

"He said, 'So have I, I haven't asked any questions about it, I don't want to know about it. I've kept myself ignorant.' That was the thrust of it.

"Mr. Nunn. Where was that conversation?

"[C/CATF.] In his office.

"Mr. Nunn. Was anybody else there?

"[C/CATF.] No, me and he. [Sic.]

"Mr. Nunn. That is the only time you ever had a conversation with Director Casey about the diversion?

"[C/CATF.] That's not about diversion, that was about funding, in general. It was the only time I ever really talked with him about that. Wait, there's one other one. Before Thanksgiving -- when was Thanksgiving? Does anyone have a calendar? Was it the 17th? Something like that. I got a phone call from Miami from Director Casey. I was at my office, I don't remember the date or

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		the time, but he was on vacation in Miami, and it was when this whole thing was in full blow, and he said, he called me up and he said, 'Don't worry, [redacted,] we haven't done anything illegal, I first learned about this thing from Furmark and reported it right away, I don't want you to worry.' "Mr. Nunn. So he specifically told you he didn't know about it before then. "[C/CATF.] That is what he told me. He said, ['Redacted] don't worry.' As you might guess, this whole thing is public, and my heart is in my mouth where it has been eight months. He made that phone call, I was a little taken aback by it. It was from Miami. It was a secure line phone call. "Mr. Nunn. You never heard anyone else, either in the CIA or otherwise, apart from these hearings, say that Director Casey either knew or didn't know? "[C/CATF.] No. We have talked about it and speculated about it. No one I have talked to said he knew about it. Nobody knows. Those are two instances in which he made comments to me." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 202-04.)	
86/11/20-000 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)	McFARLANE ON RESPONSIBILITY: "I came back to Washington and went out and made a speech on Thursday, the 20th, in Gaithersburg and believed that I was truly responsible for what had happened and said so." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 174.)	McFARLANE ON RESPONSIBILITY: See col. 1.	McFARLANE ON RESPONSIBILITY: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/20-100 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: HISTORICAL (2000) VERSION NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified that at the time the Historical (2000) Version was prepared on November 20, 1986, he had already been working on the chronologies for approximately thirteen days. North testified that while he could not say with certainty who received which drafts of the chronologies, "various drafts of these chronologies were sent to Admiral Poindexter and to others within the Administration." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 71-72. See JHICI Ex. OLN 23 [White House Chronologies, 11/20/86, 2000 (Historical Version)].)
86/11/20-130 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: HISTORICAL (2000) VERSION NORTH ACCOUNT (cont'd): "Mr. NIELDS. I would like you to turn to page six of Exhibit 23. I would like to refer you to the paragraph in the middle of the page. . . . "'In mid-November, the Israelis, through a senior officer in the Foreign Minister's Office (Kimche), indicated that the Government of Israel was convinced that they were nearing a breakthrough with Iran on a high-level dialogue. The Israeli contacted a U.S. official (North) and asked for the name of a European-based airline which could discreetly transit to Iran for the purpose of delivering passengers and cargo. He specifically noted that neither a U.S. carrier nor

an Israeli affiliated carrier could be used.'

"And I want you to focus on this next sentence -- 'We were assured, at the time, that the Israelis were going to "try oil drilling parts as an incentive," since we had expressed so much displeasure over the earlier TOW shipment. The name of the proprietary was passed to the Israeli, who subsequently had an aircraft chartered through normal commerical contract for a flight from Tel Aviv to Tabriz, Iran, on November 25, 1985. The Israelis were unwitting of the CIA's involvement in the airline and the airline was paid at the normal commercial charter rate (approximately $127,700). The airline personnel were also unwitting of the cargo they carried.'

"And then in the next paragraph it says, 'In January, we learned that the Israelis, responding to urgent entreaties from the Iranians, ha[d] used the proprietary aircraft to transport 18 HAWK missiles to Iran in an effort to improve the static air defenses around Tehran.' The statement, 'we were assured at the time that the Israelis were going to "try oil drilling parts as an incentive"' is false, isn't it?

"Mr. NORTH. There is much of what is in that paragraph that is false, and it was false because we were at that point in time making an effort to disassociate ourselves with the earlier Israelis' shipments.

". . . .

"Mr. NORTH. . . . We, in our discussions with the Iranians, starting in February of 1986, disassociated ourselves from that [November 1985]

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			shipment. By 1986, in November, my concern and my principal concern was that if we associated ourselves now at this point with the September and principally . . . November shipment of Hawks, that we could jeopardize the hostages and potentially jeopardize the Second Channel, both of whom could be placed at great risk by that revelation. There may also have been other motivations. "There is no doubt that that paragraph has several inconsistencies with the truth. I was deeply involved in that shipment . . . . ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. You knew the statements in this paragraph were false? "Mr. NORTH. Absolutely, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And Mr. McFarlane knew that they were false? "Mr. NORTH. Yes." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 73-77.)
86/11/20-160 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. By putting out this false version of the facts, you were committing, were you not, the entire administration to telling a false story? "Mr. NORTH. Well, I am not trying to pass the buck here. October? I did a lot of things, and I want to stand up and say that I'm proud of them. I don't want you to think, Counsel, that I went about this all on my own. I realize there's a lot of folks around that think there's a loose cannon on the gun deck of State at NSC. That wasn't what

I heard while I worked there. I've only heard it since I left. People used to walk up to me and tell me what a great job I was doing.

"The fact is there were many, many people, to include the former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the current National Security Advisor, the Attorney General of the United States of America, the Director of Central Intelligence, all of whom knew that to be wrong.

"Mr. NIELDS. We understand that, Colonel. I take it one of your functions was to give people above you in the hierarchy advice?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . Isn't it true--and I will put it that others above you, by putting out this version of the facts, were committing the President of the United States to a false story?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes. That is true.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you ever say to any of those people, 'You can't do that without asking the President'?

"Mr. NORTH. No, I did not.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you ever say, 'You can't do that, it is not true, and you cannot commit the President of the United States to a lie'?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't believe that I ever said that to anyone, no.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did anybody else in your presence say that?

"Mr. NORTH. No.

"Mr. NIELDS. So none of these people, Director of Central Intelligence, two National

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Security Advisors, Attorney General, none of them ever made the argument it is not true, you can't say it? "Mr. NORTH. No. And in fairness to them, I think that they had a darned good reason for not putting the straight story out, and their reasons might have been the same as mine. They may have been different, and you would have to ask them. But the fact is I think there were good and sufficient reasons at that time. "Mr. NIELDS. Did anybody ask the President? "Mr. NORTH. I did not. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you know if anyone else did? "Mr. NORTH. I do not." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 92-94.)
86/11/20-300 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			THE 11/85 SHIPMENT: 11/86 RECOLLECTION NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified he could not recall having discussed with Cmdr. Thompson or Adm. Poindexter "that notwithstanding the fact that others claimed that the U.S. Government knew [that HAWKs were shipped in 11/85], that [North] and McFarlane were sticking to [their] story." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 6.)
86/11/20-400 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION, AND THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY COOPER ACCOUNT: Meeting at the NSC to review DCI Casey's proposed testimony to Congress. Present: Casey, Meese, Poindexter, North, Thompson, Cooper, and (possibly) Gates.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			The meeting involves a discussion of a draft statement that the CIA was unaware in November 1985 that the shipment from Israel to Iran contained arms rather than oil-drilling equipment. North suggests that the statement should read that no one in the U.S. Government knew at the time that the November shipment contained arms. Cooper makes a handwritten note of North's point. North also states that the U.S. had to coerce Iran to return the 18 HAWKs that Israel had delivered there, after the U.S. learned of the arms component of the shipment. The meeting ends after about two hours when Meese leaves to give a speech at West Point. After the meeting, Cooper and Thompson go to Peter Wallison's office. While they are talking, State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer calls to point out a problem with Casey's proposed testimony. At Cooper's suggestion, Wallison calls Sofaer back on a secure line. Sofaer tells Wallison that Shultz recalls a conversation with McFarlane in November 1985 during which McFarlane referred specifically to a shipment of HAWK missiles from Israel to Iran. Wallison tells Cooper and Thompson of Sofaer's report. Cooper then asks Thompson to contact North and McFarlane to straighten out the facts. Cooper points out to Thompson the statement made by North that no one in the entire U.S. Government knew the November 1985 shipment contained arms. Thompson says he will contact North and McFarlane. On returning to his office at the DoJ, Cooper calls Sofaer to ask if Shultz is certain of his

November 1985 conversation with McFarlane. Sofaer replies that one of Shultz' aides made a contemporaneous note of a conversation between Shultz and McFarlane on November 18, 1985 in which the word "HAWKs" was mentioned.

Cooper then calls Thompson who has already contacted North and McFarlane. Each insists he did not know that arms were shipped in November 1985. Cooper contacts Thompson to convey the message to Poindexter that Casey not testify as planned about the November 1985 shipment.

Cooper then calls Meese who agrees to return immediately to Washington. Cooper also contacts Poindexter and CIA General Counsel David Doherty to discuss the problems with Casey's testimony. (Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87, at 38-70.)

86/11/20-500
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION,
AND THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY

NORTH ACCOUNT:

North attends a meeting to prepare Casey's testimony the day before Casey's appearance before the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Casey, Poindexter, North, Charles Cooper, Meese, Paul Thompson and probably Gates meet in Poindexter's office. The group discuss a CIA-prepared summary of the events of November 1985.

North testified:

"My principal objective in that session was to create some closure between a CIA version, which showed this to be an 'NSC operation,' and make it more visible as a U.S. Government operation.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"The CIA version of their chronology had said this is the NSC this this, the NSC that that, the NSC et cetera. My effort was to try and make closure between their version and one that would say this was the U.S. Government that did A, B and C. Nonetheless, the portion that dealt with the November Hawk shipments was in part in error. "Now, I understand there [are] a lot of heroes walking around that have claimed credit for exposing the fraud, et cetera. Let me just make note as to what I recall and what I recorded at the time. "I have my notes. After we left that meeting, I do not recall, incidentally, a great debate over whether the U.S. Government knew or whether the CIA knew what was aboard the airplane. "I very clearly knew what was on that airplane. So did Director Casey know that I knew what was on that airplane. The issue, as far as I was concerned, was what did the CIA know? . . . ". . . . ". . . And so, in working the chronology, it was important that the CIA be able to say that they did not know what was on the airplanes at the time, and I don't believe they did. They certainly found out shortly thereafter because of the same sensitive intelligence I referred to earlier. "There was no doubt that shortly thereafter, everybody who had access to that very sensitive intelligence knew what was going on. There was a discussion, as I recall, relatively brief, in Admiral Poindexter's office which included Admiral

Poindexter, Director Casey, myself, Mr. Thompson, I believe Mr. Cave, and the Attorney General, and if he says he was there, Mr. Cooper.

". . . I then went back to Director Casey's office over in the Old Executive Office Building, the one that was just down the hall from my basement.

"And in that room, Director Casey and I fixed that testimony and removed the offensive portions. Now, we fixed it by omission. We left out--it wasn't made accurate, it wasn't made fulsome, it was fixed by omission.

"I know there are a lot of other heroes who have exposed all of this, but I will tell you that it was done within minutes of finishing that meeting . . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. When you say the testimony was fixed, I take it, and fixed by omission--

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. --you are saying that you and Director Casey agreed that he would say that they were told to pick up bulky cargo and that the crew on the airline was told it was oil drilling equipment and Hawk missiles would never be mentioned?

"Mr. NORTH. That is right. My recollection of that agreement, by the way, goes all the way back to a year earlier in which the discussions I had with the Israeli officials we agreed that the story line would be that they were shipping oil drilling equipment, and so when I contacted the CIA in November of 1985 and asked them to provide the name of an air carrier tht was discreet in

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Europe, I told them that it was oil drilling equipment. I lied to the CIA because that was the convention that we had worked out with the Israelis, that no one else was to know." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 95-100; JHICI Ex. OLN 31, 31-A [draft text of Casey's Congressional testimony, with handwritten changes]. See North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 2-5, and JHICI Ex. 31-A [North's handwritten changes to same document].)
86/11/20-520 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION NORTH ACCOUNT: North emphasized that his purpose in changing Director Casey's proposed Congressional testimony was to remove the emphasis on the NSC and CIA, with the focus shifted over to the USG. North testified, "[M]y concern was that the documents reflect as much as oft as possible that this was a U.S. Government activity . . . . Much of the CIA paper showed this was a[n] NSC activity, and so I had urged in this meeting, 'Look, you [have] got to stop calling this a[n] NSC activity, the NSC is not a government unto itself, despite of [sic] what some of you may believe'--the NSC was an organization of the U.S. Government--'and would you therefore get closer, let's take out NSC and CIA and put U.S. Government everywhere we can in the document.' That is my recollection of what I was trying to do during that session. "Now, there were many other people there. The important thing is that, first of all, on this

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			document, that's not my writing [on Ex. OLN 31. But see Ex. OLN 31-A (copy of same document with handwritten additions), and North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 2-5 (North: "That is my handwriting.").]. Second of all, sitting in the room are other people who have intimate knowledge of what had transpired in November of 1985. I am not the only one in the room that knows what is going on. Perhaps Mr. Cooper didn't, but surely, with the possible exception of Mr. Thompson, everybody else did. So I am not the only one sitting in the room having a construction problem here, and I do not recall emphasizing the U.S. Government aspect of it. "When we went back to Director Casey's Office, my recollection is we simply deleted the whole line and went back to the version that said the CIA was told that it was oil drilling equipment." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 102-03. See id., 7/7/87, at 104 [North: "But surely everybody else in that room [besides Cooper and Thompson] knew what had happened."].)
86/11/20-531 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION POINEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Now, on the 20th, the meeting on the 20th of November with yourself and Director Casey and the Attorney General and others, there was testimony last week by Mr. Cooper that Ollie suggested a particular insertion with regard to -- "A. I read Mr. Cooper's transcript. "Q. Did you in any way suggest to him, Colonel North, that he should make that insertion?

"A. No.

"Q. Were you aware prior to his making it that he was going to suggest it?

"A. I don't believe so.

"Q. And it is your testimony that upon his making it at that time you believed it was accurate?

"A. No, I didn't say that.

"Q. Tell us, if you will.

"A. I was unsure of what the facts were at that point, and I knew that he had been in contact with Mr. McFarlane, as I had asked him to be, and I don't think I had a chance to meet with him that day or just prior to the meeting.

"As I recall, Colonel North came in later, after we had gotten started; and in front of all those people, I was not going to raise that issue. We had been concerned for some days at that point that Mr. McFarlane was not remembering what the circumstances were in Geneva.

"Q. Did you have any doubt in your mind as to the accuracy of what Colonel North was suggesting?

"A. You know, I don't -- Chuck Cooper mentioned that there was a inserted handout. I don't recall that insert. In fact, his whole description of what Colonel North prepared is not clear in my mind.

"MR. LIMAN: What does that mean, not clear in your mind? You don't recall it that way?

"THE WITNESS: I don't recall it. I simply -- he made a big issue in his testimony about Colonel North doing --

"MR. LEON: It was an exhibit.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"THE WITNESS: -- of introducing that insert, and I simply don't remember that. "BY MR. LEON: "Q. His testimony was it was a CIA-proposed insert in the testimony and that during the course of reviewing it, Colonel North made a proposal that was penned in with regard to a certain portion of it, that is, as to the knowledge of the CIA, who was preparing a change to that from the no CIA knowledge prior to January to no one in the U.S. Government. [Sic.] That doesn't ring any bells? "A. You know, it may very well have happened that way. I don't remember an insert being discussed." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 92-94.)
86/11/20-532 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Can you tell us why it was that Peter Wallison hadn't been invited to that meeting? That's the counsel to the President. "A. Because at this point, the whole issue, as far as I was concerned, was a political issue; it was not a legal issue. And with the exception of one point, and that was the primary reason in my mind the Attorney General was there, and that was to address the question of the President's exercising his constitutional authority or what we felt was his statutory authority under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to delay notification until after the fact, to do it in a timely way. We knew

that was going to be a controversial issue because Members of Congress had already indicated they were annoyed they hadn't been notified.

"As I testified before, Ed Meese had offered to, as we were getting ready to debrief the committees on the Hill, he had offered to be of whatever assistance that I needed.

"Q. The morning of the 20th?

"A. No, he made that offer long before that. It was earlier in the month; I don't remember exactly when. And in the week leading up to the 20th, I had had a couple of conversations with the Attorney General, and when he came and participated in the meeting, my understanding of his main contribution would be on the question of giving Bill Casey enough ammunition to refute any contention that the President didn't have the authority to withhold notification.

". . . .

"Q. So it is your testimony Mr. Wallison's absence wasn't a conscious effort to keep out or freeze out the White House counsel's office?

"A. It wasn't a conscious effort. It is just the counsel to the President, even before Peter Wallison's time, did not get involved in finance.

"Q. Chuck Cooper testified Wallison expressed to both Thompson and Cooper how upset he was he hadn't been invited to that meeting. Did Commander Thompson relay that back to you?

"A. Probably. I knew Peter Wallison had been wanting to get into the issue earlier that month.

"Q. Cooper also testified that during that period of meeting that afternoon, Judge Sofaer from the State Department contacted Wallison and Cooper with regard to a potential conflict that he saw between Shultz and McFarlane, and I'm sure you are aware of that testimony --

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was it relayed to you that afternoon by anyone about this potential conflict?

"A. Yes. In fact, my recollection is that I knew about that conflict before that time, but it may not have been until then."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 94-96.)

86/11/20-534
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. LIMAN. On November 20, did you meet with Mr. Casey, the Attorney General, Mr. Cooper, Colonel North and Mr. Gates in order to discuss Mr. Casey's upcoming testimony before the Intelligence Committees and your briefing . . . to those committees?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Early in the month of November--

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you have that meeting?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. We had that meeting. I want to tell you how it came about. Early in November Ed Meese called me and indicated that he wanted to be helpful in--he recognized at that point eventually we were going to have to go public or at least brief the congressional committees on the finding, and he wanted to offer his assistance in doing that.

"I had several conversations over the month with Ed, and finally the week of 17 November, the

President up to that point had taken the position, which I certainly fully supported, was [sic] that we would still try to protect as much of the information about the project as possible. The President felt, and I agreed with him, that we still had an opportunity to get some of the hostages out and we wanted to salvage what we could of the second channel.

"But the week of the 17th it became more and more clear that we were going to have to go public. Director Casey had left on that Monday, as I recall, for a trip to Central America.

At some point during the week we agreed to brief the two congressional intelligence committees on Friday. Director Casey was not scheduled to come back to the United States until Thursday night, the night before.

"I can recall the week of the 17th calling Ed Meese and telling him that either I had already or was going to call Bill Casey down in Central America. In fact, I think you have a tape of that conversation in one of your exhibits.

"I did not realize our conversation was taped at the time, but I guess the CIA taped it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 58-60. Poindexter account continues at 86/11/20-536. For further Poindexter testimony on his taped conversation with Casey, see 86/11/22-507, -508.)

86/11/20-535 UNTIL PRESENT TIME

CASEY'S TAPED CONVERSATION: WHAT AND WHEN THE CIA RECORDS

LIMAN CLARIFICATION:

"Mr. NUNN. . . . Admiral Poindexter answered

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	that he had a conversation with Bill Casey and that he had not known that conversation was taped, but later found that it was taped. This raises a great concern and question about what the Central Intelligence Agency tapes and what they do with that, what the rules are, and whether this is something we have within our knowledge. ". . . . "Chairman HAMITLON. The Chair recognizes Mr. Liman for clarification on the CIA communications. "Mr. Liman? "Mr. LIMAN. The CIA has a special voice communications system which is used in lieu of cable traffic for overseas communications of an operational nature on occasion. "When that system is used, the calls are taped by CIA headquarters and an index maintained so that there is a record equivalent to what would exist with operational cables. "During the course of our investigation, we have requested and received transcripts of pertinent communications, which is how we got the transcript of the conversation between the Admiral and Mr. Casey. "That call was taped, because Mr. Casey was overseas and that communications link was used. "I have confirmed this again with the CIA and they know I was going to read this into the record. "Chairman HAMILTON. Senator Inouye? "Chairman INOUYE. May I ask a question for clarification? "Is the caller notified that the conversation		

is being recorded?

"Mr. LIMAN. My understanding is that the CIA personnel are aware of this, and they are the people who normally use it. When a call takes place, which, as I understand is infrequent of the nature that Admiral Poindexter had where the system is used, I do not know whether the non-CIA person knows that his call was being recorded.

"Admiral Poindexter, did you know?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not know.

"Mr. LIMAN. It is used normally just for operational calls in lieu of cable traffic by CIA personnel."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 118, 132-33. For further Poindexter testimony on his taped conversation with Casey, see 86/11/22-507, -508.)

86/11/20-536
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION, AND MAKING POINDEXTER'S AND CASEY'S STORIES CONSISTENT

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from 86/11/20-534:]

"Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, if you would turn to [Ex. JMP] 68, which is the portion of the testimony of Mr. Casey that was discussed at the meeting with the Attorney General and others on November 21, and in which there has been testimony by Colonel North that he made certain changes. Do you remember being there when these changes were made, sir?

". . . .

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall--let me just

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			read this again. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall discussion of this document at that meeting? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I do not recall this document, period. But I don't think that I have seen this before just now. It may have been available to me. What I recall of the meeting is that Director Casey had a several-page statement, a draft, that had been prepared for him to give the following day. I don't recall this being part of it. "Mr. LIMAN. You could put this aside for the moment since you don't recall it. But one of the purposes of the meeting was-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. Excuse me. One other point I should make is that none of those hand-written notes on the page are mine. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, I think that Colonel North has identified his handwriting. [See 86/11/20-500 and -520, and accompanying notes.] "Do you recall that one of the purposes of the meeting was to review the facts so that you and Mr. Casey would give testimony that was consistent the following day? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, we wanted to make sure we were consistent. The major--one of the major concerns that we had, or that I had going into the meeting was that I knew that Congress was not going to be happy with the President's decision to postpone notification, and one of the reasons that I wanted to have Ed Meese there was to specifically address that question. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you remember a discussion at

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that meeting of the November shipment of Hawks? "Mr. POINDEXTER. There was a discussion about the various events of November. I don't have a good recollection of all of the discussion. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you remember a discussion of the fact that the Director of Central Intelligence was proposing to say that no one at the CIA knew that the shipment involved Hawks and that Mr.--Colonel North wanted that statement to be broadened to say that no one in the U.S. Government knew it contained Hawks? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I heard Mr. Cooper's testimony, Mr. Liman. I do not recall that with the same vividness that Mr. Cooper did. I don't recall that being a major issue. What I recall being the issue was that the draft had been primarily prepared, it was my understanding, by various CIA staff. Many of them were not totally aware of all aspects, and I can recall, although not verbalizing it at the time, after quickly reading through the draft, which I had not seen until the meeting started, that there was a clear effort on the part of whoever had drafted it to make it look like the whole Iranian project was a[n] NSC activity with very little CIA connection, and that did bother me." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 63-65.)
86/11/20-537 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION, AND THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that there was a

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			discussion at this meeting of the fact that the Director was proposing to tell Congress that the CIA thought that the plane was carrying oil drilling parts from Israel? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I recall that whoever had drafted it at that point in there--I'm not sure how much Director Casey had or hadn't participated in the drafting of that. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. . . . When your meeting broke up, was there still discussion about the fact that the U.S. Government thought that the plane was carrying oil drilling parts? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, in addition to--I'll answer your question, but just let me give this background. "In addition to the principals that I described earlier in that meeting, there were also some other people. Mr. Cooper was there, my recollection is Mr. Gates was there, and there were a few others. "I had only met Mr. Cooper a day or two before that. I didn't really know who he was or any of his background. I, as Mr. Cooper has testified, was very closed-mouth in the whole meeting. I did not want--at that point I knew that there was disagreement amongst the people that were involved in the November activities, but I did not want to surface all of those issues in front of all the people that were in that room. "In hindsight, what I should have done is adjourned the meeting and met separately with Ed Meese and Bill Casey so that we could hash through

the issues, but I didn't think about it at the time and didn't do it. It would have been a better thing to do.

"Mr. LIMAN. Were you uncomfortable with the fact that Mr. Meese had brought his Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Cooper, and that Mr. Casey had brought his Deputy, Mr. Gates?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I was.

"Mr. LIMAN. And as a result, you did not express your point of view at that meeting, you stayed silent?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct, because the big question in my mind at that point was the question of whether or not the President had approved the Hawk shipments before they had taken place or not, and I didn't know the answer to that question and I didn't want to discuss in such a group that issue until I was on much firmer ground.

"Mr. LIMAN. And after the meeting broke up, were you told that Mr. Sofaer, the counsel to the State Department, had communicated with Mr. Cooper and with White House counsel some very strong views that this was a cover-up?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall that characterization. At some point--and I'm fuzzy on the time, it was probably that afternoon, although I must say originally I thought it was earlier--I was aware that Mr. Sofaer had reported that Secretary Shultz had a different recollection of the events of November than Mr. McFarlane did. And I frankly at the time could not remember what happened in November of 1985."

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 66-68.)

86/11/20-538
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION,
AND THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 4:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, did you reach an agreement on what you would say about this shipment before the Intelligence Committee?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. At some point the evening I recall, I believe, of the 20th I called Director Casey at home and told him that I was uneasy with the section on the Hawks, that different people were recalling different things and I thought we should be very cautious the following day in briefing the committees. We did not want to put out false information the following day, and at that point I didn't have all the answers, and my recollection is that I told Director Casey that what we ought to say is that there had been a shipment in November of 1985; we didn't have all the facts, we were still looking into them and we would get back to the committees when we had all the facts.

"Mr. LIMAN. Is it a fact that whatever you may have remembered, you knew that it was a false story that the CIA and the NSC thought that these were oil drilling parts being shipped?

"Did you know that that was false as far as that went, that it was oil drilling parts?

"[Witness conferring with counsel.]

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, that isn't necessarily a false story.

"Mr. LIMAN. I know, but you say not necessarily. I am asking you whether you knew that it was false to say that these were oil drilling parts so far as the United States knew.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I wasn't certain of that at all, because I did have a vague recollection, as the various conversations went forward, that there was something about oil drilling equipment. Since that time, I have thought back over it, and I believe what happened was that Colonel North used that as a cover story with the CIA in arranging for the proprietaries, so there were probably some people at CIA that thought that it was oil drilling equipment.

"But, again, that is with a lot of additional information since that time. At the time, I remembered something about oil drilling equipment, but I was fairly certain in my mind that it was not as described in that version of the narrative of the chronology."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 68-70.)

86/11/20-540
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

THE PROBLEM WITH THE 11/85 HAWK SHIPMENT:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S VIEW

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

"Q. Admiral, I want to ask if at any time between November of '85 until you left your position as National Security Advisor did anyone say to you, you know, this shipment that took place in November of '85 is the one shipment that has created a problem for us under the law?

"A. The only thing that I can recall -- let's see. I'm trying to think.

"(Pause.)

"The person that said something like that -- and I can't recall the exact comment -- but Ed Meese said something like that in a meeting, and I rather suspect it was the meeting that I had with Ed Meese and Bill Casey on Thursday, the 20th, as near as I can place it. I'm sure that Ed was the one that made a point similar to that, and I was just trying to place the occasion. I think it was the meeting on the 20th.

"Mr. BECKLER. That's the 20th of November 1986?

"THE WITNESS: Twentieth of November, 1986.

"BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming)

"Q. Do you remember anything more of what he said on that subject?

"A. Well, the purpose of this meeting was to discuss the briefing, the informal briefing, that I was going to provide to the two intelligence committees in the White House situation room on the following day, and Director Casey was going to come up to the Hill and testify before the two committees, and I had asked both Bill Casey and Ed Meese -- Ed had offered to help earlier in the month.

"And as we began to report to Congress Ed's offer to help was mainly associated with the question the President's authority under the timely notice provision. So the discussion -- that meeting was set up to discuss the briefings and hearings the following day, and by that time we were aware that Mr. McFarlane's recollection of what happened in November was different from what

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Secretary Shultz recalled. "And that was a problem for us because none of the rest of us knew or could recall the origins of the November shipment, and the question hinged on whether the President had approved it before or after, and because we were uncertain of that fact in that meeting we agreed that the following day we would simply say that there had been a shipment in November of '85 by the Israelis but we were still looking into the details of it and we'd be back to the Committees after we had the details. "And sometime in that conversation Ed said that on both the September shipment of TOWs and the November shipment of HAWKs, that -- I don't want to put words in his mouth, but it was something along the line that it would make a difference whether the President approved it ahead of time or afterwards, or words to that effect." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 347-49.)
86/11/20-542 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S VIEW OF THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Admiral, I want to ask you if at any time between November of '85 until you left your position as National Security Advisor did anyone say to you, you know, this shipment that took place in November of '85 is the one shipment that has created a problem for us under the law? "A. The only thing that I can recall--let's see. I'm trying to think. "(Pause.)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"The person that said something like that -- and I can't recall the exact comment -- but Ed Meese said something like that in a meeting, and I rather suspect it was the meeting that I had with Ed Meese and Bill Casey on Thursday, the 20th, as near as I can place it. I'm sure that Ed was the one that made a point similar to that and I was just trying to place the occasion. I think it was the meeting on the 20th. "MR. BECKLER: That's the 20th of November 1986. "THE WITNESS: Twentieth of November, 1986. "BY MR. LIMAN: (Resuming) "Q. Do you remember anything more of what he said on that subject? "A. Well, the purpose of this meeting was to discuss the briefing, the informal briefing, that I was going to provide to the two intelligence committees in the White House situation room on the following day, and Director Casey was going to come up to the Hill and testify before the two committees, and I had asked both Bill Casey and Ed Meese -- Ed had offered to help earlier in the month. "And as we began to report to Congress Ed's offer to help was mainly associated with the question of the President's authority under the timely notice provision. So the discussion -- that meeting was set up to discuss the briefings and hearings the following day, and by that time we were aware that Mr. McFarlane's recollection of what happened in November was different from what Secretary Shultz recalled.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"And that was a problem for us because none of the rest of us knew or could recall the origins of the November shipment, and the question hinged on whether the President had approved it before or after, and because we were uncertain of that fact in that meeting we agreed that the following day we would simply say that there had been a shipment in November of '85 by the Israelis but we were still looking into the details of it and we'd be back to the Committees after we had the details. "And sometime in that conversation Ed said that on both the September shipment of TOWs and the November shipment of HAWKs, that -- I don't want to put words in his mouth, but it was something along the line that it would make a difference whether the President approved it ahead of time or afterwards, or words to that effect." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 347-49).
86/11/20-543 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. . . . After the meeting took place into the evening of November 20th, were you contacted by Mr. Cooper? "A. I didn't -- in my preparations for this hearing, reading his transcript, I understand that I was. I don't remember it very clearly. I don't deny that I was, but I don't remember it very well. "Q. Did you listen to the testimony of Mr. Cooper? "A. I read most of it, watched other parts of it.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Q. As of the end of the meeting on the 20th, I take it there was some agreement about -- one of the purposes of the meeting at least was to reconcile the fact so that you or Mr. Casey could testify consistently before the committees the following day. Is that a fair summary of at least one of the purposes? "A. That is correct. "Q. I take it by the end of the meeting there was agreement about how facts would be presented the following day. Is that -- "A. Well, I wouldn't say there was agreement because when the meeting ended I had some questions in my mind. The meeting -- frankly, it was too big, there were too many people there. "Q. To reach a consensus? "A. Well, to lay all the cards on the table. "Q. Mr. Cooper has testified about a series of events that then took place during the evening of November 20th, various phone calls between himself and Mr. Sofaer and calls to the CIA and various other calls to reconcile some facts that were learned. Did you learn about those during the evening of the 20th? "A. At some point I did learn about them, at least some of the telephone calls. "Q. And did you learn about them on the evening of the 20th? "A. I really don't recall the time frame. As I testified earlier, it seems to me I knew that Secretary Shultz's recollection of November '85 was different from Mr. McFarlane's earlier than the 20th, but it might have been after the evening

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			of the 20th. "Q. How many people were at the meeting on the 20th? "A. Bob Gates, Bill Casey, Ed Meese, Cooper, North, me, and I can't remember whether -- it seems to me there were one or two other people, probably from my staff, I'm not sure. Commander Thompson was in and out of the meeting. ". . . . "Q. I take it that's the best you recall. "A. Yes." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 117-19.)
86/11/20-544 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. When you testified a few moments ago the meeting was too large to lay the cards on the table, what did you mean by that? "A. I had only met Mr. Cooper earlier, I had no idea who he was, how close he was to Ed. His presence laid a note of caution on me. Frankly, Mr. Gates' presence also. And, as I said, at tnat point I had reports from Colonel North as to Mr. McFarlane's recollection in November, which I didn't think was accurate, and I didn't care to surface that point in front of the -- if it had been Ed Meese, Bill Casey and I sitting down together I would have raised it, but with the other people there I was unwilling to raise it. "Q. Let me ask you specifically. What was it that you would have raised? "A. I would have raised the fact that Bud's

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			recollection was what Colonel North was reporting. See, my recollection at that point of the events of November '85, I simply didn't remember the Hawk shipment, nothing about it in November. I would have raised that what Colonel North was reporting was what Bud remembered, and I was uncertain that that was right. "Q. I'm sorry to do this in such a tedious way, but when you say 'what North was reporting', what do you mean by that? What is it you recall North was reporting. "A. Well, he was reporting Bud couldn't remember anything about any prior knowledge of Hawks in November of '85. "Q. Was Colonel North reporting that the United States Government's knowledge was it was oil drilling equipment? Is that what you remember about what it was North was reporting? "A. At this point I'm not sure of what I remembered in November of '86. But at some point I did recall that oil drilling equipment had been used I believe in conversations Colonel North had with the CIA in November '85. I think that was the cover that he probably used in talking to the CIA about the proprietary. "Q. How was what Colonel North was reporting about the November '85 events, how was that inconsistent with your recollection of those events? "A. Well, my recollection was, as I said, very fuzzy. I frankly at that point didn't know what the truth was. I guess I doubted that oil drilling equipment -- that didn't sound very

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			logical in November '86, and I didn't think that was accurate. I just didn't feel at that point we were getting a straight story out of Mr. McFarlane. It may very well be he couldn't remember either. I felt he was in a better position to remember, because he had been in on a critical meeting in August of '85 that I missed with the President when this thing started. "Q. Is it your recollection in this meeting on the 20th you had already learned Shultz had a recollection it was Hawk missiles. "MR. BECKLER: I'm going to object. We went over this meeting before. We are on the tenth minute right now. Enough is enough. You will have four or five days of public testimony to hammer away, and I'm sure you will. At this point we are ready to close down here really. "MR. EGGLESTON: I will move off that meeting. . . ." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 119-21.)
86/11/20-550 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)		CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT SOFAER ACCOUNT: "[A.] And then I saw the name of Southern Air Transport in the testimony. That made me concerned. "Q. Why? "A. I associated that name with Hasenfus or the whole Central American thing. I don't know whether Hasenfus had gone down yet. "A. He had. "A. I associated the name with that. And to	CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY AND SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT SOFAER ACCOUNT: As the various witnesses to the November 1985 arms transaction give different accounts of what actually occurred, Shultz has his legal adviser, Abraham Sofaer, talk with Charles Hill, Shultz' executive assistant. Hill tells Sofaer that on November 18, 1985, McFarlane had told Shultz "that Israel would fly 100 Hawks to [redacted] and transfer them to another plane. If the hostages were released, the plane would fly to Iran. If

me it was a red flag indicating a possible connection to Central America."

See col. 3.

the hostages were not released the plane would fly to Israel."

Mid-way through Hill's briefing of Sofaer, David Gries comes from the CIA with a draft of Casey's proposed Congressional testimony for November 21:

"Q. . . . Was there any discussion of the November 1985 transfer in Director Casey's draft testimony?

"A. Yes, there was a discussion of a transfer, but not of Hawk missiles. It was of oil drilling bits.

"Q. Did it say anything about Hawk missiles?

"A. Nothing.

" . . . .

"Q. Did you say anything to Gries when you saw the reference to oil drilling equipment in the draft testimony?

"A. I expressed skepticism as to the oil drilling bits.

" . . . .

"Q. Did you find anything else in the draft testimony that caused you concern or that you took particular note of?

"A. Yes. First of all, I saw the prices, the money for the missiles, and it seemed low to me. It was either by then or later that day I started collecting information on the prices of TOW missiles. That was one.

"Another thing that I saw that made me skeptical was the assertion that the CIA said they would help out, but only this one time. The CIA said they would assist Israel in shipping these

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			oil drilling bits from [redacted] by finding an airline for them or giving them the name of an airline, but this is the only time they would do that without a finding. "This made me skeptical because I didn't see any reason why they would be reluctant to help Israel get the name of an airline if all they were doing was shipping oil drilling bits. So that story did not hang together. "And then I saw the name of Southern Air Transport in the testimony. That made me concerned. "Q. Why? "A. I associated that name with Hasenfus or the whole Central American thing. I don't know whether Hasenfus had gone down yet. "Q. He had. "A. I associated the name with that. And to me it was a red flag indicating a possible connection to Central America. "Q. When you finished reviewing the draft which had the reference to Southern Air Transport and oil drilling equipment, did you seek permission to go to the Attorney General? "A. Yes, I went to--it was the same day. I think probably there was about an hour's difference between when I learned all these facts and had them mull in my mind. "I went to Charlie Hill and I told him that I thought there was a serious question relating to November and possibly even September. That the pre-January activities were not necessarily known by the Attorney General. That he had given an

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			opinion in January, that he may not have known of any of these pre-January activities. And that it appeared that there was a misstatement in Director Casey's testimony and a story that was concocted. "Whether it was concocted with his knowledge or not, I had no idea. In fact, I knew he was out of the country. "Q. Who? "A. Casey, while this testimony was being prepared. So I assumed that it was being prepared by his staff. But whoever came up with that story, I questioned its veracity." (Sofaer, Senate Dep., 6/18/87, at 30-37.)
86/11/20-560 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY, 3:30 p.m.)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY SOFAER ACCOUNT: Sofaer, legal adviser at the DoS, tells Deputy Attorney General Arnie Burns that McFarlane had told Shultz on November 18, 1985, that the planes carried HAWKs, and that Casey's proposed Congressional testimony is not correct. Twenty minutes later, Burns confirms to Sofaer that he has conveyed the information to the Attorney General. Sofaer testified, "So Burns said to me that the Attorney General had spent the afternoon working with Poindexter and Casey on Casey's testimony and that he, the Attorney General, was fully aware of the facts I had mentioned. Burns said that the A.G. was profuse in his thanks for my warning and appreciated my motives but that he, the Attorney General, knew of certain facts that

explained all these matters and that laid to rest all the problems I might perceive.

"Burns said the Attorney General did not give him any facts and that he, Burns, was simply passing on the mysterious, as he put it, assurance that all was well."

Sofaer described his next move:

"A. I reported on this conversation to Charlie Hill and perhaps Nick Platt [of the DoS] also, and told them that I was going to call the White House counsel.

"Q. They said fine?

"A. Not quite in that spirit.

"Q. In any event, they said okay?

"A. Let me make it clear that I was not asking them for permission in the ordinary sense of the word.

"Q. I understand that.

"A. I knew what my obligations were to the President and to the law, and it was a question of simply telling them what I was going to do. That I was not satisfied with the answer I had gotten from Burns and that I was determined to tell Wallison."

(Sofaer, Senate Dep., 6/18/87, at 38-40.)

86/11/20-570
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY

SOFAER ACCOUNT:

After he speaks with Deputy Attorney General Arnie Burns, Sofaer contacts White House counsel Peter Wallison about the inaccuracies in Casey's proposed Congressional testimony:

"A. I called Wallison after speaking to Burns and then going and telling the people upstairs that I was going to call Wallison.

"Q. I take it you weren't satisfied in hearing that the Attorney General knew of some unknown facts that explained everything and laid the problem to rest?

"A. No, I was not satisfied. I was not speculating in my mind as to what had happened, but obviously one of the possibilities I had in mind was that people in the NSC or others, Casey included, had convinced the Attorney General of a story that I might find unconvincing.

"Q. So you feared that there may be a cover-up in progress?

"A. I was very afraid.

"Q. Now tell us, please, about your November 20 conversation with Peter Wallison[]?

"A. I called Wallison, it must have been around 4:00. And I told him everything that I had learned up to that point. I told him that he was the President's lawyer, that I felt an obligation to tell him these facts. That I had reviewed the CIA testimony. That I felt that it included a false story about oil drilling equipment, and that he should look into it.

"Q. What did he say to you?

"A. He was shocked.

"Q. This is Wallison?

"A. Yes. He didn't know anything about any of this. It was clear to me that he had been totally shut out of the process. He was extremely interested in as much information as I had, and he

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			promised to talk to Cooper and Thompson about it. They may even have been in his office." (Sofaer, Senate Dep., 6/18/87, at 41-42.)
86/11/20-580 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY SOFAER ACCOUNT: Sofaer contacts White House counsel Peter Wallison to inform him of problems with Casey's proposed Congressional testimony. Charles Cooper, in Wallison's office at the time of the call, tells Sofaer that the draft of Casey's testimony has just been changed to say that no one in the U.S. Government knew that the November 1985 shipment contained HAWKs rather than oil-drilling equipment. "Q. And you responded, I take it, that that claim was impossible in light of what you knew to have been the conversation between the Secretary of State and McFarlane in November '85? "A. Yes. And I also thought it was untenable as a matter of logic. That the CIA would not have reacted in the way that Casey's testimony indicated. That is, with a warning that they would not do this again. That the request for an airline would not have been urgent over oil drilling bits. And that generally the whole thing smelled to me like the kind of thing you see in a trial--and I've presided over hundreds--in a narcotics case, for example, where they refer to the drugs as 'shirts' or something like that. You always have some kind of phrase that you use to describe what you're selling when you don't want

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			to talk about it directly. "Q. And here it was oil drilling equipment? "A. Right, oil drilling bits. "Q. But what you heard from Cooper on his end was that, if anything, from the time you had seen the draft of Director Casey's statement until the time of this conversation, in between which you had conveyed a message to the Justice Department, the draft had gotten worse? "A. That's true." (Sofaer, Senate Dep., 6/18/87, at 43-44.)
86/11/20-590 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY SOFAER ACCOUNT: Sofaer discusses the November 1985 shipment with Wallison. Wallison says that North has told him that he understood the shipment to be oil drill bits, not HAWKs or arms. North said his only role was to arrange for an airline for the transport. Wallison tells Sofaer, "[T]he President keeps getting deeper into this because people are operating in his name." Later that evening, Sofaer talks with Charles Cooper who says that North has denied knowledge of the whole matter and of the purported call to the CIA to arrange for an airline. Sofaer tells Cooper that North's story has to be wrong, and that contemporaneous notes at the State Department refute it. Sofaer testified, "I was scared that the President would be in trouble if the testimony was not changed and if people

were not forced to tell the truth about all this."

Sofaer tells Cooper he will resign unless Casey's testimony is not changed.

Cooper informs Sofaer that McFarlane has held firm that he knew nothing about HAWKs in November 1985.

Shortly before midnight, Cooper calls Sofaer to report that he has discussed Sofaer's concerns with the Attorney General. He also tells Sofaer that Casey's testimony has been changed to avoid the issue. Sofaer summarized the call: "[W]hat he told me was not an indication that the matter had been dealt with fully, in a satisfactory way, but at least the misleading of Congress was avoided.

"I congratulated him and we agreed that the President should not be placed at risk until the truth is known. That is, we were satisfied with that fix because at least there wasn't a lie out there and the President wasn't at risk. We could then go further, investigate further, et cetera.

"At this point, no formal investigation had been authorized by the President and I gather it was the next day or so that Cooper called me and said the President had authorized the Attorney General to investigate."
(Sofaer, Senate Dep., 6/18/87, at 45-51.)

86/11/20-595
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION AND AFTERMATH OF THE MEETING

MEESE ACCOUNT:

The Attorney General testified in his opening statement:

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"At Admiral Poindexter's invitation, I attended a meeting in his office . . . [on] the 20th of November, with Director Casey, Assistant Attorney General Cooper, and for most of the time National Security Council counsel Paul Thompson and Lieutenant Colonel North. There may have been others present from time to time. "I was invited to that meeting as the President's legal adviser, to review the legal aspects of the Iranian initiative prior to Administration witnesses being called upon to give scheduled testimony and briefings before the Congress. "I recall seeing for the first time at that meeting a draft chronology of events that, from all appearances, had been prepared earlier in the day by the National Security Council staff. "In addition, drafts of proposed testimony were distributed--again, which I was seeing for the first time. Those documents were reviewed and discussed, and corrections and revisions were made at the suggestions of those who had knowledge of specific events. "Mr. Chairman, questions have been raised during prior hearings of these committees here about my participation in this meeting and whether I so-called acquiesced in the statements included in the proposed testimony being prepared. "The truth is, I did not at the time have knowledge sufficient to allow me to make any sort of judgment regarding the accuracy of the proposed testimony, or the prepared chronology, or the revisions or corrections that were being

suggested.

"You will recall that the Iranian operation had been rigorously compartmentalized and only those, as I stated earlier, with a need to know were brought into the planning and the implementation.

"Thus while I was generally aware on the 20th of November 1986 that there may have been arms transfers to Iran by Israel in 1985, I had no personal knowledge about such shipments, about our role (if any) in assisting with the transfers, or about the contemporaneous knowledge of other Administration officials concerning the details of these shipments.

"It was after that meeting, late in the evening, when I first learned in a secure telephone conversation with Mr. Cooper--I happened to be at West Point, New York, at the time--that there were apparent differences in the recollections of the Secretary of State, former National Security Assistant Robert McFarlane and perhaps others. I was concerned that great care be taken to resolve these differences so that accurate testimony would be given at the congressional hearings and briefings that were scheduled for the next day.

"I believed that, because the Iranian initiative had been such a highly sensitive matter, and because it had been so rigidly compartmentalized, no one seemed to have all the facts and all seemed to me to be trying to piece together various parts of the story without full knowledge of the events.

"As a consequence, there appeared to be considerable confusion as to what occurred when, and the many conflicting and inconsistent news stories only seemed to exacerbate the situation.

"It was for this reason that I went to see the President the next day. I advised him of my concerns and recommended that he have someone undertake a fact-gathering review into the Iranian initiative to ascertain a fuller and more accurate picture of the events and the activities that had occurred.

"The President agreed totally with my assessment and directed me to commence an immediate review. I had indicated that I would be willing to do that if he so decided.

"He asked that I complete this task before the National Security Planning Group meeting which was to be on this subject and that had been scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on Monday, the 24th of November." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 11-14.)

86/11/20-597
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: AFTERMATH OF THE PREPARATION MEETING

MEESE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. Turning now if I might to the day after the President's press conference, the November 19th press conference, this would have been November 20th, you have testified earlier today that you attended a meeting in Admiral Poindexter's office to consider a draft of Director Casey's testimony before the Congress the next day.

"I got the distinct impression from your

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			testimony that you then left that meeting in a hurry to get to the airport because you had a scheduled speaking engagement. "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. I was due to be a banquet speaker at the Military Academy at West Point where there was a national collegiate gathering of students from a number of universities there. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. And you testitifed that although you don't have a distinct recall of this telephone conversation, you believe you did receive a phone call from Deputy Attorney General Burns while you were in the car on the way to the airport; is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. I do believe that that occurred, I have been told that it did occur, that there was some contact between us. Neither Mr. Burns nor I remember it exactly, and I would imagine the conversation was fairly vague, particularly if it was over the telephone and also because Mr. Burns had no context for the information that he was transmitting. "He knew nothing about the Iranian initiative other than what was in the newspaper, he certainly had no knowledge of anything that had taken place in terms of weapons shipments and I suspect that what he was passing on to me was in rather simple terms that the State Department had some problem with the testimony that was about to be given the next day based upon the prepared copy of Mr. Casey's testimony and distributed to us at the meeting. And I presume State Department had a copy as well[.]

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. VAN CLEVE. Am I correct that you have since discussed this phone call with Mr. Burns and that he tells you that it is his understanding that Judge Sofaer had not said anything to him in the prior phone conversation about having had notes of an earlier transaction so that the chances are quite good that that information was not ever transmitted to you at that point? "Attorney General MEESE. I think that is correct and I believe he has told me that Judge Sofaer said the same thing. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. That evening you got a telephone call from [A]ssistant Attorney General Cooper at West Point. I take it that it was very difficult to set that phone conversation up because it was a secure phone conversation. "Attorney General MEESE. It was difficult to set up because the portable secure telephone that we had at that time as highly unrealiable and it took considerable time for it to be set up. I remember leaving the dinner or the reception that followed the dinner on a number of occasions and when I got there they had lost contact on the secure phone and it was finally after two or three tries they finally got contact with Washington, D.C. "As I mentioned, I think that was around 10:30 or so in the evening. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Would you describe Mr. Cooper as being agitated when he reached you finally? "Attorney General MEESE. I would say that Mr. Cooper's demeanor or approach was more of concern than agitation per se.

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. Can you recall whether or not during that conversation at any point Mr. Cooper suggested to you that there might have been any intentional wrongdoing on the part of any of the participants in the November 20th meeting?

"Attorney General MEESE. I can't recall any part of that conversation where he indicated there was any intentional wrongdoing. It was more that a lot of people had different recollections and that the situation was pretty well fouled up because of that."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 185-88.)

86/11/20-600
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION
MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . I take it you did attend a meeting the following afternoon in Admiral Poindexter's office[] on the subject of the upcoming congressional briefings and testimony.

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. As I mentioned in my opening statement.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I think you said that Director Casey was there and he was scheduled to testify the following day and Admiral Poindexter was there and he was scheduled to give briefings the following day.

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you were there and Mr. Cooper?

"Attorney General MEESE. I was there, Mr. Cooper, I believe, Commander Thompson was there for some or all of the meeting, I believe that Lieutenant Colonel North was there for at least part of the meeting, if not most of the meeting, and there may have been others present as well from time to time.

"Mr. NIELDS. What was the purpose for your being there?

"Attorney General MEESE. I think that it was the same purpose that [A]dmiral Poindexter had talked to me earlier, that there would undoubtedly be some legal issues coming up and I felt it was important that these legal issues be accurately stated, and, therefore, I delayed my meeting.

"I think I may have known about this meeting in advance and had planned to have Mr. Cooper attend, I am not sure. But in any event, I planned to attend myself after talking with Admiral Poindexter on the evening of the 19th.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I take it again you were there because of the possibility that some legal issues would arise?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is right.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, of course, you were actually able to catch a factual error in the President's statement of the night before based on your having been involved from the beginning and the fact that this was an Israeli proposal and that they were, in fact, involved.

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. But your presence on the afternoon of November 20 was not, I take it, to give factual input but rather legal?

"Attorney General MEESE. It was certainly to give whatever legal input was necessary and to help in any way that I could.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. NIELDS. Did the subject of the Israeli prefinding shipments come up again at that meeting? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, yes, at that meeting, as I mentioned earlier, I had already some knowledge from Mr. Cooper, very brief knowledge, that there had been shipments in 1985, prior to the 17th of January 1986 finding. "In that meeting, it did come up, and particularly I think there was a discussion of some shipments, of a shipment of Hawk missiles in November of 1985. "I remember that there was general discussion. For the first time, I saw also a chronology of the different shipments that had occurred, which the NSC had prepared. It was a two-page kind of calendar of events that had taken place, and I saw that for the first time, I remember, I was quite interested in that because that laid out for me in some detail the different shipments that had taken place, the hostages had been released and so on, in both 1985 and 1986. "I also saw, at least briefly, a chronology which was a more detailed narrative, which had been prepared by the NSC staff, I believe, earlier that day on the 20th. And then saw testimony, and--there was testimony that had been prepared for Director Casey and there was also a memorandum relating to specifically the Hawk shipments in 1985, in November of 1985. "Mr. NIELDS. And the memorandum, would that also, could that also be termed an insert? "Attorney General MEESE. I think it was

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			designed to be an insert, yes. It was in memorandum form. It was some subject--well, I imagine you have that as an exhibit also. "Mr. NIELDS. Yes, we do. It is Exhibit [EM] 33. "Attorney General MEESE. Exhibit 33, yes. This is what I am referring to. It says, 'Subject: CIA Airline Involvement,' and that was, as I understood it, intended to be an insert in Mr. Casey's testimony, and this was discussed and that is what I was referring to when I talked about the November 1985 Hawk shipment." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 56-60; JHICI Ex. EM 33 [Meese copy of insert to Casey's testimony].)
86/11/20-601 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. What do you recall about the discussion on the subject of this November 1985 Hawk shipment? "Attorney General MEESE. There seemed to be an awful lot of confusion about who had done what and how much people knew at the time. And I believe that Colonel North appeared to be the most knowledgeable person about what had taken place. I believe Mr. Casey, if I remember correctly, had actually been out of the country when this took place and didn't have much personal knowledge of it. "There may have been someone else there from the CIA, I have a vague recollection that George

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Cave might have been there, but I am not positive, or John McMahon or someone like that. "In any event, there were corrections that were made in the insert that were suggested by different people there, such as among others I believe Colonel North. "Because I notice in my handwriting here that I put in things that were suggested to be changed and I have looked at another exhibit which is similar and which I see here is Exhibit [EM] No. 34 where someone else's handwriting whom I don't recognize was apparently doing the same thing. "Mr. NIELDS. Just so the record is clear, with respect to Exhibit [EM] 33, that document contains your own handwritten interlineations, I take it. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And particularly on the third-from-the-bottom paragraph, there is in the middle of that paragraph, there is a statement, 'No one in the USG found out that our airline had hauled Hawk missiles into Iran until mid-January when we were told by the Iranians.' "I take it that is your handwriting that put in the words 'no one in the USG found' -- "Attorney General MEESE. That is my handwriting, but someone else suggested the correction and that is why I say apparently someone else was taking the same notes because Exhibit 34 has similar interlineations. "Mr. NIELDS. I think there is testimony on the records the similar interlineations on Exhibit 34 are those of Colonel North. [See 86/11/20-500

and -520, and accompanying notes.]

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, in some of the notes we have gone over today and in some others that we have not, there were statements made during this time frame that the United States Government didn't find out about the August and September TOW shipments to Iran by Israel until after they had happened.

"Now, I take it with respect to this HAWK shipment, as he learned at this meeting, it was not possible to take that position because the CIA airline had actually been used to carry them.

"Attorney General MEESE. That was not my understanding at the meeting. I believe at the meeting we were told that a CIA proprietary had been suggested to the Israelis, or that the name of a CIA proprietary, but that airline had acted as a normal carrier and not as a CIA expedition, and there was some discussion back and forth on that at the meeting.

"Mr. NIELDS. In any event, there had been United States Government participation in arranging the actual movement of the goods, whatever goods there were.

"Attorney General MEESE. What we were told at that meeting, and I had no knowledge personally as to whether this was correct or not, was that the only involvement that--well, first of all, we were told at the meeting that these were, to the best of the knowledge of people in the United States Government, these were oil-drilling parts, and we were also told that the only involvement of the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			United States Government was to suggest an airline, which happened to be a CIA proprietary, and that the suggestion to the airline, and that the CIA would notify the airline that they should take this shipment." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 60-63; JHICI Exx. EM 33 [Meese copy of insert to Casey's testimony], EM 34 [insert to Casey's testimony with North's handwriting].)
86/11/20-602 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: PREPARATION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Just so the record is clear, you said you were told at the meeting that the U.S. Government believed--had been told they were oil-drilling parts. "Attorney General MEESE. This is my understanding and that is my recollection of what we were told at the meeting that that was true. "Mr. NIELDS. Again just so the record is clear, the understanding at the meeting I take it was that in fact what was shipped was Hawk missiles? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. But that at the time of the shipment, the U.S. Government was told they were oil-drilling parts. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir; that is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. But there was at least some involvement of the United States Government in actually moving whatever it was that we were told

was being moved at the time?

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, the involvement we were told about was the recommending of an airline to carry them, yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And who was it at that meeting that proposed this insert with this interlineation, namely that 'no one in the United States Government found out that our airline had hauled Hawk missiles into Iran until mid-January?'

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't know for sure. I can't remember who. I think most of the suggestions, however, were coming from Lieutenant Colonel North.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did anyone dissent from this, anyone at that meeting dissent from this statement in Exhibit [EM] 33?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't remember anyone dissenting, and I doubt if I would have written it in unless there were general agreement that that is what should have been put in there, that that is what was agreed upon to be put in there.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did Admiral Poindexter dissent?

"Attorney General MEESE. Not to my recollection, but I can't be absolutely--I am sure that he did not because I don't think he [s]aid much of anything during that meeting.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did he dissent later on? Did he call you on the phone?

"Attorney General MEESE. Not that I--no, he did not.

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it from your testimony that you were not aware at the time that this statement was contrary to fact?

"Attorney General MEESE. I had no knowledge whatsoever about the truth or falsity of any of the material there. This was all new to me.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did this question, namely whether the CIA or the U.S. Government had acted with knowledge that there were Hawk missiles on the proprietary relate to any of the legal issues that were on the table at the time?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't think we discussed this in regard to the legal issues at the time. I don't remember it, this coming up as a specific legal issue. Although it may have, it obviously had a legal ramification as an after-the-fact consideration in November 1986, but I don't remember much discussion of the legal aspects of it.

"It is entirely possible it did.

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it when you left the meeting, this formulation in Exhibit 33 had been, as far as you were concerned, agreed to?

"Attorney General MEESE. I believe that is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And that that is what--at the time you left the meeting, that is what Director Casey would tell the committees the following day and that is what Admiral Poindexter would tell the committees the following day?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is what I recall, yes."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 63-66. See JHICI Ex. EM 33 [Meese copy of insert to Casey's testimony].)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/20-605 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: DoS CONCERNS RELAYED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: Following the meeting to prepare Casey's Congressional testimony, the Attorney General leaves for West Point: "Attorney General MEESE. Right, I flew to West Point where I was giving a talk at a banquet that night. "Mr. NIELDS. Prior to the time that you actually got on the airplane for West Point, did you receive any telephone calls on this subject, namely the Hawk missile, 1985, subject? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall receiving a telephone call specifically, but I have been told that I did and I believe it to be correct that I did receive a call, and my understanding is it was from my deputy, Arnold Burns. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you recall what he told you in this conversation? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I don't recall it, and he doesn't recall what he told me, but as best as I can piece together from what others have said, he told me that there were some concerns about the testimony that Director Casey was going to give and that those concerns came from the State Department. "I have a very vague recollection--my best guess, I guess you would have to say, based upon what Mr. Burns and I have talked about, is that I said something to the effect that we have just

been working on getting that statement corrected, or something to that effect.

"In any event, something that in effect completed the conversation, but I can't recall specifically what I said.

"Mr. NIELDS. I think you are making reference to materials that have been made public, and they are to the effect that Judge Sofaer had a copy of the same testimony that you had reviewed that afternoon and had raised objections to the statement that there had been no knowledge in the United States Government that Hawk missiles were being shipped, and made a call to your deputy and received a call from your deputy that he had discussed it with you and that you were aware of the problem, and knew facts that essentially made it okay.

"Attorney General MEESE. I am not sure that it was his--I don't know what his objection was. It was that he felt that there was something wrong with the testimony that Director Casey was going to give, and I said to Mr. Burns, as near as I can piece together, that we had just been correcting the testimony, so I assume whatever problems he had would have been taken care of in the corrections that we made.

"Because to our knowledge the one person who was most knowledgeable about this whole thing was Colonel North and he had been there making the corrections.

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . Are you saying that Mr. Burns did not tell you what the problem was so far as the State Department was concerned or that you have forgotten what he told you?

"Attorney General MEESE. I can't tell you for sure. I don't recall the details of the conversation, but I am almost positive he did not go into the specifics of what the State Department concerns were, because that would have raised a lot of questions in my mind, and what he told me did not.

"I think the reason he didn't is we were on a non-secure phone, probably a phone that was in my car as I was racing to Andrews Air Force Base.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did he give you an impression that there was a sense of alarm at the State Department?

"Attorney General MEESE. Not that I recall; that they had questions about the statement that we had just been correcting over in Admiral Poindexter's office."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 66-69.)

86/11/20-606
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: DoS CONCERNS RELAYED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it you went to West Point and at some point that evening received a telephone call from Mr. Cooper?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"After several attempts to get the secure phone working around 10:30 that evening or so, I received a call from Mr. Cooper which put a quite different picture before me, that there were concerns in the State Department that there was a good deal more knowledge within the United States Government about the fact of Hawks being shipped in November 1985 that was known then than anything we had been led to believe earlier that afternoon.

"Mr. NIELDS. Was he specific?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, since we were on a secure phone he could be specific, and he indicated that Mr. Shultz had knowledge in November of 1985 and had been told, I believe, by Mr. McFarlane, that the shipment of the Israelis that was going to Iran did contain Hawk missiles.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did he mention any documentary support for Secretary Shultz's recollection?

"Attorney General MEESE. I think that he did mention that notes had been taken at the time or that Secretary Shultz had notes about Hawk missiles being shipped.

"Mr. NIELDS. And what did Mr. Cooper suggest that you do?

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, he was concerned about this and said we couldn't let Director Casey go and testify the next day with erroneous information, and I said, 'I absolutely agree,' and asked him to get in touch with CIA General Counsel, I think his name was Dave Dougherty[,] at the time, that evening, and to go out if necessary to CIA in the morning before Director Casey left for his testimony and make sure that if there was a difference of recollection on these matters to be sure that either it was resolved or if it was not resolved to make sure that Director Casey did not put anything in his statement that might be inaccurate.

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it that you returned to Washington?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I was supposed to go from West Point to Harvard and participate in a seminar there. I decided that I better return because at that point, in my view, we had so many people involved in this and each had a little piece of information, that there was obvious confusion and that we better get a coherent account of what had occurred."
(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 69-71.)

86/11/20-607
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: DoS CONCERNS
RELAYED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . [W]hen Mr. Cooper called you in West Point, did he tell you that Judge Sofaer was sufficiently alarmed ab[o]ut this issue that he or people in the government were ready to resign over it?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall whether he mentioned that or not to me, but I certainly was concerned about the situation, and I am sure that he registered with me his own considerable concern.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you have testified to there being in your mind some confusion--

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Evidently the various versions that you heard, but I take it that it occurred to you during that conversation with Mr. Cooper that if the Secretary of State had a note, a contemporaneous note, that he had been told by Mr. McFarlane at the time that there were Hawk missiles going to Iran, I take it it occurred to you that if that was the case, . . . the proposed testimony of Mr. Casey would be false?

"Attorney General MEESE. That it certainly would be inaccurate, and my impression throughout that whole time is that Mr. Casey really had not known what was going on at the time because, as I mentioned, I think he was out of the country in '85, in November, or was at least not familiar with these facts. That was obvious from seeing what went on in Admiral Poindexter's office earlier that day and also what it did appear to me as to the whole general situation was I knew myself that this had been a highly compartmentalized situation. I didn't know very much about it, as I've already related in my opening statement. And so what I expected was there were a lot of people who had bits and pieces of what had gone on, and no one had tried to do a complete overview to figure out what, in fact, was a comprehensive or coherent account of what had taken place.

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it that the person who was I think you described as most knowledgeable, Colonel North, was the one who had been present in the meeting and had proposed the language which appeared to simply be wrong in light of what the Secretary of State had?

"Attorney General MEESE. Colonel North seemed

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			to be the one who was most in possession of the facts at the meeting, but also I had in mind, I believe from Mr. Cooper telling me, but it may have been from just prior knowledge, that Mr. Shultz's knowledge of the situation came from him being over in Geneva with Mr. McFarlane. So I didn't know but what Colonel North knew some things, Mr. McFarlane knew other things, and Mr. Shultz knew still other things. Because I think it had been related in the meeting that afternoon that Mr. North got involved in the situation to provide some minimal assistance because of a phone call from Mr. McFarlane. "Mr. NIELDS. Was Colonel North pretty definite and assertive about the version of facts that he was relating at the meeting on the afternoon of the 20th? "Attorney General MEESE. Colonel North is assertive about most things, but I don't know that he was particularly vehement about it. It was really--what I got was that people were trying to be helpful in putting together a truthful and accurate account of what had happened." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 72-74.)
86/11/20-608 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: DoS CONCERNS RELAYED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Did it at least cross your mind during your conversation with Mr. Cooper that you might be dealing with something more than just confusion?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, it did not. As a matter of fact, that didn't cross my mind at any time during that day or the next several days. "Mr. NIELDS. I will pursue that, but just for the moment, I take it, in any event, that whatever Mr. Cooper said or whatever was on your mind, it was sufficient to cause you to cancel your trip and to return to Washington? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I felt that I owed a duty to the President to let him know that there was a great deal of confusion about this matter, and this was obviously a major issue as far as the administration was concerned, and I wanted to be sure that particularly the initial testimony that was being presented to Congress, which was to take place on Friday, and the briefings that were going to be held by Admiral Poindexter, would be totally accurate, and if there was a gap in information that was available to us, that that be frankly acknowledged to the Congress rather than to say something that might later turn out to be untrue. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it you did return to Washington, and the following morning after a staff meeting, you had a meeting with the President? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I didn't actually have a staff meeting in the sense of our normal staff meeting in my office, because I didn't get back in time for that, but there was a meeting of some members of my staff later that morning where I was brought up to date by Mr. Cooper and others on what occurred during my

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			absence. I had been told that Mr. Casey's statement had been changed to be sure that he did acknowledge that we didn't have all the facts on some of these things, or words to that effect, and then I called either Admiral Poindexter or Don Regan and asked to see the President that morning, and I believe we had an appointment that was set for 11:30, sometime after 11:00." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 74-76.)
86/11/20-660 NOVEMBER 17-26, 1986			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: CIA PREPARATION GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Boren. Can you recall your preparation for Mr. Casey's testimony before the SSCI and what discussions you had with Mr. Gates or others about that testimony? "Mr. George. Certainly. "Mr. Boren. Whether or not you suggested any changes in it? "Mr. George. Let me recall my involvement in that testimony. I don't have the dates correct, but we are talking vaguely of [sic (from)] the 17th through the 26th, that whole period. "When the story broke that McFarlane had had meetings in Tehran and the entire thing became public and before the Attorney General's statement of the diversion, it became accepted in the agency that we would have to moderately brief on our activities. It was intolerable for us in the situation above all with you, the Congress. "I conducted what I believed to be -- and I don't know if any of the staffers are here, maybe Mr. O'Neil -- the first briefing by the Executive

Branch of the Legislative Branch which was a briefing on say, say, the 17th or 18th of November, about our activities after the finding and what we did.

"It was then decided -- and quite how, I don't know, except that the White House called the CIA and said, you're going to do the briefings of the Congress on, you know, Bud McFarlane's trip. Read that: this whole affair.

"Bob Gates called, in my presence, Bill Casey in Central America and said I'm a big boy[,] Bill, but would you please come back here? I mean, this is bigger than I am. I now know, again through this committee, that John Poindexter called Bill Casey and said please come back here.

"My job at that point -- and the record I believe shows it -- was to put together the facts of this directorate's activities inside -- in this affair; and we put together -- because we have the record and it's a written record and it is an exact record -- the exact record of this operation, directorate's participation in the activities we engaged in from the finding of the 17th until that date.

"That information was then sent forward to one of the staff assistants in the front office -- Bob was Acting Chief -- Acting Director at the time -- who then got information from all the other groups. Casey has by now asked that preliminary testimony be sent to him on his trip back from Central America.

"Correct me, [redacted] if I get these facts wrong.

"We flew someone to Central America and Casey began to study it. He came back. We had a big meeting in Casey's conference room with 20 or 30 people. It was evident that different people in the CIA had different pieces of information, and it was being collated by staff aid[e]s.

"I neither corrected nor changed nor overviewed. My position was throughout this entire -- at one point we ended up in the White House, in Poindexter's office, where Mr. North arrived. I was there very briefly on my way somewhere else. Either North said or Poindexter said politely, your records don't match ours. I said, I don't care. Our records are exact. We know when we flew this operation or met this person.

"Finally, those differences, I guess, were solved. But no, as to did I -- Bill Casey was still writing that testimony in the car I'm told on his way down the morning of whatever date that was."

(George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, 104-06.)

86/11/20-663
NOVEMBER 20,
1986
(THURSDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: CIA PREPARATION, AND THE QUESTION OF A DIVERSION OF FUNDS

GEORGE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. George. . . . Someone said, 'Bill not only is this chaos and how are we going to explain it, and you know we had a finding we didn't tell Congress', the rest of it, but, 'Bill, there is discussion of a diversion of Iran funds.'

"And Bill Casey replied, 'I know absolutely

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: CIA PREPARATION, AND THE QUESTION OF A DIVERSION OF FUNDS

GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. Nunn. . . . When did you first know about the diversion of funds from the arms sale to the contras?

"Mr. George. On or about the day that the Attorney General made the statement. I am told by [redacted] that I told him earlier in the day nothing about that.' And that was the only time, Senator Nunn, that I ever heard Bill Casey comment on it whatsoever.

"Mr. Nunn. And that date was?

"Mr. George. The 20th of November, 1986.

"Mr. Nunn. That was before the Attorney General had discovered that memo?

"Mr. George. I don't know, sir. I know of what I speak.

"Mr. Nunn. Where did that information come from? Do you recall who said that? How they know about the diversion?

"Mr. George. Do[]herty, our General Counsel, remembers the question that someone -- I didn't ask it. Someone said, 'Oh, Bill, there are rumors there's been diversions of funds.'

"Mr. Nunn. I wonder how they would have known at that stage?

"Mr. George. I have no idea, Senator.

"Mr. Nunn. Can you find out who that was?

"Mr. George. I think we can get you information, because I have brought that to the attention of our lawyers and asked them to walk through the entire group at that meeting.

"Mr. Nunn. Will you do that for us?

"Mr. George. I certainly will.

"[Redacted] reminds me that the memo I didn't see, the Charlie Allen memo suggesting there may be diversion of funds, had been made available to some people inside the agency. But I can get that for you."

(George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 166-69.)

See col. 3.

prior to the Attorney General's statement, but certainly I did not know about the diversion of the funds any more than a day before, and if I did, I wouldn't know how I learned that.

"Mr. Nunn. Did you talk to Director Casey about that subject either before or after that press conference by the Attorney General?

"Mr. George. On the 17th -- correct me on the record -- the 20th -- the day Bill Casey came back from his trip to Central America. The 19th of November, 1986. As you know -- may know, Senator Nunn, from previous testimony, or from Mr. Gates' testimony, there was great chaos at CIA in putting together Bill Casey's testimony. We had sent down a proposed testimony on a plane for him to read on his way back.

"That night, some 25 of us at least gathered in Director Casey's conference room to discuss his testimony. My role -- I had seen up until then -- was to gather the specific activities of the Operations Directorate and give those, in turn, to Bob Gates' special assistant who was collating all the materials from the whole agency on what we had done.

"In that meeting, and it was extremely complicated, and people wouldn't know, and Bill Casey, we now know, was very sick and gave an appearance of exhaustion. An individual at the meeting, I thought it was Bob Gates, Bob said it wasn't he. Others have remembered it. Someone said, 'Bill not only is this chaos and how are we going to explain it, and you know we had a finding we didn't tell Congress', the rest of it, but, 'Bill, there is discussion of a diversion of Iran funds.'

"And Bill Casey replied, 'I know absolutely nothing about that.' And that was the only time, Senator Nunn, that I ever heard Bill Casey comment on it whatsoever.

"Mr. Nunn. And that date was?

"Mr. George. The 20th of November, 1986.

"Mr. Nunn. That was before the Attorney General had discovered that memo?

"Mr. George. I don't know, sir. I know of what I speak.

"Mr. Nunn. Where did that information come from? Do you recall who said that? How they know about the diversion?

"Mr. George. Do[]herty, our General Counsel, remembers the question that someone -- I didn't ask it. Someone said, 'Oh, Bill, there are rumors there's been diversions of funds.'

"Mr. Nunn. I wonder how they would have known at that stage?

"Mr. George. I have no idea, Senator.

"Mr. Nunn. Can you find out who that was?

"Mr. George. I think we can get you information, because I have brought that to the attention of our lawyers and asked them to walk through the entire group at that meeting.

"Mr. Nunn. Will you do that for us?

"Mr. George. I certainly will.

"[Redacted] reminds me that the memo I didn't see, the Charlie Allen memo suggesting there may be diversion of funds, had been made available to some people inside the agency. But I can get that

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			for you." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 166-69.)
86/11/20-664 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 AND THEREAFTER		CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: CIA PREPARATION, AND THE QUESTION OF A DIVERSION OF FUNDS GEORGE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: CIA PREPARATION, AND THE QUESTION OF A DIVERSION OF FUNDS GEORGE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. Nunn. Did you have any conversations with anyone else out at CIA about whether Director Casey knew about the diversion subsequent to that event? "Mr. George. No. "Mr. Nunn. Have you since? "Mr. George. Well, since Oliver North and Ed Meese and John Poindexter have testified, Senator, I've probably discussed this with everybody in the family, and at the CIA. "Mr. Nunn. Have you had anyone tell you that they had information on this, direct or indirect? "Mr. George. I have not. Never once have I heard anybody say either over a beer or in a dead serious conversation let me tell you what I know. I am the only person that I know, except I think [redacted] and there's somebody else at this meeting I attended that heard those words out of Casey's mouth, which were I heard nothing about diversion. "Mr. Cohen. Senator, would you yield for a question? "Mr. Nunn. Sure. "Mr. Cohen. Weren't there [redacted] that Charlie Allen was at least reviewing that had to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			do with the pricing and over-pricing of the weapons? "Mr. George. So I am told. I was not aware of that. If I had access [redacted] they went in one box and out the other. "Charley and [redacted] according to the testimony, was the man [sic] who discovered or suspected or thought having read closely through [redacted] that there is some money monkeyshine going on. That led to his briefing of, I think, Bob and the Director at some point. But I was not in on that one. "Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Senator Nunn. "Mr. Nunn. Did you know Oliver North personally or professionally? "Mr. George. Professionally quite well. "Mr. Nunn. You have heard him testify that Director Casey knew? "Mr. George. That is right. "Mr. Nunn. You were there when Director Casey said he did not know about the diversion? "Mr. George. In this one remark in a room with 25 people. "Mr. Nunn. Do you have any suggestions for the committee in trying to determine who is telling the truth on that subject, Director Casey or Colonel North? "Mr. George. I do not." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 169-71.)
86/11/20-665 NOVEMBER 20, 1986		CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: CIA PREPARATION, AND THE QUESTION OF A DIVERSION OF FUNDS	CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: CIA PREPARATION, AND THE QUESTION OF A DIVERSION OF FUNDS

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(THURSDAY)		GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. McCollum. The word 'diversion' -- was that word itself actually used -- "Mr. George. I think the sentence -- it wasn't the shorthand that it has now become in the United States. I think the statement was, Bill, there is talk that some of the money that was received from the Iranian arms deal has been used for other purposes, which is now in shorthand the word diversion. ". . . . "Mr. McCollum. I am just trying to clarify it. I don't want somebody reading over dry, redacted testimony here coming up with great stories that might not be true. "Mr. George. That's true, sir." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 186-88.) See col. 3.	GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. McCollum. The diversion comment, November 20, 1986 -- "Mr. George. I had a meeting I attended in the Director's office at CIA as I told Senator Nunn, with Bill Casey. "Mr. McCollum. The word 'diversion' -- was that word itself actually used -- "Mr. George. I think the sentence -- it wasn't the shorthand that it has now become in the United States. I think the statement was, Bill, there is talk that some of the money that was received from the Iranian arms deal has been used for other purposes, which is now in shorthand the word diversion. "Mr. McCollum. There is a lot of confusion here. When [redacted] was testifying, I think [redacted] was down visiting in Central America with Casey and there was a discussion between [redacted] and [redacted] at some point where he said he first got the idea and had initially used the term diversion and explained, well, the discussion never used that term, it was about the fact there was a cost difference between the pricing. "Mr. George. Yes. "Mr. McCollum. That had been discovered, and it was Furmark's comments to the Director and that was all going around the agency at the time. I cannot take from what you are saying, unless you can make it more explicit and strengthen it for me, that the comments made in your presence on the 20th to Director Casey and his response to that

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			really showed whether he did or didn't know about the diversion of moneys from the Iranian Initiative to the contras, but rather simply it seems to me, unless it is more tied down than that as to the meaning, it simply goes further to show that there was some discussion and knowledge going on about there being a problem here, there was excess money, a profit, and maybe that was used somewhere else? "Mr. George. I agree. I only threw that out, that that was my only knowledge and my only experience of William J. Casey to me, in my presence, expressing a comment. "Mr. McCollum. I am just trying to clarify it. I don't want somebody reading over dry, redacted testimony here coming up with great stories that might not be true. "Mr. George. That's true, sir." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 186-88.)
86/11/20-700 NOVEMBER 20, 1986 (THURSDAY)			SHULTZ ALERTS THE PRESIDENT OF HIS VIEWS DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS reviews list of factual errors with REGAN. Learns that PRESIDENT, with VICE PRESIDENT, had told POINDEXTER of GPS' assertions that PRESIDENT not getting the facts. "GPS asks REGAN to attend when GPS sees the PRESIDENT that evening. "GPS meets with PRESIDENT and REGAN at the White House. PRESIDENT does not accept GPS' thesis. PRESIDENT says he knew about November 1985 shipment, but disputes that it was arms for hostages. GPS says that no one looking at the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			record will agree." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/22-150.)
86/11/21-004 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			POINDEXTER-MEESE CONTACT POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOREN. What about on November 21st? This was the day you met with the President at 11:30. Your records indicate that you had a call at 9:22 in the morning with Attorney General Meese, a telephone conversation, prior to your meeting with the President. "Do you recall the nature of that conversation? "Mr. POINDEXTER. 9:22? "Mr. BOREN. Just sometime in the morning prior to your meeting with the President. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I believe--that was the call that he initiated to let me know that he wanted to come over and see the President at 11:30 to talk to him about the conflict that existed in Mr. McFarlane's recollection and George Shultz', and he indicated that he wanted me and Don Regan to go with him. "He said he'd already talked to Don about getting the time and I believe that was the extent. "Mr. BOREN. Then you did indeed go with the Attorney General to see the President at 11:30 that morning? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I did. "Mr. BOREN. And after that there is an

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			indication that you had--that you and Attorney General Meese talked again, I guess this time in person, after that meeting with the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I believe he called me on the phone in the afternoon. "Mr. BOREN. And during that conversation did he indicate to you that he would be reviewing documents and reviewing the situation? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He--the purpose of the call was to tell me that he was going to send over a couple of his special assistants to look at the documentation that we had, and he asked me if I would have it pulled together in a central location, and I said of course, that I would. "Mr. BOREN. Did he give you any kind of a time frame as to when he would be coming to look at the documents, review the records? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. He may have, but I don't recall it. "Mr. BOREN. After that-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. Excuse me, Senator. I assumed it was going to be rather promptly because we frankly were interested in getting back to the committees as soon as we could with what the facts were. "Mr. BOREN. After that your records indicate at 2:25 that you met with--later that afternoon--you met with Colonel North. This was after you'd had this discussion with the Attorney General. "What did you talk with Colonel North about at that time? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I recall, the issue that

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			I was having the greatest trouble recalling, as I have testified, w[as] the circumstances surrounding the aborted transfer of the 18 Hawk missiles from the Israelis to the Iranians, and my recollection of that meeting in the afternoon with Colonel North was that he came in with one of his old spiral notebooks and reviewed with me some notes that he had made in November of 1985. "Mr. BOREN. Let me ask, during that conversation with Colonel North did you indicate to him that the Attorney General would be coming over, or some of his staff people, to review the records and look at the documents? "Mr. POINDEXTER. My recollection is that immediately after the phone call from Ed, I called Commander Thompson, told him I wanted him to supervise this and provide the liaison to Ed's people, and immediately after that I called Colonel North and told him. "I don't recall the Attorney General or his people coming up in the conversation with Colonel North later. "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, I know we are on day eight looking down the eyeball of day nine. I don't see any red light on here. I know you are in charge of the time. "Chairman HAMILTON. You are correct, counsel, the chairman is in charge of the time. The chairman will allocate time among the members as he sees fit. "Mr. BOREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. "So there was not any indication at this meeting that afternoon with Colonel North that he

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			should be concerned about the possibility his records might be checked or that he should make any distribution or any activity, have any activity in regard to removing documents or making sure sensitive documents were not present at that time? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have testified, Senator, at the end of the conversation, he did say something that led me to believe that he was going to destroy that notebook. And I don't believe I responded to it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 135-39. [For Poindexter testimony preceding this entry; see 86/11/17-020].)
86/11/21-008 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION SUMMARY: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION SUMMARY: For a narrative account of the inquiry conducted by the Attorney General's office, see Iran-Contra Report, at 305-24.
86/11/21-010 NOVEMBER 20-21, 1986 (THURSDAY AND FRIDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: THE START REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . Did it concern you that here we were on November 20, after this matter had been on the front pages of every major newspaper, had been the lead-off story with all the networks for a month now, that the President had already been before the nation on a speech, that the President had held a press conference which was a very contentious press conference, and was out front there having to field these tough questions, that here we were, after all this time,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			on November 20, and the NSC staff could not put together an accurate three-page chronology? "Mr. REGAN. Very concerned. Very concerned. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Did you bring that to the President's attention at that time? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . How did that come about, who did you meet with? "Mr. REGAN. I told the President when I met with him before Poindexter came in on the--I'm trying to get my dates straight. This would have been the 20th. No, the 21st, the morning of the 21st; that something sure as hell was screwy, because I had asked for a chronology, it had been given to me, but they took it back. They couldn't seem to get their act together. "I said, 'I just don't understand what's going on here. They don't seem to be able to come up with it.' I said, 'If I were you, Mr. President, I would insist, crack the whip and make them come up with the correct chronology.' "Mr. SMILJANICH. On that Friday, November 21, the Attorney General told you and the President that there was a conflict in the testimony between Secretary Shultz on the one hand and Mr. McFarlane, Casey, and North on the other hand about whether or not Hawks were on the November, 1985, shipment; do you recall that? "Mr. REGAN. Yes, I do. But before you get to that, that night, November 20, the Secretary of State was boiling, as a matter of fact, all during the day, because he claimed to have spotted or his staff had spotted five or six errors in the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			President's remarks, and he though that the President was being ill-used, and he personally wanted to tell this to the President. "So he did meet with the President--I was present at the meeting--in the quarters on the evening of November 20, and pointed out to the President some of these discrepancies. "Mr. SMILJANICH. He spoke in pretty blunt language at that point, didn't he, about the fact there were so many discrepancies and inaccuracies in the statements to date? "Mr. REGAN. He sure did. "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . And it was the next day then that the President met with you and the Attorney General and the Attorney General talked about this conflict between testimony? "Mr. REGAN. Right." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 70-72.)
86/11/21-011 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: THE START REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . Now, this led then to the Attorney General's fact-finding investigation which started on that day and ran through the weekend. "Did the Attorney General ask you and the President on November 21 whether or not you had any information as to what was on that November, 1985, shipment? "Mr. REGAN. No, not as such. He told us that there was discrepancies in the stories of, or remembrances of various people in NSC, CIA and so

on, but did not ask us what we remembered of it, no.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, you had information that would have assisted in his investigation with regard to clearing up that controversy, didn't you?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes and no. We did not know which facts were incorrect. We did not know the basis of the dispute as to whether it was facts involving the dates of shipments or the amounts of shipments, or what they were. He characterized it as being discrepancies, period, that he wanted, or thought should be looked into and cleared up so that we had all of the facts and have them correct.

"I may have added a little bit to the haste with which the Attorney General looked into some of this thing, because I urged him to have the thing ready by Monday afternoon at 2:00. We had called a meeting of all of the NSC members in order to go over our future with Iran: Where do we go from here? The story is out, the President has been on the air; where do we go from here, what--and how are we going to arrange it?

"Recall that the Secretary of State was urging that State take over and run this operation now. Question: Should they be doing it? Who should be doing it? Should we be doing it all?

"I said, 'Ed, it would be appropriate that at least when we review where we have been, that we at least know or have common knowledge of all of the facts.' 'I'll try to get them by 2:00 on Monday.'

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, there were only a handful of people in the entire United States Government who knew back in November, 1985, that there was this ongoing Hawk shipment, and two of them were sitting there in the Oval Office with the Attorney General who was beginning a fact-finding investigation. "Is it your testimony that the Attorney General did not even ask you and the President what information you could contribute to this question? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. That's right. It is not unusual, by the way. Remember, he is just starting an investigation. I don't know how--I notice by your bios, many of you have been in investigatory positions before. I don't know whether you start at the bottom and work you way to the top, or start at the top and work your way to the bottom in an investigation. "I figured if he wanted information from us, he would ask us at the appropriate time. "Mr. SMILJANICH. You understood the Attorney General was going to try to get some information together in connection with very early the next week, November 24 or 25? "Mr. REGAN. That's right. "Mr. SMILJANICH. During that time frame, up to the 24th, did the Attorney General ever interview you or the President about your recollections? "Mr. REGAN. He did not interview me and I don't think he interviewed the President." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 72-74. See

generally Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 113-16; Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 11-13 [the start of the Attorney General's investigation].)

86/11/21-020
NOVEMBER 21, 1986

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MEETS WITH THE PRESIDENT:
THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZES AN INVESTIGATION
MEESE ACCOUNT:

Shortly after 11 a.m., Meese meets with the President:

"Attorney General MEESE. I told the President--and here I might say for the record that I normally do not relate conversations with the President, but with his permission I will give it as accurately as I can recall--I told the President that we had been working on the preparation of testimony for Director Casey and for the preparation for the briefings of Admiral Poindexter--incidentally, in the meeting were the President, myself, Don Regan and Admiral Poindexter--and that I was concerned that there seemed to be a lot of confusion among the people who were participating or who had some knowledge of the Iranian Initiative.

"I mentioned that it was probable that this was because different people were doing different things, the CIA was doing some things, the Department of Defense was doing other things, the NSC staff had certain responsibilities, and so on, and that because of the highly compartmentalized nature of the whole initiative, that people had not talked to each other, you did not have the normal documentation and reporting, and that therefore there was a great deal of confusion, and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			I was afraid that there would be inaccuracies both in what he would be saying to the public and in what would be testified to before Congress if we didn't have someone look into the matter to the extent of trying to develop a coherent overview of all the facts. "I told him at that time that I thought this was absolutely necessary. "I can't recall whether he told me in that conversation that George Shultz had talked to him the previous evening about the same thing or not, but I did gather that he was already aware that there was such confusion. And I think Don Regan expressed agreement that something like that had to be done, as did Admiral Poindexter. "In any event, the President--in the course of the conversation, I said to the President that if he wanted me to do it, I would do it or he could get someone else, but someone really had to get on top of the facts so that we did know exactly what had happened. "The President, in the course of the conversation, asked me to do that. I think maybe Don Regan or someone, I'm not sure, said that we would have to be talking with Cabinet members, so it would be desirable to have a Cabinet member doing the fact gathering. "In any event, I left that meeting with the charge from the President to try to develop an overview of the facts, and he asked--I think Don Regan, probably Don Regan, interjected, could I get that done by 2:00 o'clock on Monday afternoon, the 24th, because we were supposed to have a

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			National Security Planning Group meeting on the subject of Iran. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you explain precisely what the discrepancy in versions of the facts were? "Attorney General MEESE. I can't, I am not sure how much detail I went into. I do think I remember saying that Lieutenant Colonel North knew some things[,] that people in the CIA knew other things, that George Shultz knew some additional information, and that nobody had put all of this information together. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, I take it from your prior testimony that there was a specific issue of conflict, namely whether the U.S. Government knew at the time in November of 1985 that Hawk missiles were being transported rather than oil-drilling equipment. "Did you disclose that that was the issue on which there was a conflict? "Attorney General MEESE. I may have mentioned that that was it, but my own view in light of the presidential news conference the previous Wednesday, the confusion that was apparent on Thursday afternoon and then the additional facts I had learned on Thursday night gave me the impression that there was pretty general confusion about what had gone on and that we needed to pull the facts together. "Mr. NIELDS. Did Admiral Poindexter give any factual input during that meeting? Did he clarify his version of the facts? "Attorney General MEESE. No, he did not. My recollection is he agreed that that would be a

good idea to do that.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask the President whether the U.S. Government had known of the Hawk missile shipment at the time or whether he had approved of it?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, I don't believe that ever came up in the conversation."
(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 76-80. See id., 7/29/87, at 277-80 [the start of the Attorney General's investigation; neither the President nor Poindexter mentions the 12/5/85 Finding to Meese].)

86/11/21-021
NOVEMBER 21,
1986
(FRIDAY)

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION:
BEGINNING AND ORGANIZATION
MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, following receiving this charge from the President, I take it you met with various people on your staff at the Justice Department.

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, what I did was I went back to the Justice Department and brought together people who were knowledgeable on this subject or on related subjects so that we would have a small team. I brought together Mr. Reynolds, who had had a lengthy career in complex litigation and who was one of our top people in the Department and who had also done a number of National Security Council-related projects for me.

"I brought together obviously Mr. Cooper, who had been working with me on this specific matter, and the legal aspects of it previously, and who, of course, was in the office that has

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			responsibility for advising me and the President on all the Executive Branch matters[,] including the national security matters, and I brought together John Richardson, who was an assistant in my office who handled the foreign intelligence matters for me, and I brought them together because of their knowledge and also they were people I could count on to work over the weekend, and so as a result we started work and brought them together at noon on Friday and commenced a plan then of how we would go about this. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you select anyone from the Criminal Division? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I did not. "Mr. NIELDS. Was there a reason for that? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, there was no reason to select anyone from the Criminal Division inasmuch as there were no criminal aspects to this. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, you said that you worked out a plan of action, and I take it that you identified people that you wanted to talk to and also documents that you wanted to review. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I believe that you have an exhibit that reflects at least some of that here, which lists, is the list that I started on the 21st and then added to as we went along of the people that we wanted to talk with and also the actions that we wanted to take. "Mr. NIELDS. That is Exhibit [EM] No. 42. "Attorney General MEESE. I will turn to that if I may to assist me in answering any questions you have.

"Mr. NIELDS. Please do.

"Attorney General MEESE. On that--

"Mr. NIELDS. I don't think we need to spend a lot of time with this.

"The first page is a list of people and I take it those are people you felt ought to be interviewed.

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. And, Counsel, just so we are sure, the list bears the date the 21st of November 1986, and I think at least the first five or six or perhaps more names were added or were put on there at that time and then other names were added as we went along as I discovered other people that might be worthwhile talking to.

"Mr. NIELDS. And the second page has a number of other items on it, the first one that isn't blocked out says, 'JMP.' I take it that is Poindexter.

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. It says 'every document, telephone logs, et cetera,' and there is a check next to that, 'contact person Paul Thompson.' There is a check and then there is 'What did G[PS] give to or show RR,' and there is a check there.

"Attorney General MEESE. Right.

"Mr. NIELDS. And again I take it you had not asked RR earlier that day what GPS had given to or shown him?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't know how, I think that possibly the President may have said something or John Poindexter may have said something that he had given something to the President.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"In any event, we wanted to see what that was and asked that be made available." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 80-83; JHICI Ex. EM 42 [Meese notes, 11/21/86, listing persons to be interviewed].)
86/11/21-022 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: BEGINNING AND ORGANIZATION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, the first item says every document, telephone logs, et cetera, and you have checked it. Does that reflect the fact that you made a call to Admiral Poindexter at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon? "Attorney General MEESE. Right. "My notes show there was a telephone conversation on that date, the 21st of November 1986 at 3:00 p.m. and the checks would mean that I mentioned each of those things to Admiral Poindexter that we wanted to first have--first of all, that we wanted to have a chance to look at every document, telephone logs or other things that might be helpful in developing kind of a chronology or overview, secondly, I asked him who the contact person would be. "I assumed it would be Paul Thompson, and he said that it was, and I asked the question: 'What did George Shultz give to or show the President?' If there was anything. "I don't know whether I knew there was anything or not. So I can't be sure on exactly what that meant at the time, but at least I asked

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that question of him. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, in any event, I take it it is clear that you made a request by telephone of Mr. Poindexte for relevant documents. "Did you give him a time when you wanted those documents by? "Attorney General MEESE. I probably, I don't know whether I did or not. But I probably, I may well have at least told him the next morning, because obviously we wanted to get all the documents together, and also, I was going to proceed to talk to Mr. McFarlane that afternoon, so I think that I specified then it would be the next morning. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, I need to ask you this question because the committee, as you know, has heard evidence that that afternoon a number of the relevant documents were destroyed both by Admiral Poindexter and by Colonel North. Was there a reason for not doing the document review Friday afternoon? "Attorney General MEESE. The only reaosn that I can remember is by the time I called him it was three o'clock and I would figure they would need at least a little time to get those documents together and so that was the only reason that I told them that we would have our people there the next morning so they could go through these things in an expeditious fashion. "Mr. NIELDS. The-- "Attorney General MEESE. I believe, counsel, that you also received testimony that most of the documents, or much of the documents had already

been shredded before that time, if I remember correctly.

"Mr. NIELDS. We have received testimony of shredding earlier and shredding that afternoon. . . ."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 83-85; JHICI Ex. EM 42 [Meese notes, 11/21/86, listing persons to be interviewed].)

86/11/21-024
NOVEMBER
21-25, 1986
(FRIDAY -
TUESDAY)

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERVIEWS: NO NOTES

MEESE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. RODINO. Can you tell the committee why you took no notes during your interview of Admiral Poindexter and your discussions with Vice President Bush, Secretary Weinberger and CIA Director Casey? You were conducting an inquiry for the President. I think it was important for you to take notes.

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, at the time that I talked with each of them, it was a very brief discussion. I recall the details of the conversation, it was so brief and in most cases it was just a casual conversation, certainly with Director Casey it was not any part of the inquiry as such, but was rather a casual conversation.

"I did on those matters where there were what you might call formal or informal interviews of detailed conversation that took more than a few minutes, then we had someone taking notes.

"Mr. RODINO. But during that period from when you were delegated or designated to conduct that fact-finding inquiry, weren't all of your interviews important and essential, and wouldn't

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	notes establish afterwards for you a basis for whatever you would find? "Attorney General MEESE. I did, I obviously took notes of those things which were long and complicated. We planned to develop an outline of the facts. As I say, this was kind of eclipsed by the discovery that we made that put the whole thing into a different mode." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 221-22.)		
86/11/21-025 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION, GENERALLY MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. VAN CLEVE. There have been some suggestions, and I want to personally disassociate myself from these suggestions, that potential for conflict of interest in your fact-finding because of your close personal relationship with the President and I have a series of questions for you about that. "The first question is: is it the case that there were a very limited number of people in the Government at the time that your inquiry took place who could have conducted the investigation given the fact that there was still concern about the lives of the hostages and a continuing relationship with the second channel in Iran? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I think that is true. It would obviously fall to one of the people who [was] already knowledgeable about the general picture or had some knowledge about that situation. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. And is it also the case that it is a traditional function of the Attorney

General serving as the attorney for the President to conduct this kind of fact-finding review?

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, I am not sure that this particular type of fact-finding review has been engaged in before on a topic similar to this, but certainly these types of reviews in the past, there have been plenty of precedent[s] for that.

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. And further, I think it is important to be aware that the Independent Counsel statute, which I gather will probably be a subject of discussion later on in the course of your testimony, and which might be thought of as a political conflict of interest statute of sorts, specifically recognizes the key role of the Attorney General in finding basic facts in cases where there is, according to the statute, a clear potential for conflict.

"Is that a clear description of the statute?

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, the Independent Counsel statute is a statute which provides an opportunity for a separate investigation where there is certain legal and factual predicates achieved, so that, in effect, the top officials in the government are not investigating themselves.

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. But even in cases where the factual and legal predicates clearly exist, the statute specifically requires that the Attorney General be involved in conducting the basic inquiry that leads to the appointment, isn't that correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I

misunderstood your question. Yes, that is correct.

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. And if it is the case, the statute mandates that type of role for the Attorney General even in cases where Congress has, in effect, said we regard this as a conflict of interest situation, then it seems to me to follow that in a situation such as the one that you faced in November 1986, you would have been well within the purview of the provisions of that kind of a notion of conflict of interest in undertaking the inquiry which you undertook.

"Would you agree with that?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, counsel, I think I do, if I understand your question correctly.

"Let me say this, that it was clear to me from the outset on the 25th of November 1986 that if there was to be a criminal--if there was a basis for further criminal investigation, it was highly likely, highly probable that an Independent Counsel would be needed because of the closeness of this situation within the White House itself, the National Security staff and so on, and I discussed that with some of my senior colleagues in the Department of Justice at the time that that was the case.

"Had it been different, had, for example, it been otherwise that it was probable that we would retain that case in the Justice Department, there would be a Justice Department investigation ongoing as opposed to an Independent Counsel investigation, then I would undoubtedly have

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			recused myself ultimately from the Justice Department investigation not because of any conflict of interest, but because I was, in fact, a fact witness to some of the events that took place." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 199-202.)
86/11/21-030 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: HAWKs MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Now, on the morning of November 21st, you returned to Washington early in the morning and you then met with your staff at the Justice Department for a period of about an hour and a half, I think the record shows. "I wanted to ask you, were you shown at that time a copy of Director Casey's actual testimony that had been delivered that morning? "Attorney General MEESE. I am not sure whether I was shown a copy. I believe there was a copy or there may have been a copy in the possession of Mr. Cooper or others who were there. I don't specifically recall that it was shown to me or that I read it. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Mr. Cooper testified, and I ask you, whether you are aware of this, that that testimony does not, in fact, mention that the U.S. had been involved in a shipment of Hawk missiles in November 1985. "Were you aware of that, sir? "Attorney General MEESE. I am not sure whether I was aware of it or not. I may well have been. My recollection now is that the testimony had been--had a statement in it of something that

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			there--that there were questions as to the involvement of the U.S. or questions as to the degree of our knowledge of involvement of the U.S. persons as of that time or some words to that effect, leaving it as rather an open question in Mr. Casey's testimony, but I don't know the exact substance of that statement. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. But I take it there was no affirmative statement made of which you are aware that Mr. Casey would not disclose the fact of the Hawk shipment to the committees before which he was testifying that day, there was no affirmative decision of which you are aware? "Attorney General MEESE. Not that I know of or recall at the time, sir." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 188-89.)
86/11/21-031 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: THE START MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Later [on November 21] you assembled a team of Justice Department employees to assist you in the fact-finding investigation that the President had commissioned you to conduct and you described for the committee briefly the background of several of these individuals, but I want to confirm for the record if this is correct that Assistant Attorney Reynolds, as head of the Civil Rights Division, has criminal responsibilities, because the Civil Rights Division conducts criminal prosecutions; is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. We do not consider it a fact-finding investigation

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

inasmuch as we were not really going into it to build a case or to investigate in the depth that that term implies.

"It certainly was an inquiry to find out what the facts were.

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. I wanted to refer back to your earlier testimony, Mr. Attorney General, that you called Admiral Poindexter and you asked him to produce every document and all phone logs that related to the Iran initiative.

"You made it clear to him, I take it, that you wanted comprehensive information from the National Security Council, everything that they had about the Iran initiative; is that correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. To your knowledge, did the National Security Council staff make available the so-called PROFS notes to your staff when they came to review documents the next day? These are the electronic mail messages that have been so much in the news.

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't know whether they did or not. That was a term that I had not known of until the hearings commenced here. But I don't know how much information and what documents they presented there.

"There was a considerable body of documents that were presented because it took our people all morning and on into the early evening hours to go through all the material.

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. Mr. Chairman, I think the record will show that Mr. Cooper testified before the committee that with respect to several of the key exhibits in his examination, and these are PROF notes that show contemporaneous knowledge on the part of certain NSC employees such as Colonel North that he had not seen these documents until he was examined earlier in the week and that Admiral Poindexter, for example, had never told him about such PROF notes.

"So that the fact is that your staff simply didn't have this information available to them when they understood [sic (undertook?)] this fact-finding review?

"Attorney General MEESE. I believe that may well be correct. As a matter of fact, it is my understanding that there were people in the NSC that didn't know those records were available either at the time.

"Mr. VAN CLEVE. I think it is very important for the committee to bear in mind that we are in the process now of taking a look back in time in a situation where we have considerably better documentary evidence available than was available to any of the participants, whether they were the NSC staff officials or the officials of the Department of Justice, who were actually conducting this fact-finding inquiry at the time.

"[Attorney General MEESE.] Counsel, I appreciate your mentioning that because that certainly is the case. As a matter of fact, it was for that reason that I was so tentative in the statements that I made at the press conference that Mr. Nields referred to earlier. I think if you count in the press conference transcript you will find in at least 40 instances I indicated

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that I said we are looking into there or as best we know or I don't know precisely or something to that effect. That whole thing, it was the President's desire to get the facts as quickly as possible, and when we made this discovery, it was a matter then of getting that before the American people as quickly as possible, knowing that additional investigation would be carried on afterwards." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 189-92.)
86/11/21-032 NOVEMBER 21-24, 1986 (FRIDAY - MONDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Now, in the course of the weekend, and I take this from Friday through Monday you met with, among others, Mr. McFarlane, Colonel North, Director Casey, and Secretary Shultz, to discuss their knowledge of the 1985 Hawk shipment and related matters. "And without getting into the question for the moment of the--their intent with respect to the disclosures that they made to you and to your staff, would it be fair to say that you repeatedly advised these present and former NSC staff officials that the most useful thing they could do to serve the President was to make full disclosure of the facts? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe that I did in virtually every case at the beginning of our discussion, I made a statement to that effect. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. I might note that several of the exhibits that are before the committee today which are contemporaneous notes taken by members

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			of your staff reflect those instructions that you made to people that you interviewed. And yet as far as the committee can tell, and again, without asking you to pass-judgment on the accuracy of what you were told, there appears to be the distinct possibility that full disclosure was not, in fact, made by a number of these participants in these events, is that a fair statement? "Attorney General MEESE. Again, I am not in a position to evaluate, but it may appear that way based upon all the testimony heard in these hearings and the other investigative activity. "As I mentioned earlier, there is a far different picture of the situation today than there was during that weekend in November 1986." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 192-93.)
86/11/21-035 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES WELD ACCOUNT: At a morning staff meeting at the DoJ, William Weld, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, suggests that the Criminal Division and the FBI be called in to investigate the Iran arms sales. A federal court in N.Y. has requested confirmation whether the defendants in a case brought there -- the Evans case -- had been officially authorized to engage in arms sales with Iran. The common denominators in Evans and the Iran Initiative are Adnan Khashoggi and HAWKs and TOWs. According to Weld, to give the N.Y. court a truthful answer, the Criminal Division and FBI must be involved.

The reaction to Weld's suggestion is surprise from the group that includes Trott, Reynolds, Cooper, and probably Burns, Eastland, Bolton, Markman, Richardson and Cribb. Meese is not present.

Prior to the meeting, Weld had told Mark Richard "that the Attorney General should not be a gumshoe." Weld at the time is unaware of the Attorney General's involvement in the January 17, 1986 Finding. He is concerned about the time needed for the Attorney General to conduct an investigation and about management issues: "It is crazy to have the top people going out doing fact research."
(Weld, House Dep., 7/16/87, at 4-11, 13-21.)

86/11/21-035
FROM
SEPTEMBER 16,
1986

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES, AND THE EVANS CASE

MEESE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. RUDMAN. I am going to turn to the Evans case, a case that you referred to in your opening statement.

"You are familiar, I assume, with the case generally although not with the specifics?

"Attorney General MEESE. I am familiar with the case generally. I also am somewhat precluded from commenting on an ongoing litigation that is now taking place in the courts.

"As to the general parameters that you may want to ask about--

"Mr. RUDMAN. There is a public record. You referred to the Evans case in your statement, a case involving the sale of arms by--the alleged

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			sale of arms by individuals to the Iranians; am I correct? "Attorney General MEESE. That is my understanding of the case. "Mr. RUDMAN. I want to preface the next few questions with a remark that I guess you would agree with that just because the United States had a policy supported by findings to sell arms to Iran for whatever reason, that is not exculpatory of individuals selling it for profit--we can agree on that, I assume? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir, as a matter of fact, there are wholly different sections of the laws relating to private activities and those activities engaged in lawfully by agents of the Government. "Mr. RUDMAN. I have a problem with this matter in terms of administration of this case which I think is illustrative of this. I would like to read something and see if you can explain it to us. "You were asked by one of the defense counsel at the Justice Department questions about whether or not arms sales had been authorized to Iran. That was a defense motion. "The U.S. Attorney in New York asked the Department, because Mr. Giuliani had to make pleadings, Mr. Giuliani, one of the most outstanding United States Attorneys in this country, I am sure you would agree--when you found out that that particular sale had not been authorized, was passed on to the U.S. Attorney in New York that they could make a declaration to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that effect. "The thing that troubles me is in the pleading in the U.S. Court in New York, this statement appears, an answer filed by you in response to a defendant's motion. "I want to read to you one paragraph. It says, 'Obviously we intend to produce any documents indicating that the proposed transactions,' those that are a matter of that lawsuit up there, 'that the proposed transactions were, in fact, sanctioned or that the foreign policy of the United States during the period of conspiracies as charged in the indictment was to permit the shipment of U.S. arms to Iran.' "So far so good. "Then, 'At this time, we are aware of none.' "Now, at the time that this was filed in the United States District Court up in New York, September 16, 1986 or slightly thereafter, obviously the arms initiative to Iran wasn't known. So essentially we had a statement here that the United States Attorney in New York, relying on information from main Justice, was filing that was false. "Would you comment on that? "Attorney General MEESE. I have not seen that document, Senator, and it would have--I would have to look at all of the aspects of it. But certainly the proposed transactions were not authorized, and I would have to know the context in which that was filed in order to say that it was in fact false. Certainly nothing that was said by the Department to my knowledge would have

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			given the U.S. Attorney's Office in New York a basis to make a statement such as that inasmuch as the only information that was provided that I know of by the Department, certainly by my office to the Criminal Division, was that this specific transaction was not authorized. "Mr. RUDMAN. I am not going to spend a lot of time on it, but let me say that when you look at this and I will make sure you get a copy, and I would like you to comment for the record because I think it is a serious matter, although not involved here--there was no question when you read it and read the pleadings, you will agree that that statement stands on its own four legs. "It says, 'At this time, we are aware of none.' I get very concerned about United States Attorneys being put in the position of making affirmative misrepresentations to courts, and I am sure you are, too. "Attorney General MEESE. I suspect I am even more concerned about it than you are. This is the kind of thing that may well be an error in language was made by a U.S. Attorney and I will have to look at that before making a judgment and I would appreciate a copy." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 17-21.)
86/11/21-036 NOVEMBER 21-24, 1986 (FRIDAY - MONDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Were you ever made aware on Friday, the 21st or at any time over the weekend, that the head of the Department's Criminal

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Division had expressed a desire to have this investigation handled by his division? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I don't believe I was. As a matter of fact, I have talked with him and he has indicated to me that he never was of a desire to have this investigation that I am talking about handled by his Criminal Division. "Quite the contrary; he indicated that his interests had to do with something totally different, which was the investigations that were going on in connection with New York's smuggling activities [sic] and that sort of thing. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you recall having a conversation with him on Monday the 24th in which you told him that the decision not to use the Criminal Division had been a deliberate one, not an inadvertent one? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I don't have a recollection of the discussion, but I believe I did call him on Monday, and indicate that to him. "Mr. NIELDS. What did you have in mind in telling him it wasn't inadvertent? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall, frankly, because I don't recall the conversation, but there may have been some indication to me that shouldn't we let Bill Weld know that the Criminal Division isn't being cut out of this or something to that effect. "Of course, they weren't. I indicated to him that at an appropriate time--I don't recall the exact conversation, but my intention was that at an appropriate time if there was any indication of criminality that we would bring him into it, and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			in fact that was what happened." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 144-45. For Weld account, see 86/11/21-035 and 86/11/24-005.)
86/11/21-037 FROM NOVEMBER 21, 1986		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. RODINO. We have talked a bit and you have testified this morning about why you didn't use the Criminal Division, and you do know that there have been news accounts, people have stated--former high-ranking Justice Department officials, both of this Administration and previous administrations, have criticized the political team you have put together to conduct the inquiry and your failure to use any career attorneys in the Criminal Division. "They have pointed out that if you had used experienced career investigators, they would be more sensitive to the situation, to the fact that you were conducting at a later date a very, very important investigation which might be considered as being handled politically instead. "Didn't you think it was necessary for you to conduct the inquiry with a team of career employees, rather than the political allies you designated? "Attorney General MEESE. I didn't have political allies; I had competent people who were the most experienced people on this subject matter in the Department of Justice. "At no time I think was there contemplation by anyone that there was any reason to bring in the

Criminal Division, and so the people that I brought were those who were the most experienced on the issues that were being looked into, namely, the national security issues.

"As I mentioned earlier, I brought in Mr. Cooper, who is not any more political in his appointment than is the head of the Criminal Division. They are both appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

"Mr. Cooper was the head of the division of the Department of Justice that has the specific responsibility for dealing with the issues about which we were finding the facts, namely, national security issues.

"I brought in Mr. Reynolds, who likewise is an appointee of the President, confirmed by the Senate, who was knowledgeable not only as a long-time expert trial lawyer who was considerably experienced in complex litigation and would have the personal skills to participate in this kind of a fact-finding inquiry, but also had done a number of projects for me in the national security area in which he had looked into the relationship between the various working groups that are a part of the national security process. So his background knowledge was, of course, important.

"I also brought into it Mr. Richardson, who was a trusted member of the Department of Justice in matters relating to foreign intelligence and who had had that background.

"So actually what I did, Mr. Rodino, was to pull together the people who had the most knowledge about this subject or who had the best experience in the Department of Justice to participate in this fact-finding inquiry.

"Mr. RODINO. However, I might point out, and I'm sure you are aware, that there have been law enforcement officials in your own department who have stated to the committee that the evidence properly called for bringing the Criminal Division in earlier and as a result, I suppose, now this criticism of your having brought in a political team.

"On reflection, do you think you might have done otherwise?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't know of any member of my department who has made that criticism.

"If you have any knowledge of that, I would like to see the deposition and find out who made such a statement. Is there such a person?

"Mr. RODINO. We will go on and I can assure you that we have that testimony.

"Attorney General MEESE. I think I'm entitled to see who it is and what the basis is for their knowledge and experience in this matter, because no one that I know of who has looked at this situation has made that criticism.

"Quite the contrary, Director Webster, then director of the FBI, concurred in my judgments as to how this should be handled. And subsequent to that, the leadership of the FBI, the top leadership, said that to a person the FBI leadership felt that I had made no mistakes and had made no errors in the way that I conducted that investigation.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"So if you have contrary information, I would certainly like to see it. "Mr. RODINO. Well, we will show it to you." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 223-26. See id., 7/28/87, at 243, 251; id., 7/29/87, at 174-76, 286-89, 304-05 [all on Webster's concurrence].)
86/11/21-038 FROM NOVEMBER 21, 1986		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Attorney General MEESE. I would like to see it and, if there is no such information, I would like that statement retracted, because there has been a lot of criticism attributed to anonymous sources in the news media. "Quite frankly, I think that on that weekend the team that I put together did a pretty fine job. It is as a result of their efforts that this whole matter was discovered, was made available to the Congress and made available to the American people, and it is as a result of their efforts that this whole series of hearings has been available to be conducted. "Mr. RODINO. Let me read you a portion of Mr. Weld's deposition. "You stated that you expressed your feelings rather strongly. Can you give us a sense of what you said? "'My exact words, as best I can recall, were I'm not sure it makes very much sense for the Criminal Division and the FBI not to be involved

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

in this.'

". . . .

"Mr. RODINO. This is a deposition of Mr. William Weld and the deposition was taken on July 16, 1987, and I am going to move, Mr. Chairman, that the deposition of Mr. William Weld taken July 16, 1987, be marked as an exhibit and included on the record.

"Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I would object to that request until the members have a copy of the deposition.

". . . .

"Mr. RODINO. Mr. Chairman, we will move on and I will defer my motion until later.

"Attorney General MEESE. I would like to answer the question because I have now looked at this, and this has to do with a meeting that was held on Friday, November 21st, at 8:30, where I was not present. But I have since talked to Mr. Weld about this statement because he asked to see me and to explain what he was trying to tell the committee, and he said that he was not talking about the inquiry which I was going to conduct later because he didn't even know about it at that time, nor, as a matter of fact, did I at that hour of the day on the 21st.

"It wasn't until that noontime, sometime after that meeting that the President asked me to conduct that inquiry. And he was talking about a different investigation, the so-called Evans investigation out of New York, which was a separate Iranian arms smuggling investigation in which the Criminal Division was very much

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			involved. "So it really has nothing to do with the investigation you are talking about that I conducted, or the inquiry. "Mr. COHEN. Would the gentlemen yield to inquire as to whether or not that meeting on November 21st at which the Assistant Attorney General had the meeting--you were not present. "Attorney General MEESE. I was not present. "Mr. COHEN. There was a discussion that took place about the need for his recommendation was [sic] to have the Criminal Division handle that, and then on the following Monday I believe you had a conversation with Mr. Weld in which you advised him as to why it was not inadvertent that the Criminal Division was not involved; is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. I think we are talking about two different things. "My understanding is that on Friday Mr. Weld was referring to the aspects of the Evans investigation and, as a matter of fact, I'm sure he was not referring to the fact-finding inquiry that I was involved in, because on the 22nd of November his own Criminal Division had come up with a memorandum saying that there were no criminal offenses involved in the Iranian situation as they understood it and so there would be no basis for the Criminal Division to be involved." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 226-29. See id., 7/29/87, at 105-06 [further comments by the Attorney General on Weld's deposition].)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/21-039 FROM NOVEMBER 21, 1986		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. COHEN. The only problem was that during the period from Friday through Monday there was a discussion about diversion which you immediately recognized as being a serious, potentially explosive problem, which was never conveyed to him at all. "Attorney General MEESE. It was indeed. It was conveyed to him. I'm not sure whether it was on Monday or Tuesday when we had finished, but certainly Mr. Weld was brought into it as soon as there appeared to be a possibility of a criminal offense, which I believe was on Tuesday, the 25th. "On Monday, the 24th, I had asked Mr. Cooper, based on the facts that we knew, to see if there was any possible criminal law violation. Mr. Cooper reported to me he thought there was enough that we could at least bring in the Criminal Division, and on Tuesday, the 25th, Mr. Weld was asked to look to see whether he felt there might be any criminal involvement. "He wasn't sure, and so his people worked all afternoon and by evening came up with the basis that they felt, while it was slim, there was enough to proceed with an initial criminal investigation. "So there was at no time any attempt to keep the Criminal Division out of anything that had criminal implications."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 229-30.)

86/11/21-041
FROM NOVEMBER
21, 1986

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION:
CRIMINAL ISSUES, AND THE EVANS CASE

MEESE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. COHEN. Yesterday I interrupted Congressman Rodino on the Evans case. [See 86/11/21-038.] I would just like to clarify it for the record.

"My understanding is--and Senator Rudman raised this issue with you again this afternoon--that on Friday, November 21st, a staff meeting was held at the Department of Justice during which time you were not present; that Mr. Weld argued that the Criminal Division should be involved because they were involved in the handling of the Evans case. That basically was the argument he presented to his associates.

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't believe that is correct.

"Mr. COHEN. Let me finish.

"Then on Monday apparently you called, placed a call to him to indicate--apparently the information had sort of percolated up to your level at that point--that Mr. Weld thought there should be a Criminal Division investigation.

"Attorney General MEESE. No, that is not correct either.

"Mr. COHEN. You called him on Monday; is that correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. COHEN. You indicated to him at that time it was not an inadvertent oversight or error as to why the Criminal Division was not involved, right?

"Attorney General MEESE. Actually these are two separate instances.

"Let me take Monday first. What I did on Monday was call him so that if he heard about an inquiry taking place in the department, he wouldn't wonder why the Criminal Division was not involved. I indicated to him, as a matter of indicating to him, that we had in mind the Criminal Division, they hadn't been forgotten.

"I may have even said--I don't know, I don't recall the specific conversation, but in talking with Mr. Weld about it, in trying to reconstruct, I believe I was assuring him that the Criminal Division might well become involved."
(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 58-59.)

86/11/21-080
DURING
NOVEMBER 1986

THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES: FINAL VERSION
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it that the final version, . . . the last version that was ever done of these chronologies that you just testified about states two things: One, the U.S. Government did not have prior knowledge and did not approve either the Israeli TOW shipment or the Hawk shipment, and those statements are inaccurate; and also states, with respect to the Hawk shipment, that the U.S. Government believed at the time that . . . the CIA proprietary was carrying oil drilling equipment.

". . . .

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think it is inaccurate to describe that chronology [Ex. JMP 76] as the final

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			version. There really never was a final version. It is the last one that was prepared because Colonel North and I left the White House after that point; and the whole purpose of Ed Meese looking into the facts and talking to Mr. McFarlane and Secretary Shultz about the events in Geneva and what discussions there were then about the plan, my intent was to wait until Mr. Meese had finished his fact-finding search, and we would eventually have produced the final version of the chronology, hopefully correct in every aspect. "But on the afternoon of the 21st, as the pieces began to fall into place for me, there was nothing done to change the chronology at that point. "Mr. NIELDS. How was an accurate version of the chronology going to be prepared if all of the critical documents relevant to the chronology had been destroyed? "Mr. BECKLER. There is no testimony to the effect that all the critical documents of the chronology were destroyed, unless counsel has some information that we don't know about. I know of no testimony by this witness supporting that assertion. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I certainly did not consider, as I said, in a thoughtful orderly process the significance of that finding. I simply saw it as contributing to the story that the President's initiative was an arms-for-hostage arrangement, which it was not, which he did not feel it was, and which, in fact, it was not." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, 25-27. JHICI

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Ex. JMP 76 [11/20/86 Chronology, 2000 Version].)
86/11/21-087 NOVEMBER 20-21, 1986 (THURSDAY - FRIDAY)			POINDEXTER'S CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING: THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Admiral, you testified on the 20th you did have a meeting concerning Casey's testimony. Am I correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. And you were going to brief the Intelligence Committees the next day yourself; is that correct? "A. That's correct. "Q. It was during this meeting an issue arose as to what was contained in the shipment in November, am I correct? "A. Well, the issue was not so much what was contained in the shipment. "Q. As to what you knew was contained? "A. What we knew was contained and our prior knowledge. "Q. Do you recall North saying at that meeting that no one in the United States Government knew that there were Hawks in that shipment? "A. I don't recall that specifically. "Q. Was a decision made as a result of the discussions that were had on the 20th that when Casey and you appeared before Congress the next day that you would not represent to Congress that you had no knowledge that Hawks were in that shipment? "A. After --

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"MR. SMALL: That's a double negative. "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. Was there a decision reached as a result of those discussions as to what you would say to Congress? "A. Yes, there was. "Q. What was it that you agreed upon? "A. Actually, I think I formulated it, that we would say that there had been a shipment by the Israelis in November, 1985, we didn't have all the facts and when we had all the facts, we would report back to the Congress. And to the best of my knowledge, that's what I told the House Intelligence Committee and Senators Leahy and Durenberger. "Q. If the Members of both the House and the Senate committee said that you told them that you did not know until January of 1986 that Hawks were contained, they would be wrong? "A. I think they would be wrong. I'm very comfortable with that. "Q. And have you had occasion to read the memorandum of Mr. Newsom, which I think was provided to you, of your meeting with the Senate committee? "A. No, I haven't seen that. "Q. We are going to let you see it. It was in the papers, but there were a lot of papers, and I think you ought to see it before your appearance. "A. Who was Newsom? "Q. He was a staff member of the Senate committee. And there is apparently a similar memo

from the House committee.

"MR. BECKLER: They were taking notes?

"MR. LIMAN: Apparently. He said, 'Poindexter said he learned in January, 1986, that Israel had sent 18 Hawk missiles to Iran on November 25, 1985, without U.S. approval. He told the Israelis the missiles had to be returned from Iran and they were returned in February. It is unclear whether there was prior knowledge by any U.S. official of that shipment. Poindexter said he was looking into that question right now. He did not know the details of that shipment.'

". . . .

"MR. BECKLER: This was prepared when? On November 28, seven days after the -- I'm just trying to get it straight here. These were not notes taken at the meeting.

"MR. LIMAN: Don't tell me it wasn't notes taken at the meeting. Obviously they didn't sit there and type it at the meeting."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 72-75; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 56 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 70; Newsom Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting with Admiral Poindexter on Iran," 11/28/86].)

86/11/21-088
NOVEMBER 21,
1986
(FRIDAY)

POINDEXTER'S CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING: THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

". . . .

"THE WITNESS: This does not -- I simply just don't recall providing that much detail on that issue. We were clearly uncertain on the 20. I simply don't recall it.

". . . .

"THE WITNESS: As I testified before, my recollection in November of '86 of events of November, '85, was very, very fuzzy.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. If this memorandum is correct, you said that you learned in January, '86, that the 18 Hawks were sent. Was that your recollection on November 21?

"A. It was unclear at that point because I was faced with the problem of two people that were directly involved in the November shipment having different recollections of events. We had Bud McFarlane saying one thing and Secretary Shultz saying something else.

"My best recollection is at that point that I did not remember anything about, or know anything about the Hawks until January, '86.

"Now, since that time and the preparation and reviewing PROFs notes, it is clear that I did know in November, '85, but I did not remember that in November of '86.

"Q. That is your position?

"A. That's my position."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 75-78; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 56 [= JHICI Ex. JMP 70; Newsom Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting with Admiral Poindexter on Iran," 11/28/86].)

86/11/21-090
NOVEMBER 21,
1986

POINDEXTER'S CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, when you . . . briefed

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(FRIDAY)			the Senate Intelligence Committee the following day, did you tell them that the first time that you found out that Hawks were being shipped was in January of 1986? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That was my recollection at the time. I thought that was an accurate statement. It obviously isn't accurate. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, Admiral, you are a man who prides yourself on memory, is that fair to say? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I have a reasonably good memory, but I have also--I have up until my year as National Security Advisor, I have never been hit with so many issues in such a short period of time. There was a lot of activity that had happened over that previous year and the events of November of 1985 until November of 1986 were very far from my current memory. "Mr. LIMAN. Wasn't the Hawk shipment a memorable event in that it was a disaster? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Not necessarily-- "Mr. LIMAN. Not necessarily? ". . . . "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, I don't know how a person's memory works. I am telling you at the time I did not remember it, and that is an honest answer. I did not remember it. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you remember that the Iranians felt that they had been cheated by the Hawk shipment? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I think I recalled that at some point, but I am not sure at what point. As I testified or didn't testify, there were informal briefings to the House Intelligence

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Committee and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "By the way, we had invited all the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee to come down and they chose not to. Those two came down. "But my intent was there to put out accurate information and I thought that I did, at the time." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 70-72.)
86/11/21-091 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			POINDEXTER'S CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. You had, I take it, earlier that day given briefings to both House and Senate Intelligence Committees? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I had. "Mr. NIELDS. That was on the subject of these arms transactions with Iran? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It was more than that. It was a discussion with the two--well, the House Intelligence Committee and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee of the Iranian project, which didn't just involve arms. "Mr. NIELDS. But it did include the arms transactions? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It did include arms. "Mr. NIELDS. And you had spent part of the previous afternoon in the same room with Director Casey making sure that whatever he testified to to the same committees was consistent with what you told him? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I testified to that.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. [Ex. JMP 79] is a memorandum for the record of your briefing of the House Intelligence Committee, and if you look at the second page, this one is organized by the dates on which certain events occurred, and there is a paragraph headed 'November of 1985.'

"[D]o you see that in front of you?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I think it is important to point out that this memorandum was, is not a contemporaneous record of the meeting, it is a memo that was prepared a week later, and it is. It says staff officer[']s summary of what I said.

"Mr. NIELDS. What I am going to get to is ask you a question about what you said. The memo says opposite November '85, 'The Israelis transferred 18 Hawk missiles to Iran at this time. The United States did not learn about it until January 1986.'

"Then later down, just to make sure I am complete about what is written in the memo, . . . it says, 'In February 1986, the U.S. managed to talk the Iranians and Israelis into returning the missiles to Israel,' and it says 'Poindexter indicated there may have been some prior U.S. knowledge of this November 1985 shipment.'

"Now, my first question is: Did you tell them that the U.S. did not learn about the Hawk shipment until January 1986?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, my recollection of what I said is probably different from that. My recollection is that I said that I did not learn until January of 1986 of the Hawk shipment, and at the time I thought that was an accurate statement.

"The later--and obviously this was the issue that we, part of the issue that we had talked about the day before, and it was pretty clear in my mind at that point that we were aware of the 1985 shipment prior to it, but I simply didn't have all the facts and as I have testified before, I didn't want to go any further into the issue until we had information about prior approval, and I had a situation at that point where Mr. McFarlane didn't remember anything about it, and Secretary Shultz did, but nobody could confirm that.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. Is that true, Admiral Poindexter, that you told the House Intelligence Committee that the events through December 1985 were based on second-hand information?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I recall at the time, because I couldn't, I could not recall my involvement in November of 1985 with the Hawk shipments, and as I have testified, it wasn't until after Colonel North came in in the afternoon of the 21st, several hours after this briefing, that he began to refresh my memory on exactly what happened.

"So I do recall saying to the House Committee and Senators Durenburger and Leahy that [I] was very fuzzy on the issue of what happened up until December 7 of 1985, because I had not been fully engaged in all the issues up until that time." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 127-31; JHICI Ex. JMP 79 [Memorandum for the Record dated

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			11/28/86 from Mike O'Neil, Poindexter's Briefing of HPSCI on 11/21/86].)
86/11/21-092 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		POINDEXTER'S CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. POINDEXTER. The only thing that was deliberately withheld was the transfer of the residual funds from the arms sales to the contras." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 224.) See col. 3.	POINDEXTER'S CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. STOKES. . . . Admiral Poindexter, I want to start my questions to clear up a little confusion around a meeting of the 21st that you had with the Intelligence Committee. In the discussions that have taken place in the last few days, reference has been made to your coming up on the Hill and speaking with the committee here. "The meeting on the 21st took place in the Situation Room of the White House, didn't it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, it did, and I believe I have testified that way. "Mr. STOKES. And that meeting was set at 7:30 that morning, wasn't it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It was. "Mr. STOKES. Do I characterize that meeting properly when I say that you opened up the meeting at 7:30, that you talked, giving a chronology, from 7:30 until ten minutes until nine? At ten minutes to nine, you made note of the time, you said that you understood we had a meeting with Director Casey at nine o'clock, and therefore there wouldn't be any opportunity to answer questions. Perhaps we could do this at another time. "Mr. Hamilton, the Chairman of our committee, then, in his very gracious manner, thanked you for having invited us there and briefing us and all of us got up and left. No one had an opportunity to

ask a question; is that right?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. I had a lot of information to put out, and it took me longer than I expected. There was no intent on my part to preclude your asking questions, but we would have had to have started earlier, I guess.

"Mr. STOKES. You were there for an hour and twenty minutes.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Right, but there was a lot of information to put out.

"Mr. STOKES. Is it fair to say that at that meeting you withheld information from us?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. The only thing that was deliberately withheld was the transfer of the residual funds from the arms sales to the contras.

"As it turns out, I made some inaccurate statements, but that was not deliberate and I was not trying to withhold anything. We had some uncertainties as to what all the facts were in the aborted Hawk missile transfer. But I think I acknowledged that at the time and indicated that we were still looking into the matter and I would get back to the committees when we had more information."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 222-24.)

86/11/21-095
NOVEMBER 1985
AND NOVEMBER
21, 1986

POINDEXTER SUMMARIZING HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE 11/85 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTION, AND HIS DESTROYING THE 12/5/85 FINDING IN 11/86

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . Admiral, I take it from your testimony of yesterday that[--]and I am just going to summarize a few things and if I get them

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			wrong, I want you to tell me--that you were aware in November of 1985 of the shipment of Hawk missiles by Israel to Iran before the shipment occurred? "You were aware that a CIA proprietary had, in fact, been used to carry those weapons to Iran, and you were aware that the CIA had sought a finding to cover their activities in that regard and you eventually obtained the President's signature on that finding? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I did, but I would like to go over that one more time, since it is being reported inaccurately in the press and I frankly think it is deliberate and it is exactly the problem that I thought would happen when I saw that finding again in November of 1986. "In November of 1985, Colonel North asked the CIA to help in identifying a proprietary, to help the Israelis with that shipment. Now I was aware of that at the time. I had forgotten that in November of 1986. "After John McMahon, the deputy Director of CIA, found out about the CIA assistance, he was upset, and he asked or directed, as I understand it, Stanley Sporkin to draft a finding to cover retroactively the CIA assistance in that particular shipment. That finding was prepared. "I understand that Colonel North assisted to some extent, but it was basically prepared by the CIA, Mr. Sporkin and other CIA staff. "The people involved in drafting that finding had not been involved in any prior discussions with the President in which the broader aspects of

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			the plan were laid out. "The only thing that they knew about at that time was that one aspect of that one shipment. Therefore, that is what they put in the finding. "Director Casey sent me that finding on November 26, 1985. That was during the Thanksgiving holiday. The President was on the West Coast. "On the 4th of December, the President announced that Mr. McFarlane was retiring and that I was to be named in his place. "John McMahon had called me rather insistently wanting to get the finding signed. So the following day, the 5th of December, I took the finding to the President. The finding was not properly staffed. "As I have said, I was unhappy with it. The President signed the finding. "In no way did that finding cover the totality of the President's thinking on the issue. It did not reflect the discussions that had taken place up to that time. "It didn't cover the strategic aspects of the Israeli proposal with regard to the Iranians. It didn't cover the fact that one of our major objectives was to keep the Soviet Union out of Iran, to develop the potential for a better relationship in the future with Iran, didn't cover the intelligence against that we thought we could make by having channels into the Iranian Government. "Instead, the only part that it addressed was the problem of getting over the first obstacle and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that was a confidence-building effort on our part and on the Iranian part. "On the--for us it was the provision of a small amount of defensive arms. On the Iranian part, it was to put pressure on the Hizballah to release the hostages. "The President did not view that at the time as arms for hostages, I did not either, I do not today." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 9-11.)
86/11/21-096 NOVEMBER 1985 AND NOVEMBER 21, 1986			POINDEXTER SUMMARIZING HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE 11/85 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTION, AND HIS DESTROYING THE 12/5/85 FINDING IN 11/86 POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Poindexter testimony continuing from preceding entry:] "[Mr. POINDEXTER.] The hostage aspect was one small part of the plan; obviously an important part. The finding that [the President] signed that day only addressed the retroactive aspect of the CIA's assistance on that one shipment. "In no way can that be considered an arms-for-hostage arrangement. "Now, because the finding only addressed that part, it can be interpreted that way taken out of context and that is exactly how my testimony to date has been taken by the press, out of context. "On Nightline last night, the moderator said that I had testified that it was simply an arms-for-hostage arrangement. That simply is not what I testified and that is not what happened. "When I saw that finding on the 21st of

November of 1986, as I said the other day, the President was under a lot of pressure in the media from the standpoint of calling it an arms-for-hostage arrangement. I recognized then and I think my judgment was accurate as has been borne out in the past few days that that would be interpreted as an arms-for-hostage arrangement.

"I didn't go through a long orderly thought process as to what to do with that.

"At that point, I was damned annoyed. I was still annoyed that I was pressured into getting that signed before it was staffed and so without thinking about it, I tore the finding up.

"I think that is a fair and accurate description of what happened. I hope it gets reported that way.

"Mr. NIELDS. My point is that I take it also from your testimony today and yesterday that the things you just told us now you had forgotten by the time November 1986 rolled around?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. You had forgotten that you knew about the shipment of the Hawks before they were shipped?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. You had forgotten that you knew that a CIA proprietary had been used to ship them?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Nields, every day in the White House I received hundreds of documents, hundreds of messages and hundreds of PROFS notes. We had been involved in many, many issues over the year. I simply did not remember.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . When the press accounts of the Iranian initiative began in November of 1986, you directed that chronologies be prepared so that senior officials, including yourself, would be brought up to speed on the facts?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. And as I have said, I frankly could not remember the events of 1985, and I thought it was important, as this issue was going to become very heated, it was clear that we have a basic source document to use internally in the White House that laid out what had happened.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you received drafts of those chronologies which made direct reference to the shipment of 18 Hawk missiles in November of 1985? I think you testified to that yesterday?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. The earlier drafts contained some reference to that; that's correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And after reading them, you still didn't remember that you had known about it at the time?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I still do not remember that.

"Mr. NIELDS. Then--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Now, also as I recall, I did not see the first draft until about a half hour before a congressional leadership meeting down in the Situation Room on [November] 13th, I believe it was.

". . . .

"Mr. POINDEXTER. But frankly, it got in a half hour before the meeting ended to have an opportunity to read it. [Sic.]"
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 11-15.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/21-097 NOVEMBER 1985 AND NOVEMBER 21, 1986			POINDEXTER SUMMARIZING HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE 11/85 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTION, THE EVENTS OF 11/86, AND HIS 11/21/86 CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. And on the 20th of November, you met with the Director of Central Intelligence and some other people, including the Attorney General, at your office to talk about the fact that you were going to brief the Intelligence Committees the next day and so was the Director of Central Intelligence? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. That's right. As I said yesterday, I had asked Director Casey to come back from Central America early, and I understand that that tape recording of that conversation has been declassified now. [See 86/11/20-534.] "Mr. NIELDS. I take it one of the purposes, in fact, for those chronologies was to put you and Director Casey in a position to accurately brief the congressional committees that had an interest in the matter? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct. I think the transcript of that conversation indicates the objective was to get all of the facts collected as best we could and to lay these issues to rest in fully discussing the matter with the committees. "Mr. NIELDS. And I take it that during the meeting on the 20th, there was mention of the fact that the U.S. Government had believed in November that the proprietary was carrying oil-drilling

equipment?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think I really understood for sure--

"Mr. NIELDS. I think you testified yesterday that at that meeting with Director Casey on the 20th, there was discussion of the fact that the United States Government had believed in November of '85 that the CIA proprietary was carrying oil-drilling equipment and that you recognized that that was incorrect?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. My recollection was that there was some connection, as I could vaguely recall, with oil-drilling equipment, but I was reasonably confident that we knew that it wasn't that, that that was somehow involved in the issue, but my memory of that period of time a year before was very vague.

"Mr. NIELDS. But you still didn't remember, even on the 20th, after all the discussion of oil-drilling equipment, you still didn't remember that you had known in November, 1985, at the time that it was Hawk missiles?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct. I did not remember in November of--the 20th, it would have been Thursday, that I knew that they were Hawks. I simply had put that out of my mind.

"Mr. NIELDS. And so you went in front of the House Intelligence Committee the following morning and gave them a briefing. . . . [and] someone making a summary of your remarks wrote: 'The Israelis transferred 18 Hawk missiles to Iran at this time, November, 1985. The U.S. did not learn about it until January of 1986.'

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"My first question is, I take it that is what you told the House Intelligence Committee on November 21st, and I take it it is your testimony that at that time you still didn't remember that you had known about it in November? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I certainly did not remember at that time that I had known about it in November of 1985. I can't be sure--there are about three versions of notes on that briefing taken by House and Senate staff officers. "I think--the main point that sticks in my memory that I told the committee-committees on that Friday was that I was very--I think I admitted--in fact, I think in the footnote on the first page of that exhibit, I admitted that I was very fuzzy on that time period in 1985, was being very straightforward in acknowledging that, and that we were still investigating what had actually happened in November of 1985, which is not reflected here in this note, and that when we finished that investigation and had the rest of the details, we would get back to the committee. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. . . . The footnote refers that your briefing is based on secondhand information. You actually had firsthand information at the time, but your testimony is that you had forgotten it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 15-18.)
86/11/21-098 NOVEMBER 1985			POINDEXTER SUMMARIZING HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE 11/85 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTION, THE EVENTS

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
AND NOVEMBER 21, 1986			OF 11/86, AND HIS 11/21/86 CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing for preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Then you went before the Senate Intelligence Committee. And I think the memorandum of that briefing is Exhibit [JMP] 70? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. It was not the whole committee. "Mr. NIELDS. The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Right. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Now, there are a couple of things about this. First of all, it states . . . at the top of the first full paragraph on that page, 'Poindexter said that he learned in January, 1986, that Israel had sent 18 Hawk missiles to Iran on November 25, 1985, without U.S. approval.' "I take it, first of all, you did say that to them? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I can't be certain of that, but I probably did, because that was my recollection at the time. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. I take it, Admiral, that at that time . . . you still did not remember that you had known about the shipment in November of 1985; and then I think you go on, . . . 'Poindexter said he was very disturbed to learn yesterday that there had been some important missing facts.' "I take it that refers to the fact you had heard that Mr. Sofaer, Judge Sofaer from the State

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Department, had indicated that Secretary Shultz knew in November, 1985, that Hawk missiles were being shipped? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The previous day--at that point, Mr. McFarlane couldn't remember anything about the discussions in Geneva and the previous day, or maybe even before that--I can't be certain at this point, but it looks like it was on the 20th--I learned that Secretary Shultz had some--a different recollection and had recalled that Mr. McFarlane had discussed with him in Geneva a plan for the Israelis to ship some Hawk weapons to Iran as the first stage in opening up a dialogue with the Iranians, and hopefully some hostages would come out as a result of that. "I, of course, did not participate in those conversations and I didn't have any firsthand knowledge about it. Mr. McFarlane couldn't remember it, and I did not want to get further into this issue until I had those facts; and so what I told the committee was what I could remember that I knew about it at the time. "Now, obviously it was inaccurate. I did not know it was inaccurate. I did not know it was inaccurate at the time." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 18-21. JHICI Ex. JMP 70 [Memorandum for the Record from Eric Newsom, "Meeting with Admiral Poindexter on Iran" (11/21/86), 11/28/86].)
86/11/21-099 NOVEMBER 21, 1986			POINDEXTER SUMMARIZING HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE 11/85 IRAN ARMS TRANSACTION, THE EVENTS OF 11/86, AND HIS 11/21/86 CONGRESSIONAL

BRIEFING

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 5:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. And you told the committee, and it says this also in the second paragraph [of Ex. JMP 70], referring to you, 'said that he wants to clear this up.'

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is right. Let me read the whole paragraph.

"It says, 'Poindexter said he was very disturbed to learn yesterday that there had been some important missing facts. He said he wants to clear this up. He said it is not fair to say this was an operation run from the basement of the White House. The U.S. is still not precluded from making progress in the opening with Iran.'

"Mr. NIELDS. So you wanted to clear up the question of what the U.S. Government knew about this shipment, when and whether, and when it had been approved?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And later that day, you ran across a document that was relevant to that question, namely . . . the December, 1985 finding which you say you had forgotten up until that time, and you destroyed it?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. But that finding did not answer the question which was the key question at that time, and that was what happened in Geneva. It did not relate to that.

"Mr. NIELDS. It did show, however, and it did remind you, did it not, that you were aware back in November, 1985 that the CIA proprietary had been used to carry the missiles?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Obviously, at that point the pieces began to fall in place, and it was reinforced by Colonel North coming over with some notes from his spiral notebook that he had dug out of the files, that did begin to put the pieces in place. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And is it correct to say that you found one document that related to this issue which was the November finding, and you destroyed it?

"Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to object. . . .

"Chairman HAMILTON. The objection is overruled. . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. And Colonel North had found one document that related to this subject, which was his notes; and when he left your office, it was your understanding that he was going to destroy his notes?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That was my impression.

"Mr. NIELDS. So each of you had discovered one document that would be helpful to answer the question that you told the committee you were going to clear up, and it was your understanding that both of them would be destroyed?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I would like to make a point clear, that my impression was that he was going to destroy them. In reality, he did not, and we didn't have any discussion about the matter. Obviously, I got the wrong impression.

"Another main point here, though, I would like to make _is_ that--look, if we were trying to cover up something from the beginning, we would not have gone to all the trouble of preparing all those various drafts of the chronology. It would have been stupid to try to find out what all the facts were, which I think all of the evidence indicates we were trying to do, if we had intended to cover up something.

"I have explained to you why I tore up that finding. It had nothing to do with trying to cover some Hawk shipment or something like that. We had already indicated that there had been a TOW shipment in which we had acquiesced. I was fuzzy on exactly when that approval had taken place, because I did not remember anything about that and based on my statements on what Mr. McFarlane had told me, we had press guidance prepared. In fact, I backgrounded the press on the 13th or 14th of November that there had been a TOW shipment. There really wasn't any difference in my mind between TOWs and Hawks with regard to the Arms Export Control Act.

"The reason the finding was destroyed was what I have explained, and indeed what has happened over the past few days here today."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 21-25. JHICI Ex. JMP 70 [Memorandum for the Record from Eric Newsom, "Meeting with Admiral Poindexter on Iran" (11/21/86), 11/28/86].)

86/11/21-106
NOVEMBER 21,
1986
(FRIDAY)

POINDEXTER-MEESE CONTACT
POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. RODINO. Let me ask you, Admiral--on the 21st, Attorney General Meese called you early in the morning and, as I recall, Attorney General Meese intended to see the President and ask you as well and Don Regan to see the President at 11:30 that day in order to embrace the matter and to conduct a fact-finding investigation, is that not so?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. Attorney General Meese called me early in the morning on the 21st just to answer some questions on this and said that he wanted to meet with the President. He thought because we had an agreement [sic] in recollections between Mr. McFarlane and Secretary Shultz that it would be useful if he looked into the matter to try to figure out what had happened in November of 1985.

"And he indicated he had arranged a time with Don Regan to see the President at 11:30 and he asked me to come along and, of course, I did.

"Mr. RODINO. And you met for 45 minutes at that time with the President?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. My recollection is it was much shorter than that.

"Mr. RODINO. I have a copy of an appointment schedule of Admiral Poindexter, November 21st, and [sic (at)] the President's Oval Office from 11:30 to 12:15.

". . . .

"Mr. POINDEXTER. The President's diary, his schedule, would be much more accurate in terms of time. I doubt seriously if all of that time I was actually in the Oval Office.

"Mr. RODINO. Could you tell us what you discussed at that time?

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"I know you have talked about clearing up things. Just what did you discuss? This was supposed to be apparently a meeting which had been requested by the Attorney General in order to conduct a fact-finding investigation. "[Counsel conferring with the witness.] "Mr. RODINO. It was more than just saying hello. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I have already described the meeting, as much as I can recall about it, in previous testimony. But I'll go over it again. "My recollection is it was a very short meeting, lasting maybe 10 minutes or 15 minutes. But the Attorney General indicated that there was a disagreement between Bud McFarlane and George Shultz as to what had happened in November, and he thought it would be useful if he looked into the matter to try to get to the facts as to what happened in November of '85. "The question was had there been discussions in Geneva, during the summit with Gorbachev, about an Israeli plan to move forward with the initiative that the Israelis had discussed with Mr. McFarlane back in July and which the President had discussed with the other national security advisers in early August of '85. And that was the key question. We didn't know at that point what the answer was. "Mr. RODINO. I thought, Admiral, that the meeting had been requested by the A.G. to conduct a fact-finding inquiry on the whole matter of the President's knowledge of these different initiatives, and that was to be the A.G.'s

embracing of the facts, so that he might later report to the people.

"You mean all you discussed at that time was the issues that arose at Geneva?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, no, you misunderstood me, Mr. Rodino.

"The November--what eventually turned out to be the November shipment of Hawks by the Israelis to the Iranians--according to George Shultz' recollection, a discussion about that had taken place in Geneva. Mr. McFarlane didn't remember it.

"That is what we were trying to sort out, was the prior knowledge of the Israeli plan to take the next step in the project with the Iranians.

"Mr. RODINO. Admiral, it was later that afternoon, after that meeting and after another call from Attorney General Meese, I think about 2:52 on a secure phone--was it after that that you destroyed that November finding?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. My recollection is that I destroyed that December finding late in the afternoon, early evening of the 21st, that's correct.

"Mr. RODINO. This was following the telephone call from Meese and following that meeting on the 21st with the President?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that's correct." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 150-54.)

86/11/21-110
NOVEMBER 21,
1986

LEDEEN'S ROLE
McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

Ledeen calls McFarlane at "11:30 or so in the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(FRIDAY)			morning." He tells McFarlane he is putting together his own narrative and wants to review it with McFarlane. McFarlane agrees, and arrives at Ledeen's house nearby at about noon. For "20, 25 minutes," Ledeen describes his role as "a conveyor of information, not a negotiator or otherwise an operative of the U.S. Government. And that was true. So I said that is accurate, Mike." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 175-76. See Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 13-19 [Ledeen's contact with McFarlane on 11/21/86].)
86/11/21-111 1985 THROUGH NOVEMBER 1986			LEDEEN'S ROLE NORTH ACCOUNT: North responded to McFarlane's testimony that North had told him he suspected Ledeen of having profited from the Iran transactions: "I would like to get something on the record, if I may, Mr. Chairman. "That is that there was an indication that I had accused Mr. Ledeen of making money on the transactions in 1985. I want it noted, and you have it in my records, that that information was provided to me by two foreigners who made that allegation. "Now, I know many of the allegations made against me are untrue. I know them to be and I hope you know at least some of the ones that have been made about me are untrue. And when I asked that question [sic] to Mr. McFarlane, I did not expect that it would come out in this committee hearing. I did not expect it would be the subject of debate.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. Ledeen assured me when I asked him that question that he had not made money on it. I have no reason to believe that what the Iranians told me or that one of the Israelis told me is necessarily true. "I do not want it noted by the committee record that I have accused Mr. Ledeen of making money on the transaction. I do not know if he did. And I do not know if he didn't. "When he told me he didn't, I believed him. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Do you have any evidence that Mr. Ledeen was paid by the Israeli Government? "Mr. NORTH. I have none." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 108-09. See 86/01/16-653 [Ledeen's denial that he profited].)
86/11/21-115 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		DIVERSION: WHETHER THE PRESIDENT KNEW NORTH ACCOUNT: North learns for the first time that the President had not authorized -- or even known of -- the diversion of funds from the Iranian arms transactions: "On or about Friday, November 21, I [a]sked Admiral Poindexter directly, 'Does the President know?' He told me he did not." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 25.)	DIVERSION: WHETHER THE PRESIDENT KNEW NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
86/11/21-116 DURING NOVEMBER 1986		DIVERSION: WHETHER THE PRESIDENT KNEW POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. I neglected to ask you when I was asking you about the conversations on the diversion in November, do you recall whether prior to Colonel North's meeting with the Attorney General, did he	DIVERSION: WHETHER THE PRESIDENT KNEW POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 3.

ever ask you point blank whether you had discussed the diversion with the President of the United States?

"A. I don't remember that.

"Q. Were you aware that North was going to be meeting . . . with the Attorney General on November 23?

"A. I don't believe I was aware of that.

"Q. And you testified that after the meeting he called you.

"A. That is right.

"Q. And he told you at that time that the diversion had come up, correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. He also met with you the following morning on this subject?

"A. I believe he did, or we may have talked by telephone, I am not sure.

"Q. Either in that telephone conversation on Sunday or in the meeting on Monday, did he ask you whether the President of the United States was aware?

"A. I am almost certain that he didn't in the telephone call. And I don't remember in the meeting on Monday, it is possible, but I don't remember that.

"Q. Did you ask him whether the Attorney General had asked him about the President's knowledge?

"A. I simply don't remember that. My recollection of that is not very clear.

"Q. When is the first time that you recall Oliver North asking you whether the President was

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		aware of the diversion? "A. Say that again. "Q. When is the first time, if any, that you recall Oliver North asking you about whether the President was aware of the diversion? "A. I don't recall his asking me that. "Q. Do you recall ever telling him that? "A. No, I don't recall that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 15-17.)	
86/11/21-117 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		DIVERSION: WHETHER THE PRESIDENT KNEW POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Mr. LIMAN. Now on the 21st, did Colonel North ask you, as he has testified here whether you had told the President about the diversion? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I heard his testimony. I don't recall that. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall him asking you at any time about that subject? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I simply don't recall it. He may have, but I don't recall it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 82.)	
86/11/21-120 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		DIVERSION: WHETHER THE PRESIDENT KNEW NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you just testify a few moments ago that had Admiral Poindexter not told you on that Friday that the President was unaware of the diversion, you might well have told the Attorney General on that Sunday that the President knew? Is that what you said? "Mr. NORTH. Well, let me cast this the right way. I don't want to leave any false impressions.	DIVERSION: WHETHER THE PRESIDENT KNEW NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"In the conversations that I had with the Admiral on Friday, all of which related to, as I recall them, my departure, the safety of the hostages, and the second channel, the clean-up of the files, if that is an acceptable way of putting it, I asked the Admiral pointedly that day, did the President or does the President know about the fact that we used these moneys to support the resistance. And he told me then no. I think that's the last conversation I ever had with the Admiral about that aspect of it. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [Y]ou had assumed for some nine months that the President of the United States knew and approved of the diversion; correct? "Mr. NORTH. I had assumed from the day I took my post at the National Security Council that those things which required the approval of the President, and I sent forward memoranda soliciting that approval and I got the authority to proceed on various initiatives, had indeed received the approval of the President. I've testified to that. "Mr. LIMAN. And it wasn't until Admiral Poindexter answered your question that that assumption was shaken? "Mr. NORTH. It wasn't shaken. He simply denied that the President knew. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ask him, 'Admiral Poindexter, why did you not discuss this with the President'? "Mr. NORTH. No.	

"Mr. LIMAN. Why not?

"Mr. NORTH. First of all, I am not in the habit of questioning my superiors. If he deemed it not to be necessary to ask the President, I saluted smartly and charged up the hill. That's what lieutenant colonels are supposed to do. I have no problem with that.

"I don't believe that what we did even under those circumstances is wrong or illegal. I told you I thought it was a good idea to begin with. I still think it was a good idea, Counsel.

"Mr. LIMAN. And have you wondered why, if it was a good idea, that the President of the United States dismissed you because of it?

"Mr. NORTH. Let me just make one thing very clear, Counsel. This lieutenant colonel is not going to challenge a decision of the Commander in Chief for whom I still work, and I am proud to work for that Commander in Chief, and if the Commander in Chief tells this lieutenant colonel to go stand in the corner and sit on his head, I will do so. And if the Commander in Chief decides to dismiss me from the NSC staff, this lieutenant colonel will proudly salute and say[,] '[T]hank you for the opportunity to have served,' and go, and I am not going to criticize his decision no matter how he relieves me."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 152-55.)

86/11/21-150
NOVEMBER 21,
1986
(FRIDAY)

"SHREDDING PARTY"
McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

See col. 3.

"SHREDDING PARTY" AND LEDEEN'S ROLE
McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

North arrives at Ledeen's house, joins Ledeen and McFarlane, but soon says he has to go back to his office. He asks McFarlane for a ride back to town. McFarlane goes to get his car while Ledeen and North continue talking in the house. North then comes out.

McFarlane testified: "[W]hen North got in [the car], he was pensive and seemed a little preoccupied by whatever he had discussed with Mr. Ledeen; and said that he was worried that Mr. Ledeen might have profited from this enterprise." North added, according to McFarlane, "I ju[s]t believe that perhaps Schwimmer and Ledeen have made some arrangements that we are just not aware of and cannot account for, and I am worried about it."

"Mr. LIMAN. Did Colonel North tell you in the car that there was going to be a shredding party that weekend?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. On that occasion or [on Sunday, 11/23/86]."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 176-79. See id., 5/13/87, at 135-37 [shredding party reference], 172-74 [Sen. Hatch poses other view of shredding, "that in the intelligence community and in the National Security office itself, that there is a constant shredding of documents"]. See below at 86/11/23-100 [shredding party references]. See also McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 283-85 [McFarlane again summarizes the Ledeen visit and car ride with North]. See also 86/01/16-653 [Ledeen's denial that he profited].)

86/11/21-154
NOVEMBER 21,

NORTH ON SPARING THE PRESIDENT AND McFARLANE
McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

NORTH ON SPARING THE PRESIDENT AND McFARLANE
McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986 (FRIDAY)		See col. 3.	"Mr. MITCHELL. . . . I would like to ask you one other question regarding your trip with Mr. North in your car. Did Mr. North say to you during that trip words similar to: I don't want to see either you or the President to be hurt by this? "Mr. McFARLANE. He did at some point, either in the car or elsewhere." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 145.)
86/11/21-157 NOVEMBER 21 OR 23, 1986		"SHREDDING PARTY" McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	"SHREDDING PARTY" McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MITCHELL. You testified Colonel North told you there's going to be a shredding party, and you said that comment occurred either in your car shortly after noon on Friday, November 21, 1986, or at a meeting in your office shortly after noon on Sunday, November 23. Is that correct? Do you recall that testimony? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. [See 86/11/21-150, 86/11/23-100.] "Mr. MITCHELL. Now, the clear meaning of the words 'there's going to be a shredding party,' suggests that the shredding has not yet occurred but is an event to occur in the future. Do you agree? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. MITCHELL. So if in fact Colonel North held his shredding party on that Friday night, that would indicate his comment about shredding was made to you on Friday in the meeting in your car. Do you agree with that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. MITCHELL. Now, on that same Friday and on the following Monday you met with the Attorney General who questioned you about these events. Is that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. MITCHELL. Now, what did you understand Colonel North to mean when he said to you, there is going to be a shredding party? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I think the obvious point, that there was going to be the destruction of some documents. "Mr. MITCHELL. As you testified today, do you know what obstruction of justice is? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know last November when these events occurred what obstruction of justice is? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. MITCHELL. And you didn't try to persuade Colonel North not to have a shredding party even though you are close to him, he is your former subordinate, you share a lot in common, you are obviously an important person in his life. Isn't that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. MITCHELL. And you didn't tell the Attorney General of the United States about it, did you, even though he questioned you about these events with respect to which the documents were to be destroyed. Isn't that correct? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. "On your last question, Senator Mitchell, the response that I gave Colonel North was simply,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Ollie, look, you have acted under instruction at all times and I'm confident that you have nothing to worry about, let it all happen and I'll back you up. "Mr. MITCHELL. But you didn't try to persuade him not to destroy documents, did you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir, I didn't, but I think it's worth noting at least that if his reason for saying that to me was his sense of obligation to me to protect me or me to disarm him of any notion that he had to protect me might have eliminated that impulse. [Sic.] "Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you have had an impressive record, Mr. McFarlane, you display great personal courage, you devoted your life to your country, and I speak only for myself but I'm sure others feel the same way, moved by your circumstance, but I feel constrained to ask you. As you sit here today, what do you feel the obligation of an American citizen is when he learns that a crime may be about to occur? "Mr. MCFARLANE. He should seek to prevent it. "Mr. MITCHELL. Did you do that in this case? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Not well enough." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 135-37.)
86/11/21-160 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		"SHREDDING PARTY" NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	"SHREDDING PARTY" NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Did you, after you learned that the Attorney General's people were going to come in on Saturday, tell Mr. McFarlane that you were going to have a shredding party? "Mr. NORTH. No, I don't recall ever using the

words 'shredding party'. I may have told Mr. McFarlane, as I know I told Admiral Poindexter, albeit erroneously, that I had destroyed the records pertaining to the use of Iranian funds to support the Nicaraguan Resistance. I may have told him that point blank. I don't recall the specific conversation.

"I also don't recall--I mean, it is just not my vernacular to use the words 'shredding party'. That is not the way I talk.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you in words or substance tell Mr. McFarlane that you were planning to shred documents on Friday, the 21st of November?

"Mr. NORTH. Again, I think--if I did refer to this with Mr. McFarlane--and I don't recall the conversation--but if I did, I probably would have said the same thing that I had already assured Admiral Poindexter earlier in the day, or perhaps at some point in the day, I think it was later, that, 'Don't worry about that, it is already taken care of. Those documents are gone.'

"I was wrong. There was one left. I had believed at that point in time that they were all gone."

(North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 144-45.)

86/11/21-180
NOVEMBER 21,
1986
(FRIDAY)

LEDEEN-NORTH MEETING

LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 1:

Ledeen testified that he met with North, at North's request, probably around 2:30 or 3 o'clock at North's office.

"A. Well, it was a standard Ollie conversation, which is to say it's a conversation with Ollie, and at least two and sometimes three telephones. So, a variety of phone calls, conversations of various sorts, and so forth, and in between we talked a bit about Iran and were there still prospects there for the future.

"And he said, he then asked me, 'What would you say if you were asked if you knew anything about a shipment of Hawk missiles to Iran in November of 1985?' And I said I would tell the truth of the matter, which was that I had been aware of it, and I knew about it. That I had known about it at the time, but that I did not, and do not know who had authorized it, or how and where the authorization took place.

"Q. What was his response?

"A. He said fine.

"Q. What else was said at this meeting?

"A. I don't think much of anything else. A bit of chit-chat. I told him I hoped that his position would be secure, and that nothing bad was going to happen to him, despite all the rumors.

"Q. What led you to make that statement?

"A. There were a lot of rumors, as there had been, intermittently, for months, that Ollie would be dismissed.

"Q. What was his response?

"A. He said that he served at the pleasure of the President and any time the President thought that he, North, was becoming a burden, he would be happy to leave.

"Q. Do you recall anything else of significance that was said at the meeting? If you don't remember anything, then you can say so.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"A. Ah, yes. He said words to the effect that he was going to--that he had had some things which he was saving for his grandchildren, which he was now, unfortunately, going to have to shred. "Q. Did he explain why he was going to have to shred these things? "A. No. Nor was it at all clear to me, one, whether he was serious about it, two, what he was referring to. It did not suggest to me, for example, that he was talking about documents because documents are not the sort of thing one normally saves for one's grandchildren." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 20-22.)
86/11/21-181 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		LEDEEN-NORTH MEETING: NORTH'S AUTHORIZATION FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN ACTIVITIES LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "And he [sc. North] had repeatedly assured me that with regard to his Central American activities, about which I didn't know much, that all of that had been very carefully checked by lawyers, and had been guaranteed, been assured that it was proper. "And the McFarlane statements in the fall of 1985 had made a very great impression on me, when McFarlane had said to the congress people who were investigating North, that he, McFarlane, had personally authorized everything that North was doing, and that if anybody had a complaint they should please go to McFarlane, because I had nothing but the highest respect for McFarlane, who[m] I knew to be a scrupulously rigorous observer of the law.	LEDEEN-NORTH MEETING LEDEEN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. By this point you knew that Justice Department attorneys were investigating the Iran arms initiative, correct? "A. Yes. "Q. Did you connect his [sc. North's] statement about shredding to that investigation? "A. I really didn't think much about his statement, to tell you the truth. You have to keep in mind that I had worked with him for the better part of two years at that point. I had found him, all the way through that period, to be quite scrupulous in observing all manner of legalities, not simply trying to--as he's been portrayed in public sometimes--try to go to the limit of the letter of the law while trampling all over its spirit.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"So it really never entered my head that Ollie had done anything improper, let alone illegal, or therefore that he had anything to hide f[r]m any investigation. So it really wasn't something on which I focused very closely." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 22-24. On the 11/21/86 meeting, see id. at 33-34.) See col. 3.	"I had, for example, worked with him during the Achille Lauro affair, in which he was under enormous pressure to do all kinds of things, and he had, at every step of the way, meticulously, double and triple-checked everything with a variety of lawyers, to make sure that everything we were doing was technically legal and proper. "And he had repeatedly assured me that with regard to his Central American activities, about which I didn't know much, that all of that had been very carefully checked by lawyers, and had been guaranteed, been assured that it was proper. "And the McFarlane statements in the fall of 1985 had made a very great impression on me, when McFarlane had said to the congress people who were investigating North, that he, McFarlane, had personally authorized everything that North was doing, and that if anybody had a complaint they should please go to McFarlane, because I had nothing but the highest respect for McFarlane, who[m] I knew to be a scrupulously rigorous observer of the law. "So it really never entered my head that Ollie had done anything improper, let alone illegal, or therefore that he had anything to hide f[ro]m any investigation. So it really wasn't something on which I focused very closely." (Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 22-24. On the 11/21/86 meeting, see id. at 33-34. See id., 9/10/87, at 30-31, 60-62 [Ledeen's conversations with North in 11/86 and on 11/21/86].)
86/11/21-315		McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW: McFARLANE REPORTS TO	McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW: McFARLANE REPORTS TO

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		POINDEXTER McFARLANE PROF: See col. 2.	POINDEXTER McFarlane PROF to Poindexter: "You must be pretty well drained after the session with the Intel committees. That's not a terribly uplifting experience; I did it a time or two for Ollie. I spent a couple of hours with Ed Meese today going over the record with him. The only blind spot [o]n my part concerned a shipment in November '85 which still doesn't ring a bell with me. "But it appears that the matter of not notifying about the Israeli transfers can be covered if the President made a 'mental finding' before the transfers took place. Well on that score we ought to be ok because he was all for letting the Israelis do anything they wanted at the very first briefing in the hospital. . . ." (JHICI Ex. 59.)
86/11/21-320 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane does not mention the diversion to the Attorney General. See col. 3.	McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . But I did go to Mr. Meese's office. I spent about two hours with him. His associate, Mr. Cooper, was taking notes. "Mr. Meese asked the questions. They were oriented toward how the Iranian initiative had gotten started and so forth. And finally after that was completed, his secretary came in and told me that I had a call from my wife, it was kind of urgent, and Mr. Meese and Mr. Cooper started to leave the room and I said, 'Wait a moment, Ed,' and I told him that while I was pleased to take on the full responsibility for this and had the night

before [see 86/11/20-000; McFarlane's speech at Gaithersburg], that I wanted him to know that the President had been supportive of this from the very first and was foursquare behind it.

"Mr. LIMAN. By this you are talking about the Iranian arms sales?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And the effort to get the hostages?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. You are not talking about the diversion?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No.

"Mr. LIMAN. You didn't tell Mr. Meese about the diversion?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell Mr. Meese during this meeting, the first part of the meeting, that the November shipment involved oil drilling equipment?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't recall. He was asking all the questions. I believe that I told him that it was ambiguous that there had been reports of Israel believing that oil drilling equipment was perhaps more effective, but that ultimately I learned--

"Mr. LIMAN. You told him in that meeting that you knew it was Hawk parts?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, his notes will say one way or another. I just don't remember today.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, as you sit here today, were you trying to hold anything back from Meese?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think so. He was asking the questions.

"Mr. LIMAN. Why didn't you tell him about the diversion?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. As I say, he was asking the questions. Perhaps it was something that I should have told him. We discussed it two days later.

"Mr. LIMAN. Why don't you continue. You have now had your meeting with Attorney General Meese.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. And he closed by saying that he was glad to learn what I had said about the President's approval of the Iranian initiative, and that from a practical point of view that made the President's position more legally sound for as early as he made the decision to approve these sales, the subsequent actions would be justified.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did he tell you the President's approval, if given orally, was the equivalent of a finding?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I interpreted it that way, and it may be my error, but he said in so many words that his predecessor, Attorney General William French Smith, had made a determination several years ago that a President's decision on matters like this, however oral, is just as official an act from the point of view of law, and that's the way I interpreted it."
(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 179-81. See id., 5/14/87, at 40 [According to McFarlane, Meese told him, "Well, Bud, I am glad you told me that. As a practical matter, the earlier the President makes that decision, the better he is in legal terms."].)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/21-321 NOVEMBER 1986 - JULY 1987			"MENTAL FINDING" MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. Well, you testified yesterday that you totally reject the notion that you told anybody there was such a thing as a mental finding. I assume you affirm that today? "Attorney General MEESE. I assume there can be a mental finding, but it is not something that I believe is either--should be, certainly, the basis for proceeding as though it were a finding in the meaning of the statutes you are talking about. "Mr. RUDMAN. In other words, what you are saying is that a President may decide that something ought to be done and advise people, but it's got to be formalized if the statute is to have any chance of working? "Attorney General MEESE. I agree with that. I think that is the view also of our President." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 12.)
86/11/21-330 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW COOPER ACCOUNT: McFarlane does not mention diversion. See col. 3.	McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW COOPER ACCOUNT: Meese and his assistant, Charles Cooper, meet with McFarlane who says he did not know HAWKs were involved in the November 1985 shipment, nor did he find that out until May 1986. McFarlane does not mention diversion of money to the Contras, or the alteration or destruction of documents, or whether an oral Finding had been made. After the meeting, McFarlane speaks briefly alone with Meese. Meese later tells Cooper that

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			McFarlane stated, in effect, "You know, I am trying and I am hopeful that I can keep the President's interests uppermost in this. I am trying to protect the President." (Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87, at 78-82; JHICI Exx. CJC 14, 15.)
86/11/21-333 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. MITCHELL. Isn't it true that you misled the Attorney General in your meetings with him regarding the state of your knowledge and most specifically regarding your knowledge about the November 1985 shipment of Hawks from Israel to Iran? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Senator Mitchell, that is categorically false. May I please give a direct answer, a full answer? "Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, go ahead. "Mr. MCFARLANE. You know this is very important and very, very disappointing for someone who is trying here today to promote the idea of consulting with the Congress and cooperating with it. Now, here today I believe honestly that effort to cooperate--what have we had? "I think Mr. Nields, consciously wanting to give me a fair opportunity to answer questions, has gone through interrogation, which has left a fundamentally false impression, and deliberately withheld information. I cannot have any other interpretation. For example, on this November 18 episode concerning the Senator's question of misleading the Attorney General about Hawk

shipments, your point was, after dozens of questions, to reach the conclusion that I had spent a full week working on the chronology and had not apparently come to the conclusion that there had been a Hawk shipment involved. [See generally 86/11/18-347 through -355.]

"Well, surely you must have gone to the trouble of finding out that in that week that you suggest--from the 14th to the 21st of November, I was out of Washington, D.C. for five days. How is it that I could have spent a week working on the chronology when I wasn't even in the city?

"Secondly, if you will turn to Exhibit Number 59, you see that at the end of that entire process I still did not have command of whatever must have taken place regarding the sale of Hawk missiles. I put that formally in a note to my successor, and 'I spent a couple of hours today with Ed Meese going over the record with him. The only blind spot on my part concerned a shipment in November 1985, which still doesn't ring a bell with me.' [Ex. 59; see 86/11/21-315.]

"Now, that is on Friday afternoon, November 21. The time that I spent contributing to that chronology was basically the evening of Wednesday night for a period, or Tuesday night, of about three hours, almost all of which was spent in working on the opening statement, not the chronology at all.

"The basic document used for the testimony against me was something that I did not foremostly rely upon, but yet another one which, I take it, has not been introduced into evidence. Now, I

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			will be glad to answer questions all day, but is it not so that there has been until this moment the impression in this committee that I was involved importantly, continuously for a sustained period in the preparation of the chronology, when in fact it is a matter of, a matter of perhaps minutes or hours at most-- "Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. McFarlane, the record as developed by Mr. Nields yesterday will speak for itself. You have obviously expressed your view. I will express my view that the evidence is clear and convincing, indeed it is overwhelming that you did in fact deliberately participate in the fall fix of a portion of that chronology-- "Mr. MCFARLANE. I disagree. "Mr. MITCHELL. --and I limited my remarks to that aspect of dealing with the knowledge you had of the President's prior authorization of that first shipment. I think no conclusion is possible other than that I have expressed on the reading of those documents. "I won't try to rehash them here. With respect to the question of the Attorney General, again I refer you to the notes taken by Mr. Cooper, who recounts your statements made at the time regarding your knowledge of the Hawk shipment in November which [sic (statements were?]) directly contradicted repeatedly through documents and statements made by you prior to that. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, Senator Mitchell, if you rely on that set of notes from Mr. Cooper with such importance and credibility for that, how is it you can't take the equally valued point of

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			his--I take it in those notes to the effect that Israel could come for replacements? I mean-- "Mr. MITCHELL. I haven't disputed that point, Mr. McFarlane. I haven't raised that point. "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is a decision the President made." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 140-43; JHICI Exx. 59 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, "HFAC," 11/21/86], 67 [Cooper notes of McFarlane-Meese Interview, 11/21/86].)
86/11/21-334 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. MITCHELL. He [sc. Cooper] says in here, November Hawks, meaning you[,] think he [sc. McFarlane] first learned of it when briefed for a trip to Iran in May. "This is obviously untrue, isn't it? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That is what I could recall, and I said so in a note back to Poindexter. It simply was not something in my mind. "Recall now that I was out of the country with the President in the summit in Geneva. "Mr. MITCHELL. And then in his notes he says, November 15 to 15 [sic (Ex. 67 reads "Nov. 16 or 17")] at summit in Geneva learned Israel had shipped oil equipment. You had known for many months that Israel had not shipped oil equipment? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I referred to you that perhaps during that very week of November 1986, when this chronology was being put together, that I was again encouraged to believe that it really

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			was oil parts. "Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I just want to say the tactic of assuming general responsibility while denying any responsibility for specific events is not uncommon. You are not the first person to use that-- "Mr. MCFARLANE. I challenge that as a position I have taken. "Mr. MITCHELL. My point is that no penalty attaches for assumptions of general responsibility, whereas we all know specific responsibilities do attach for specific events. And as I said, I believe the record will speak for itself. "I would like to ask you one other question regarding your trip with Mr. North in your car. Did Mr. North say to you during that trip words similar to: I don't want to see either you or the President to be hurt by this? "Mr. MCFARLANE. He did at some point, either in the car or elsewhere." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 144-45; JHICI Ex. 67 [Cooper notes of McFarlane-Meese interview, 11/21/86].)
86/11/21-335 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . The first witness on your list is Mr. McFarlane, and I take it you arranged to have him interviewed on Friday afternoon. "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And did you ask him during your interview whether what [sic] he knew about the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

cargo on the plane that went to Iran in November of 1985?

"Attorney General MEESE. Let me consult, if I may, my notes, or the notes that were taken of the interview with Mr. McFarlane.

"Mr. NIELDS. Exhibit [EM] 40.

"Attorney General MEESE. All right. I think I also have copies of those notes that may be easier to read. Let me try this.

"Mr. NIELDS. The relevant portion of the notes is page 3 at the bottom and page 4 at the top.

"Attorney General MEESE. Okay. I have copies of the same notes here which are one xerox removed, I believe, so if I may, I will refer to those.

"Yes, it relates to--it says 'November Hawks, McFarlane thinks he first learned of it when he was briefed for the trip to Iran in May. Iran sent back the Hawks because they couldn't reach high altitude bombers.' I am representing now what our notes reveal that he told to us. He said, 'North briefed McFarlane, he was the action officer on this beginning in October or November.'

"And then he goes on to say that November 16 and 17 at the summit in Geneva, I assume this relates then to 1985, he learned that Israel had snipped oil equipment, Rabin called him from New York and told him they had a problem with a shipment to Iran.

"'McFarlane asked North to assist. North reported back that Israel hit a snag in Customs in . . . [a European country] and it may take a call

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			to the Prime Minister . . . [of that country]. A couple days later he talked with the Prime Minister . . . [of that country].' And I am not sure whether that refers to North talking or McFarlane talking, but I believe it was McFarlane, I am not positive. "McFarlane said 'it was an important project and that Rabin had told him that it was an important project and would appreciate his, McFarlane's, assistance. "'McFarlane remembers no mention in all this of arms. McFarlane didn't know this involved procuring a plane, doesn't remember his chat with George Shultz but he probably had one.' "Mr. NIELDS. I think you have read the relevant portion. Is that consistent with your recollection of your interview with Mr. McFarlane? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, it is." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 85-87; JHICI Ex. EM 40, at p. 3096 [Cooper notes of McFarlane interview, 11/21/86].)
86/11/21-336 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. So that Mr. McFarlane told you on the afternoon of November 21 that he had been told at the time in Geneva that oil drilling equipment was being shipped, that his information was obtained from Colonel North and that he didn't learn that there were Hawk missiles on the airplane until May of 1986. "Attorney General MEESE. Well, I believe, if

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			you put all of this together, he actually learned, it is hard to say who[m] he learned from that this was supposed to be oil drilling equipment, it may have been from Mr. Rabin who was calling from New York who was telling him that this was an important Israel shipment. "So that knowledge could have gone through that route rather than f[ro]m Colonel North. "Mr. NIELDS. Correct. But he does say as a general matter that North was the action officer and-- "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. --and North briefed McFarlane. "Attorney General MEESE. Well, he says that he asked North to assist after getting the call from Rabin. As I read these notes and having my recollection refreshed, the narrative that Colonel North gave to us was that he had gotten a call from Mr. Rabin or from Israel officials, and I believe it is Mr. Rabin, calling from New York saying that there was an important Israel shipment going to Iran, that they needed our help, that because Bud McFarlane was in Geneva with the President, you remember this was the summit, that he asked Colonel North, called Colonel North at the NSC staff offices and asked him to assist. "North reported back that Israel had hit a snag in Customs in . . . [a European country] and that it might take a call, I believe from McFarlane to the Prime Minister . . . [of that country], in order to clear this snag, and a couple days later he, and I believe that is McFarlane, did talk with the Prime Minister . . .

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			[of that country]. "You are probably more knowledgeable from Mr. McFarlane's testimony than I am of this. "In any event, it was an important project and so Mr. McFarlane was trying to do what he could but a lot of the pick and shovel work, it was not an extensive United States involvement in all of this, and at least Mr. McFarlane's version was it was to clear a Custom's snag in . . . [the European country]. "In any event, this is, Mr. North had worked on that and the information that Mr. McFarlane had was this was oil drilling equipment and that he later learned these were Hawk missiles. "Mr. NIELDS. Later, meaning May of 1986? "Attorney General MEESE. That is what he told us, yes." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 87-90; JHICI Ex. EM 40 [Cooper notes of McFarlane interview, 11/21/86].)
86/11/21-337 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, when you heard Mr. McFarlane's version of the facts, did it occur to you that it was squarely contrary to the version of the Secretary of State? "Attorney General MEESE. No, because I hadn't talked to the Secretary of State yet. "Mr. NIELDS. But you had heard, I take it, from Mr. Cooper that the Secretary of State had a note contemporaneously made that Mr. McFarlane had

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			told him in Geneva that the cargo was Hawk missiles? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe that the information that I had was that George Shultz knew that they were Hawk missiles, I don't think I knew at the time or I may not have known at the time that he had learned that from Mr. McFarlane because I really didn't know much about what Mr. Shultz knew until I talked with him the following morning. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you recall Mr. Cooper telling you the night before not only that he had learned from Judge Sofaer of the State Department that Secretary Shultz had a note indicating that he had learned about Hawk missiles from Mr. McFarlane, but that he had then asked Commander Thompson to double-check the story with Colonel North and McFarlane and the word had come back that they stick to their story? Do you recall that? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall that precisely, but it is entirely possible. I know I did ask Mr. McFarlane about whether he remembered a conversation with George Shultz. He said he did not but he probably had one. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it you asked that question because you had heard about that conversation before the interview? "Attorney General MEESE. I'm sure I had. It is even possible that Mr. Cooper might have asked that question. I'm not sure. But at least that came up in the conversation. "Mr. NIELDS. In any event, by the time the interview was over, either because of what Mr.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Cooper had told you earlier or because of what he was relating during the interview, you had now uncovered what appeared to be a square conflict between Mr. McFarlane's claimed lack of knowledge and Secretary Shultz' claim that McFarlane had told him? "Attorney General MEESE. Or at least a difference in their recollections, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Did it occur to you it is at least unlikely that the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State, on a matter such as this, would fail to remember whether oil drilling equipment or arms were involved? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, the whole--Mr. McFarlane's memory about this was very hazy, very murky, and I attributed that at the time to the fact that he was primarily involved with the summit with the President and with the meeting with the General Secretary of the Soviet Union and really didn't probably pay an awful lot of attention to this. "Mr. NIELDS. . . . I take it the interview was conducted in the presence of Mr. Cooper? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, it was--Mr. Cooper and I were together in my office with Mr. McFarlane. "Mr. NIELDS. And indeed these are Mr. Cooper's notes that you have been referring to? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. No one else was there, I take it? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I don't believe anyone was there at any time. Someone may have

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			wandered in or out during the--I think it was about an hour, a little more than that. But not that I can recall." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 90-92; JHICI Ex. EM 40 [Cooper notes of McFarlane interview, 11/21/86].)
86/11/21-338 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, at the end of the interview, did Mr. Cooper and Mr. McFarlane leave together and did Mr. McFarlane then return and have a discussion with you, just the two of you? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe they were both going out, and I think either I was walking out with Mr. McFarlane or he turned back, something like that. But we did have a conversation just between the two of us. "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [D]id Mr. McFarlane initiate it, or did you? "Attorney General MEESE. I think Mr. McFarlane did, as near as I can recall. "Mr. NIELDS. What did he say? "Attorney General MEESE. He said something to the effect that I have been taking a lot of this on my shoulders in the speech I gave this last week and what I have said this last week but I want you to know--it was something to the effect he wanted me to know that the President was generally in favor of pursuing the Israelis' ideas all along. "Mr. NIELDS. And did you respond to that?

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I said, 'Well, Bud, just be sure that whatever you do you tell the truth.' I said[,] 'Don't try to shade this one way or the other, thinking you are helping the President, because the best thing to do is just get the whole truth out.' I said, 'It might even be helpful to the President, not hurtful, if he generally supported this from the start', or words to that effect. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you tell him in words or substance that if the President had approved the Israeli transactions before they occurred, even if he didn't do it in writing, that that might actually solve the legal problem? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I don't think I went into that much detail. I think it was just very briefly to the effect that if the President had approved or supported this earlier rather than later it might be helpful rather than hurtful. My plain purpose there was to do what I had done actually at the commencement of my conversation with him, and which I did with I think virtually everyone that I talked to, and that was to say[,] 'Let's not try to think about what the outcome of this is going to be, what we need', and I am referring now to the notes, 'We need the facts and the total chronology', and I encouraged each person to be sure they didn't try to think they were trying to protect somebody or do anything other than get all the facts out and to be sure to tell the truth. "Mr. NIELDS. Exhibit [EM] 41 is a message that is neither from nor to you, and you would

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			have had no reason to have seen it. It is a message from Mr. McFarlane to Mr. Poindexter later on in the same day after his interview with you, and in the first paragraph he makes a reference to his interview with you. "In the second paragraph, he says: 'Bud, it appears that the matter of not notifying about the Israeli transfers can be covered if the President made a "mental finding" before the transfers took place. Well, on that score, we ought to be okay because he was all for letting the Israelis do anything they wanted at the very first briefing in the hospital. Ed seemed relieved at that.' "My questions are simply: Does that refresh your memory in any way at all on the following two points: Do you recall using the phrase 'mental finding'? "Attorney General MEESE. I am sure that I never used the phrase 'mental finding'. This is the first time--I have seen documents similar to this in preparation for these immediate hearings, but the term, 'mental finding', is one that I can't ever recall using or would have ever used. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you recall expressing relief at the idea that the President might have approved these transactions in advance, thereby improving the legal posture? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I don't think that anything--that I would have characterized it as expressing relief but rather approximately what I did say to you earlier." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 92-96; JHICI Ex. EM 41 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter,

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			11/21/86].)
86/11/21-347 NOVEMBER 17-22, 1986 (MONDAY - SATURDAY)			THE 11/85 HAWK TRANSACTION: OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Did you during the week of November 17, 1986 discuss with North or Poindexter the fact that each of you w[as] going to say that your understanding of the November 1985 shipment had been that it was oil drilling equipment? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No. "Mr. NIELDS. Did North or anyone else tell you either on the 20th of November, which is a Thursday, or the 21st, which is a Friday, that a dispute had arisen about what the government knew of the Hawk shipment in November of 1985? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think you are right. I would have said, I believe, 18th, but you are perhaps correct. "The way I recall it was the mention by Colonel North to me and it is probable that evening setting on November 18, that at the time it was ambiguous to him whether or not the shipment was to be of oil parts or of Hawks. But I thought that at the time he acknowledged that in the course of the shipment, he did learn that it was indeed Hawks. At the time I had a very superficial recall of exactly what had happened for the reasons I have stated and having been out of the country. "But as to translating from that statement in 1986 to me of Colonel North's uncertainty about when precisely he learned that it was Hawks and

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			not oil parts, I don't know how or if that was translated into the chronology actually written. [Sic.] "Mr. NIELDS. Did North tell you on Thursday or Friday of that week that the Attorney General had come back from a trip because of a problem with the stories that were being told about the November, 1985, shipment? "Mr. MCFARLANE. That doesn't ring any bells. "Mr. NIELDS. You had a meeting with Mr. Ledeen and Mr. North in the middle of the day on Friday; I think you have already testified to it. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. [See 86/11/21-150.] "Mr. NIELDS. That was set up in advance, was it not? "Mr. MCFARLANE. It was set up that day. Bear in mind that I was out of the city. I left on Wednesday, and was not in the city on Wednesday or Thursday, until later in the day on Thursday. "Mr. NIELDS. Did North tell you at that meeting with you and Ledeen that a problem had arisen concerning the story you were telling and he was telling about the November, 1985, shipment? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't really remember that he--what he talked about there. It was a very brief encounter. I believe yesterday I said that he came late and said that he would have to arrange to come back again to see Mr. Ledeen. And then I or Mr. Ledeen said that he had--that he, Ledeen, had been going over what his role had been, and I will accept your point that he raised it. It doesn't--it isn't familiar to me. "Mr. NIELDS. Did he tell you specifically

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that a question was being raised by people at the State Department? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, but I learned, I believe from the Attorney General himself, that the State Department recalled that the Secretary had, I think, his own notes, that it had been Hawk missiles, and I could accept that. "Mr. NIELDS. It is your testimony that until you went to see the Attorney General, no one had told you that the State Department was raising a question about the story that you and North were telling? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't remember anyone saying that." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 63-67. For McFarlane testimony preceding this entry, see 85/12/04-002.)
86/11/21-350 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES AND THE McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane testifying on the White House Chronologies and his interview with AG Meese: "Mr. NIELDS. Let's take it one step at a time. The first version of the chronology describes a shipment of Hawks in November. Your proposed revision makes no reference to Hawks but refers to equipment. "The later version says that we were told it was oil drilling equipment and we didn't find out that it was Hawk missiles until January 1986. "Then you go down to the Attorney General's office on Friday, November 21 -- is that correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you were interviewed by him?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. Colonel North knew that Hawk missiles had been transported to Iran in November of 1985?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And Admiral Poindexter also knew that Hawk missiles had been transported to Iran in November of 1985?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you were working on a chronology that was supposed to set forth the collective understanding of the people who had participated in November of 1985?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. I am right now asking you what you told the Attorney General. You told the Attorney General that you first learned of the Hawks in May. Then [in Cooper's notes of the meeting with the AG], it says November 16 and 17, at summit in Geneva, learned that Israel had shipped oil equipment. So you told the Attorney General on Friday November 21 that you were told in November that is was oil equipment and didn't find out it was HAWK missiles until May. Is that correct?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And that is exactly the story that was written in the [11/20/86 2000] version of the chronology that we just looked at. Isn't that true?

". . . .

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, what is missing from this, Mr. Nields, is that I stated in November on the 18th, that subsequently, and it is in written notes to me from Admiral Poindexter -- this is 1986 now -- that I had no clear recollection of the November Hawk shipment at all which is true.

"When I went to the Attorney General, I was still in that same basic condition but in our discourse there in the Attorney General's office he and I talked about that. I mentioned that I had heard some peripheral mention of oil parts perhaps being tried, that I wasn't sure that they were in fact shipped then, that I had no clear recollection of it.

"But then finally when he mentioned to me George Shultz has contemporaneous notes that he says you talked to him about the Hawks, and I said, I can understand that, and I will accept it. I have no clear recollection of it.

"But there wasn't any effort to deny. It was simply to say that I didn't recall what had happened. I could accept that the Secretary of State jotted that down, that he would right [sic], and that is fine.

"I don't deny that, nor did I contribute to this November 20 chronology."
(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 28-34. See id., 5/12/87, at 165-67 [the chronology]; id., 5/13/87, at 7 [Meese interview]; id., 5/13/87, at 138-44 [the chronology and reference to oil drilling equipment]. See JHICI Ex. 59 [McFarlane

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			PROF to Poindexter, 11/21/86: "I spent a couple of hours with Ed Meese today going over the record with him. The only blind spot [o]n my part concerned a shipment in November '85 which still doesn't ring a bell with me." See 86/11/21-315.].)
86/11/21-352 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE WHITE HOUSE CHRONOLOGIES AND THE McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . I take it that on the 19th or the 20th, while I was out of town, other steps were taken to change the chronology and that the integration of a reference to oil drilling parts must have been made the 19th or the 20th. I don't know. I didn't have anything to do with it. Apparently that was also introduced to Director Casey's testimony. Whatever. I was not there. However, I was, as you say, in the Attorney General's office where I conveyed to him what I had been told. Basically without any first-hand solid recollection of my own, I said that I recalled or believed that there must have been some report about oil drilling parts which is what I had been told two days before. "At that point the Attorney General said to me, George Shultz believes that you told him in Geneva that it was Hawks and I said I'm sure that he's right. In short, it was never an issue with me about whether or not all of us in '85 certainly did know that it was Hawks. What I was conveying to the Attorney General was based upon what I had been told a year later about these events in which

I was basically uninvolved.

". . . .

"Mr. McFARLANE. . . . there is one more point. . . . I left the meeting with the Attorney General, went home, sent a PROFS note to Admiral Poindexter reporting exactly what I had just done and I said, John, I've just spent two days--excuse me, two hours with the Attorney General.

"Mr. MCCOLLUM. Seemed like two days, I'm sure.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. And everything went fine, with one exception. He asked about a Hawk shipment in 1985 which still does not ring a bell with me.

"In sum, after the total exposure that I had had in 1986, with the preparation of these chronologies, which was two hours, total of a week, I still could not remember the details of that shipment."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 276-78. See JHICI Ex. 59 [McFarlane PROF to Poindexter, 11/21/86: "I spent a couple of hours with Ed Meese today going over the record with him. The only blind spot [o]n my part concerned a shipment in November '85 which still doesn't ring a bell with me." See 86/11/21-315.].)

86/11/21-355
NOVEMBER
20-21, 1986
(THURSDAY -
FRIDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY AND THE McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW: VERSIONS OF THE 11/85 HAWK SHIPMENT

MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to go now to the question that was raised regarding the testimony for Mr. Casey and the briefing for Admiral Poindexter.

"As you will recall, you said that on November 20th, you participated in a meeting in Admiral Poindexter's office to prepare testimony for Mr. Casey to give to Congress the following day and for Admiral Poindexter to use for briefing Members of Congress.

"Now, at the meeting, the proposed testimony was changed to say that no one in the U.S. Government knew about the shipment of Hawk missiles to Iran in the fall of 1985.

"Do you recall that aspect of it?

"Attorney General MEESE. I recall that. Yes.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Colonel North testified here. He told us that he proposed the change and that when he did so, he knew the statement was false. He further said that Admiral Poindexter and Mr. Casey knew it was false; in his first statement, he included you as knowing it was false, but later under questioning he said he had no basis for that, and you and Mr. Cooper both testified you did not know it was false because you had no factual basis on which to make a judgment one way or the other on.

"Now, it was only later that day that Secretary Shultz who knew the statement was false protested and that was brought to Mr. Cooper's attention, who brought it to your attention.

"You testified at some length about that yesterday that you got the phone call up at West Point and you returned.

"Now, you have said repeatedly in describing

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			those events that it was a matter of confusion, different recollections, but it seems clear, at least to those of us who heard Colonel North's testimony, that it was a problem of a deliberately false statement being proposed to be made that some of the persons there knew was false, others did not, you being among those who did not know; and it was not until later that Secretary Shultz, who had an independent recollection based again on notes that Mr. McFarlane had told him while at Geneva that they knew it was Hawk missiles, that this was raised. "So my question is, when did you become aware that the problem was one of a deliberately false statement proposed to be given by Mr. Casey and Admiral Poindexter rather than one merely of confusion arising from different recollections? "Attorney General MEESE. I would say that I probably did not become aware of that until at least the time that I had the chance to talk with Colonel North, and I am not even sure then, and it may have been even later. "It may have been after the course of these hearings here. "Mr. MITCHELL. Well, on that point, you talked to Mr. McFarlane on that Friday, that same day? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. MITCHELL. And you and Mr. Cooper interviewed him, and Mr. McFarlane told you that he had not known until after the fact that the 1985--the November 1985 shipment contained Hawk missiles?

"Attorney General MEESE. He told me that is what he recalled at that time.

"Mr. MITCHELL. And you recall at your deposition you indicated that Mr. McFarlane seemed concerned and somewhat hesitant about this aspect of the interview; do you recall that?

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, actually he seemed somewhat concerned and hesitant about a number of--about the TOW missiles, the missiles that had previously been transferred by the Israelis; and when I say concerned and hesitant, this was a feeling that I got that he might be hesitant. He seemed hesitant in answering the questions.

"I didn't know whether it was faulty memory or those being at that time more than the year and a half or two years earlier, a year to a year and a half earlier; but in any event, I did indicate that I thought he was somewhat hesitant about that, yes."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 94-97.)

86/11/21-356
NOVEMBER
20-21, 1986
(THURSDAY -
FRIDAY)

CASEY'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY AND THE McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW: VERSIONS OF THE 11/85 HAWK SHIPMENT

MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. MITCHELL. Did you discuss your reaction with Mr. Cooper? He testified, and I quote him now, 'I did not leave the interview, nor did I take it during the interview that Mr. McFarlane was being entirely straightforward and entirely forthcoming.' [Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87, at

82.]

"Did you discuss after that with Mr. Cooper your individual reactions?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't think so. I don't believe I discussed it with him. But I thought at the time that he was trying to, as I think--not distort his testimony, but certainly shade his testimony because he had some idea that this was protecting the President. The President was not involved.

"Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

"In fact, you said after the meeting, you talked separately with him, outside of Mr. Cooper's presence?

"Attorney General MEESE. That was incidental. I would have said the same thing if Mr. Cooper had been there.

"Mr. MITCHELL. He wanted to make the point to you that the President really was generally behind this whole thing and that led you to tell him the importance of telling him the truth and the best way to help the President was to tell the truth?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. MITCHELL. The next morning you interviewed Secretary Shultz. He described to you in some detail his version of the events of the November 1985 shipment which is in direct contradiction to the version of events given by Mr. McFarlane.

"Isn't that correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

"And a few hours after you interviewed Mr.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Shultz, you learned of the diversion memoranda? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. Five hours or so, yes. "Mr. MITCHELL. Sometime early afternoon, I gather? "Attorney General MEESE. Right. "Mr. MITCHELL. Well, and again this is hindsight, and we all understand how difficult it is when you are in the middle of events, but it seems that you had Mr. McFarlane telling you a story that was directly contradicted by Mr. Shultz. "Mr. McFarlane making a point of speaking privately with you about the President and you warning him to tell the truth. You had the diversion memorandum, at least that you knew of at that time. "You are an experienced criminal investigator and people think of criminal investigators as being, if not cynical, at least skeptical about things. "Did anything register in your mind then that there might be here an effort by those involved in this initiative, in the diversion, to prevent the facts from becoming public? "Attorney General MEESE. Senator, first of all, the diversion aspect was totally separate from what had occurred in November of 1985. So there was nothing there that would have aroused suspicion as to those two events. "Secondly now, I was dealing with people who had been entrusted by the President with some of the most important tasks as well as the important

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			secrets of the country. People I all [sic] knew to be--I knew all to be honorable and reputable individuals. "And in each case, in the case of the difference in recollection of Mr. McFarlane and Secretary Shultz, Mr. McFarlane said that he couldn't remember that conversation with Mr. Shultz, a conversation about Hawks with Mr. Shultz. He could [sic] remember even a conversation with Mr. Shultz on this general subject at Geneva, but he didn't doubt that he had such a conversation. "And as I think I testified earlier, I chalked up that lack of recollection to the fact that he was almost totally preoccupied with the main purpose of his being in Geneva, which was the summit. "So those were the reasons why it didn't flag anything that anyone was being deceptive. Furthermore, I had no reason to believe there was any reason for anyone to be deceptive about these particular events." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 97-100. For Charles Cooper's account of the McFarlane-Meese interview, see Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87, at 78-82.)
86/11/21-370 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW: POSTLUDE McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. Mr. McFarlane, after your interview with the Attorney General on Friday, November 21, 1986, you called Colonel North from a pay phone outside the Department of Justice.		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"During that conversation, did Colonel North indicate that someone from the Department of Justice had advised him to retain an attorney? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Mr. Chairman, I believe it was in that conversation that what you describe occurred. It occurred between Colonel North and me at some point. If not there, within a day or so. "Mr. RODINO. Did Colonel North also tell you that he had been advised that his phone and possibly your phone may be tapped? "Mr. McFARLANE. Yes, sir." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 222-23.)		
86/11/21-400 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	NORTH SUBMITS HIS RESIGNATION NORTH ACCOUNT: Prior to his meeting with Meese, North tenders his resignation to Poindexter. North testified, "We had talked about it several times prior to that, and I transmitted it, as I recollect, either Sunday or Monday." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 125.)		
86/11/21-420 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	SCAPEGOAT NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	SCAPEGOAT NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Is it a fact on November 21 after meeting with Admiral Poindexter, you told your colleague, Colonel Earl, that you were going to be the scapegoat? ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. I may have. I don't deny that I said that to him. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you use the term 'scapegoat'?	SCAPEGOAT NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. NORTH. I don't recall, counsel. I may have. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, scapegoat means someone who is going to take the blame for others. For whom did you expect to take the blame? "Mr. SULLIVAN. Objection. He said he didn't recall whether he used scapegoat. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, yesterday, you said that when the time came, you were going to [be] dropped like a hot rock, that you were going to be the deniable link, and I think you also used terms like scapegoat. For whom were you going to be the scapegoat? "Mr. NORTH. For who[m]ever necessary, for the Administration, for the President, for however high up the chain they needed someone to say that is the guy who did it, and he is gone and now we have put that behind us, let's get on with other things. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you tell Admiral Poindexter that you were prepared to play that role? "Mr. NORTH. I had told Admiral Poindexter that, and I had told Mr. McFarlane that as early as 1984. "Mr. LIMAN. Had you told Mr. Casey that? "Mr. NORTH. I think it may well have been his idea to begin with, that there had to be somebody who was going to stand up and take the rap for this. "Mr. LIMAN. And this means what, sir? "Mr. NORTH. Well, starting in 1984 for the political or international consequences of what we	

began to call the support for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.

"Mr. LIMAN. And after that became involved and linked with the Iranian arms sale and the proceeds, you were the person who was going to take the rap for that, too?

"Mr. NORTH. I saw no difference one to the other.

"Mr. LIMAN. And you were prepared to do that?

"Mr. NORTH. I have testified to that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 129-31. On who was to be protected, and whether the President was covered by the Fall Guy Plan, compare this entry with North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 147-50 [quoted below at 86/11/23-370].)

86/11/21-430
NOVEMBER 21,
1986
(FRIDAY)

(1) THE 12/5/85 FINDING: POINDEXTER, INFORMED OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION, RIPS IT UP; AND (2) NORTH BRINGS HIS NOTEBOOKS

POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Q. When did you destroy [the 12/5/85 Finding]?

"A. I destroyed it, to the best of my recollection, the early evening of November 21st, 1986.

"Q. Why?

"A. When -- going back to the meeting with Ed Meese and Bill Casey on Thursday the 20th, when it became clear that there was a disagreement over the recollection of the events of November, '85, Ed Meese asked to meet with the President on the following day, on Friday the 21st. Ed called

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			sometime in the morning of the 21st and indicated that he wanted to come over and see the President. He may have given some indication of that on Thursday when we were meeting, talking about the briefings to the congressional committees the following day. "But anyway, he said that he wanted to come over to see the President at 11:30 and he would like for Don and I to attend the meeting -- Don Regan -- to attend the meeting with him. We did. He told the President, to the best of my recollection, that there was a disagreement about the facts, especially of the early phases of the Iranian project, and he wanted the President's permission to look into the facts and the President said fine. "Early afternoon on the 21st, the Attorney General called me and said, 'In following up on our discussion with the President this morning,' he said, 'I would like to be able to send over a couple of my people to look at the files and records that you have and could you have somebody pull them together and I'll have my people get in touch with Commander Thompson,' who was my military assistant, also the General Counsel for the NSC, and the primary liaison with the Attorney General's front office. "So immediately after the telephone call from the Attorney General, I called Commander Thompson on the intercom and told him about the Attorney General's request and I asked him to take responsibility for pulling the material together. "After I finished talking to him, I called

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Colonel North, told him the same thing. I wanted him to clearly understand the directions that I had provided to Commander Thompson about pulling the material together. He said that he would do that. "Then later in the afternoon -- well, the events of that day are important to you, and earlier in the day -- and I don't recall what time it was, but that was the day that Colonel North came in and -- with his old notebook. He kept notes in these half steno pads. He came in with a notebook that covered the time frame back in November, '85, and went through the notes of what he had told me in November of '85 that indicated that we clearly knew that Hawk missiles were aboard that aircraft. His notes did not shed any light on whether the President had approved it ahead of time or after the fact. "In that conversation with Colonel North, I don't recall exactly what he said, but I had the distinct impression that he was going to destroy that spiral notebook when he left the office. I didn't tell him to destroy it, but I also didn't tell him not to destroy it. It was completely consistent with my view that working notes and PROF's notes and that sort of thing were not something that we had to retain." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 108-11.)
86/11/21-431 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE 12/5/85 FINDING: POINDEXTER, INFORMED OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION, RIPS IT UP POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 2:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			[Poindexter's testimony continues from preceding entry:] "At this point, we frankly viewed the issues as a political issue, or I did anyway. The big -- the uncertainty in my mind was exactly what happened in November of '85. That's what we were trying to figure out. When later in the afternoon -- it was probably early evening, Commander Thompson came into my office. Because we had handled the 17 January finding outside of our normal channels, it would normally have been handled through our Intelligence Office headed up by Mr. DeGraffenr[ei]d; but even though I set that system up or was largely responsible for it, I deliberately in this case had decided not to use our formal system. I wanted to generally have the responsible cabinet officers involved. Again, I wanted to limit knowledge of the exact details as much as possible so they only knew what they needed to know to carry out their part of it. "So we -- I clearly accept responsibility for deviating in our standard procedures. But anyway, I had given at some point earlier in the year the 17 January finding to Commander Thompson to hold in one of the safes in our outer office. So he was in the process of going through what we had in the immediate office for Ed Meese's people to look at. When he called, I frankly thought there were very few records because of my penchant and all of the cautions that I had provided earlier about not putting anything in writing. I doubt if there was much. I certainly didn't believe, as I said, at that point that PROF's notes existed.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Anyway, when Commander Thompson came in with this envelope, the 17 January finding was in it as well as an earlier version. There were in total, starting with this version, there were three versions the President signed. There was this one -- "Q. The January 6th? "A. One in early January and the one on the 17th of January. "Now, I always viewed that as one finding. In other words, we went through several iterations. The final product was 17 January. It was the only version of the finding that I felt was operative and when Commander Thompson started going through the stuff that was in the envelope, there was the 17 January finding, my cover memo to the President with the 17 January finding. There was the earlier draft in which there had been, from the 5th of January, in which a couple words had changed to the 17 January finding. And there was this original finding. There were two or three copies of PROF's notes kind of like this that addressed -- "Q. Kind of -- you are pointing to the exhibits we have been over? "A. That's right. They were printed versions of PROF's notes from Colonel North to me that covered various aspects of the Iranian plan in 1986. And Commander Thompson said something to the effect that -- well, I don't want to put words in his mouth. "Q. The substance of what you recall? "A. The substance of it was that the first

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			version of the finding is going to be embarrassing." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 111-13.)
86/11/21-432 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			(1) THE 12/5/85 FINDING: POINDEXTER, INFORMED OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION, RIPS UP THE CIA's CYA FINDING; AND (2) NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. So what did you do? "A. I said, 'Let me take a look at it.' I did. It put the thing in perspective. We were being put about the head and shoulders in the press that this was an arms-for-hostages deal. "The first version of the finding was prepared unilaterally by the CIA, by people that really didn't understand what our overall objectives were. They had written it in a very narrow way, frankly to[o] colloquially -- can we go off the record? "Well, they wanted some protection. "MR. NIELDS: Use initials. "THE WITNESS: CYA. "MR. NIELDS: There you go. "THE WITNESS: Over the involvement of their proprietary in 19 -- November of '85. "But anyway, sitting there on my desk, Commander Thompson is in front of the desk, my thinking is that if this gets out and if anything left my office, I didn't have any assurance that it wouldn't get out. "I decided that it would be politically

embarrassing to the President at this point because it would substantiate what was being alleged, that this was strictly an arms-for-hostages deal, which truly it was not intended to be; and so I decided to destroy it. So I tore it up and put it into my waste container behind my desk.

"Q. In front of Commander Thompson?

"A. To the best of my knowledge, he was there.

"Yes. And the -- the two or three PROF's notes that were in the package, I also destroyed at that time.

"Q. Admiral, did you understand that North was going to get rid of his spiral notebook for the same reason, because it would be politically embarrassing to the President?

"A. Well, I guess that -- I frankly --

"Q. Why did you? I don't want to put words in your mouth. Why did you think North was going to get rid of it?

"A. To understand our frame of mind at the time, as I said, the administration had been very concerned about leaks. An awful lot of sensitive information had leaked out over the years.

". . . [M]y general view was not to keep paper around. I thought that working notes, PROF's notes were working documents that we didn't have to keep. In my view, the less we kept around, the better.

"At that point, it was still being viewed in my view anyway, as a political issue over the Iranian arms missions.

"Q. Did you communicate that point of view to North?

"A. I certainly did over the months. I don't recall specifically telling him that in November of 1986, but that would be his clear view." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 113-15.)

86/11/21-433
NOVEMBER 21,
1986
(FRIDAY)

DESTROYED DOCUMENTS: REFERENCES TO DIVERSION
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

See col. 3.

THE 12/5/85 FINDING: POINDEXTER, HAVING DESTROYED THE FINDING, DOESN'T TELL NORTH TO DESTROY HIS NOTEBOOKS
POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT, Part 4:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Q. Did you tell [North] at the time he left your office with his spiral notebook words and substance to the effect that that book is going to be embarrassing?

"A. I did not say that to him. In fact, I didn't -- acquiesced to his destruction [sic] -- of what I thought was to be the destruction of the notebook by simply not saying anything.

"Q. What was in, to the best of your . . . recollection, those PROF's notes that you ripped up or destroyed at the same time that you destroyed the unsigned finding?

"A. I can't be certain, but I would be almost sure that they were copies of some of the stuff that is printed in the Tower Commission Report. I don't recall that it had any additional information.

"Q. Did they refer to what has been called the diversion?

"A. No. To my knowledge, until Sunday, Sunday night, the 23rd, I didn't think there was

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			anything in writing any place on the transfer of funds to the contras. "Q. Had you not remembered . . . that memorandum? "A. I did not remember that memo. "Q. Had you ever seen any memorandum that referred to this? "A. Nothing. With hindsight now going back through the Tower Commission Report, there were oblique references. I didn't remember those. "Q. The oblique references in the PROF notes that we have $6 million available? "A. Right." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 115-16. On the $6 million available, see entries starting at 86/05/16-440 [Ex. 11 (= Exx. OLN 10, DTR 29)].)
86/11/21-440 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE 12/5/85 FINDING: POINDEXTER, INFORMED OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION, RIPS IT UP POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [A]m I correct that the [12/5/85] finding itself was essentially a straight arms-for-hostage finding? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. It had been prepared essentially by the CIA as a--what we call a CYA effort. "Mr. LIMAN. Did the President of the United States sign that finding? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have testified before, he did, on or about the fifth of December. I am vague on the date. ". . . .

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. LIMAN. But you do recall that whatever you recommended, the President read it and signed it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, he did. He did sign it. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. What happened to that finding? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I said earlier, I destroyed that by tearing it up on the 21st of November, because I thought it was a significant political embarrassment to the President and I wanted to protect him from possible disclosure of this. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, would you tell the panel the circumstances of your destroying this finding because you thought it would be a significant political embarrassment to the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I will. The finding, the existence of the finding I had completely forgotten in early November, 1986. As I said before, the finding initially was prepared by the CIA for the reason that I stated. I can recall in my time at the White House one or possibly two other findings that had a retroactive nature to them. I, frankly, was always uncomfortable with that, because I thought it didn't particularly make a lot of sense. "The finding was very narrow. It was prepared before there had been thorough discussion of the issue. As I said earlier, I came into the issue in a full, responsible way in early December of 1985. Prior to that time, Mr. McFarlane handled it. I felt that it was important that we improve

on this finding so that we clearly lay out what the objectives were in the Iranian Initiative. And, as we'll get to, I am sure, there were other findings in January.

"But, anyway, after this finding was signed, it was retained in my immediate office, and at some point after it was signed, I had apparently given it to Commander Thompson, my military assistant, to put in an envelope in his safe to keep. I had, as I said, completely forgotten about it.

"On November, the 21st, when Ed Meese called me and said--we will go back a step, we had run into a problem in November of what had actually happened in 1985. It was very dim in people's memories. We didn't think we had much in writing. As I think you have heard Colonel North testify, we, frankly, did not realize the old PROF notes existed. My policy was to erase them, and I apparently did it the right way, and I don't think Colonel North did it the right way. So we didn't have the benefit that these committees have in going back over these old PROF notes, or we didn't realize that we had that opportunity.

"But Ed Meese and I had talked many times during the month of November, and when it became clear that there was a disagreement between Cabinet-level officials as to what had happened in November of 1985, he indicated that he wanted to come over and ask the President to have a fact-finding session, primarily with the Cabinet-level officials involved, to try to sort out what had happened, actually happened, in

November of 1985.

"And he called me early in the morning on the 21st of November and told me this, and he said he had an appointment to see the President at 11:30, and he wanted me and Don Regan to go with him, which we did, at 11:30. He told the President about the controversy--not really controversy--the different recollections as to what had happened in November and said he thought it would be useful if he would have a couple of his people that were close to him look into the matter to see if they could piece together what had happened. The President readily agreed, as I did, at that point. Because here we had Mr. McFarlane on one hand and Secretary Shultz on the other hand recalling different recollections as to what had happened in the early days of November of '85."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 42, 44-47. See JHICI Ex. JMP 18 [12/5/85 Finding].)

86/11/21-441
NOVEMBER 21,
1986
(FRIDAY)

THE 12/5/85 FINDING: POINDEXTER, INFORMED OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION, RIPS IT UP

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2:

Poindexter's testimony continued on his destruction on November 21, 1986, of the 12/5/85 Finding:

"[Mr. POINDEXTER.] So Ed [Meese] called me after lunch, as I recall, and said he was going to send over a couple of his people either that afternoon or the next day, and I am not sure which, and he asked if I would have the appropriate documents pulled together so they

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			could take a look at them. I said I would do that. "After he called, I called Commander Thompson, my military assistant, and asked him to take charge of pulling these documents together, and then I called Colonel North and told him of my conversation with Mr. Meese and asked him to cooperate with Commander Thompson and Mr. Meese's people. "I called Colonel North because he was very protective of the documents that he had, and I wanted to make sure that he understood the tasking that I had given Commander Thompson. "Later in the afternoon or early evening, Commander Thompson brought in to my office the envelopes that I had given him earlier containing the material we had on the Iranian project in the immediate office, which was essentially the various findings, and he pulled out this November finding, it was actually signed in December, and my recollection is that he said something to the effect that 'They'll have a field day with this', or something to that effect. "And my recollection is that the import of his comment was that up until that time in November of 1986, the President was being beaten by the head and shoulders, that this was--the whole Iranian project was just an arms-for-hostage deal. "Well, this finding, unfortunately, gave that same impression. And I, frankly, didn't see any need for it at the time. I thought it was politically embarrassing. And so I decided to tear it up, and I tore it up, put it in the burn

basket behind my desk. I can't recall, but I believe that Colonel North was there in the office, but I am a little fuzzy on that point.

"Mr. LIMAN. Was Commander Thompson there when you tore it up?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I believe he was, but I can't swear to it. I know he brought it in, and I can recall his comment, but exactly how long it took--because when he made his comment, I said, 'Well, let me see the finding', and he pulled it out and gave it to me, and I read it, and at some point after that I tore it up, but it was within a short period of time.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, Admiral, you talked about the fact that you were being--

"[Conferring.]

"Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, you talked about the fact that the President was being beaten around the head and shoulders by the media for sanctioning an arms-for-hostage deal and that this finding seemed to corroborate it, and you, therefore, destroyed it in order to prevent significant political embarrassment.

"Did you regard one of the responsibilities of the National Security Advisor to protect the President from political embarrassment?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think that it's always the responsibility of a staff to protect their leader, and certainly in this case, where the leader is the Commander In Chief, I feel very strongly that that's one of the roles, and I don't mean that in any sense of cover-up. But one has to always put things in the President's perspective and to make

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			sure that he is not put in a position that can be politically embarrassing." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 47-49. See JHICI Ex. JMP 18 [12/5/85 Finding].)
86/11/21-442 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE 12/5/85 FINDING: POINDEXTER, INFORMED OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION, RIPS IT UP POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Now, Admiral, a finding represents a decision of the President of the United States, correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It represents-- "[Consulting with Counsel.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. A finding, I don't believe, is discussed in any statute. It is discussed in various Presidential directives. It is an artifact of what the statute calls a Presidential determination. "Mr. LIMAN. And the President, when he signed this finding, was making a determination? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. But it's important to point out that the finding, that early finding was designed for a very specific purpose, and was not fully staffed, and did not in any way ever represent the total thinking on the subject. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, the President didn't authorize you to destroy the finding, correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He certainly did not. "Mr. LIMAN. And whether the finding was fully staffed or not or represented the full thinking or

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			not, the President did sign it after reading it. "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to object here. This is the--I think it has been established that the President signed it. There has been no hesitancy about that. The question has been asked and answered several times. I would ask that counsel move on to the next subject. "Mr. LIMAN. I am moving. "Mr. BECKLER. Thank you, Mr. Liman. "Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, this finding constituted, in your words, an artifact but a document that provided authorization for what the CIA had done in November of 1985, correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. But it is, I mean the question is, is that a finding, whether it is in writing or verbal approval, or whatever form the President's determination takes, has to be done before the fact. And I never felt on this finding or any of the others--and, as I say, I think there were two--that the retroactive nature was not really a very good mechanism. "Mr. LIMAN. In addition-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. The question was--excuse me, Mr. Liman--but the question in my mind was what the President had approved ahead of time. "Mr. LIMAN. And this finding also was prospective, it wasn't just retroactive, but it was prospective in its language? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It was. But not adequate in terms of addressing the prospective nature. "Mr. LIMAN. You concluded that it wasn't adequate. You have said that already. Now, when

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			you destroyed this finding, was it your intent to really make it appear that no such determination as the one that's there on the wall, arms for hostages, ever took place by the President? "[Witness conferring with counsel.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. Would you repeat that, Mr. Liman. "Mr. LIMAN. Was it your intent that no one know that this document was, in fact, signed by the President of the United States? "Mr. BECKLER. At what point--objection. At what point in time? "Mr. LIMAN. When you just ripped it up. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, when I ripped it up, the reason that I ripped it up was that from my sad experience over many years in the White House, I had concluded that if any paper left my office, I had no assurance whatsoever that that paper wouldn't leak. "At that point if that paper had leaked out, it would have reinforced the story that all we had in mind in the beginning on the Iranian project was arms for hostages. That was not the case. "The finding did not in any way present a total, accurate description of what Mr. McFarlane had in mind, what I had in mind or what the President had in mind. It addressed part of the issue. "Mr. LIMAN. How did you know, when you ripped it up, that the President would not recall that he had signed that finding and ask for it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, if he had, and asked me about it--and this is a hypothetical

question--but based on my past experience on such issues, I would have told him exactly what I had done with it."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 49-53. See JHICI Ex. JMP 18 [12/5/85 Finding].)

86/11/21-443
NOVEMBER 21,
1986
(FRIDAY)

THE 12/5/85 FINDING: POINDEXTER, INFORMED OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION, RIPS IT UP

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 4:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. LIMAN. Were you conscious at the time that you took your action that there was a Presidential Records Act that related to the preservation of documents signed by the President of the United States?

"[Witness conferring with counsel.]

"Mr. POINDEXTER. As I've said earlier, after this December finding was signed, I tasked and we did produce a much more detailed finding that addressed the total picture and, as I looked at that December finding in November of 1986, my thinking was at that time that that finding had been superseded by the January 17 finding.

"I didn't spend a lot of time in making that decision, analyzing exactly what that meant, but my best recollection of my thinking at the time was that this finding that superseded [sic] wasn't really applicable at the time. It did obviously, you know, with hindsight, cover a time period between early December, when it was signed, and January the 17th, when the final version was signed. And I'm aware of a Presidential Records

Act. I must say that I did not think about that at the time.

"Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, I don't want to embarrass you by belaboring this any more than you want to embarrass the President. I just want to ask you this. The fact is that this finding remained in effect until January, when there was a new finding. Am I correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct. For a period of about six weeks, six or seven weeks.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it is also a fact that findings get superseded or terminate all the time. Is that so?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it is a fact that they are not destroyed just because they expire or because a new finding is adopted?

"Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to object to that question. That is a conclusion. There is no basis for him asking that question, no foundation for it.

"I would ask it be stricken.

"Chairman HAMILTON. Counsel, your objection is overruled.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, I honestly don't know whether other superseded findings are destroyed or not. We handled this series of three findings outside of our normal system. We did have a normal process through which most findings were managed, and I frankly don't know what the records people do with superseded findings.

"Mr. LIMAN. In any event, you never destroyed a finding before that had been signed by the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't believe I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And the reason that you destroyed this was not because it was superseded but because it had the potential for political embarrassment. "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, I have to object again. The testimony did not support that glittering generalization by Mr. Liman. "Mr. LIMAN. I withdraw the question. "Chairman HAMILTON. I think counsel has withdrawn his question. "Mr. LIMAN. Is the reason that you destroyed that finding because it would provide political embarrassment? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, clearly." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 53-56. See JHICI Ex. JMP 18 [12/5/85 Finding].)
86/11/21-444 DURING 1986		THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT AND DESTROYED DOCUMENTS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT AND DESTROYED DOCUMENTS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. BROOKS. . . . Now I'd like to ask you a couple of questions related to the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Are you familiar with it at all? I will give you a copy of the pertinent parts if you are not. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I'm not familiar enough with it to-- "Mr. BROOKS. I'll send you down this copy and ask that it be made--entered as a committee exhibit. "Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection, so ordered.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. BROOKS. First, Admiral, I would like for you to take a look at the act's definition of 'presidential records.' That is in Section 2201 on the first page . . . . ". . . . "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Brooks, this is quite a long definition. Is there any particular part you would like us to focus on? It has paragraph 1, 2, subpart (a), subpart (b). "Mr. BROOKS. Generally look at the subheadings. "Would you say that the December 5, 1985 finding which has been signed by the President, which you have testified that you personally destroyed on November 21 of 1986, would fit the definition of a presidential record? "Somewhere there it ought to be included, wouldn't you think? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Brooks, we are not going to be able to conclude, I don't think, whether it does or it doesn't. There is an officer on the NSC staff, an archivist, Ms. Reger, who handles such matters and a large portion of her time is devoted to answering questions as to whether a particular document was covered or not covered. "But for the purposes of this questioning and answering, let's assume that it is covered. I am not sure of that, but let's just make that assumption. "Mr. BROOKS. I would like you to look at Section 2203 on the next page. It says that during his term of office, the President may dispose of presidential records that no longer

have administrative, historical, informational or evidentiary value. But it doesn't say that presidential records can be destroyed if some bureaucrat thinks they might be politically embarrassing.

"As a matter of fact, 2203(c) requires the President to obtain the views of the Archivist of the United States before disposing of presidential records, and that is on--you know, that is under part (c), 1 and 2 where you are supposed to check with the Archivist.

"I wonder by any chance, did you call the Archivist before ripping that up and stuffing it in that burn bag?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely not, Mr. Brooks.

"Mr. BROOKS. You didn't call him?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. The thought didn't cross my mind.

"Mr. BROOKS. It didn't even cross your mind.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Not at all.

"Mr. BROOKS. I will bet it didn't.

"Colonel North has testified tht beginning in October of 1986, and right up until the day he was fired by the President from the staff on November 25th, that he undertook to destroy and alter records from the NSC files related to both contra supply and the Iranian arms deal and you were his superior officer at the time, head of the NSC.

"Did you authorize or instruct him to alter or destroy those records?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't believe I did, but I also don't think it is accurate to say that all--I don't know exactly what he destroyed, but based on

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			his testimony, I would conclude that most of what he destroyed is not covered by this particular Act that you are talking about here. They are working records of the NSC, which in this context are different than the presidential records. "The papers, for example, that I handled in my position as National Security Adviser fell in about three different categories. One, they were presidential records; two, they were official NSC records; and three, they were personal or working papers. "Mr. BROOKS. You were aware that he did destroy some records, though? "Mr. POINDEXTER. After the fact, I understand from his testimony that he did." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 180-85.)
86/11/21-445 DURING 1986		DESTROYED DOCUMENTS AND DIVERSION, GENERALLY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	DESTROYED DOCUMENTS AND DIVERSION, GENERALLY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] ". . . . "Mr. POINDEXTER. That particular version of the finding taken by itself, which would have been done if it leaked out as has been done since I have testified about it, taken out of context presents a misleading picture to the American public and that is what I was trying to avoid. "Mr. BROOKS. I understand that is your viewpoint. It was your intention that Congress not know anything about the Iran arms shipment for the diversion of funds to the contras; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It was the President's

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

decision to postpone notification to the appropriate congressional people [of] the finding until such future time as he decided it was appropriate. He has the constitutional and statutory authority to make that decision.

"Mr. BROOKS. And you agreed with him?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I obviously did.

"Mr. BROOKS. And it was your intention that the President himself not know anything about the diversion?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That was my intention.

"Mr. BROOKS. In other words, you wanted to exclude all the elected officials from knowledge of some of the most important and far-reaching polic[ies] facing the U.S. Government.

"Your plan would have vested the final authority for these decisions in yourself as a Navy admiral, working in a staff position within the White House appointed by the President, and is this not precisely the kind of thing that our Founding Fathers were trying to prevent when the Constitution placed the authority and the accountability for these decisions in both the Congress and the Department?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Brooks, I don't agree with your interpretation of that either. I was a Cabinet level official and I had very broad authority. What we were talking about here with regard to the transfer of the residual funds to the contras was not a major foreign policy decision by any stretch of the imagination. It was an implementation detail of a presidential policy that is well understood by the American

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			people. "Mr. BROOKS. Was it not a major policy of his? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The decision to support the contras was a major policy decision, but I didn't make that decision. "Mr. BROOKS. You made the decision to give them the money and not tell them [sic] about it and you made the decision not to tell Members of Congress. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I certainly made that decision, but the President was aware that money was getting to the contras from third countries and from private individuals. What we are talking about here in terms of the transfer of the residual funds from the Iranian arms sales was just like that. "For reasons that I have tried to explain, I decided not to talk to the President about that so he could distance himself from that decision." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 187-89.)
86/11/21-446 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1986			THE 12/5/85 FINDING: WHAT McFARLANE KNEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. Mr. McFarlane, Oliver North testified that he believes he saw . . . the Sporkin finding, in November of '85, that he saw a signed version of that. [See 85/12/05-700.] Did you ever see such a signed finding? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir, I don't believe I have. . . . "Mr. COHEN. During the discussion of putting together this chronology, was there ever mention

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			made or reference made to a finding of November, '85? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. And inferentially, there is kind of a point that may be relevant. That is that in November of last year, when Admiral Poindexter called me in and at one point we came to the issue of what had occurred and when it had been authorized, he said, 'Bud, the President did sign a finding on this,[] in January of 1986, []so it is authorized.' "Now that isn't conclusive, but he did not say that he ever signed one in November or December." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 280-81. See 85/12/07-300 [further McFarlane testimony on his unawareness of the 12/5/85 Finding].)
86/11/21-450 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		DESTROYED DOCUMENTS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	DESTROYED DOCUMENTS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. On the 21st, did Colonel North tell you that he was going to be shredding documents the next day? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He did not. "Mr. LIMAN. You testified yesterday that when you ripped up the Presidential finding, you also ripped up some other papers? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. On the second of May, I told you that I had--in the envelopes that Commander Thompson had there were the three versions of the finding. I have always personally considered the December finding the first version. By the way, on that, you know the way that that is reported in the paper is exactly what I was afraid of. You know, it is reported this morning in the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Washington Post that this clearly indicates this was an arms-for-hostage deal. That was exactly what I was afraid of in November of 1986. It was never intended by the President as an arms-for-hostage deal. He never thought about it that way. That is probably why he doesn't remember it. "Mr. LIMAN. Did he read it before he signed it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I'm sure he did. He reads a lot of papers though, as I've told you. "Mr. LIMAN. And he didn't have to sign that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. But this was one aspect of the issue, and as I've testified yesterday, it was a CYA effort on the part of the CIA to protect their particular small involvement with the project up to that time. "Mr. LIMAN. Now when you ripped up the other documents that were shown to you or--you did rip up other documents shown to you? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did. "Mr. LIMAN. What were those documents? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I got off the track. I apologize for that. "The other documents were PROFS notes, as I recall. They were printed--once in a while, when I would get a PROFS note, if it was something that I wanted to brief the President on, I would print out a hard copy of it. I had a little printer by my desk. And there was a few PROFS notes in the envelopes in addition to the three versions of the finding. "I saw nothing in them that we needed at that

point, and consistent with my policy of deleting my PROFS notes, I tore up those PROFS notes as well.

"Mr. LIMAN. A year later, do you remember what they dealt with?

". . . .

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No. We are talking about November of '86.

"Mr. LIMAN. Six months--I am sorry--do you remember what was in them?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't know. I suspect that they are PROFS notes that you have that were in Colonel North's files.

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . [D]o you have a recollection of that?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I don't. There were two or three.

"Mr. LIMAN. You just a moment ago said that the . . . November, 1985 finding was a CYA finding for the CIA. Can you tell me who[m] you were protecting when you were ripping up those PROF notes?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Look, PROFS notes were never intended to be finished documents. As you can tell from the PROFS notes that you have--and I frankly think the White House made a terrible mistake in ever releasing those PROFS notes--they were intended to be private, frank communications between two staff officers, and they were not intended for public use, and I did not want those PROFS notes to be released."
(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 83-86.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/21-452 DURING NOVEMBER 1986	DESTROYED DOCUMENTS: POINDEXTER'S KNOWLEDGE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. You testified on May 2nd that you met with Colonel North and he briefed you from a notebook that he had. I think it is your recollection that you thought he was going to destroy the notebook. [See 86/11/21-430.] "A. That's right. "Q. Did you have any understanding he was going to destroy anything in addition to the notebook? "A. Not from that particular incident. And I didn't have any specific knowledge that he was going to destroy anything else. I would not have found that particularly inconsistent in terms of working documents, private records. "Q. Well, did you believe he was going to destroy documents as a result of the investigation about which he had been advised? "A. It wasn't an investigation. I would not characterize it that way at all. It was an inquiry or factfinding to resolve the problem that we had. As I recall, this was the way it was presented to the President on that Friday morning at 11:30 when Don and I were there. ". . . . "MR. EGGLESTON: . . . I don't think he was asked whether he believed Colonel North was going to destroy other documents. "THE WITNESS: I didn't know that to the best of my knowledge. "BY MR. EGGLESTON:	DESTROYED DOCUMENTS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	DESTROYED DOCUMENTS POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Q. Do you know whether anybody else over that weekend in addition to yourself or Colonel North destroyed documents? "A. Not that I know of." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 122-23.)		
86/11/21-455 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: DOCUMENTS ASSEMBLED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. All right. You said in your testimony that you had given the task to Commander Thompson to assemble some documents, that you had a request from the Attorney General to assemble documents. You tasked him, to use your words, to do that. You said you called Colonel North, and I am quoting you now, because he was 'very protective of his documents.' And you wanted him to know--Colonel North--that Thompson had been properly tasked to assemble those documents. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. "Mr. RUDMAN. Do you believe that it is possible or probable that Colonel North might have misconstrued what you were saying to him and that you were really telling him that some documents ought to be destroyed? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That thought didn't cross my mind either. To be very frank, there had been some friction between Commander Thompson and Colonel North over the years on the staff, and I wanted to be sure that Colonel North understood that I had asked Commander Thompson to do this. "Mr. RUDMAN. So you believed that the message was clear?	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: DOCUMENTS ASSEMBLED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think so. "Mr. RUDMAN. Do you believe it was proper? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Excuse me. "Mr. RUDMAN. Do you believe that it was proper for the destruction of all these documents to be accomplished, Admiral Poindexter? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Senator, I don't have any problem with it. I know there is concern here that I have heard expressed, but these are working documents in the staff offices. "Mr. RUDMAN. Well, to the extent, Admiral, that people wanted written documentary proof of the veracity of your testimony on, let's say, the notification of the President, it certainly would have been helpful if we had some documentation. I am not talking about classified things that would protect sources. I am talking about historical documents. Don't you think that is right? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I understand that much of the recordkeeping that goes on in Washington is for such purpose." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 150-51.)	
86/11/21-475 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: EVENTS LEADING UP TO IT POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. With regard to the weekend's events, that weekend in November, 1986, to the extent that you have any knowledge, with regard to Friday, the 21st, on that morning, the Attorney General, as Mr. Cooper testified last week, met with the President and Donald Regan, and asked for authority to commence an investigation.

"At some point after that, I believe Mr. Cooper testified that the Attorney General met with you. Do you recall meeting with the Attorney General that morning?

"A. Yes. But the sequence he gave was not right by my recollection.

"Q. All right.

"A. After I had finished briefing Senators Durenberger and Leahy, Ed Meese called me and said that he wanted to meet with the President at 11:30, and because I had been tied up, he had arranged that meeting through Donald Regan, and he wanted me and Don to be there. So the three of us met with the President at 11:30, and the Attorney General called me sometime after lunch, early to mid afternoon, and asked that I have the relevant documents pulled together and he wanted to send over a couple of his assistants.

"Q. Do you have any knowledge whether the Attorney General on that morning met with Colonel North at any time?

"A. The 21st?

"Q. Yes.

"A. I don't think so.

"Q. Do you have any reason to think --

"A. He could have. I just don't think I know about it.

"Q. Do you have any knowledge of him meeting with the Attorney General, Colonel North meeting with the Attorney General any time later that day?

"A. I don't believe so.

"Q. Did Colonel North ever indicate to you, or did anybody else indicate to you that Colonel

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JH!CI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE GENERAL CONTRAS IRAN

North had requested from the Attorney General a 24- to 48-hour period in which to get his documents in order? [See 86/11/21-538, -540.]

"A. I'm not aware of that."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 83-85.)

86/11/21-480
NOVEMBER 21,
1986
(FRIDAY)

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: EVENTS LEADING TO IT, AND POINDEXTER DESTROYS THE 12/5/85 FINDING

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. NIELDS. I think you testified that you destroyed this November finding late on Friday, November 21st, 1986?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did.

"Mr. NIELDS. And I think you've testified that earlier that week a difference of opinion amongst Cabinet officers surfaced about the U.S. Government knowledge and involvement in that shipment?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. The disagreement specifically related to conversations that had taken place in Geneva between Mr. McFarlane and George Shultz.

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . Secretary Shultz had said that Mr. McFarlane had told him in Geneva on November 18, 1985, that Hawks were being shipped to Iran for hostages, and Mr. McFarlane said that he had not known that the shipments were missiles at that time.

"Is that about the size of the dispute?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. As near as I could--can make out at this point. I don't think I ever saw or heard recited to me exactly what Secretary

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Shultz's recollection of that conversation was. "Mr. NIELDS. And again referring to Friday, November 21st, 1986, earlier that same day you had had a meeting with the Attorney General and the President of the United States at which the fact of this dispute was raised? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. The question was one of the President's prior knowledge in Geneva of the Israeli plan and whether he had approved it or not, and we needed to get to the bottom of that. "Mr. NIELDS. And, indeed, you needed to get to the bottom of just what the facts were regarding this Government's knowledge and approval of the November Hawk shipment? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that's correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And, by the way, at that meeting did anybody ask the President whether he had approved? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's an obvious question, but I don't recall it coming up. We were talking about events that had taken place over a year earlier, and I certainly didn't remember much about the year and I don't think I even thought about asking the President because I didn't think he would remember that level of detail either. "Mr. NIELDS. In any event, the Attorney General-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall the Attorney General asking him about it. And I certainly didn't recall this finding even existing at the time and I think it's important to restate again that the reason I destroyed that finding was that I thought it would be a political embarrassment

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			because it focused on only the arms aspect of the whole initiative. "Mr. NIELDS. You are jumping ahead of me again a little bit. "I take it that during the meeting with the President and the Attorney General on the morning of Friday, November 21st, the Attorney General asked permission to conduct a fact-finding inquiry to resolve these discrepancies? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And the President authorized or directed him to proceed? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I viewed it in his role as really a special adviser to the President. He had been involved in the project and since we had our--on our hands a dispute between a Cabinet officer and a previous Cabinet-level official, I appreciated his help in trying to get to the bottom of this. "Mr. NIELDS. And you were actually there when the President directed the Attorney General to proceed? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, the President--in reality, what happened was that Ed asked permission to do it and the President said fine. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, later that same day I take it the Attorney General asked you to gather or told you that he wanted to review documents relating to this issue? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He said that he was going to send over a couple of his people and asked that we pull together the documents that we had, in a central location, relating to the Iranian

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			project." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 120-23.)
86/11/21-481 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: POINDEXTER DESTROYS THE 12/5/85 FINDING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, the November finding, or the December finding, the one that is up on the board there, was of direct relevance to the inquiry that the Attorney General was doing; isn't that true? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It was related, but, again, it did not address the key question, and that was what were the discussions in Geneva early in the month on which there was a disagreement. "Mr. NIELDS. It showed that the President had approved of this transaction involving the 18 Hawk missiles? "Mr. POINDEXTER. There was no question in our mind--certainly in my mind at that point--that the President had approved the shipment at some point. The question was whether he had approved it in the initial stages, as George Shultz had recalled. "Mr. NIELDS. This document showed when he approved it in writing? "Mr. POINDEXTER. But-- "Mr. NIELDS. Isn't that true? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It shows that he approved after the fact that particular concept, but we had information at that point that he had actually--he may have approved it before the fact, and that was

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			the key question. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you have any document in your possession or in Colonel North's that was more directly relevant to the Attorney General's inquiry into the question of Presidential approval of the Hawk shipment than the one up on the wall? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't know of any other document that--in fact--you know, at this point we wished that we had a lot more documents, but we didn't. I have explained why we didn't have many documents. We were very concerned about leaks. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it . . . before the Attorney General had a chance to look at that document, you destroyed it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I--when Commander Thompson showed me this document, my concern was only that it would reinforce the story that the only objective we had in the whole project was arms for hostages. I did not think in terms of Hawk shipments or TOW shipments, or anything else, at that point. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you destroy it to give the President deniability? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, did you not by destroying that document give the President the ability to deny that he had signed a finding on December 5th that dealt with arms and hostages? "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, this question has been asked over and over and over. . . . "Chairman HAMILTON. Objection is overruled. . . . ". . . .

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. NIELDS. . . . By destroying this document, did you not permit the President to deny that he had signed a finding on December 5th, 1985, relating to arms and hostages? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That was not the intent at all. I haven't--as I said, I haven't talked to the President since the morning of the 25th, and I don't know what he had in mind when he has made these statements. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, you did--I take it, it was your intent when you destroyed that document that no one would see the document? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, my concern was, as I have testified before, that any time a document left my office, I was concerned that it was susceptible to public exposure. I didn't--simply did not want this document to see the light of day. "Mr. NIELDS. And insofar as this document recorded the President's approval shortly after the fact of the Hawk shipment, and insofar as it recorded his approval of a finding that related to arms and hostages, you were, by destroying the document, attempting to falsify the record, weren't you? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. I was not at all." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 123-26, JHICI Ex. JMP 18 [text of Finding signed 12/5/85].)
86/11/21-482 NOVEMBER 21, 1986			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: POINDEXTER DESTROYS THE 12/5/85 FINDING POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(FRIDAY)			[Continuing from preceding entry:] ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Admiral Poindexter, what made you believe that the President of the United States would want you to destroy a finding in order to save him from political embarrassment, if anything? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I--that thought didn't cross my mind. I recognize that it was politically embarrassing. I thought one of my jobs was to protect the President, and I didn't think about asking him about it. "Mr. NIELDS. I have to ask you this question: Was it any part of your purpose in destroying that document to protect anyone other than the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Nobody. "Mr. NIELDS. And particularly was it part of your purpose to protect yourself? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, in no way." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 127.)
86/11/21-485 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: EVENTS LEADING TO IT AND POINDEXTER'S DESTROYING THE 12/5/85 FINDING REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. . . . I have another question and that relates to the November 21st, 1986 meeting that you had with Admiral Poindexter and the President and Attorney General Meese. "Poindexter went away from that meeting and after that meeting later that afternoon he destroyed a memorandum which was a very

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			significant memorandum [sc. the 12/5/86 Finding]. ". . . . "My question is, was there any discussion that morning when the Attorney General was charged with the fact-finding inquiry concerning some possible political embarrassment and that maybe he might have had a signal of some sort? "Mr. REGAN. No. The President never concerned politics, capital P or small P, in this situation. I don't recall his ever saying that this is going to be politically embarrassing to him. Remember that this man will never run again for office. So politically embarrassing is not something that he considers or about himself personally. "The embarrassment obviously is to his Administration and to him that he didn't know what was going on, that this was going--being done to him by underlings without his knowledge. That is very embarrassing to any CEO when something happens in an organization that he is unaware of and it turns up and is very bad for the organization. "That was Admiral Poindexter's judgment of politics. I am supposed to be the one that knew less about politics in the White House than anyone else, so we are going to understand there was somebody that knew even less than I." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 236-37.)
86/11/21-487 NOVEMBER 21, 1986			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND POINDEXTER'S DESTRUCTION OF THE 12/5/85 FINDING

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(FRIDAY)			MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. Mr. Attorney General, on November 21st, you met with the President, Don Regan, and Admiral Poindexter at 11:30 in the morning and you were directed by the President at that time to conduct a fact-finding inquiry, get to the bottom of this. "Admiral Poindexter has testified that later that day after being advised by you that the Justice Department was going to be coming to the NSC offices, he destroyed the December 1985 finding signed by the President and some other documents. "Now, frankly, of course, I don't understand why the admiral destroyed that document. And the reason why I ask that is because you had been with the President and Don Regan and you talked about fact finding and undoubtedly the President told you to get at the bottom of this and conduct this fact finding. "Yet, we have got Admiral Poindexter going right back and destroying this document, this very significant document. "Any reason for that? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't understand it either. "Mr. RODINO. Well, Admiral Poindexter did in testifying before the committee, sa[y] that he took it upon himself because he considered that it might be politically embarrassing to the President. "These matters would then be revealed and it would be shown that the President had been doing

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			something contrary to often-stated policies that he had been against. [Sic.] "And my question, since he said he wanted to save him from political embarrassment, was there any discussion that day when you were talking with the President about anything that might come up which might be embarrassing? "Attorney General MEESE. There certainly was no discussion about anything coming up that would be politically embarrassing. The only thing the President said that might even be related was, 'If you find anything wrong at all, we want to be sure to get it out.' "Mr. RODINO. And yet Admiral Poindexter, who had this very significant document, notwithstanding all of this, does go back and destroys a very significant document; and, of course, you and I don't know the reason for it? Is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, he stated that it was to spare the President any political embarrassment, so he made that decision." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 296-97.)
86/11/21-500 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. . . .[Y]ou had a meeting with the Attorney General on the 23rd of November? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And you were aware, were you not, sometime during the day on Friday, November 21st, that the Attorney General's people were going to come in and look at documents over the	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

weekend?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you shredded documents before they got there?

"Mr. NORTH. I would prefer to say that I shredded documents that day like I did on all other days, but perhaps with increased intensity; that's correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. So that the people you were keeping these documents from, the ones that you shredded, were representatives of the Attorney General of the United States?

"Mr. NORTH. They worked for him.

"Mr. NIELDS. And it was those people from whom you were keeping these documents?

"Mr. NORTH. No. Because, as I have already testified, counsel, I believed -- when I was apprised by Admiral Poindexter that the Attorney General, in his role as Mr. Meese, not that the Attorney General is going to come by and do a full-fledged investigation -- the word 'investigation' wasn't used -- that Mr. Meese had been asked to do a fact-finding inquiry and would be sending people over to review documents.

"I assured Admiral Poindexter, incorrectly, it turns out, that all of the documents that pertained to the residual funds being used to support the Nicaraguan resistance had already been destroyed.

"I then went back to my office and I lined up on my desk, or on my table in my office, about the size of this table, a whole set of binders, all by subject and by date, unlike the documents that

I've now received to prepare for testimony, and each one of those were laid out on the table. I had already gone through those days before, removing documents like this and others.

"Mr. NIELDS. This is referring . . . to Exhibit [OLN] 1?

"Mr. NORTH. That's correct. And I laid them out on the table.

"Later on in the day, I was going through my safe -- I knew as early as mid October that my tenure at the NSC was coming to a close. I had had lengthy discussions about this with Director Casey. I had talked to Admiral Poindexter about it. I believe I had talked to Mr. McFarlane about it.

"And I stood there beside my safe and I was pulling things out of the safe and looking at them, and occasionally I would drop one in the shredder which is right next to my safe. As I recall, my secretary then walked over to me and said, 'Why are you doing this? You know, you could be doing work on the chronology or work on something else. Let me help.' Or words to that effect.

"She then asked me, 'What about the phone call logs, things that are yours personally?' And I said, 'They probably ought to go.' And it is my recollection that most of this stack of foot and a half, or however it's been described in earlier testimony, consisted of phone logs, things that I had been told during my tenure at the NSC staff were mine and mine alone, plus the PROFs notes that I considered to be mine and mine alone,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		deeply personal communications between me and my colleagues and, in some cases, my superiors. And I asked her to put those in the shredder because those I considered to me mine. Not that they specifically related to this activity, but simply that they were not going to go anywhere and they ought to go in the shredder. "And so what has been created is this sensational, you know, horrible, final, last-minute, last-ditch shredding. It wasn't that at all. "Mr. NIELDS. You had already done that shredding? "Mr. NORTH. I thought I had gotten it all. That is correct, Mr. Nields. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. So you shredded some documents because the Attorney General's people were coming in over the weekend? "Mr. NORTH. I do not preclude that as part of what was shredded. I do not preclude that as a possibility, not at all." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 54-59; JHICI Ex. OLN 1 [diversion memo].)	
86/11/21-510 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS NORTH FIRST ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [Y]ou knew . . . that the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief who[m] you respect, revere, and I suspect love, had asked the Attorney General to do a fact-finding mission. That's correct, isn't it?	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Mr. NORTH. Actually, I don't know that Admiral Poindexter, when he told me about the fact-finding inquiry on the 21st, that he specified that it was the President who had asked that that be done, but I did come to know that, that is correct.

". . .

"Mr. NORTH. . . . I don't know that the Admiral told me on the 21st that the President, at least I don't recall knowing at the time that the Admiral told me that this was being done at the request of the President. He may well have told me that.

"Mr. LIMAN. Would you have shredded less documents on the 22nd if you had been told that the Attorney General was acting at the specific request of the President, your Commander in Chief?

"Mr. SULLIVAN. Objection.

"Chairman INOUYE. What is the basis of your objection?

"Mr. SULLIVAN. It is pure speculation. Dreamland. It has two 'ifs' in it . . . .

"He says if you had done this and if you had done that, what about this? Come on, let's have, Mr. Chairman, plain fairness. Plain fairness, that's all we are asking for.

". . . .

"Chairman INOUYE. Let the witness object if he wishes to.

"Mr. SULLIVAN. I'm not a potted plant. I'm here as a lawyer. That's my job.

"Chairman INOUYE. Mr. Liman, please proceed with that question.

"Mr. NORTH. Let me answer it with a hypothetical answer.

"Mr. SULLIVAN. No. No.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, you testified when I put a question to you that you did not recall whether the Admiral had told you that the President had requested the Attorney General to act. Do you recall that?

"Mr. NORTH. I do.

"Mr. LIMAN. You are the person who volunteered that fact in response to one of my questions. Do you recall that?

"Mr. NORTH. I do.

"Mr. LIMAN. And my question to you was, would that have made a difference? You are the person who surfaced it.

"Mr. NORTH. Don't get angry, Counsel. I'm going to answer your question.

"If the Admiral had told me that the President had asked the Attorney General to conduct a fact-finding inquiry into all of the aspects of what I had done, and that I should tell the Attorney General everything, then I would have done so.

"Does that answer your question, sir?

"Mr. LIMAN. And?

"Mr. NORTH. And the Admiral did not tell me that.

"Mr. LIMAN. If the Admiral had told you that, you wouldn't have done the quantity of shredding that you did; is that correct?

"Mr. NORTH. We can play hypothetical games all night. If the Admiral had told me not to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		shred, I wouldn't have shredded. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell the Admiral that you were going to shred? "Mr. NORTH. I told the Admiral that I was cleaning up my files. I told him that well before this began. I assured him on the 21st that I had already done most of it. ". . . . "Mr. NORTH. I honestly think, and I'm not trying to be light about it, we spent more time talking about it than I spent doing it. I honestly mean that. "I shredded. I was never told not to shred. I shredded because I thought it was the right thing to do. When I didn't have a shredder, I put it in a burn bag and they were burned. "And when the time came that I saw the entire situation change and I was faced with the possibility of being the victim of a criminal prosecution, I then took action to protect myself. I took my notebooks home and I took papers home. And I kept them until I turned them over to you and to the White House." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 198-202.)	
86/11/21-511 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS NORTH SECOND ACCOUNT: In his testimony four days later, North again addressed the issue whether the President had ordered the Attorney General's investigation (for fuller context see next entry): "[A]nd I specifically asked him [Poindexter],	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		as I remember it, 'By the way, does the President know about this?' Since it's my recollection that he had said that the President had asked the Attorney General to look into this. And he at that point said, no, the President does not know about it." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 204-06.)	
86/11/21-512 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. Colonel North, when Admiral Poindexter told you that the President did not know, that was a result of your having asked him whether or not the President knew? "Mr. NORTH. Yes, sir. My recall on that is that on the 21st the Attorney General had told him, I mean this is the way it was conveyed to me, that he was going to conduct a fact-finding inquiry into the activities that had occurred in 1985. Specifically the August, September and November transfers of Israeli equipment to Iran. And as a consequence of that inquiry in which the Admiral told me to lay out everything, I told him that I had destroyed the references to the use of residuals to support the Nicaraguan Resistance, and I specifically asked him, as I remember it, 'By the way, does the President know about this?' Since it's my recollection he had said that the President had asked the Attorney General to look into this. [But see North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 198-202, quoted in notes below.] And he at that point said, no, the President does not know	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

about it.

"Mr. RODINO. Did Admiral Poindexter tell you that he had talked with the President and learned that he didn't know?

"Mr. NORTH. No. As I remember, it was a very brief conversation, and I think basically just the way I described it to you as I remember.

"Mr. RODINO. Did you ask him whether or not the five memos which you had sent forward requesting that the President be advised had been sent forward for the President's knowledge?

"Mr. NORTH. No, because I had--what precipitated this conversation was my assurance to him that those memoranda no longer existed.

"Mr. RODINO. Was this a surprise to you?

"Mr. NORTH. I think so, yes. But by that point in time I was one exhausted, and, number two, I suppose nothing much surprises you after that point.

"Mr. RODINO. Did this, Colonel North, at this point then send a flash through your mind that now you were the fall guy, that this was what was being said to you?

"Mr. NORTH. No, not at all. Because in that same conversation I told the Admiral again that I thought I ought to go right away, that I ought to l[ea]ve now in an effort to diffuse this thing. Director Casey had by that point suggested to me it was probably going to take someone above my pay grade as he put it or above my level at the NSC or within the Administration to take this on the nose as it were. And I thought that we at least ought to make an effort to diffuse it at the lowest

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		level possible before it worked its way up. "I don't believe I related to the Admiral what Director Casey had told me about him." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 204-06. But see id., 7/9/87, at 198-202 [North: "Actually, I don't know that Admiral Poindexter, when he told me about the fact-finding inquiry on the 21st, that he specified that it was the President who had asked that that be done . . . . If the Admiral had told me that the President had asked the Attorney General to conduct a fact-finding inquiry into all of the aspects of what I had done, and that I should tell the Attorney General everything, then I would have done so. . . . And the Admiral did not tell me that."].)	
86/11/21-515 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		DIVERSION MEMOS: WHETHER ANY EXISTED EVER OR UNTIL 11/21/86 POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Mr. LIMAN. Did Colonel North on the 21st tell you that he had gotten rid of all memos that related to the diversion? [See 86/11/21-512.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. I heard his testimony. I do not recall it. I don't deny that he did say that, but I simply don't recall it. "My recollection at the time was that I didn't think any documents existed, period, because I couldn't remember any of the memos that he had described. "Mr. LIMAN. Yesterday you said that you weren't sure whether you gave him instructions not to put anything in writing . . . relating to the diversion.	DIVERSION MEMOS: WHETHER ANY EXISTED EVER OR UNTIL 11/21/86 POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH: See col. 2.

"I direct you to page 182 of your testimony in the deposition which has now, I am told, been declassified, and I will read to you these questions and ask you if you gave these answers [quoted above at 86/00/04-502].

"'Question' --

". . . .

"'Admiral, did you ever see any other version of this memorandum'--which was the so-called diversion memo--'referring to the use of the proceeds of the arms sale for Iran?

"'Answer: I do not recall seeing any other versions of it.

"'Question: Any other writings referring to it?

"'Answer: Writings?

"'Question: Yes. Other than the PROF note on the 6 million [sc. Ex. OLN 10].

"'Answer: I simply don't recall.

"'Question: Did you ever'--and there was an answer that interrupted the question.

"'Answer: In fact, my operating assumption was that there wasn't anything in writing on it because I told Colonel North repeatedly not to put anything in writing on the transfer of funds to the contras and not to talk to anybody about it.

"'Question: Transfer of funds from whom?

"'Answer: From the Iranian project to the Democratic Resistance, to the contras.

"'Question: How many? You said you told him repeatedly?

"'Answer: I told him several times. I was surprised to learn--and I forget exactly when I

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		learned it--that he said something to Mr. McFarlane on the way back from Teheran. I would have advised him or told him not to do that if I knew he was planning on it.' "Does that refresh your recollection, sir, that you in fact did tell Colonel North not to put anything in writing on the diversion? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I testified yesterday, I recall telling Colonel North many times not to put things in writing on the sensitive projects that he was involved with, and clearly the transfer of funds to the contras was a sensitive item that he was involved with. I also told him not to talk to anybody about it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 78-80 [quoting Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 182-83]. See Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 179, 231-32; id., 7/2/87, at 431 [Poindexter on the diversion memo]. On diversion memos, see entries starting at 86/00/04-100.)	
86/11/21-530 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		THE FACT-FINDING INQUIRY BY THE FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. . . . [W]hen you refer to Mr. Meese as a friend of the President, why do you use that term? "Mr. NORTH. Well, I am not sure what--exactly what I meant in those terms. What I clearly intended to say was that no one told me then, it was not until four days later on the 25th, that there was any criminal investigation or criminal concern in this whole issue, and my recollection	THE FACT-FINDING INQUIRY BY THE FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		is that the Admiral told me that morning or that day at some point that there was going to be a fact-finding inquiry conducted by Mr. Meese, not in his role as chief law enforcement officer or as Attorney General, but because he was close to the President, he was a person the President relied upon to be able to get to the bottom of all this. "Mr. RODINO. In other words, your answer then is that Admiral Poindexter said to you that Mr. Meese would be coming to conduct an inquiry, but he would be coming as a friend of the President. "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. NORTH. Again, I am making the characterization. I don't believe Admiral Poindexter said he is coming as the friend of the President. My recollection of the discussion-- "Mr. RODINO. You just used those terms. "Mr. NORTH. I understand, but I am saying that was my characterization, not the Admiral's characterization. "[Counsel conferring with witness.] "Mr. NORTH. Does that answer the question? What I am saying to you, Mr. Rodino, is that I characterized it after the fact as that kind of an inquiry. "At the point in time I would guess, and I don't recall the specifics of it-- "Mr. RODINO. Is there any reason why you wanted to characterize it that way? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. I wanted to make it clear that I had absolutely no inkling of criminal investigations, criminal inquiry, behavior, anything criminal until the 25th of November 1986.	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"When the Admiral told me that, in fact I don't think he said the Attorney General was coming. It was the Attorney General is going to send some people over or Mr. Meese is going to send some of his people over, but the characterization I gave it in my discussion with Mr. Nields was mine, not the Admiral's. "Mr. RODINO. You assumed that he would be coming as a friend to make a friendly inquiry? "Mr. NORTH. What I am saying is I assumed he was coming not as a criminal investigator. No mention was made to me when the officers arrived in my office on Saturday morning the 22nd, nobody said, 'We are going to conduct a criminal inquiry into your behavior, North, or the documents you have.' "It was described to me as a fact-finding inquiry; I think those were the three words that were used. "As I indicated to you earlier on Friday, I started laying out the documents. The characterization I gave Mr. Nields is one that I put on it and as I have described it to you here in the committee." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 157-59. See id., 7/8/87, at 141 [North: "My recollection is that the issue was a fact-finding inquiry--I think that is the way it was put--regarding the September and November, '85, shipments."].)	
86/11/21-531 FROM NOVEMBER 21, 1986		THE FACT-FINDING INQUIRY BY THE FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT MEESE ACCOUNT:	THE FACT-FINDING INQUIRY BY THE FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT MEESE ACCOUNT:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		See col. 3.	"Mr. RODINO. Mr. Attorney General, you have talked about the fact-finding process, and you have repeatedly referred to it as such and not as an investigation. You have also said in public statements that you were conducting the inquiry as a Presidential advisor and not the chief law enforcement officer of the country. "In your deposition, you said you were acting as the legal advisor to the President and when Colonel North testified before this committee, he stated that you were conducting your inquiry in some cases he characterized it as a friend of the President and as a confidant and advisor to the President. Admiral Poindexter described you as wearing two hats. "My question to you is: Did you tell Colonel North or Admiral Poindexter that you were acting merely in the capacity as a friend of the President? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I never used that characterization. I told them the same thing as I have told this committee, that the President had asked me to conduct a brief review or a quick review to provide an overview of the facts surrounding the Iranian Initiative. "Mr. RODINO. Mr. Attorney General, you keep talking about a quick review, and I am puzzled--knowing the enormity of the problem that you had to deal with, weren't you, weren't there some signals being sent to you that this was going to necessitate more than a quick review? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, Mr. Rodino, as I mentoned, I was asked if I could pull together

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			the facts in time for a meeting on Monday, the 24th of November, and I was requested to do this approximately at noon on Friday, the 21st of November, so that was a very brief period of time, approximately 72 hours, and that is why I have characterized it as what it was. That is why I have been careful not to use the word 'investigation'. It was not an in-depth investigation as you would do if developing a case for litigation, but it was an overview to try to find out what the facts were and to present that to the President." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 216-18.)
86/11/21-532 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S "FACT-FINDING INQUIRY" MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. . . . Mr. Attorney General, yesterday I was a bit confused initially with Mr. Van Cleve's asking you several questions calling the investigation a fact-finding inquiry [see, e.g., 86/11/21-031]. On a couple of occasions, I think you indicated one time you were asked to assemble facts, and then you, in the same paragraph, said a factual overview. I assume that you associate this with a fact-finding inquiry, your investigation from the 21st of November through the 25th? "Attorney General MEESE. I considered my activities a fact-finding inquiry, also a factual overview, and also a review of the facts. "Mr. COHEN. All the same thing? "Attorney General MEESE. All the same thing." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 39-40.)	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S "FACT-FINDING INQUIRY" MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/21-533 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NUNN. . . . [B]ut it is my understanding that your inquiry--and this is the four days in November, 21st through 25th, that I'm referring to--that your inquiry was basically an information-seeking inquiry; is that right? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir, it was, Senator Nunn. "Mr. NUNN. And it was under the direction of the President of the United States? "Attorney General MEESE. It was at the request of the President of the United States, yes. "Mr. NUNN. What generally did he ask you? What was the scope of what he asked you to find? "Attorney General MEESE. He asked me to provide a factual overview of the Iranian initiative and to determine who had--what had occurred, and to resolve to the extent possible the differing recollections as to a series of events that had occurred during the implementation of that initiative. "Mr. NUNN. So he was primarily asking you to seek information and to report back to him with that information? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir, and to the National Security Council." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 192-93.)
86/11/21-534 NOVEMBER		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT:	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: "NOT . . . AN INVESTIGATION AT ALL, REALLY"

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		See col. 3.	MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. COURTER. . . . You must have sensed the enormity, the importance of the task that was given to you by the President of the United States way back in November of last year, that business could not be conducted as normal, that there was a great deal riding on the investigation that you had to conduct in a 72-hour period. "I'm just wondering, you know, based on reflection, whether you would have done anything different? I personally have been critical--maybe I feel somewhat better about the investigation now after hearing you personally. I still have the feeling that perhaps additional notes should have been taken, some tougher questions asked. Maybe I don't understand it, becuase I'm not sure what the Presidential request was. I know that--I saw the movie, I suppose you did, too--Murder on the Orient Express. Investigator Poirot walks in the room where the murder was and said, 'Touch nothing.' We all suspect that was the type of investigation you were to conduct. "You articulate to a greater degree the type of charge you felt you were under. Was your responsibility a full investigation? Was it something to report to the President so he could inform the American people? Or precisely what was the President's recommendation and charge to you? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, Mr. Courter. Let me just start from the end of your statement there. It was not a Hercule Poirot investigation or an investigation at all, really. "It was not to assist the President in getting

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			to the bottom of some deep mystery and reporting to the American people. It was in essence to correlate information from various people in the administration, all of whom were assumed, as we would in any everyday investigation, to be acting in good faith and to be fully cooperative with the President, to look at what people recalled of some events that had taken place up to nearly two years before, and then to put that together into a coherent outline so that what the President did talk about with the American people, what he knew himself, and what people testified to before Congress would be accurate and would relate to the different recollections that different people had of what had occurred. "It was something quite different than an investigation. That's why I have been rather careful in my depiction of it. It was more akin to having someone develop a coherent piece of testimony to be presented to a legislative hearing." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 207-09.)
86/11/21-538 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND NORTH'S CONVERSATION WITH EARL: SCAPEGOAT, 24 OR 48 HOURS, AND PULLED DOCUMENTS EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND NORTH'S CONVERSATION WITH EARL: SCAPEGOAT, 24 OR 48 HOURS, AND PULLED DOCUMENTS EARL ACCOUNT: At North's request, Earl brings his Iran file to North's office and hands it to him. Earl testified, "And he was, I believe, in the process of going through files and pulling materials out and placing them in stacks on his desk, and I am not sure, but possibly also putting some materials

in the burn bag, but that's even vaguer. That may be another memory that is mixed in now.

"But I think he received my file, took the documents out, and I believe either handed me the file back or put that separately down on the table and added the contents of my file to the stack on his desk. This seemed to me different from any previous of my files that he had, so I asked what was going on, and he said something, and again I can't recall the exact words, but something to the effect that 'It's time for North to be the scapegoat, Ollie has been designated the scapegoat', or something like that. The term 'scapegoat' is what I recall.

". . . .

" . . . He [North] mentioned that he had said to the Attorney General or asked the Attorney General, 'Can I have' or 'Will I have 24 or 48 hours' -- he didn't say both, he said one or the other. I can't recall whether he said 24 or 48, but he asked for that.

"And he told me that the Attorney General had said something like that he didn't know whether he could have that[ ]much time, something like that. Again, I am not quoting.

"Q. Did Ollie tell you with whom he had met across the street at the West Wing? I take it he mentioned the Attorney General.

"A. I don't think he mentioned anyone else specifically. I don't recall, he may have, but I don't recall.

"Q. You do recall the Attorney General?

"A. Yes. As the person that he had talked to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			and had this remark [sic], I think at the end, but I am not positive. "Q. Did you understand he had just come from seeing the Attorney General at the West Wing, in the West Wing? "A. That was my understanding from the fact he had just come from a meeting, from one of the usual meetings of principals, I believe. I would believe Poindexter was there, but I don't know that, and that -- so from what he told me, it was my understanding that the Attorney General was at that meeting that he had just attended. "Q. Did he explain at all what he meant by the time has arrived, whatever, for North to be the scapegoat? Did he explain what he meant? "A. No. ". . . . "Q. Did you understand what North intended to do with your file documents once you gave the documents to him? "A. It was my understanding, from all that I heard and was observing, they were going to be destroyed." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 63-66, 70.)
86/11/21-540 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND NORTH'S CONVERSATION WITH EARL NORTH ACCOUNT: North--responding to Col. Earl's testimony that on November 21, 1986, North had told Earl that he had asked the Attorney General for 24 or 48 hours--testified: "Mr. NORTH. . . . I do not specifically	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND NORTH'S CONVERSATION WITH EARL NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

recall a meeting with the Attorney General on the 21st. I do recall discussions with the Attorney General's office and maybe the Attorney General himself on the issue of an investigation that was ongoing regarding Southern Air Transport; and our concerns that pursuing that investigation was going to create a liability for a potential hostage release.

"I indicated to the Attorney General that Southern Air Transport was being investigated by I think it was the FBI and perhaps Customs and maybe even others regarding its support for the Nicaraguan resistance, and as a consequence of the Hasenfus aircraft shoot-down, and they were also engaged, as we all know, in support of the Iranian initiative, and our concern was that further exposure on the Iranian initiative would jeopardize both the hostages and the second channel, and we were--right up until the end--we were hopeful of another hostage release.

"I don't recall specifically what that conversation [recalled by Earl] refers to.

"Mr. RODINO. You don't recall--

"Mr. NORTH. But I do remember asking for more time from the Attorney General before turning the Justice Department or FBI or whatever investigations were ongoing with regards to Southern Air Transport back on again.

"Mr. RODINO. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is to be able to determine whether or not what Colonel Earl told us at that time that you were requested, 24 or 48 hours, is a fact or whether it is not a fact. And he told that to us,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		to this committee. "Mr. SULLIVAN. I direct your attention to page 66 where he says he's not positive about it, sir. "Mr. RODINO. Well, he may not be positive about it, but he did say that that's what he recalled. "Mr. NORTH. I can assure the Congressman of this, that if this discussion, which Colonel Earl refers to, and I, you know, took place, I'm certainly not saying that it did not. That it is probably referring to Southern Air Transport, and it is certainly not referring to, do I have more time to shred documents, because I--I'm--I want to answer that very clearly. "I never addressed to the Attorney General or anyone else whether or not I had enough time to shred-- "Mr. RODINO. In other words, you did not ask for 24 or 48 hours more? "Mr. NORTH. For me, no, sir. For Southern Air Transport, I certainly asked for more time." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 196-98. See id., 7/8/87, at 138-40 [North: "I do not recall talking to Colonel Earl about 24 hours left in the NSC or anything like that."].)	
86/11/21-541 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND NORTH'S CONVERSATION WITH EARL NORTH ACCOUNT (cont'd): ". . . Our effort at that time was to ensure that the hostages and the second channel could indeed have time to get out, and that indeed may	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND NORTH'S CONVERSATION WITH EARL NORTH ACCOUNT (cont'd): See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		be what Colonel Earl is referring to in the conversation. "It may have been Southern Air Transport, it may have been the hostages in the second channel. Because we were taking every effort to ensure that those people who needed to get out of Iran could, and that the hostages if we were going to get any more out, could indeed be rescued." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 204.)	
86/11/21-542 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	WHETHER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ADVISED NORTH TO GET A LAWYER MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. Could I inquire, Mr. Attorney General, why did you advise Colonel North to get an attorney as of Friday, which would have been November 21st? "Attorney General MEESE. I did not advise him to get an attorney. "Mr. COHEN. You did not? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir. I have no recollection of ever talking to Colonel North about getting an attorney. "Mr. COHEN. All right. Because at that point there was no reason for him to get an attorney, was there? "Attorney General MEESE. Not that I knew of. "Mr. COHEN. As far as you were concerned, everything had been authorized--as far as the sale of weapons to the Iranians, the President had signed off on that; as far as the covert activity or secret activity with the contras, that was expressly or implicitly adopted by the President,		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	so there was no wrongdoing there? "Attorney General MEESE. So far as I knew, there was no reason for him to get an attorney and indeed I never--as I say, I don't recall ever having any conversation with him whatsoever about getting an attorney." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 54.)		
86/11/21-570 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND THE OIL-DRILLING EQUIPMENT STORY SOFAER ACCOUNT: Charles Cooper of the DoJ calls Sofaer, the legal adviser at the DoS, and tells him that the President has authorized the Attorney General to conduct an investigation. He tells Sofaer that he has learned that the pilot of the plane involved in the November 1985 transfer knew that the plane carried HAWK missiles or arms. Sofaer's account of the phone call continued: "Q. Did Cooper tell you it was all a big mess now? "A. Yes, because he gave me the impression that they had assured him -- "Q. That who had assured him? "A. That the people in the NSC, with whom they had spoken, had assured the Attorney General that the pilot did not know that he was carrying arms and the CIA didn't know, and now they found out that the pilot did know. "Q. Indeed, Director Casey, as the record will show, has testified earlier that day that the pilot was told it was oil drilling equipment? "A. Right. So it's clear that Cooper

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			regarded that as very significant in light of that specific testimony. "Q. Did Cooper tell you what he was going to do? "A. He said he was getting off the phone right away because he was very busy. "Q. Did he tell you, by that point, that the President had ordered a formal investigation by the Attorney General? "A. Yes, either then or roughly then." (Sofaer, Senate Dep., 6/18/87, at 56-59. See Sofaer Dep. Ex. 4 [memo from Sofaer to Shultz, via Platt, Hill and Raphel, warning that individuals who supported a politically disastrous policy were misinforming the President, and advising Shultz to use the facts not to criticize the President but to make him aware that others were not telling him the truth].)
86/11/21-580 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS: NORTH BRINGS THEM TO POINDEXTER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS: NORTH BRINGS THEM TO POINDEXTER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS: NORTH BRINGS THEM TO POINDEXTER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. LIMAN. On the 21st, did Oliver North come into your office with his spiral notebook? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. This was the afternoon of the 21st. "Mr. LIMAN. And did he tell you that he had in that spiral notebook some notes that indicated that you knew that it was Hawk shipments, that the President had approved it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. He came in some time middle to late afternoon with one of his old spiral notebooks and said he had just pulled

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			these out of his files and gone back through to try to reconstruct what had happened in November of 1985, and he reported that conversation with me at the time. "I told him that I didn't recall it, but I didn't question that it had happened. I am sure it did happen. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you reach a conclusion as to what Oliver North was going to do with his notebooks? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. From something he said--I don't recall exactly what it was--but I recall as he left the room that I had the impression that he was going to destroy that notebook. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell him not to? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I didn't tell him not to. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, if what you were interested in was telling the Congress, the public, the truth about what was known about the November shipment and the fact that the President had approved it, why didn't you say to Oliver North, 'don't destroy the note'? "Mr. POINDEXTER. My recollection of his reciting at that short meeting these events that had happened in November of 1985, my recollection was that there was nothing in the note that described whether or not the President had approved in Geneva before the operation started the shipment of the Hawks, and the whole plan to get the hostages back the Israelis had come up with. "That in my mind was the crucual issue at the

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			time, not related to what Colonel North had just read to me." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 72-73.)
86/11/21-581 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS: NORTH BRINGS THEM TO POINDEXTER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS: NORTH BRINGS THEM TO POINDEXTER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS: NORTH BRINGS THEM TO POINDEXTER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Who[m] did you think he was trying to protect by destroying those notes? "Mr. BECKLER. Objection, Mr. Chairman. I think--are you talking about Oliver North? "Mr. LIMAN. Colonel North. "Mr. BECKLER. He was up here for six days. Isn't he the appropriate one to ask that question? "Mr. LIMAN. You came away with the conclusion he was going to destroy those notebooks; right? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is right. "Mr. LIMAN. For what purpose did you think he was going to destroy those notebooks? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think I really particularly focused on that at the time. The working notebooks and the working files I have never considered as official documents, and it was perfectly all right with me if Colonel North destroyed his personal notebooks and working files that he had. I had no problem with that. "Mr. LIMAN. You understood that he had kept that notebook for a year. It dealt with an event a year before? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I think at that point I probably thought that he had kept most of his notebooks. I had kept mine.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. LIMAN. Are you saying that you gave no thought to why North was going to destroy a notebook that now recorded the fact that it was Hawks? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, you are trying to imply something different about the Hawk shipments. In my mind, there was nothing different between the TOW shipments and the Hawk shipments. We had already acknowledged that there had been TOW shipments made and on the 13th of November, in a press backgrounder, I acknowledged that the U.S. had acquiesced to a TOW shipment. "We were not trying to conceal that. Later on, Mr. McFarlane in a PROFS note to me indicated that the President hadn't approved that until after the fact. I accepted Mr. McFarlane's memory of that situation. "But we weren't--I mean, this idea that I see being generated that somehow we were trying to cover up the Hawk shipment for some peculiar reason escapes me. "Mr. LIMAN. Didn't the Attorney General on the 20th of November tell you that the only problem that he saw with the transactions related to the Hawk shipment? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall his limiting it to Hawks. I think he had some concern also about the TOW shipments because he recognized that there was a difficulty with the Arms Export Control Act, in terms of a reporting requirement. "Mr. LIMAN. I will ask you before you return tomorrow to look over your transcript at 347 and 348 [Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87; quoted at

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			86/11/20-540] which hopefully we will have declassified by then on that subject." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 73-75.)
86/11/21-582 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS: NORTH BRINGS THEM TO POINDEXTER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS: NORTH BRINGS THEM TO POINDEXTER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS: NORTH BRINGS THEM TO POINDEXTER POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Did Oliver North, when he was greeting you or brought his notebook there, read to you from his entry of November 26, [1985,] which is Exhibit [JMP] 81. . . . which said, 'R.R. directed operation to proceed. If Israelis want to provide different model, then we will replenish'? "Let me rephrase the question. "Does that note there, which comes from his book and which has been typed, refresh your recollection that the notebooks that you thought he was going to shred did, in fact, reflect that the President had approved the Hawk shipment? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I do not believe that was the note that he read to me at the time, because I have a distinct recollection of being disappointed that it didn't shed any light on prior approval. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, when you met with North on the 21st, did you tell him that the Attorney General was going to be coming in to look at his files the next day? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. As I testified yesterday, that happened earlier in the afternoon by telephone call. "Right after Ed called me and told me he was

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			going to send some people over to go through the documents that we had to try to sort out this disagreement, I called Colonel North, after talking to Commander Thompson, and asked him to pull the documents together and then I asked Commander Thompson to coordinate that. That was earlier in the afternoon." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 77-78.)
86/11/21-600 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1986		THE 6 ALTERED MEMOS NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on what prompted him, as he prepared to leave the NSC, to alter the memos McFarlane had first brought to his attention over a year earlier: "Mr. NIELDS. I take it that the handwritten list of the numbers on the documents had been kept by you for the almost year period from the time you first discussed these documents with Mr. McFarlane until the time you took them out in November of 1986? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. In fact, I provided to the committee a copy of that list. "Mr. NIELDS. What? "Mr. NORTH. I sent it back to you. "Mr. NIELDS. Where had you kept it? "Mr. NORTH. I believe the original of it was probably underneath the blotter on my desk. . . . [I]t was probably on my desk or underneath one of my computers or something like that. I don't readily remember. "I do remember in the latter days of my tenure at the NSC coming across the list saying, oh, boy,	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		this isn't done, and going about doing what I had been asked to do some period before." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 222. See above at 85/08/16-292.)	
86/11/21-610 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1986		ALTERED DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: Contrary to McFarlane's account that in August 1985 North altered the 6 documents which McFarlane questioned (see 85/08/16-200 through -204), North testified that McFarlane first brought the documents to his attention after Rep. Barnes made a written request for documents on October 29, 1985 [JHICI Ex. OLN 111]. North testified he did not get around to making the alterations until just before he left the NSC. "Mr. NIELDS. What was the reason for altering those documents right before you left? "Mr. NORTH. Well, he [McFarlane] had asked me to do it some time before. I simply hadn't gotten it done yet. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, he was gone. What was the reason that he gave you for changing these documents? "Mr. NORTH. Well, those documents clearly indicated that there was a covert operation being conducted in support of the Nicaraguan resistance. "Part of the whole thing with the covert operation is being able to protect those people with whom you are engaged as we had committed to do, and protect from political damage as well as international repercussions the Government of the United States, and so, I very clearly understood	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		why he wanted those documents cleaned up, and I sought to do so." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 216. See id., 7/8/87, at 211-16; JHICI Exx. OLN 111 [letter from Rep. Barnes to McFarlane dated 10/29/85 requesting documents], 112-13 [McFarlane's handwritten list of 6 questionable documents], 141-53 [original and altered versions of the 6 questionable documents]. See also above at 85/08/16-200 [McFarlane account of North's altering the targeted documents].)	
86/11/21-613 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER 1986		ALTERED DOCUMENTS McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Prior to my testimony, . . . I learned for the first time that within days before Colonel North left the White House in November of 1986, he withdrew these documents and altered them. This was done without my knowledge or concurrence." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 204.)	
86/11/21-615 NOVEMBER 21, 1986		ALTERED DOCUMENTS: McFARLANE'S LIST HALL ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. BELNICK. Would you look at FH-Exhibit 1? Now, FH-Exhibit 1, Ms. Hall, is a note which was produced to us by the White House. That is the note we have showed you that helped refresh your recollection and, indeed, lead us to copies of the altered documents, correct? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Do you recognize whose handwriting that note is in? "Ms. HALL. Mr. McFarlane's. "Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall when you first	

saw this handwritten note by Mr. McFarlane, FH Exhibit 1?

"Ms. HALL. I believe it was in the summer of 1985.

"Mr. BELNICK. Where did you see it?

"Ms. HALL. It was taped to the ledge of Colonel North's desk in suite 392.

"Mr. BELNICK. Taped to the ledge near his computer terminal?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you associate first seeing FH-1 with the time that Congressional inquiries were under way into Colonel North's activities on behalf of the contras?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. You were familiar at the time that Congressman Hamilton and Congressman Barnes had made such inquiry?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall that documents were being pulled from System 4 files around that time as part of the response to the inquiry?

"Ms. HALL. I don't recall, sir, no.

"Mr. BELNICK. But you do associate this list of numbers by Mr. McFarlane with those inquiries?

"Mr. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. The sheet of handwritten numbers remain taped to Colonel North's desk until the time you moved in May, 1986?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

". . . .

"Mr. BELNICK. Would you take a look at Fawn Hall Exhibit 1-A. This is another version of the same note with some text at the bottom, which I'll read into the record.

"'All originals attached except 401214 according to computers, all copies of 401214 were destroyed. Please return these documents to me when you have finished. Brian.'

"Do you recognize that handwriting?

"Ms. HALL. I don't recognize the handwriting, sir, but the name I associate with Brian Merchant, the Systems 4 keeper.

"Mr. BELNICK. There is another handwritten note at the bottom which reads: 'Signed out to Oliver North, J.B.' Do you recognize that handwriting?

"Ms. HALL. Again, I do not recognize the handwriting. J.B., I associate with June Bartlett, [de Graffenreid's] secretary.

"Mr. BELNICK. Based on this note, it appears that the documents were at least first requested if not signed out on November 21, 1986, which is the date that you were handed original System 4 documents to alter, correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes, sir.

"Mr. BELNICK. You did not see this note at the bottom prior to our interviews.

"Ms. HALL. That's right."

(Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 254-57; JHICI Exx. FH 1 [McFarlane's handwritten list of 6 System IV document numbers], FH 1-A [McFarlane's list with handwritten message signed by "Brian"]. On McFarlane's list and the problem documents, see Iran-Contra Report, at 124-26.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/21-616 UNTIL NOVEMBER 21, 1986		ALTERED DOCUMENTS: McFARLANE'S LIST HALL ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. BELNICK. Now, Ms. Hall, there was another way that you were able to help us identify the altered and unaltered documents, and I would like you to please turn to FH Exhibit 2. That exhibit is on a letterhead which reads 'National Security Council' in the center. And over on the left, it reads 'Memorandum.' Correct? "Ms. HALL. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. That form of letterhead was in use during 1985, correct? "Mr. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Was that form of letterhead discontinued by 1986? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Now, would you take a look at Fawn Hall Exhibit 2-A. You will see that's on a letterhead which doesn't have the word 'memorandum,' correct? "Ms. HALL. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. And in the center it not only reads National Security Council, but it also contains Washington, D.C., and a separate code, right? "Ms. HALL. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. That form of paper was in use at the NSC in November of 1985, was it not? "Ms. HALL. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. But never for memos from the staff to the National Security Advisor?	

"Ms. HALL. I don't believe it was supposed to be used for that purpose, no.

"Mr. BELNICK. So that in 1985 you would not have prepared a memo such as Exhibit 2-A on that National Security Council letterhead.

"Ms. HALL. That's correct.

"Mr. BELNICK. You would have prepared it on the form of letterhead we saw on Exhibit 2?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. But by 1986, November 1986, when you were asked to make altered versions of certain documents, that memo letterhead had been discontinued, correct?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. So that all you had was the letterhead we see on Exhibit 2-A, National Security Council, Washington, D.C.?

"Ms. HALL. Yes.

"Mr. BELNICK. Which indicates to you that that document wasn't prepared in 1985?

"Ms. HALL. Yes."

(Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 257-60; JHICI Exx. FH 1 [McFarlane's handwritten list of 6 System IV document numbers], FH 2 [North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaraguan Arms Shipments," 2/6/85], FH 2-A [other version of North memo to McFarlane, "Nicaraguan Arms Shipments," 2/6/85]. For Hall testimony on individual altered documents, see 84/12/04-100; 85/02/06-310 and -311; 85/03/05-215 and -216; 85/03/16-100; 85/04/11-230; and 85/05/31-100.)

86/11/21-620 ALTERED DOCUMENTS

ALTERED DOCUMENTS

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	HALL ACCOUNT: Sometime during the afternoon, North comes to Hall and gives her 5 or 6 original System IV documents, dated April and May of 1985, with red ink changes written in by North. This is the first time Hall has been asked to revise original, completed System IV documents. Hall makes the changes North has indicated and destroys the marked-up originals North has handed her, although North has not asked her to destroy the originals or to replace them with the altered versions. Hall asks North what to do with the action line (disapprove/approve) sections of the memos. Norths tells her to check them, which she understands to mean she should check the box consistent with the action indicated on the original memo. Hall then initials the new documents for North with an "N," checks the action lines, and adds the original cover sheets and attachments. North does not review the documents once the alterations are made. Hall at the time planned to photocopy the new versions and insert them in place of the original versions in her chronological and subject files. She never completed the process. Instead, she copied the new versions and placed them in an accordion folder on her desk for future filing. Hall did not take note of the changes she was asked to make on the documents. She testified she therefore could not recall the precise changes she made or even which documents she revised. (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 249-83.)	HALL ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/21-624 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	ALTERED DOCUMENTS: POINDEXTER'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you know until these hearings that Colonel North had altered System IV documents? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I was unaware of that. "Mr. LIMAN. He never told you? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 54.)	ALTERED DOCUMENTS: POINDEXTER'S AWARENESS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	
86/11/21-630 PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 25, 1986	WHETHER SYSTEM IV ITSELF WAS TAMPERED WITH NORTH ACCOUNT: "I certainly altered documents, but not System IV systems." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 121.)		
86/11/21-633 DURING 1986	WHETHER SYSTEM IV ITSELF WAS TAMPERED WITH POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Were you familiar with the System 4? "A. Yes. "Q. And did you ever ask anyone to delete any documents from System 4? "A. The only conversation that I can recall even that is remotely connected to that is the one I gave you on May 2, my conversation with Mr. DeGraffenreid. "Q. Were you familiar with the steps that would have to be taken to delete a document [from] System 4 so there would be no reference to it left in the files? "A. I can't say I was that familiar with the		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	details of how the files were maintained. "Q. It is fair to say you never actually worked with the computer to remove the reference to documents in System 4. "A. No, I did not. "Q. Did anyone ever tell you that there were any System 4 documents that referred to the division? "A. No, I don't believe so." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 39-40.)		
86/11/21-635 BEFORE NOVEMBER 25, 1986	WHETHER SYSTEM IV ITSELF WAS TAMPERED WITH POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. And did you know how to get System IV documents out of the computers so that they would leave no traces? "I know you are a computer expert. You told me that. And it's your hobby. Are you an expert in getting them out of System IV? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Not that particular system. System--what I think you are referring to is that System IV had--well, all of the numbered systems had computerized indexes, but I'm not familiar with the software for that. "Mr. [LIMAN]. Did you ever either erase anything from that computer-based index of System IV? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not. "Mr. LIMAN. Or instruct anyone to erase something from that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I did not." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 53-54.)		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/21-678 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT: Early in the evening on November 21, Hall observes North pulling files from the 5-drawer safe next to the shredder and placing them on top of the shredder. Hall goes over to him and assists him in shredding the documents. "Ms. HALL. . . . I joined with him in an effort so that he would not have to--wasting his time shredding. As he pulled documents from each drawer and placed them on top of the shredder, I inserted them into the shredder. "At the same time, I asked him if I could go ahead and shred the PROFs notes and phone logs. He acknowledged I should go ahead and do that, and I did so. "Mr. BELNICK. Approximately what time did this begin on November 21? "Ms. HALL. My recollection is early evening, 5, 6, 7. "Mr. BELNICK. Who else was in the office at that time apart from you and Colonel North? "Ms. HALL. I remember Colonel Bob Earl being in the office and I believe Jock Sharfin who shared the suite upstairs with us, who had an office in the middle, was probably going in and out. "Mr. BELNICK. To you knowledge did Mr. Sharfin observe any of the shredding? "Ms. HALL. No. "Mr. BELNICK. And he did not participate in that activity; correct?	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Ms. HALL. That is correct, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Did Colonel Earl participate in the shredding acitivity? "Ms. HALL. As I recall, Colonel Earl's participation was that of--I recall him in the office carrying files and my assumption was that Colonel North probably had engaged him in pulling documents and he--my recollection is that he passed me the KL-43 messages which I have said were also shredded. "Mr. BELNICK. He, Colonel Earl, passed you those messages to shred? "Ms. HALL. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. You were at the shredding machine, he saw you there, and he gave you the documents. "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. that is my recollection. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. Did you look at the documents that Colonel North was pulling to be shredded? "Ms. HALL. No, I didn't. "Mr. BELNICK. Well, did you glance to see what kinds of documents they were? "Ms. HALL. I really didn't take notes or I was just purely doing my job. I was shredding the documents. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. . . .[D]id you notice whether any of those documents were PROF messages? "Ms. HALL. I said before, sir, that I shredded an entire file of PROF messages. "Mr. BELNICK. Those were PROF messages you		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	pulled out from your files? "Ms. HALL. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. Did there come a time while Colonel North was pulling documents that he came across a letter from Felix Rodriguez? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Did he made a comment about that letter? "Ms. HALL. Yes, he did. "Mr. BELNICK. What did he say? "Ms. HALL. My recollection is he said something to the effect that they will have fun with this and tossed it back in the safe." (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 284-88.)		
86/11/21-679 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)		SHREDDING DOCUMENTS: FELIX RODRIGUEZ' LETTER NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Do you remember at all telling your secretary at one point that you were leaving a document that the Justice Department could have fun with? "Mr. NORTH. I do not recall that. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. If you don't recall it, you don't remember what the document was? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall the conversation nor do I recall the thought. I am not denying that I said it. Those were, as you indicated earlier, Counsel, difficult times. Trying to maintain a sense of humor under those circumstances is difficult at best." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 193.)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/21-680 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT (cont'd): Hall testified further on the shredding of documents in North's suite at the OEOB: "Mr. BELNICK. How would you describe the quantity of documents shredded in feet? "Ms. HALL. Maybe a foot-and-a-half. "Mr. BELNICK. How long did the shredding go on? "Ms. HALL. Possibly a half hour. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall whether there were any memos to the President among the documents you were asked to shred? "Ms. HALL. I don't recall, sir. I did not shred individually pages, I shredded 12, 15, 18 pages at once. "Mr. BELNICK. Did there come a point during shredding [at which] the quantity became so great the machine jammed? "Ms. HALL. I believe it did. The bag had become full and as I was shredding it comes into a tunnel and jammed, yes. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. Had that ever happened before during your time in Colonel North's office the shredding machine jammed? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. When was that? "Ms. HALL. On several occasions. "Mr. BELNICK. Had you ever shredded documents in such quantity?	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Ms. HALL. No, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Was shredding documents in that quantity a normal part of the routine in suite 392 or suite 302? "Ms. HALL. Shredding was the normal process, but I would not say that volume, no. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. There had never been an organized program of shredding on any occasion like the one that occurred on November 21, 1986, right? "Ms. HALL. That is correct. "Mr. BELNICK. When you left the office was Colonel North still there on November 21? "Ms. HALL. I don't recall. We might have all walked out together, I don't recall. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. Did you come to work at all over the weekend, November 22, November 23? "Ms. HALL. No, sir." (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 288-92.)		
86/11/21-695 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS EARL ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . Tell us what happened, continuing on this same day after you handed your files over to North [see 86/11/21-538]. Did he tell you to do anything more? "A. Basically, the conversation ended. "Q. What did you do? "A. I went back upstairs to my office and started to review my files to see if there were any other things besides the document or file that	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	I had just handed to Colonel North that would either compromise that which I believe was being destroyed or lead to that, point to that, and, like I say, it is a little unclear to me what exactly to look for, so I erred on the side of destruction. "Q. Did you find documents at that time? "A. Yes. "Q. What did you do with them? "A. I either ripped them up and put them in my burn bag or if -- I know on at least one occasion I shredded some documents. I don't know if it was that day. It was probably that day. "Q. Did you have a shredder upstairs, or was the only shredder on the first floor? "A. The only shredder was downstairs. "Q. Do you recall seeing any shredding in process that day on the first floor in which North and/or Fawn Hall w[as] involved? "A. The only recollection that I have is, I have an image of Fawn standing in front of the shredder with a pile of documents. That's the only one I specifically have." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 71-72.)		
86/11/21-720 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS: THE SCAPEGOAT JUSTIFICATION NORTH ACCOUNT: North testifying on why and when he shredded documents: "Mr. NIELDS. That is the whole reason for shredding documents, isn't it, Colonel North, so that you can later say you don't remember whether you had them, you don't remember what is in them?	SHREDDED DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified further on what he shredded, and when: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . Are there any documents or were there in your files that you were thinking about shredding on November 21st that would have been any more damaging politically than one of	SHREDDED DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: See cols. 1 and 2.

"Mr. NORTH. No, Mr. Nields. The reason for shredding documents and the reason the Government of the United States gave me a shredder -- I mean, I didn't buy it myself -- was to destroy documents that were no longer relevant, that did not apply or should not be divulged.

"Again I want to go back to the whole intent of a covert operation. Part of a covert operation is to offer plausible deniability of the association of the Government of the United States with the activity, part of it is to deceive our adversaries, part of it is to insure those people who are at great peril carrying out those activities are not further endangered. All those are good and sufficient reasons to destroy documents, and that is why the Government buys shredders by the tens and dozens and gives them to people running covert operations; not so they can have convenient memories.

"I came here to tell you the truth, to tell you and this committee and the American people the truth, and I am trying to do that, Mr. Nields, and I don't like the insinuation I'm up here having a convenient memory lapse like perhaps others have had.

"Mr. NIELDS. You shredded these documents on Friday, the 21st of November 1986?

"Mr. NORTH. I started shredding documents as early as my return from Europe in October. I have absolutely no recollection when those documents were shredded, none whatsoever.

"Mr. NIELDS. There has been testimony before the committee you engaged in shredding of these diversion memos reflecting presidential approval?

"That is the question.

"Mr. NORTH. The way you have asked the question, I can tell you absolutely not because I don't think the documents existed on November 21st.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, that is my next question.

"Are you here telling the committee that you don't remember whether on November 21st there was a document in your files reflecting presidential approval of the diversion.

"Mr. NORTH. As a matter of fact, I will tell you specifically that I thought they were all gone because by the time I was told at some point early on November 21st that there would be an inquiry conducted by Mr. Meese, I assured Admiral Poindexter, incorrectly, it seems, that all of those documents no longer existed. And so that is early on November 21st because I believe the decision to make an inquiry, to have the Attorney General or Mr. Meese, in his role as a friend of the President, conduct a fact-finding excursion on what happened in September and November in 1985, I assured the Admiral, 'Don't worry. It is all taken care of.'

"Mr. NIELDS. You have already shredded them?

"Mr. NORTH. That is right.

"Mr. NIELDS. When?

"Mr. NORTH. To answer your question about November 21st, is no, sir. [Sic.]

"Mr. NIELDS. When did you shred them, sir?

"Mr. NORTH. My answer, Mr. Nields, is that I

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	documents on November 21, 1986. You deny that? "Mr. NORTH. I do not deny I engaged in shredding on November 21. I will also tell this committee I engaged in shredding almost every day I had a shredder and put things in burn bags when I didn't. "Every single day I was on National Security Council staff, some documents were destroyed, and I don't want you to have the impression that these documents that I referred to seeking approval disappeared on the 21st. Because I can't say that. In fact, I am quite sure, by virtue of the conversations I remember about the 21st, that those documents were already gone. "They were gone by virtue of the fact that we saw these operations unraveling as early as the mid part of October: We lost the Hasenfus airplane, and the discussion the Director of Central Intelligence had had with a private citizen about what he knew of a contra diversion, as you put it, and at that point I began to, one, recognize I would be leaving for NSC, because that was a purpose for my departure, to offer the scapegoat, if you will, and second of all, recognizing what was coming down, I didn't want some new person walking in there opening files that would possibly expose people at risk. "So I do not want you to leave with the idea that those documents were shredded just on the 21st. They might have been shredded on the 19th or the 11th of November when I came back from a series of trips to Europe." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 37-39. See id.,	started shredding documents in earnest after a discussion with Director Casey in early October, when he told me that Mr. Furmark had come to him and talked to him about the use of Iran arms sales money to support the resistance. "That followed shortly -- was preceded shortly by the crash or shootdown of the aircraft Mr. Hasenfus was on. And Director Casey and I had a lengthy discussion about the fact that this whole thing was coming unraveled and that things ought to be 'cleaned up,' and I started cleaning things up. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. You have testified that you shredded documents shortly after you heard from Director Casey that Furmark had said monies had been used from the Iranian arms sales for the benefit of the contras. "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. My question to you is, did you or did you not shred documents that reflected Presidential approval of the diversion? "Mr. NORTH. I have absolutely no recollection of destroying any document which gave me an indication that the President had seen the document or that the President had specifically approved. I assumed that the three transactions which I supervised or managed or coordinated, whatever word you are comfortable with -- and I can accept all three -- were approved by the President. "I never recalled seeing a single document which gave me a clear indication that the	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	7/7/87, at 36 [North: "I tried, as I was departing the NSC, a process which began as early as October, to destroy all references to these covert operations. I willingly admit that."]; id., 7/7/87, at 41-42 [Mr. Nields: "And I take it that you would agree that you at least shredded some documents on the 21st of November." Mr. North: "Absolutely."].)	President had specifically approved that action." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 46-50.)	
86/11/21-723 UNTIL NOVEMBER 25, 1986	DESTROYED DOCUMENTS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	DESTROYED DOCUMENTS: ANY SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. COURTER. . . . Admiral Poindexter, were you aware of any shredded documents that you believe today would have a material effect on this investigation? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I am not sure what documents Colonel North may or may not have shredded. I, frankly, don't know of anything significant that hasn't already come out in these hearings, and I think I have listened to most every session. "I think you have at this point a very accurate picture. "Granted there are conflicts between different people's recollection of events. But I don't know of any documents that ever existed that would shed any light on any aspect of this that hasn't come out already." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 220.)	DESTROYED DOCUMENTS: ANY SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
86/11/21-725 DURING	SHREDDED AND ALTERED DOCUMENTS: POINDEXTER'S KNOWLEDGE	SHREDDED AND ALTERED DOCUMENTS: POINDEXTER'S KNOWLEDGE	SHREDDED AND ALTERED DOCUMENTS: POINDEXTER'S KNOWLEDGE

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 1986	POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. You read in the newspaper -- and I won't comment about it beyond that -- but you read in the newspaper about alleged shredding of documents by Colonel North. "A. I have. "Q. And alteration of documents by Colonel North in November of 1986. "Apart from what you have told us as to what you anticipated with respect to that spiral stenographer's notebook that he kept [see 86/11/21-099], did you have any knowledge of shredding of documents by him? "A. I wasn't even certain, Mr. Liman, that he shredded that one. What I was telling you was my impression that I had when he left the office. "Q. And you have no knowledge of any alteration of documents by him? "A. No. I do not." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 229-30.)	POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 1.
86/11/21-728 1984-87	UNSHREDDED DOCUMENT NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. HYDE. . . . You have been accused of shredding the Constitution, and that is serious. "Mr. NORTH. I don't believe that was one of the documents that I shredded." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 169.)		
86/11/21-730 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	SHREDDED DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	SHREDDED DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, when you spoke to [Poindexter] on the 21st, would you tell us what	SHREDDED DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		occasioned the conversation about diversion? "Mr. NORTH. My recollection is that the issue came up that there would be an inquiry by the Attorney General's office or by the Attorney General on a fact-finding activity to find out what had happened in '85 as a consequence of Israeli transfers to Iran. "And during that discussion, I assured Admiral Poindexter, erroneously, it turns out, that all references to the use of funds generated by U.S. sales to the Government of Iran and using the residuals from those transfers for support of the Nicaraguan resistance had been removed and destroyed. " . . . . "Mr. LIMAN. You say that you assured him in the course of that conversation that the documents that referred to this no longer existed. Did he ask you whether the documents existed? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall who raised the subject, whether it was the Admiral or I. But I do remember assuring him that they had all been destroyed. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you discuss when you destroyed them? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall, but I had been in the process of destroying things for some[ ]time by that point. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. And so at the time that you gave Admiral Poindexter this assurance you believed in good faith that no record existed of the diversion that you had written. Is that correct?	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. NORTH. When I talked to the Admiral on the 21st, I assured him that all references to the sale of arms as it related to the Nicaraguan Resistance had been destroyed, and I was wrong. "Mr. LIMAN. And at that point, you were in a position in which you did not have a single document that indicated that your actions had been authorized by your superiors. That is the way you believed, you thought, correct? "Mr. NORTH. Well, yes, and I also believed that all of the PROF notes which are now in stacks all over Washington also had been destroyed. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, after you were dismissed, did Admiral Poindexter call you and say to you that he would confirm that he had given the authority? "Mr. NORTH. I honestly don't recall a conversation with Admiral Poindexter after I was dismissed. He may have called, I don't remember it. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall any conversation with him in which he said, 'Colonel North, don't worry, even if you destroy all the documents, I will stand up and say I approved it'? "Mr. NORTH. No. I recall no such conversation. "Mr. LIMAN. So that you were--once the documents were destroyed, you were out there without any kind of assurance that anyone would stand behind you; is that a fair to say? "Mr. NORTH. That was the plan, and it was planned that I would be out there. Everything had gone right according to plan, right up until about	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		12:05 in the afternoon the next day, or several days thereafter. "Mr. LIMAN. And when the plan changed was when you had the IC, or the criminal investigation announced? "Mr. NORTH. Well, I don't know where--in who[m] else's mind the plan changed, counsel. I know that when I heard the words 'criminal investigation' or criminal behavior or whatever the words were that were used in the press conference, or shortly thereafter--I don't--it was certainly profound at that point that my mind changed considerably. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, if the investigation by the Independent Counsel had not been instituted, if you hadn't heard the word 'criminal', would you still be sticking by the cover story? "Mr. SULLIVAN. Objection. "Mr. LIMAN. I will not press it. It is hypothetical." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 135-36, 143-46.)	
86/11/21-740 NOVEMBER 1986	THE FALL GUY PLAN NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE FALL GUY PLAN NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NORTH. I[t] had always been part of the plan that Director Casey would know nothing of the support to the Nicaraguan resistance. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [I]t was always part of the plan that Director Casey . . . would not know. Is that in essence what you said? "Mr. NORTH. If you mean by the plan, the fall	THE FALL GUY PLAN NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		guy plan, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And so, the fall guy plan was that even though Casey knew, you would not finger him, to use a colloquial expression? "Mr. NORTH. Your expression counsel, not mine. "Mr. LIMAN. You wouldn't name him? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. And then, the next question I asked was, were there other people who knew things that you were also not supposed to name? "Mr. NORTH. Not that I know of. I know of no other people who actually knew. . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 148-49.)	
86/11/21-780 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	THE FALL GUY PLAN NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE FALL GUY PLAN NORTH ACCOUNT: North, while lengthily explaining that he did not recall telling Col. Earl on November 21, 1986 that he had asked the Attorney General whether he had 24 or 48 hours before the Attorney General's office would begin fact-finding, described his reasons for delaying the investigation of Southern Air Transport's Contra-related activities. North explained that disclosure of Southern Air's Iranian link "was going to disrupt ongoing efforts to achieve the release of another hostage as well as potentially compromise the second channel and cause people to die." Tacked at the end of North's response was his description of the Fall Guy Plan: "I do not recall talking to Colonel Earl about 24 hours left in the NSC or anything like that. I	THE FALL GUY PLAN NORTH ACCOUNT: ". . . I had made it clear to Mr. McFarlane, I made it clear to Mr. Casey, and I made it very clear to Admiral Poindexter that I recognized that there would come a time when you may have to have a political--I emphasized the word 'political'--fall guy or scapegoat or whatever. I never in my wildest dreams or nightmares envisioned that we would end up with criminal charges. It was beyond my wildest comprehension right up until the 25th." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 139-40.) See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		don't think that--I had told Admiral Poindexter several times, I think perhaps it started right after the Hasenfus aircraft was shot down . . ., that I knew things were coming down and that I was prepared to leave at any point. And I know I talked to Admiral Poindexter on the 21st and told him that I thought I would have to leave right away. "I know that I said that several times before, but we were then at the point where I thought that it was important to defuse the controversy, that I would be relieved and I would be transferred. I saw that because I had made it clear to Mr. McFarlane, I made it clear to Mr. Casey, and I made it very clear to Admiral Poindexter that I recognized that there would come a time when you may have to have a political--I emphasized the word 'political'--fall guy or scapegoat or whatever. I never in my wildest dreams or nightmares envisioned that we would end up with criminal charges. It was beyond my wildest comprehension right up until the 25th." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 139-40.)	
86/11/21-790 DURING NOVEMBER 1986	THE FALL GUY PLAN: CASEY'S VIEW OF TAKING THE HIT UP THE LINE NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE FALL GUY PLAN: CASEY'S VIEW OF TAKING THE HIT UP THE LINE NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, in November of 1986, after the Iranian venture had been publicized initially in Lebanon and in papers all over the world, did you discuss the diversion with Director Casey? "Mr. NORTH. Oh, sure.	THE FALL GUY PLAN: CASEY'S VIEW OF TAKING THE HIT UP THE LINE NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. LIMAN. Now tell us about that, whatever you can recall. "Mr. NORTH. Well, I don't recall the--I mean, we had several discussions about it. "Mr. LIMAN. I will take all several. "Mr. NORTH. My recollection is that Director Casey agreed with my assessment, that the time had come for someone to stand up and take the hit or the fall. He, quite frankly, did not think that I was senior enough to do that and suggested that--I am trying to recall--suggested that it was probably going to go up the line, or something like that. "Mr. LIMAN. Did he suggest who else could take the hit? "Mr. NORTH. He suggested it might be Admiral Poindexter. "Mr. LIMAN. Because next up the line from you was Admiral Poindexter, wasn't it, on this matter? "Mr. NORTH. Well, after Don Fortier died, that is correct. Don Fortier was the nominal deputy who had been aware, I believe, at least of some of this. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, did you discuss blaming it on Fortier after his death? "Mr. NORTH. It would be hard to blame something that was going on in November on a man who died in the summer. "Mr. LIMAN. But the original approval. "Mr. NORTH. No, no.- "Mr. LIMAN. So that-- "Mr. NORTH. Don wasn't in a position to do those approvals.	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. LIMAN. So Director Casey, as I understand it, discussed with you the fact that it just might not be credible for you to take the hit and that it might have to be Admiral Poindexter? "Mr. NORTH. Words to that effect. "Mr. LIMAN. Did he discuss anyone else who might have to take the hit? "Mr. NORTH. No. But he was concerned that the President not be damaged by it, and I shared that belief." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 163-66.)	
86/11/21-795 1984 - JULY 1987	THE FALL GUY PLAN POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE FALL GUY PLAN POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. FASCELL. . . . Now, according to Colonel North, he and Director Casey discussed the question of who was to be the fall guy and Casey said, according to North, that he was not big enough, not a big enough fish or words to that effect [see 86/11/21-790: "I was not senior enough"], and that, as I recall his testimony, he didn't bother to tell you about that discussion. "Did you ever ask Colonel North to be the fall guy or take the spear or stand on his head and salute? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Colonel North would do anything I asked him, but I did not ask him to be the fall guy, or the scapegoat, as I have testified. "He brought that up with me several times, and each time he brought it up I told him it wasn't necessary, it wouldn't work, wouldn't be appropriate, and to quit thinking in those terms.	THE FALL GUY PLAN POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Mr. FASCELL. Do you know if anyone else ever asked Colonel North to be the fall guy?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't know that.

"Mr. FASCELL. Well, I wonder why it ever came up in discussions.

"Did you ever discuss with anyone the question of whether you were to provide plausible deniability or whether or not you were to take the spear?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not.

"Mr. FASCELL. Well--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That was a personal decision on my part when I made the decision in February of 1986.

"Mr. FASCELL. I believe that, Admiral. I don't like it, but I believe it.

"Colonel North has testified--

"Mr. BECKLER. Thank you.

"Mr. FASCELL. --he would follow you up a hill because he had such a high regard for you, but obviously he wasn't about to follow you down the hill.

"He testified and you corroborated that he was operating totally under your orders, so both of you knew all the time that he would never have to take the spear and that you would; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That both of us understood that?

"Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Certainly it--as I have testified, he would have no reason to believe from anything I said that I was asking him to be the scapegoat.

"I didn't tell him that my personal decision was not to tell the President, that I would take responsibility for it, because I thought I had the authority to do it.

"And I expected after both of us left the White House in November of 1986 that Colonel North would tell the story exactly as it was, as I think he tried to do, and as I am trying to do.

"So I don't consider that he wouldn't follow me down the other side of the hill. I think he would, and I think he has."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 85-87.)

86/11/21-900
NOVEMBER 1986

"ABOVE THE WRITTEN LAW"
HALL VIEW:

"Mr. FOLEY. Without any reference to possible obstruction of justice, which is not the purpose of this committee to determine, did you not know that alteration of existing documents in a major, fundamental way was a violation of the responsibility of those who possess those documents?

"Ms. HALL. I agree with you, sir, and at the time, as I stated before, I felt uneasy but sometimes, like I said before, I believed in Colonel North and there was a very solid and very valid reason he must have been doing this for and sometimes you have to go above the written law, I believe.

"I don't know, I felt--I believed in Colonel North. Maybe that is not correct. It is not a

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	fair thing to say. I felt uneasy to begin with and I agree with your assessment basically. "Mr. FOLEY. That unauthorized destruction of documents is a gross violation of security. "Ms. HALL. I don't know that destruction--okay, you are talking about the altered documents. "Mr. FOLEY. The shredding. "Ms. HALL. The shredding. I don't know that it was unauthorized. "Mr. FOLEY. You are not sure whether Colonel North had-- "Ms. HALL. I don't believe-- "Mr. FOLEY. You are not sure whether Colonel North did not have superiors' approval to destroy those documents? "Ms. HALL. I have no idea, sir. "Mr. FOLEY. But normally speaking, you would not be engaged in that kind of shredding as a routine daily or routine weekly or monthly activity of your office? "Ms. HALL. Sir, we never shredded to the volume we did. . . ." (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/9/87, at 108-09.)		
86/11/21-910 NOVEMBER 1986	"ABOVE THE WRITTEN LAW" NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. And you do not share the view that was expressed and retracted by your Secretary that sometimes you must rise above the written law? "Mr. NORTH. I do not believe in rising above the law at all, and I do not believe that I have		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	ever stated that. "Mr. LIMAN. You haven't. "Mr. NORTH. I have not." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 232. See id., 7/13/87, at 2-4.)		
86/11/21-950 NOVEMBER 21, 1986 (FRIDAY)	MEESE-WEINBERGER CALL MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-WEINBERGER CALL MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-WEINBERGER CALL MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCCOLLUM. . . . No one has mentioned it, but it seems to me at some point during this short four-day weekend while you were calling up everybody, whether it be Mr. McFarlane or Mr. Casey or who[]ever, you also at some point talked to the Secretary of Defense, did you not? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir, I did. I talked with him by phone. His wife was in the hospital and I did talk with him on the telephone, I believe, on Friday night when I informed him of what I was doing at the President's request, as I had the others, and then again on Saturday we had a brief conversation on the phone. "In talking with him, I ascertained that he didn't know much more about the situation than I already knew and therefore we put off any further conversation until after the weekend." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 268-69.)
86/11/22-030 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY a.m.)	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING NORTH ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. LIMAN. Do you remember shredding documents during the lunch hour on the 22nd when the representatives of the Attorney General's	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

office had left for their lunch?

"Mr. NORTH. I remember shredding documents while they were in there reading documents.

"Mr. LIMAN. Do you remember--shredding them in their presence?

"Mr. NORTH. I mean, they were sitting in my office and the shredder was right outside and I walked out and shredded documents.

"Mr. LIMAN. More than a few pieces of paper, right?

"Mr. NORTH. Pardon?

"Mr. LIMAN. It would be more than a few pieces of paper?

"Mr. NORTH. That is a pretty high-speed shredder. It eats them pretty quick.

"I'm not trying to be light about it. They were sitting in my office reading and I would finish reading a document and say, 'We don't need that anymore.' I would walk up and I'd go out and shred it. They could hear it. The shredder was right outside the door.

"Mr. LIMAN. I'm not trying to be light about it either.

"Mr. NORTH. I'm not either.

"Mr. LIMAN. You would go up there and take documents that they had finished reading?

"Mr. NORTH. No, no, no. I want to be very clear. I had my office . . . . And the desk that I had was in the corner of my office and then there was a table about this size, and on that table [were] laid out all of the Iran documents. And I was working at my desk on other things, literally cleaning up files on lots of things.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	And when I would finish with a handful of documents, I'd walk up, walk past them, walk out the door--you know where the shredder was--turn the corner, turn on the shredder and drop them in. "Mr. LIMAN. Did anyone say to you, 'Colonel, what are you doing'? "Mr. NORTH. No, and I didn't think anything of it either. What you've got to understand, Counsel, is that I didn't think I had done anything wrong. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. The record is that before lunch hour, Mr. Reynolds found the diversion document? "Mr. NORTH. But he didn't tell me. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. . . . He found that document. He attached significance to that document. And what you are saying is that even after that, which occurred before lunch, you were there taking batches of documents past these attorneys in the Department of Justice and shredding them, and they weren't saying 'Stop, we'd like to look. What are you doing? We're concerned.' None of that, right? "Mr. NORTH. I'm not trying to leave the wrong impression, Counsel. Okay? "What I'm saying to you is, I thought, and perhaps they thought, and I'm trying to be in several people's mind at once, is that they were looking for the facts on what had transpired in September and October and November of 1985. All right? And what I was told, they were looking for what I thought was in the files that I gave them.		

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Let me finish. I was also engaged in a number of other projects of national security importance. The fact that I was shredding documents I don't think would be unusual to them. This was, after all, an office with a shredder in it. "I'm not trying to say that these guys were just letting me willy-nilly go and shred documents. I had a shredder for that document. [Sic.] If I finished reading a Top Secret cable of intelligence value, you don't leave those things sitting around your office, you destroy them after you read them. And that is what I was doing." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 184-87.)		
86/11/22-031 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY a.m.)	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING NORTH ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, were you taking single documents over to the shredder or were you taking files over to the shredder? "Mr. NORTH. I was not taking files. I would go through a file. I was sitting at my desk. They were working ten feet from me. They were working on their projects. I was working on mine. "Mr. LIMAN. I want to hear more about it. Go ahead. I am not interrupting. "Mr. NORTH. I don't want to accuse them of incompetence, because they stopped a guy from doing his job. That is why the Government of the United States gave me a shredder.	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

"Mr. LIMAN. But your job on that day was to get rid of files, wasn't it? That is what you came in for?

"Mr. NORTH. No. That isn't what I came in for. I was working desperately, among other things, and I received two or three phone calls on it to keep the hostages alive. Good grief, we had had this stuff all over the newspapers. The Israelis were calling me every half hour. I was working with those people. They heard me taking the phone calls.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel--

"Mr. NORTH. I was also in the process of looking after several other action packages that I had to move across the street on totally unrelated issues.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, was your work on the phone with the Israelis leading you to shred documents?

"Mr. SULLIVAN. Objection.

"Mr. NORTH. On occasion.

"Mr. LIMAN. Weren't you going through your files to get rid of embarrassing documents?

"Mr. NORTH. Embarrassing, no. Documents that could compromise the national security of the United States, documents that would put lives at risk, documents that would demonstrate a covert action in the U.S. direction, control, and relationship to it, yes.

"Embarrassing, no. I am not embarrassed to be here, Counsel.

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . Are you saying, Colonel, that you thought that allowing the Attorney

General of the United States or his representatives to see documents would jeopardize lives?

"Mr. NORTH. No. What I am saying to you, Counsel, is that revelations regarding those documents would destroy lives. Many of the documents that I destroyed that day, prior to that day, and after that day, had absolutely no relationship to the Iranian activities. They had to do with Nicaraguan resistance activities.

"They had to do with counterterrorist operations. Things that were just as this committee has, I think, a scope within which they operate, they were looking for specific Iranian-associated activities. And thus if I had a file of matters pertaining to support for the internal opposition in Nicaragua, or people who[m] I had contacted in Europe and with whom I had worked to get weapons for the Nicaragua resistance, and sitting there at my desk, I would pull those out, and look at them, and say, 'North, if you are not here tomorrow, this doesn't need to be found by anybody.'

"I would take them over to the shredder and destroy them.

"That is what I am saying. It was beyond the pale of their inquiry.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, those were files that you had assembled over time, correct?

"Mr. NORTH. Five-and-one-half years, sir.

"Mr. LIMAN. And those were files that had remained secure for five-and-a-half years; is that correct?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. You knew whoever your successor was who would occupy that office would be someone that was selected by the National Security Adviser; is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. I did not know that the person who moved into that office would share the same responsibilities or indeed have anything to do with the matters in which I had worked and the documents that existed in the permanent files were all that were necessary to carry on whatever--the activities in which I was engaged, and it was only a part of my work, Counsel, in support of the Nicaraguan resistance, and in support of the Iranian initiative were being terminated. [Sic.] "There was no need to retain those documents. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you deny, Colonel, that one of the reasons that you were shredding documents that Saturday was to avoid the political embarrassment of having these documents be seen by the Attorney General's staff? "Mr. NORTH. I do not deny that." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 188-91.)		
86/11/22-035 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. MCCOLLUM. Something else has been bothering me. It has been around 1411 times as Colonel North testified it seems to me that some of your staff w[ere] present there going through these papers in Colonel North's quarters on Saturday, 22 November and the colonel, Colonel	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	North has testified that all this while he was shredding. "Now I thought he was an excellent witness and had great credibility up here and I think the public thought so, but this was one issue I had real problems with. "I asked him about that. [See below at 86/11/22-600.] I would like to ask you about that. "Did you have occasion or have you since this came up [had occasion] to talk to Mr. Reynolds and the others who were in Colonel North's office on Saturday 22 November as to whether they observed any shredding going on while they were looking? This was the time, you know, they found the diversion memo. "Have you asked them about that? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I have, Mr. McCollum, and I have been told by Mr. Richardson and Mr. Reynolds, who were the people who were on the scene, that at no time in their presence or in their field of vision or within their hearing was any shredding going on by Colonel North or anyone else, to the best of their knowledge. "As a matter of fact, I believe there is also testimony that has been received by the committee by Lieutenant Colonel Earl that the shredder that was supposed to be involved in Colonel North's office was actually broken and there is also testimony I believe by Colonel Earl that in order to shred they had to take the documents out of that office some distance away, so that it would have been virtually impossible to have that		

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	shredding going on so-called under the noses of either Mr. Richardson or Mr. Reynolds. "Mr. MCCOLLUM. I brought that up to Colonel North and put that portion of Colonel Earl's deposition in the record. "Now Colonel Earl was the assistant to Colonel North. . . . "This is from Colonel Earl's deposition that was taken contemporaneously with some of the other things that were going on in this committee. ". . . . "On page 74 is where it starts, a deposition taken May 2nd of Colonel Robert Earl by this committee. "He says, 'The next morning,' the question was asked him on page 74, 'Saturday, November 22. Did you go to work that morning?' "The answer, 'I got as call from, I believe, White House Signal, but I am not sure whether it was Paul Thompson calling me or whether a message was relayed through the White House Signal, but somebody called me to say, "Come and open up the office," that Colonel North wasn't available, couldn't be found. So I went in and opened up the office.' "Question: 'Just let me ask you. Back on the 21st--do you know Tom Green?' "Answer: 'Yes.' "Question: 'Did he come to Suite 302 on Friday, the 21st, before you left?' "Answer: 'Not that I recall. He may have, but not that I recall.' "Question: 'Now we are back on Saturday		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	morning. You get a contact from White House Signal, et cetera. Do you go to 302 and open up?' "Answer: 'I recall driving through the gate and parking on the street between the Old Executive Office Building and the West Wing. I wasn't sure whether I ought to go up to Paul Thompson's office or over to Paul's office. I recall considering that, but I don't recall what my solution to the dilemma was. I went to one of the two places first. I do recall I did eventually, either directly or secondly, go to the office and open it up,' presumably referring to Colonel North's office, 302. "Question: 'You were the first guy to arrive at 302 that morning?['] "Answer: 'Yes.' "Question: 'Now, do you remember, were files laid out when you opened the office up?['] "Answer: 'This is another one that I cannot recall, whether the circular table in front of Colonel North's desk had files on it at that point when I got there or whether it was empty and I added all the files for them to review.'" (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 259-62 [quoting Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 74-75]. See also below at 86/11/22-595 and -600.)		
86/11/22-036 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Rep. McCollum's narration of Earl's deposition testimony continued:] "[Mr. MCCOLLUM.] Question: 'In any event,	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	the table you are referring to--which I imagine you are going to tell me, the AG representatives reviewed documents, right?' "Answer: 'Yes.' "Question: 'That on [Earl Dep.] Exhibit 2 is the table marked "conference table" in North's office, right?' "Answer: 'Correct.' "Question: 'Okay. Did the Attorney General's people arrive next or someone before them?' "Answer: 'At some point, I am not sure exactly how much later, but I think what happened next was that Paul Thompson brought over two representatives from the Department of Justice, Bradford Reynolds, and I think his name is John Richardson, introduced me, said they were there to look at files on the Iran project, and then I think Paul Thompson left.' "Question: 'And Richardson and Reynolds started their review?' "Answer: 'Correct.' "Question: 'Do you recall their asking you for any specific documents, files?' "Answer: 'I recall that they asked for more documents, or maybe all of them. If the table was empty, they asked for all the documents; if the table had some of them arranged, they asked for more. I recall going behind Colonel North's desk into this credenza and going through files in his credenza pulling them out and looking at the subject title to see if they were relevant and putting some of them that were I believe onto the table for their review. [Portion redacted in		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	original transcript of Earl testimony.] So I looked through all those documents behind Colonel North's desk, I couldn't find them. I will go into that more if you want. They were subsequently found.' "Question: 'Where did you find them?' "Answer: 'I didn't find them, Colonel North found them. When he came in, I told him of their request for them.' "Question: 'Now, Richardson and Reynolds were in Colonel North's office, you were in there with them?' "Answer: 'Initially, I was in there looking for the files in the credenza, and I also from his desk placed a call to him to let him know that I was in his office and the people were there, and to see if he had gotten the call and was en route, and he said, yes, he had gotten the call, and he would be there in a while. I am not sure exactly how much later, an hour, or maybe two hours later.' "Question: 'That was the substance of your conversation with him?' "Answer: 'Yes.['] "Question: 'He arrived next at 302. Was he the next person to come in?' "Answer: 'No.' "Question: 'Who came next?' "Answer: 'The next thing that happened is that they left to go to lunch with the Attorney General. On their way out, in the passageway, they ran into Colonel North coming in. They had a brief conversation in the hallway, and then		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	Colonel North came into the office.' "Question: 'Did you overhear their conversation?' "Answer: 'No. I observed it, I was on my way out and saw them down there talking to Colonel North. So I never got out of the office when Colonel North arrived.' "Question: 'North came into the office?' "Answer: 'I told him of the request of the team. [Portion redacted in original transcript of Earl testimony.] He said he didn't know where they were filed and started looking around, and apparently found them.' "That is redacted [as noted above] as to what it was they were looking for. "'I am not sure that he found them while I was still there or while I was on the same floor with him. My recollection is when Richardson and Brad Reynolds returned, there was a file, an empty file folder on the desk that had not been there before that Bradford Reynolds held up and said, "Now, that is very sensitive," because it was empty, and I couldn't explain why it was sensitive.' "Question: 'We get protection of documents like that from the White House all the time.' "Answer: 'Colonel North was out of the office at that time. When he returned, he explained they had been filed in one of these files over here. "Question: 'In front of Barbara Brown's desk?' "Answer: 'Yes, and had taken them and put them with' . . . some of the other materials. It is redacted as well."		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 263-66 [quoting Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 75-78].)		
86/11/22-037 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Rep. McCollum's narration of Earl's deposition testimony continued:] "[Mr. MCCOLLUM.] Question: 'Before the AG team came back, did you and North have any conversation apart from talking about' blank--redacted. "Answer: 'Not that I can recall the substance of, although there were a couple little parts that I recall before the AG's teams--before they returned. "[']Colonel North continued to review documents, and I think found others that were suitable for the category that we had been looking for the day before.['] "Question: 'Termination?' "Answer: 'Termination.' "'Mr. Leon: Where was he looking for those, among the files they had just reviewed?' "'The Witness: I don't think so, but I am not positive. I think it was other files back on his desk. I am not sure where--oh, and one of the things he told me when he first came in was that the shredder had broken the night before, because I reached up to turn it on, and sure enough, it wasn't working. Then when he was compiling material--' "'By Mr. Belnick:'	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	DoJ AND NORTH COUNTERACTIVITIES: SEARCHING AND SHREDDING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

"Question: 'Can I stop you there for a second, Bob? Was the shredder bag full?'

"Answer: 'I don't recall.'

"Question: 'Was the machine the kind of machine you could see the bag, or would you have to open it? Was the bag visible?'

"Answer: 'I think it was.'

"Question: 'It didn't work. Did he ask you to find a working shredder?'

"Answer: 'He didn't ask me. I intuited it from what he was doing. I told him I was going across the hall to CMC where I knew they had a shredder and see if we could get in there. The door was locked, so I couldn't get in. And at some point--the recollection that I had, rather than speculate how we get to it, is of Colonel North with a file and a stack of documents that I knew from all of this were to be shredde[d], had Paul Thompson standing beside him and in some way a reference to going over to the sift'--and I am sure they mean Situation Room--'with a hefting of the documents--I am not exactly sure what, but I knew what he meant, and I don't know what Thompson knew or inferred from that.'

"Anyway, I am not going to read the rest of this.

". . . .

"Mr. MCCOLLUM. The bottom line of this, Mr. Attorney General, is that it is very clear from Colonel Earl[']s deposition that [has] just been reported and hasn't been put forward to the public that if you believe what he said in his testimony, Colonel North didn't come in in the morning and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	didn't arrive at his office until about noontime when your people were leaving to go to lunch and it was at that time they discovered the shredder was broken, and I think that needed to be brought out and I appreciate your indulging me to do that. "Is that consistent with your knowledge? "Attorney General MEESE. That is my understanding, Mr. McCollum. It certainly is consistent with my understanding that at no time was shredding being done in the presence of people from our office who were there that day." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 266-68 [quoting Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 79-80].)		
86/11/22-070 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS, 11/22/86 NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that on that Saturday when the Justice Department representatives left for lunch that you left the room with Commander Thompson and with a group of documents that you had to shred in the West Wing because your shredder was no longer working? Does that ring any bell with you, sir? "Mr. NORTH. It does not, but I do know that I used the shredder which was identical in the West Wing to mine on a number of occasions. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall using it in that period? "Mr. NORTH. I don't, but I certainly don't deny it. "Mr. LIMAN. And did you use it when your shredder was full and not operational? "Mr. NORTH. I may have, but again, Counsel, I	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS, 11/22/86 NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS, 11/22/86 NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	am not denying that. I may well have. If someone said that I did, it is entirely likely that I did do that. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell Admiral Poindexter that you were going to be shredding documents other than the diversion documents which you had said you had already gotten rid of? "Mr. NORTH. Again, I don't recall specifically saying that, but I do recall assuring them [sic] on a number of occasions that I had taken care of my files, that I had shredded things, that basically the files were cleaned up. "That was the basic input." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 193-94.)		
86/11/22-080 NOVEMBER 21-22, 1986 (FRIDAY - SATURDAY)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS TO SAVE LIVES NORTH ACCOUNT: North, questioned about his activities on November 21 and 22, drew back to explain his purposes in shredding documents from October through November: ". . . I believe that the things I did were right and I believe that the lives of the people with whom I worked needed to be protected. "I knew that the successor that [w]as coming in wasn't going to do that. ". . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 195.)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS TO SAVE LIVES NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS TO SAVE LIVES NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.
86/11/22-150 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)			MEESE-SHULTZ INTERVIEW DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS is interviewed by MEESE and ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL COOPER. Among other things, GPS

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			tells MEESE that PRESIDENT told GPS earlier in week that PRESIDENT knew of November 1985 shipment." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/24-150.)
86/11/22-151 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)			MEESE-SHULTZ INTERVIEW SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. On November 21, the President authorized the Attorney General to go forward with an inquiry into the facts relating to the Iran initiative. You were interviewed, you recall, by the Attorney General on Saturday, November 22. "Secretary SHULTZ. I was very pleased to hear that the President had decided there should be an investigation. And I remember after my session with him that I described, I came back and I had felt--and I think I told my executive assistant I didn't make a dent on him. But then when I saw this investigation, I thought well maybe he had some second thoughts, maybe I made more of an impact than I thought. "Mr. BELNICK. The notes of your interview with the Attorney General reflect, among other things, your expressing the concern to him on that Saturday that this Iran matter--or fear that this Iran matter would somehow get wrapped into aid to the Nicaraguan resistance. "What was the basis for that fear that you expressed on Saturday, the 22nd? "Secretary SHULTZ. Because somebody had pointed out to me that the--I think it is the

DATE | GENERAL | CONTRAS | IRAN

Southern Air Transport was used in the Central American situation and also in terms of the flights of arms and so I said, 'Well, my gosh, if this gets connected, then we are going to have a problem with our policy in Central America.'

"That is what I noticed."

(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 114-15. See 86/11/22-700 [Sofaer testimony on his conversation with Shultz after the Meese-Shultz interview].)

86/11/22-160
NOVEMBER 22,
1986
(SATURDAY)

MEESE-SHULTZ INTERVIEW
MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, the second witness on your list [Ex. EM 42, after McFarlane] was Secretary Shultz.

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you interviewed him, I take it, the following morning, that is Saturday morning early, at 8:00 o'clock?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is right.

"Mr. NIELDS. Was that at his office or yours?

"Attorney General MEESE. That was in his office. He had called me the night before. I believe he had been out of town and got back and said, 'I understand that you would like to talk to me.' He had heard about this from someone, perhaps Admiral Poindexter or somebody, and said that he would be available the next morning, whatever time I wanted, and we agreed upon 8:00 o'clock in his office.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, during that interview, did the Secretary of State personally inform you that he had been told by Mr. McFarlane in 1985 that

Hawk missiles were being shipped?

"Attorney General MEESE. I believe he did. And I am going to refresh my recollection from the notes of that meeting.

"Again, I am referring to notes that were taken by Mr. Cooper. This took place on the 22nd of November. Present were myself, George Shultz, a gentleman by the name of Charles Hill, I believe it's Charles, Mr. Hill anyway from the State Department, and Charles Cooper.

"And I asked him about the November Hawk episode, and he said that during the--and again, I am referring to the notes. I don't know, do you have these notes as an exhibit?

"Mr. NIELDS. [T]hese are not exhibits at this hearing.

"Attorney General MEESE. These are the notes I am referring to of the conversation, and he said that during the Geneva Summit after the second day's meeting, he thought it was on the 18th, Mr. McFarlane came to George Shultz's hotel and said that a complex deal was underway, that there was a shipment of arms, he may have said Hawks, according to Mr. Shultz, would go to Iran on the assumption that hostages would be released. The Iranians would know what was on board the plane.

"And then Mr. Hill said: 'McFarlane said the plane would go from Israel to . . . [a European city]. If the hostages were released, it would go to Iran. If not, it would go back to Israel, and that we would be advised through . . . [another country] that hostages, that the hostages were released.'

"Do you want me to continue with the conversation?

"Mr. NIELDS. I think that is enough, Mr. Attorney General, thank you."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 96-98.)

86/11/22-161
NOVEMBER 22,
1986
(SATURDAY)

MEESE-SHULTZ INTERVIEW
MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Nields' question continuing from preceding entry:]

"[Mr. NIELDS.] I take it now that you did have conflicting versions at this point of which you had personal knowledge?

"Attorney General MEESE. We had certainly conflicting recollections of what had occurred.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you also had heard Colonel North's version two days earlier and you had heard from Mr. McFarlane that indeed North had been the active participant and indeed Mr. McFarlane had received some of his information from Colonel North. His version also conflicted with Secretary Shultz.

"Did it occur to you at that time that you might be dealing with something other than confusion?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, it really didn't because each of these people had been very straightforward in what they told and again as I said with Mr. McFarlane I remembered that he was at the summit with the President and this was a year later so it was not unusual that he had a different recollection.

"I thought that probably George Shultz

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			was--perhaps had the best recollection of what he had learned between the two of them, between h[im] and Mr. McFarlane because there had been notes taken at the time, not contemporaneously, but afterwards he had given the information to Mr. Hill. "I also know that George Shultz has [sic] been very much concerned about it because he told me that he had said to Mr. McFarlane it was a very bad idea; he didn't think it would work. "He said he was being consulted not for approval, and then he also said that he thought it didn't happen because no hostages were released and he said he had been told around Thanksgiving that it hadn't worked out and that the whole thing had shut down. "He said that he had breathed a sigh of relief. "Mr. NIELDS. Did Secretary Shultz during that conversation make reference to a concern he had about the involvement of Southern Air Transport and the fact that it was involved in both the Iran and the contra matter that had hit the press recently? [Compare 86/11/22-151 (Shultz) with 86/11/22-700 (Sofaer).] "Attorney General MEESE. I don't have any recollection that he did. I don't think he did. I certainly see nothing in here that he did, and I don't know why he would because Southern Air Transport wasn't involved at all in this shipment of Hawks in November of 1985. "I learned that from other sources, but it was not involved."

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 98-99.)
86/11/22-163 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE-SHULTZ INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-SHULTZ INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. VAN CLEVE. . . . [I]t is my understanding that Secretary Shultz told you that the President, to his knowledge, was aware of the Hawk shipment at the time it occurred in November 1985. It is my recollection that he told you or made a statement to you to that effect during your interview with him; is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. Counsel, I would have to check the notes of that interview because I don't recall without that that issue coming up. Secretary Shultz saw the President on the evening of the 20th, I believe, of November 1986, and discussed with him the whole situation at that time. The President said that he knew of the shipment that had taken place in November of 1985 but I am uncertain both from the notes and from my recollection whether the President's knowledge was as of November 1985 or as of November the 20th, 1986, when Secretary Shultz talked to him about it. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. If I might, and I appreciate your confusion, the context of that meeting between the Secretary and the President was that the Secretary meet with the President to express concern about the accuracy of congressional testimony that dealt with precisely this question and the question was, in effect, that knowledge U.S. officials had had of the shipment at that time, and so if I am not mistaken, what the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Secretary was relating to you on the morning of November 22nd was that the President had told him that he was, in fact, aware in November 1985 that there was going to be a Hawk shipment. "Would that be a fair conclusion to draw from the context? "Attorney General MEESE. That is possible, but I am not absolutely positive either from my reaction or from the notes. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. I believe earlier today you were asked another question about your meeting with Secretary Shultz and that was whether or not the subject of the involvement of Southern Air Transport had been raised at the meeting with Secretary Shultz, and my recollection is you said that you did not recall that subject having come up. [See 86/11/22-161.] "Am I correct about that? "Attorney General MEESE. That was my recollection, yes. And I am looking through the notes and I don't see any--any particular reference to that. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. I might just note for the record here that the committee has previously released the deposition of Judge Sofaer, the State Department legal advisor, which was taken June 18, 1987, and at page 68 of that deposition, Judge Sofaer makes the following statement in response to a question. "The question is on the general subject of the diversion and the question is, 'and did that lead you to conclude that there was probably a surplus of funds that had been generated in this

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			transaction?' "Answer, 'I didn't conclude anything, but it led me to mention to the Secretary on Saturday the 22nd at the end of the meeting with him after he had spoken to the Attorney General that I was very concerned about the possibility that there was a surplus of funds and that I had no idea how it was used but that I was also concerned about the presence of Southern Air Transport in the picture.['] "Then Judge Sofaer makes it clear on page 69 that he was not present at your meeting and that this discussion occurred after you had left. So I think that probably reinforces your recollection on that subject." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 194-96. On Sofaer's testimony, see below at 86/11/22-700.)
86/11/22-164 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE-SHULTZ INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. We also talked yesterday, and I want to make certain that the record is clear here, again on Shultz's notes on the contra connection. Yesterday you seemed to dispute that the committee had any evidence on that point. I just want to make clear, Mr. Attorney General, . . . first of all, that the committee last week had received testimony from the Secretary of State. It was sworn testimony, that he did tell the Attorney General on November 22nd at his interview that he was worried about a possible connection between the Iran arms matter and the contras. [See 86/11/22-151.]	MEESE-SHULTZ INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"And then the notes of his special assistant, the special assistant of Secretary of State Charlie Hill, who was present at the Attorney General's November 22nd interview of Secretary Shultz's record [sic], that the Secretary of State told the Attorney General that day, and these are Mr. Hill's words, 'Another angle worries me. Could get mixed up with help for freedom fighters in Nicaragua. One thing may be overlapping with another. May be a connection.' And that is the conversation that took place which is being reflected by Mr. Hill. "I thought that I want to keep that record straight. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rodino. I usually see you in the role of Chairman. In this particular case, I think the point that I misunderstood at the time was the implication that he saw some connection, some actual connection between the two matters, the Iran initiative and the freedom fighters of Nicaragua. "On the contrary, this appears that people might put a political connection between the two things; as he said, our enemies on the Hill would love to wrap the two together, rather than any actual connection. "Mr. RODINO. Let me read you further in the testimony by Mr. Secretary of State. In answer to Mr. Belnick, who said, and this is on page 115 of the testimony that was given that day, 'Mr. Belnick: The notes of your interview with the Attorney General relfect, among other things, your	

expressing the concern to him on that Saturday that this Iran matter or fear that this Iran matter would somehow get wrapped into aid for the Nicaraguan resistance. What was the basis for that fear that you expressed on Saturday the 22nd?

"'Secretary Shultz: Because somebody had pointed out to me that the--I think it is the Southern Air Transport was used in the Central American situation and also in terms of the flights of arms, and so I said, well, by gosh, if this gets connected, then we are going to have a problem with our policy in Central America.' [See 86/11/22-151.]

"Attorney General MEESE. But obviously that was not said to me; that was said to the committee here.

"Mr. RODINO. That was said to the committee here, yes.

"Attorney General MEESE. But at no time in my conversation with Secretary Shultz did he ever raise the issue of Southern Air Transport.

"Mr. RODINO. You don't believe that Mr. Hill's reflection of the Secretary's notes reflecting what the Secretary said at that meeting with you, the interview, that that doesn't suggest 'another angle worries me. Could get mixed up with help for freedom fighters in Nicaragua. One thing may be overlapping with another. May be a connection.' [Sic.]

"Attorney General MEESE. That refers to a political connection that enemies of the administration would love to wrap together. It certainly doesn't suggest anything related to Air

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Transport or an actual connection." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 290-92. See id., 7/29/87, at 302-04 [Shultz-Meese interview].)	
86/11/22-165 FROM NOVEMBER 21, 1986		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: [Continuing from 86/11/21-039:] "Mr. RODINO. . . . Mr. Attorney General, you have testified in your deposition that you were aware of the Judiciary Committee independent counsel request of October 17, 1986, regarding the Hasenfus flight. "You also knew that the Criminal Division was conducting an inquiry based on that request and that request specifically named the Vice President, Director Casey, Secretary Weinberger, Admiral Poindexter and Oliver North as individuals to be investigated. "All these individuals were on your list to be interviewed during your fact-finding inquiry, as well. "Didn't the fact that the Criminal Division had an inquiry underway already raise concerns in your mind at the outset about the propriety of speaking to these individuals without criminal investigators present? "I know you have had lots of criminal experience conducting investigations. Didn't you think that that was the proper thing? "Attorney General MEESE. It never was raised at all, Mr. Rodino, because there was absolutely no connection at all between the fact-finding I

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			was doing relating to Iran and the investigation which was proceeding in the Criminal Division, which had to do with Central America or South America. "Mr. RODINO. Mr. Attorney General, didn't you know of possible connections, for example, and I recite: you knew Colonel North--and this is according to your depositions--handled both the Iran and contra accounts at the NSC; you knew Admiral Poindexter, who was involved in the arms sales had called you to delay the Southern Air Transport investigation on the basis of the Iran situation; and on Friday, November 21, Mr. Reynolds['] notes indicate and [sic (that?)] department officials discussed the possibility that TOWs were redirected to the contras; on November 22, according to Secretary Shultz's notes, he expressed concern to you about the relationship between the arms sales and the contras because of the involvement of Southern Air. "Now, it seems to me that all of these had some connection and might have raised some concerns with you. "Attorney General MEESE. Mr. Rodino, I think you have got things mixed up here. "Mr. RODINO. I don't have them mixed up, I am just reciting facts, Mr. Attorney General. "Attorney General MEESE. I think it has been brought out in testimony today Secretary Shultz's notes that you refer to had nothing to do with a meeting with me, that was a meeting that he had with Mr. Sofaer and his legal advisors at a time

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			after the meeting he had with me, so this had nothing to do with anything that I knew about or that took place while I was present. "Furthermore, the Southern Air Transport investigation, I knew none of the details of that. I merely referred it to the FBI so that they could determine whether or not their investigation could be temporarily delayed. "I had no knowledge myself of how that connected with any of these other events, and to my mind and to the best of the knowledge of anyone else who was there as we discussed this, including Director Webster, there was absolutely no connection between the Iranian initiative about which we were asked to do a fact-finding inquiry and any other criminal investigation taking place in the Department." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 230-33.)
86/11/22-166 FROM NOVEMBER 21, 1986		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES AND SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES AND SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. RODINO. Well, Mr. Attorney General, I am going to read to you from a deposition [sic (public hearing testimony)] that was taken of Secretary Shultz by Mr. Belnick, and this is a matter of public record. [See 86/11/22-151.] 'The notes of your interview with the Attorney General reflect, among other things, your expressing the concern to him on that Saturday night that this Iran matter, of fear that this Iran matter would somehow get wrapped into aid to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			the Nicaraguan resistance. What was the basis for that fear that you expressed on Saturday, the 22nd?' "Secretary SHULTZ. 'Because somebody had pointed out to me that the--I think it is the Southern Air Transport was used in the Central American situation and also in terms of the flights of arms and so I said, "well, my gosh, if this gets connected, then we are going to have a problem with our policy in Central America."' "Attorney General MEESE. I don't believe that was ever stated at any meeting with me. I don't have the document, I don't believe, you are reading from. Can I have a copy of that deposition? "Mr. RODINO. This is public testimony, and this is a public record. "Attorney General MEESE. I was not here when that was given, Mr. Rodino, and I would like to see a copy of it before I respond to something [so] that I have [an] idea what you are quoting from or what the context of the question was. I can only tell you that I have-- "Mr. RODINO. I am quoting Secretary of State Shultz's [hearing testimony]. ". . . ." [Parliamentary inquiry on providing the Attorney General with a copy of the transcript.] "Attorney General MEESE. I see the statement of the Secretary of State in this transcript, Mr. Rodino, but I have looked at the notes that I have taken, or that were taken by Mr. Cooper at the time of my meeting with Secretary Shultz, and I

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			have looked at the notes that were taken, I believe, by Mr. Hill, and I find no reference to that. "And I have no recollection that there was such a conversation with me. "Mr. RODINO. That is your response? "Attorney General MEESE. And I believe that there was previous testimony here in this session this afternoon which indicated that, and which would clear up the matter, that Mr. Belnick was apparently in error when he talked about notes of the interview with the Attorney General and that rather those were notes of a meeting with Mr. Sofaer, the legal advisor of the State Department at a meeting after the one in which I took place. "So I think in order to resolve this, the only way to do it would be to look at the respective notes of those two meetings. ". . . . "Chairman INOUYE. . . . May I make an announcement at this juncture? I have been advised by the counsel of this committee that the references to which Mr. Rodino referred are, in fact, Mr. Hill's notes of the interview of Secretary Shultz[] by the Attorney General, and we will be pleased to point out, point these out to the Attorney General at the overnight recess, and Mr. Rodino, if he wishes, may examine them as he chooses. . . ." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 233-36, 242.)
86/11/22-167 NOVEMBER 22,		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES AND SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES AND SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCCOLLUM. . . . Now, I would like to turn to a couple of the things that you have been battered around the ears with here in the last few days. "One of them has to do with the issue that Mr. Rodino just brought up with you. Judge Sofaer supposedly got wind of this business about Southern Air Transport having a connection with the contras and this Iranian matter in the process of the weekend of November 20th to 25th, and during that time, as we have heard discussed--you were asked questions about this just a few moments ago--he talked about this with Secretary Shultz at some point, and you related the fact that in your conversation with Secretary Shultz on the morning of the 22nd, a Saturday, that didn't come up. "Am I correct? "Attorney General MEESE. I cannot recall that coming up in our conversation. "Mr. MCCOLLUM. . . . On page 68 of [his June 18] deposition, Mr. Sofaer was asked about his review of this whole matter of the TOWs, that is, the missile involvement in September and some of the sales later and so on, and he said on the 21st I came back to town and called Mike Mattison and I asked him to get me the figures on the cost of TOW missiles. "Question: He gave you--these are attorneys asking these questions for us, this committee--he gave you those figures and what did you conclude when you looked at the figures? "Answer: I concluded--Judge Sofaer says--I

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			concluded that the fair market value of the TOWs was substantially in excess of what the Department of Defense received from the CIA as payment. "Question: And did that lead you to conclude there was probably a surplus of funds that had been generated in this transaction? "Answer: I didn't conclude anything, but it led me to mention to the Secretary--that is, Secretary Shultz, his boss--to the Secretary on Saturday, the 22nd, at the end of the meeting with him, after he had spoken to the Attorney General, that I was very concerned about the possibility there was a surplus of funds and that I had no idea how it was used, but that I also was concerned about the presence of Southern Air Transport in the picture. "The point of that is that he apparently talked about it with Secretary Shultz right after you left or he left you. "Attorney General MEESE. I left him and apparently that is correct and I appreciate your correcting the situation which was referred to earlier by Mr. Rodino. There is no way that that that [sic] subject as far as his discussion with Judge Sofaer could have come up at the time that he discussed it with me." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 256-59. For Sofaer testimony, see 86/11/22-700.)
86/11/22-170 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)			MEESE-SPORKIN INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Following your interview with Secretary Shultz, I take it you returned to the

Justice Department and met with your team of attorneys?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And then you dispatched Messrs. Richardson and Reynolds to review documents at the White House?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. What was the reason for selecting Judge Sporkin?

"Attorney General MEESE. I believe that he was available. I think we may have tried to get other people because I know I was interested in getting to Colonel North, but I do believe that we called Judge Sporkin, now Judge Sporkin, then I guess he was a judge then--in any event, we got hold of Judge Sporkin and he said he was available and would come down.

"I don't remember whether we tried to get anyone else. If I look at Exhibit [EM] 42--

"Mr. NIELDS. I haven't made my question clear. I wasn't asking why did you take him out of order on your list, but rather why did you put him on your list in the first place? What did he have to do with this transaction?

"Attorney General MEESE. He had been the General Counsel at CIA during the time that this all took place, these transactions, particularly in November, and somewhere we had learned--and it may have been Thursday afternoon or it may have been subsequent to that--we had learned that there had been a discussion at CIA about whether there should be a finding made because of the very limited CIA participation.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"I think it is important to note here that in November of 1985 the shipment of whatever it was, whatever it was known to be, oil-drilling equipment or what was actually Hawks, was entirely an Israeli operation. "There was no involvement in the management or direction or source of weapons as far as the United States was concerned. It was the Israelis who asked us through the call from Mr. Rabin presumably and perhaps others to Colonel North--I mean to Mr. McFarlane, that they needed help with some minor aspects of it. "One item of help that McFarlane [k]new about or had been told about was that they needed some help with Customs in . . . [a European city]. "Later on, Colonel North apparently had been told that they needed help finding an airplane. There is a lot to that that we can talk about when we talk about Colonel North's testimony. "In any event, there was a tangential involvement or assistance by the United States. But even that, there were people at CIA in 1986, November 1986 [sic (1985)], felt that it would have been preferable to have a finding and in any event the people who had been involved who had been assisting Colonel North at CIA were told to talk to Mr. Sporkin, so his name had come up and we asked him to come in and talk with us. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you have a copy of a proposed finding in your possession at that time? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I did not. I don't believe I have ever seen a proposed finding in the sense of the one that we now know

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			is related to the events occurring in November of 1985. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. We don't need to go into a great amount of detail here, but let me ask you one question about your interview with Judge Sporkin. Did he tell you that he was aware at the time that munitions were involved? "Attorney General MEESE. Again, I am referring now to notes that Mr. Cooper took of that interview. He said that, and if I may, I will refresh my recollection from these notes--he said that Mr. McMahon, who at that time was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 'around November or December of 1985 sent to Sporkin two guys from operations, who he couldn't remember who they were, who reported that there was an arms shipment and transportation.' "'They told him of an arms shipment and transportation being involved. Sporkin said they would need a finding and he drafted one and told McMahon that it should be used.' "Mr. NIELDS. I think that is enough. "Attorney General MEESE. One other point that is probably relevant, he had in it something that would purport to ratify anything that already [had] be[en] done, which I think is important in that it was done after the fact. "Excuse me--if I could add one thing, because I see it in the notes[,] I think it is important to show the extent of Mr. Sporkin's knowledge--'he says he thinks that what was done was something to facilitate an arms transfer, a plane-load of some

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			kind of arms going to he thinks Iran. "'He can't recall if Israel was involved.' That was Mr. Sporkin's knowledge at the time." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 100-04; JHICI Exx. EM 42 [Meese notes listing persons to be interviewed, 11/21/86], CJC 18 [Cooper notes of Sporkin interview, 11/22/86].)
86/11/22-175 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. So you now as of the time of your interview with Judge Sporkin had learned that Director Casey's general counsel had been aware of the fact that arms were shipped. Did it at that point occur to you that you might be dealing with something more than confusion? "Attorney General MEESE. No, because this was consistent with what he had learned on Thursday afternoon. There was no doubt on Thursday afternoon that this had been Hawk missiles shipped and what Mr. Sporkin said was that he learned about it after the fact and actually it confirmed some of the things we had heard earlier that somehow this had come to the attention of CIA after the actions had been done and it was at that time that Mr. McMahon, being concerned because arms were involved, asked the people who had worked on this to talk with the General Counsel. "There was still confusion in my mind at that point as to who had learned what, when, and that is why I added to my list of people here in addition to Mr. Sporkin, who was already on the list, operatives one and two, who I believe were

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			people who may have had something to do with providing the information to Mr. Sporkin, and I think I also called around that time Mr. Casey asking if we could have the names of the people at CIA who were in any way involved. "Mr. Casey told me, and again, I have refreshed my recollection from a note on this, that he would make available the names of all the people who were at CIA headquarters, but if any of them were operating in the field, he would not make that available except on a one-by-one basis if they were actually necessary, which was apparently the normal procedure. "Mr. NIELDS. The two operatives you were interested in are the ones who had told Judge Sporkin what had been on the plane? "Attorney General MEESE. That is right." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 104-05.)
86/11/22-210 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		DoJ ACTIVITY: DISCOVERY OF THE DIVERSION MEMO MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. I take it following your interview with Judge Sporkin you had lunch at the Old Ebbits Grill? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, that is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. And you there met up with the two lawyers who had been doing the document review at the White House, Messrs. Richardson and Reynolds? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. Mr. Cooper and I went over there first and they joined us a few minutes later.	DoJ ACTIVITY: DISCOVERY OF THE DIVERSION MEMO MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. NIELDS. And I take it they during that lunch disclosed a document that they had found to you? "Attorney General MEESE. They talked about what they had done and said in the course of looking at the documents they had found a particular document that related to a possible plan or a plan that was laid out in the document that had to do with diversion of funds. "Mr. NIELDS. And when you say diversion, what did they tell you it was a diversion to? "Attorney General MEESE. I can't remember the exact words they used, but it was that funds which had been derived from the profits of the transfer of arms to Iran had been used for the freedom fighters in Nicaragua." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 105-06.)	
86/11/22-220 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		DoJ ACTIVITY: DISCOVERY OF THE DIVERSION MEMO COOPER ACCOUNT: At a restaurant over lunch, William Bradford Reynolds tells Meese and his assistants, Charles Cooper and John Richardson, of his discovery of the undated Diversion Memorandum. Meese discusses the potential impact of the memo later in the car as he drives back with Cooper to the DoJ. Cooper testified, "I think we both recognized two things about it. It had legal significance, though its legal significance wasn't obvious to me, . . . but it had political significance of a very large nature." They do not discuss calling in the FBI or securing documents at the NSC. (Cooper Testim.,	DoJ ACTIVITY: DISCOVERY OF THE DIVERSION MEMO COOPER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		JHICI, 6/25/87, at 85-89.)	
86/11/22-390 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	MEESE SCHEDULES MEETINGS WITH NORTH AND CASEY MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Following your lunch [at which the discovery of the Diversion Memo was disclosed], I take it you returned to your office? "Attorney General MEESE. I returned to my office, yes, and they [sc. Richardson and Reynolds] returned to the NSC office, NSC council staff offices. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you receive a telephone call from Colonel North? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall receiving a telephone call from Colonel North, although he may have been calling back. My recollection was that I called him, but he may have been calling back from a call I had left earlier that morning. That is possible. "Mr. NIELDS. In any event, at some point in time you attempted to reach him in order to schedule an interview and you did have a conversation with him either because you called him or because he called you after you returned from lunch? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe that is correct, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you schedule an interview? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, we scheduled a meeting for the following afternoon at two o'clock. "Mr. NIELDS. Very shortly thereafter, did you receive a telephone call from Director Casey?		

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Attorney General MEESE. Some time during the afternoon I received a call from Director Casey, yes. I think I may have talked with him earlier in the day, also. "Mr. NIELDS. You should have a set of appointment and phone logs. Do you see that in front of you? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, it says[,] 'Ed Meese, November 1986, appointments and phone calls.' "Mr. NIELDS. Now, it will take you a minute to find, but it is in chronological order and I would like you to turn to a sheet of paper dated November 22nd, Saturday, which appears to be in your handwriting. "Attorney General MEESE. I have something that says schedule for this, and there is a list that says telephone calls Saturday the 22nd of November 1986. But it is not in my handwriting. "Mr. NIELDS. But I take it it relates to your telephone calls? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, it appears to, and I believe it is probably in the handwriting of my confidential assistant, whose handwriting often is similar to mine. "Mr. NIELDS. Just looking at that, does that refresh your memory about the timing of your calls from Colonel North and Director Casey? "Attorney General MEESE. It says that 'at 9:55 a.m., received a call from Bill Casey.' Then it says 'at 3:40 received a call from Oliver North'; 'at 3:46 received a call from Bill Casey.' "Mr. NIELDS. So Director Casey called you		

some six minutes after the origination of your conversation with Colonel North?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you then scheduled a meeting, I take it, with Director Casey at his home that evening?

"Attorney General MEESE. Mr. Casey said he had something he wanted to talk with me about. I said why don't I drop by on my way home this evening, since we live not very far apart. So we did that and I said I would be by some time after five."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 106-08.)

86/11/22-391
NOVEMBER 22, 1986
(SATURDAY)

MEESE SCHEDULES A MEETING WITH NORTH

MEESE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. NIELDS. When you spoke to Colonel North in the afternoon to schedule his interview the following day, did you mention to him the new subject on which you wished to question him?

"Attorney General MEESE. Absolutely not. As a matter of fact, I asked him really to meet with us in the morning, because we were trying to meet with him on Sunday morning. He said that was the only chance he got to go to church with his family and would we mind if we made it in the afternoon; I said that would be all right with me.

"So we settled on 2:00 in the afternoon."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 117.)

86/11/22-400
NOVEMBER 22, 1986

NORTH-CASEY CONTACT

NORTH ACCOUNT:

"Mr. LIMAN. You saw the Attorney General on

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(SATURDAY)	the 23rd. "Mr. NORTH. On Sunday, the 23rd, right. "Mr. LIMAN. And you knew that you were going to see him on the 22nd. Is that correct? The Attorney General called for an appointment on the 22nd. "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you speak to the Director after the Attorney General asked to see you? "Mr. NORTH. I do not have a recollection of doing that, no." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 169.)		
86/11/22-505 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY AND NORTH POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. Let me ask you one final question, Admiral. "At 1:25 to 3:20 p.m. on Saturday, November 22, 1986, again according to schedule for Admiral Poindexter--and if you don't have it, I'll send it down to you--you had lunch with Director Casey and were later joined by Oliver North. "Was there anyone else present at that lunch? "Do you recall whether or not-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. In fact, I hadn't thought about that lunch until you just now mentioned it. "Mr. RODINO. Can you tell us what took place at that lunch? What did Casey say, what did North say, what did you say, if you can recall? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I really don't recall. Al Keel may have been in and out during the lunch. As I recall, it was-- "Mr. RODINO. Do you remember Don Regan	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY AND NORTH POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. POINDEXTER. . . . My recollection is we talked about how we could get over to the American people better what we were trying to do with the Iranian project. Probably Bill gave me a debrief of his meeting with the congressional committees the previous day, because I had only talked to him very briefly the evening of the 21st, I believe, and there was no discussion of the transfers of residuals to the contras at that point. ". . . ." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 154-55.) See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY AND NORTH POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. POINDEXTER. . . . My recollection is we talked about how we could get over to the American people better what we were trying to do with the Iranian project. Probably Bill gave me a debrief of his meeting with the congressional committees the previous day, because I had only talked to him very briefly the evening of the 21st, I believe, and there was no discussion of the transfers of residuals to the contras at that point. ". . . ." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 154-55.) See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	calling also for Casey during that time? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't remember that. "My recollection is we talked about how we could get over to the American people better what we were trying to do with the Iranian project. Probably Bill gave me a debrief of his meeting with the congressional committees the previous day, because I had only talked to him very briefly the evening of the 21st, I believe, and there was no discussion of the transfers of residuals to the contras at that point. "He, as I recall, had called me and wanted to know if I had eaten lunch yet, and I said no, and so he said why don't I come over and let's have a sandwich together. "But I don't remember much more about the meeting." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 154-55.)		
86/11/22-506 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NUNN. Admiral, you testified yesterday that there was a lunch, I believe on Saturday, November 22nd; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I do have a recollection of a lunch, yes. "Mr. NUNN. Who attended that lunch? "Mr. POINDEXTER. My recollection was it was just Director Casey and I. My schedule, which I forget--I guess it was Mr. Rodino raised that issue--you would have to pull my schedule out. It should indicate who was there.	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"As I recall, Director Casey called me from his Executive Office Building office and asked me if I had had lunch yet and I said no and he said, 'Why don't I join you for a sandwich?' I said fine. "It was very impromptu. It was the first opportunity I had had to meet with him since his testimony before the Intelligence Committees the previous day. He was up here on the Hill for many hours that day, six or eight hours. "Mr. NUNN. Who else was there? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall anybody else being there. "Mr. NUNN. Colonel North wasn't there? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He may have been. I don't recall it. He was not invited. He may have dropped in. "Mr. NUNN. Was your assistant, Al Keel, there? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He was in the office area. He may have dropped in. It was just Director Casey and I who were actually eating lunch. Other people may have come in while we were sitting there. "Mr. NUNN. At that meeting, that was Saturday November 22nd, that was after the President had his news conference on Iran on November 19th? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, it would have been. "Mr. NUNN. And that was after the meeting on November 20th between [sic (among)] you and Colonel North and Ed Meese and Mr. Cooper and Director Casey to discuss the Casey testimony to the Congress; is that right?	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. NUNN. And that was after Director Casey had testified on that Friday, November 21st to the Intelligence Committees; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. "Mr. NUNN. And that was after Friday the 21st when Ed Meese met with President Reagan and requested permission to proceed with his investigation; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think it is more accurately described as a fact finding-- "Mr. NUNN. Fact-finding investigation. "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. NUNN. And that was after--we have heard testimony that Colonel North and his secretary, Miss Fawn Hall, had shredded documents. I am not asking you to verify that. That was after that time sequence; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. If they testified that way. "Mr. NUNN. Right. And that was after Friday the 21st, when you have testified you ripped up the December 5th finding? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. NUNN. And that was after the Justice Department arrived that morning on Saturday the 22nd to go over the documents? "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, we will stipulate that that lunch at noontime on Saturday, November 22nd, took place after everything that happened before that. "Mr. NUNN. Thank you, Counsel. "Mr. BECKLER. Will that satisfy you, Mr. Senator?	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. NUNN. That is wonderful. If you had done that earlier, I could have skipped those questions." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 70-73.)	
86/11/22-507 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Chairman HAMILTON. Senator, you may proceed. "Mr. NUNN. Admiral, now I want to ask you some questions about the luncheon. What did you discuss at the luncheon? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I testified yesterday, about the only thing I could recall was Director Casey giving me a debrief of his meetings with the two intelligence committees the previous day, going over the questions that had been raised. "Mr. NUNN. You don't recall anything else? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The only thing that I can be positive of is that there was no discussion of the transfer of funds to the contras. "Mr. NUNN. Why don't you tell us what you are not quite positive of but think that you recall? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I have told you that. "Mr. NUNN. That is all you can recall? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is all I can recall. "Mr. NUNN. You didn't talk about the destruction of documents? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I didn't. "Mr. NUNN. Would you remember that now if you had, or are you just saying you can't recall? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I'm sure--I was unaware of the destruction of documents that Colonel North	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

was involved with, although, as I have testified, I thought that he was going to destroy some of his working documents.

"Mr. NUNN. Would you recall one way or the other whether you discussed destruction of documents with Director Casey at that time?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I'm sure I would have recalled that.

"Mr. NUNN. If it had occurred, you would recall?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I'm absolutely certain that I did not tell him that I had destroyed that earlier finding.

"Mr. NUNN. Did you discuss the Justice Department review?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't even recall discussing that.

"Mr. NUNN. Do you think you would recall it had it occurred?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think I would have recalled that. We may very well have discussed the different recollection that Secretary Shultz had of the November events and Mr. McFarlane's.

"This is an exhibit--I believe it is an exhibit. This is the transcript of the tape recording that I have referred to before [see 86/11/20-534, -535] of a conversation I had with Bill Casey when he was in Central America before he came back to Washington, and I think it is pertinent to the line of questioning that you are using, and I would like to read part of it into the record, because I think it demonstrates what our objectives were at that time.

"Mr. NUNN. I don't mind you doing that but I prefer you to let me complete my questioning, and if the Chairman would give you extra time after that, it could be done. Is that relevant to the lunch?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. It is relevant. I think what you are getting at is what was our mood, what was our intent, what were we worried about at the time.

"Mr. NUNN. Yes.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. The mood and the intent was one of finding out all the facts so we could get them out to the appropriate authorities in the Congress.

"My conversation with Bill starts, after initially establishing communications, at the top of page 2 of the transcript, it says, 'Bill, it is just that because I got to thinking about the hearing on Friday and the coordination the two of us need to do and I just didn't think there would be enough time to do it with your coming in early Friday morning. So if you could get back on Thursday so we could meet Thursday afternoon, I think it would be very useful so we make the best possible presentations on Friday and try to lay as many of these questions to rest as we can. Over.'

"Bill comes back, 'Okay, John, I'll be back Monday--I'll be back--I'll be back Thursday morning'--

"Mr. BECKLER. The hesitation is because of the way the transcript reads of the conversation.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I'm trying to read it accurately.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"He says, 'I'll be back Thursday morning and I would like whatever information you can collect in there, okay? Over.' "'This is John. Roger. We have been putting together all the chronologies and all the facts that we can lay our hands on and I'll be ready to talk to you any time on Thursday, but you probably would want to spend some time out at your place on Thursday morning, I guess, Over.' "And then the conversation goes on. "But my point is that I obviously did not know that that tape recording was being made. It was a contemporaneous conversation over a secure telephone, and I think it very accurately depicts our mood of trying to find out what all the facts were and get them out." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 74-77.)	
86/11/22-508 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NUNN. Admiral, would you read on over the third page of that transcript, the third sentence down? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Right. I come back to him and say, 'This is John. Okay.' The previous sentence, Bill says-- "Mr. BECKLER. Why don't we just keep reading? There's only a few more words between that and the next paragraph. "Mr. NUNN. Fine. I thought that last reference would probably lead up to the Saturday luncheon.	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. POINDEXTER. 'Bill, this is John. I prefer to meet Thursday afternoon. That would give you an opportunity to spend some time out at the Agency in the morning and talk to Clair' --Clair George, that is-- 'you know you went up' --or 'you know who went up. I guess the staffers came out to him today, but that would give you some time to talk to them in the morning. Over.' "Bill comes back, 'Are you going to have a lot of people at the meeting, State and Defense? Over.' "'This is John. We could do it however you would like. I want to--I would like to'-- "Mr. NUNN. Who is this, now? "Mr. POINDEXTER. This is me talking. 'I want to--I would like to spend some time, just the two of us, but if the--Ed Meese indicated he should want to be helpful and so he would like to be in at least one of the meetings. Over.' "'You set whatever time you would like for us to get together and have a little talk ourselves. Then I'll have, I'll handle a meeting any time you set it and I'll be there and I'll see you then on Thursday. Over.' "'This is John. Roger.' "Mr. NUNN. Admiral, thank you for that, and I think that does set up the Saturday meeting. "My time has expired. "It seems to me in light of the circumstances that we have been over, and we both agree to the sequence of events, that this was an enormously important meeting with you and Director Casey, and yet you seem to recall nothing about it except	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		that you had sandwiches. "Can you think of anything else that occurred at a meeting which certainly, based on the sequence of events, the conversations that you had had with Director Casey, must have been a very important and perhaps traumatic meeting between the two of you? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think by that time, we of course had provided the additional briefings to Congress, and, as I said, Director Casey had been up here for six or eight hours the previous day, and I wouldn't describe the meeting or the mood as traumatic. "We were concerned about the damage to the second channel. Director Casey had, as I[] had[,] been very optimistic that with the second channel, that we had finally reached the point where we were in a position to make some significant progress in terms of setting up a process that would lead to a better relationship with Iran. And obviously we were both very disappointed that it looked like that we weren't going to be able to salvage that. "At that point, at least in my mind, there was no concern about the transfer of residual funds to the contras. At that point, I was unaware that Director Casey was aware of it, so that particular issue wasn't discussed. "Mr. NUNN. Well, the only thing I could say, at that stage you had already gotten that long letter from Director Casey talking about the allegations about the $15 million being put in Central America, so you knew he knew there were	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		allegations to that? [See entries starting at 86/10/11-112.] "Mr. POINDEXTER. I knew he knew there were allegations to that, but I took it just that way, that it was very speculative. I was aware that generally the financial dealings in the whole business, not just our Iranian project, but across the board, in terms of financing Iranian arms purchases, were very complex. There were probably lots of financiers around the world that were participating and just because a particular individual comes in and says he speculates on this, I frankly didn't lend a lot of credibility to that." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 77-81.)	
86/11/22-509 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NUNN. Admiral, I find it paradoxical that in an effort to compartmentalize, you hadn't been told by North that Casey knew. Therefore, it seems to me it was the ultimate compartmentalization, that you, in charge of a lot of this operation, did not recognize that the man you were dealing with knew an awful lot about it. "It seems to me that is the ultimate in terms of over-compartmentalization to the point it seems you could make a case it was detrimental to the relationship between you and Casey, if the testimony is entirely accurate. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think it was in any way detrimental to my relationship with Bill	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Casey. I think that that relationship was very good. I certainly had very high respect for him and I think he did me. "It's ironic that indeed he knew. I wish that I'd known that. "Mr. NUNN. That is exactly my point. If you had known that he knew, there would have been a lot of things done differently, maybe good, maybe bad, maybe ugly-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. If I had known that he knew, I think that we could have possibly done things a bit differently, which would have improved our chances of success. "Mr. NUNN. I agree." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 77-81.)	
86/11/22-510 NOVEMBER 22-23, 1986 (SATURDAY AND SUNDAY)	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY AND NORTH: REGAN'S CALL REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. You testified that you went home over the weekend of November 22nd and 23rd of 1986 during the Attorney General's inquiry and didn't focus on the affair again until Monday when you came back, on November 24th? "Mr. REGAN. No. I focused on it. I was getting calls from various parts of my staff, things like that, what is going on. There were--I don't know who--but there were several people on the talk shows on Sunday, and I had been asked either by them or their intermediaries as to what my opinion is, what should they say about this, what should they say about that. So I was in general discussions, but I was in no way	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY AND NORTH: REGAN'S CALL REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY AND NORTH: REGAN'S CALL REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

part--what I meant by that was I was no part of the investigation nor was I questioned.

"Mr. COHEN. Did you call the White House yourself that day on Saturday?

"Mr. REGAN. Probably.

"Mr. COHEN. The phone logs indicate you called Admiral Poindexter during his lunch with Director Casey and Colonel North. Do you recall what you discussed at that time?

"Mr. REGAN. I suspect I was asking him technical questions about how much could be said or would be said on these talk shows.

"Mr. COHEN. Were you aware the Admiral was having lunch at that point with Mr. Casey?

"Mr. REGAN. No, I was not."

(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 129-30.)

86/11/22-512
NOVEMBER 22,
1986
(SATURDAY)

POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

See col. 3.

POINDEXTER'S LUNCH WITH CASEY: NO MENTION OF THE DESTROYED FINDING

POINDEXTER ACCOUNT:

"Mr. NUNN. . . . [W]e talked this morning at length about the lunch you had with Director Casey on November 22nd, which was Saturday. That was the day after you had destroyed the finding of December 5th.

"Mr. BECKLER. Yes. We stipulated that that lunch took place after everything that took place before it.

"Mr. NUNN. One other question.

"Did you this morning indicate that you did not in any way discuss the destruction of that finding with Director Casey?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't believe I did. I

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			don't have any recollection of that. I feel rather confident that I would not have discussed that with him. "Mr. NUNN. The thing I am puzzled on, why would you not tell him about destroying it? Wasn't he one of these people who knew about that finding? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, but you are missing the point, Senator. "When I destroyed that finding, I didn't really think that it was an important document from the standpoint of the process that we had been going through. I viewed it as being superseded by the final finding; and the reason I destroyed it was simply because if it leaked out, it would be misconstrued and present a picture that was not accurate as to the President's thinking at the time. "Mr. NUNN. Well, I understand that pa[r]t. But since Director Casey was head of the CIA and they were the ones who requested the finding, wasn't it important if that embarrassing information was not going to come out to know that finding had been destroyed? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think so. You see, you are putting too much importance on my destruction of that finding. At the time, my frame of mind was that destroying it was not really a very significant issue. And it would not have frankly occurred to me to even raise it with Director Casey. "It was a minor matter in my mind. As long as it didn't exist, you know, if it had leaked out,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			it would have been a big problem, I think. [Sic.] "Mr. NUNN. That is the point of my question. Unless you had the cooperation of Director Casey, it was inevitably going to leak out, wasn't it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Good evidence I didn't discuss it with him, the copies you have came from apparently CIA files. "Mr. NUNN. That is the point. I wondered why if you didn't want it to come out, you didn't tell him to get rid of it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I didn't consider it an important issue and it didn't occur to me there were other copies of it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21//87, at 192-94.)
86/11/22-595 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS: BROKEN SHREDDER EARL ACCOUNT: North tells Earl the shredder had broken on Friday night. Earl testified, "I reached up to turn it on, and sure enough, it wasn't working." Earl did not recall whether the shredder bag was full. Earl "intuit[s] from what [North] was doing" that North needs a shredder. They try to get into a room across the hall to use a different shredder; the room is locked. North takes "a file and a stack of documents that [Earl] knew from all of this were to be shredded" and walks toward the West Wing with Paul Thompson (Earl: "I am not sure, I think they [went together]."). Richardson and Reynolds from the Attorney General's office, out to lunch while this is	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS: BROKEN SHREDDER EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS: BROKEN SHREDDER EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	occurring, then return. (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 79-81.)		
86/11/22-600 NOVEMBER 22 AND 24, 1986 (SATURDAY AND MONDAY)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS: BROKEN SHREDDER EARL ACCOUNT AND NORTH REPLY: "Mr. MCCOLLUM. . . . The other day you testified if I recall correctly that when the attorneys general, then Mr. Reynolds and others, were in the office spaces of yours in the White House on Saturday 22 November last year, that you continued the process of shredding, that there was some of that going on routinely while they were there and you were asked a number of questions about it. ". . . . ". . . Colonel Earl . . . has testified that he saw you about noon that day and came up on the situation and you told him that the shredder had been broken the night before. He said he tried to work with that shredder and that indeed it was broken and that as a consequence of that and in fact it wasn't fixed all day that day, you went to the Situation Room and all the shredding to his knowledge done that day was done in the Situation Room. "Justice Department officials have said in the press that they don't remember the shredding that day. I am wondering if this refreshes your recollection at all if indeed perhaps you were mistaken about the day, where the shredding was going on or the timing of it that day. "MR. NORTH. My recollection is that the shredder was not broken, that it had jammed with	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS: BROKEN SHREDDER EARL ACCOUNT AND NORTH REPLY: See col. 1.	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS: BROKEN SHREDDER EARL ACCOUNT AND NORTH REPLY: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	an overload of documents in the teeth of the gears or whatever, that it had been reset, we needed to reset it again as I recall on Monday. I do recall specifically taking documents that I was working on, some of which were current intelligence and the like, and shredding them. My recollection is that I did it in my own office. Again, I attach no specific relevance to tnat. Some of those documents I shredded had absolutely nothing to do with the issues before these committees." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 117-19.)		
86/11/22-605 NOVEMBER 21-24, 1986 (FRIDAY - MONDAY)	THOMPSON'S ACTIVITIES POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Were you in contact with Commander Thompson on Monday morning, the 24th? "A. I'm sure I was. He was sitting right outside my office. "Q. Did Commander Thompson bring to your attention that Monday, or any time prior to that, that on the previous Saturday afternoon, November 22, he had been over in Colonel North's office after Attorney Meese's designees had been there reviewing documents and that he saw Colonel North assembling documents to take with him over to the White House Situation Room? "A. I don't believe he reported that. "Q. Were you aware on Monday morning the 24th that Thompson had been in on Saturday? "A. Yes. We were both in on Saturday. "Q. Did he give you any kind of a briefing, do you recall, Admiral, about what he had observed taking place Saturday with regard to the Attorney		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	General's representatives? "A. Yes. As I recall, in fact, I think I probably asked him if the Attorney General's people had come over. He said, 'Yes, they were busily going through all the files over in Colonel North's office.' "Q. Do you remember anything else about that briefing? "A. No. "Q. I assume it was an oral briefing? "A. Yes. "Q. You didn't take any notes, did you? "A. No. "Q. So he hadn't expressed any concern that North taking the documents out of his office over to the White House Situation Room might be a problem? "A. I don't recall that. I had called Commander Thompson on Friday after the Attorney General called me, and I told him to supervise the pulling together, or to arrange to have the documents pulled together." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 89-90.)		
86/11/22-650 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE-CASEY MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-CASEY MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: The Attorney General described his stop-off at Casey's home on Saturday after 5 p.m.: "Mr. NIELDS. How long did you stay? "Attorney General MEESE. Probably somewhere between a half-hour and 45 minutes, something in that neighborhood, perhaps as long as an hour. "Mr. NIELDS. What did you discuss?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Attorney General MEESE. Well, I had already talked to him about what I was doing at the President's request, and he told me that he wanted to tell me, because of what I was doing, that he had received information in October from a Mr. Roy Furmark, who was a friend of his or a business associate of his from his earlier days in New York. "Mr. NIELDS. What did the information--well, let me just ask, did the information relate to diversion of funds to the contras? "Attorney General MEESE. No. "Mr. NIELDS. Not at all? "Attorney General MEESE. No, not at all. The information was that Mr. Furmark had called him to say--and this was somewhere I think in the early part of October and that this was at a time when the whole Iranian Initiative had not been made public--Mr. Furmark had called to tell him that there were some, I believe, Canadians who had been middle-men in providing financing for the arms transactions and that they apparently provided in effect bridge funding, because the Iranians didn't want to put up the money until they got the weapons, and the CIA representatives working through the Israelis didn't want to turn over the weapons until they got the money, so somebody had to put up bridge funding, if you will, in order to make this thing go, and that these people apparently were putting up bridge funding, I believe dealing with the go-between, whom I later learned was a Mr. Ghorbanifar--I may have known it at the time--and that the people who had been

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			these financiers claimed that they had not been paid back all the money owed them, apparently they were putting it up for a short period of time, like 30 days, and receiving a rather high premium or interest rate for their putting up the money and that they were threatening to go public with this if they did not get their money. "And I believe Mr. Casey told me that Mr. Furmark felt that they were going to go public as a means of trying to get the U.S. to replace the funds that they felt they had not received. "In the course of the conversation, he said that they might even claim that the money that should have gone to them--I am not sure whether he told me this in so many words, but I later learned in other documents that Mr. Furmark had described it as going for U.S. and Israeli projects other than what was involved in the Iranian transfer. "Mr. NIELDS. I think you said a moment ago that you had already discussed with Director Casey what you were doing for the President. When did you have that discussion? "Attorney General MEESE. I think I probably told him that on Friday night. I tried to reach each of the Cabinet members on Friday night that we would probably be talking to. In Mr. Casey's case, it was just so that they were all on notice that we already knew what he knew from the work that had been done on Thursday afternoon in preparation of his testimony, but so that as I was asking these questions and talking to people, including people in the CIA or former CIA people, they wouldn't hear it for the first time from

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			somebody else and would know what I was doing and why I was doing it. "Mr. NIELDS. Director Casey made this disclosure to you in his home? "Attorney General MEESE. He told me about Mr. McFarlane's conversation with him earlier, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Concerning the possibility that funds from Iranian arms sales may have gone to some other projects? "Attorney General MEESE. That wasn't the disclosure. The disclosure was that Mr. Furmark had said that people were, in effect, trying to extort money from the U.S. Government by claiming that they would otherwise go public, and the claim of the money going to other projects was more or less incidental." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 109-12.)
86/11/22-651 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE-CASEY MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-CASEY MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. But you had just read a memorandum from Colonel North's files that contemplated money from the Iranian arms sales going to the contras. "Did you mention that to Mr. Casey? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I didn't, and for a very good reason. I felt that while this was some preliminary information we had gotten, I didn't know where it would go or what it involved until we talked to Colonel North--incidentally, I didn't know this came from Colonel North's files. It came from the documents that had been presented

to us by the National Security Council staff, so I didn't know what the origin was.

"But, in any event, I felt it was not appropriate to discuss this with anyone, even as good a friend as Mr. Casey, until after I found out what it was all about.

"Mr. NIELDS. Without disclosing it to him, did you ask him about it?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, I did not ask him about it because that would have disclosed the knowledge that I had. And there was nothing in his conversation which would have led to it logically.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, he had raised the topic of someone extorting money from the United States Government by making a disclosure that funds from the Iranian arms sales had gone to other projects?

"Attorney General MEESE. No. What he said was that they were, in effect, trying to pressure the United States into paying them the money that they felt they were owed by saying they would go public with this information, which would have of course then exploded, if you will, the Iranian initiative, and that they might even--I think Mr. Furmark had told him, if I recall correctly--and I'm not positive that he told me that night, but I think he did; I later found it out in some documents--that they had talked about money that should have gone to them being used for other Israeli or United States projects.

"Mr. NIELDS. This was on the 22nd of November?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. The President had had his press conference on the 19th?

"Attorney General MEESE. Right.

"Mr. NIELDS. Hadn't the President pretty much disclosed the Israeli--the Iranian initiative during his press conference of the 19th?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, but what I'm saying is that Mr. Furmark, when he talked with Mr. Casey, had talked with him I think in early October when this was still a highly secret, sensitive matter, and it was at that time that he said these people were threatening--Mr. Furmark was not involved--he said these other people, the Canadians as I think they were known to me at the time, were threatening to go public with this matter.

"Mr. NIELDS. As I understand what you have said, there was one thing that these people, if they went public, would disclose which had not yet been disclosed, which was that funds from the project had been used for other purposes.

"You had just heard a similar--you had read a similar thing in an NSC document. Didn't that logically--didn't the two logically relate? And I guess my question is why didn't you mention to Director Casey the information that you had on this subject.

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, because I only had very scant information, which was a memorandum, which we didn't know whether this had ever been followed, what had happened to it, and I felt it appropriate not to talk with anyone about that until we had pursued that memorandum, and the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			logical person to pursue it with was Colonel North, as in fact happened the next day." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 113-15.)
86/11/22-652 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE-CASEY MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-CASEY MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask Director Casey, when he told you that there was this threatened disclosure of funds being used for other purposes, did you ask him if that was true, were funds used for any other purpose, to your knowledge? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes--well, I don't know that I asked him that. It was a minor part of what--the real thing was the disclosure making this whole thing public, and in effect blowing the Iranian initiative. "What the funds were used for, as Mr. Casey reported to me, was a minor part of what Mr. Furmark had told him. But he also told me, and I believe it was that night, that he had talked to Admiral Poindexter about this and Admiral Poindexter assured him there was nothing to it and that nothing wrong had happened in regard to the funds. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, I understand from what you are saying that what was on Director Casey's mind was the threatened lawsuit or the threatened going public. "Attorney General MEESE. That's right. I believe he did mention that they were threatening a lawsuit. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it at least one of the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			things that must have been on your mind at the time was the diversion information that you had learned at lunch that day. And my question is, I gather you were attempting to do a full fact-finding investigation, and why didn't you ask--why didn't you take the opportunity to ask Director Casey what he knew about any use of arms sales proceeds for other purposes? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, as a matter of fact, he told me that he had talked to Admiral Poindexter about this--I believe it was at that time that he told me this--and that Admiral Poindexter had told him that nothing wrong had been done and that there was nothing to this. "In any event, the two did not seem to be directly related, particularly as he told me that this was something that was just a threat and that Furmark had portrayed it to him not as though they had any knowledge of anything, but that this was a threat that they were going to use to try to get the money from the United States. "Obviously I marked it in my mind as a matter to refer to later on, depending on what we found out from Colonel North the next day, and would have done so had that opportunity presented itself." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 115-17.)
86/11/22-653 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE-CASEY MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-CASEY MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Chairman INOUYE. On your 10-minute casual conversation that you had with the late Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, can you tell

us again why you did not think it was important enough to discuss the most important matter that was pending in the administration at that moment, the diversion?

"Attorney General MEESE. Which conversation are we now talking about, Mr. Chairman.

"Chairman INOUYE. This is the one [where] you stopped off at his house for 10 minutes and the conversation that you had with Mr. Casey?

"Attorney General MEESE. Is this the one on Saturday evening?

"Chairman INOUYE. Yes.

"Attorney General MEESE. That was more than 10 minutes, from 45 minutes to an hour. During that conversation, I did not bring this matter up, the diversion memo, because at that time I had not seen the diversion memo myself, didn't know very much about it, we had not verified what the memo meant, whether there had been a diversion scheme. I knew we were going to talk with Colonel North the following day, and I determined not to talk with anyone about that, including Mr. Casey, until such time as I knew more about it.

"Chairman INOUYE. But you knew enough and suspected enough, didn't you?

"Attorney General MEESE. I didn't have any basis to suspect anything. We didn't know whether that memo was just somebody's pipe-dream, some idea, or whether there was actually some substance that it had been implemented. At that time we had no knowledge whatsoever of what this particular document meant. As I mentioned, I had not even seen the document itself.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Chairman INOUYE. Although you weren't quite certain as to the full import of the document, you were startled, and-- "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. And shaken by that. "Attorney General MEESE. I was startled even by the possibility that somebody was thinking in those terms. "Chairman INOUYE. When you dealt with Mr. Casey, you were dealing with someone who was one of your closest friends. You had worked together with him in campaigns, raised funds together, you had enjoyed victories, some defeats. You had gone through turmoil of politics. You weren't dealing with a stranger, were you? "Attorney General MEESE. I dealt with Mr. Casey in one campaign and fortunately we had only victories, no defeats, and that was the campaign of 1980, so he was a good friend. "Chairman INOUYE. So you were dealing with someone friendly? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. Not a stranger? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. Why were you so shy in asking him the $64,000 question? "Attorney General MEESE. Because of the importance of this situation and because I didn't know what that information that had been discovered meant yet, and so I made the decision instinctively, I think, as any lawyer would, not to talk with anyone about something that important until such time as I knew what I was talking

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			about. "Mr. Chairman, I have always thought since that time if I had talked with Mr. Casey on that Saturday evening, then this committee would now be asking me, 'Why did you tip off Mr. Casey and let him cover the ground before you talked with Colonel North?' "Chairman INOUYE. Weren't Colonel North and the Admiral tipped off already? "Attorney General MEESE. Not at all. They didn't know if I had the memorandum. That is why Colonel North the next day when I talked to him showed considerable surprise that we had it." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 115-18.)
86/11/22-654 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE-CASEY MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-CASEY MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Chairman INOUYE. In dealing with Mr. Casey, he did bring up the diversion with you, didn't he? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. He talked about Mr. Furmark. "Attorney General MEESE. He talked about Mr. Furmark, but I didn't view that as part of this diversion or part of any diversion at that point. "Chairman INOUYE. Did that tip you off that this may have been related? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir. The way he talked to me about the Furmark matter had nothing to do with this kind of diversion or anything to do with the contras, and it was more a threat to go public with a lawsuit, which was something

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			quite apart, and was still part of the whole aspect of the Iranian Initiative and had no relationship whatsoever with what was going on in Central America." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 118-19.)
86/11/22-655 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. . . . Just hours before visiting CIA Director Casey at his home on November 22, 1986, you had learned of the diversion memorandum found in Colonel North's White House office which said $12 million from the Iran arms sales would be sent to the contras. Casey told you at that time that the Iranian intermediaries were still owed $10 million[], they had advanced on arms and were threatening to expose the Administration's secret arms deals with Iran and possible funding of other projects. "And according to Secretary Shultz's testimony and notes of his various meetings, he told you that day that he believed there was an overlap between the Iran sales and the contras. "I have got [to] ask in view of that, Mr. Attorney General, how it was possible for you in view of the information you had already, knowing that you were conducting an inquiry, how you could fail to ask Director Casey a question concerning that very problem of Iran funding? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, first of all, Mr. Rodino, your facts are not correct. I had no information from Secretary Shultz at all about any	CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

concern or knowledge that he had of any overlap between the Iranian Initiative and the contra funding. That was not in any way discussed that I can recall at the meeting that I had with Secretary Shultz that morning, and indeed, to the best of my knowledge, that was never discussed with Secretary Shultz prior to the discussions we had in the President's office on Tuesday, the 25th of November.

"Furthermore, I had heard of the memorandum that you describe. I had not seen the memorandum and did not know the details. As a matter of fact, I didn't see that memo until the following morning, and as I previously testified, I believe in answer to questions by Mr. Nields, I had deliberately not talked to Mr. Casey about that until such time as I would have the opportunity to read the memorandum and talk to Colonel North and know what the whole situation was about.

"Mr. RODINO. The question that I have to ask again, and I ask it [o]f myself also, is how would it have been possible for you not to have asked Director Casey, after having had some knowledge of these matters, when you knew that you were responsible for conducting a fact-finding inquiry?

"Attorney General MEESE. Mr. Rodino, as I indicated earlier, both in response to you and to Mr. Nields, I first wanted to find out what this whole Iranian-contra link, if there was one, was all about. All I had received at that time was verbal information that there was such a memorandum. I had not had the opportunity to see the memorandum, I knew nothing of the details, and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		I knew that the person that seemed to know the most about it would be Colonel North, and, therefore, I made the conscious decision not to talk to Mr. Casey or anyone else about it until we had found the facts from Colonel North. Obviously, had there been any indication that Mr. Casey knew of it, or maybe just to determine whether he knew about it, I would have questioned him further about it after finding out the facts from Colonel North and after seeing the document. "In fact, the events of Monday eclipsed that because it was Mr. Casey himself who told me on Tuesday morning that he had known nothing about it." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 213-16. See 86/11/25-007.)	
86/11/22-656 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE-CASEY MEETING, AND CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-CASEY MEETING, AND CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. RUDMAN. Let me move on to the Casey meeting. "I would like to make an observation based on some of your comments yesterday. "I think it is important for this record to say something about the evidence on Mr. Casey. "You testified that Colonel North advised you that only three people in the United States Government were aware of the diversion: Colonel North, Admiral Poindexter, and Bud McFarlane, who learned it pretty far along into the transaction; is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

"Mr. RUDMAN. Admiral Poindexter testified that he did not know that Casey knew about the diversion.

"You are aware of that testimony, I am sure?

"Attorney General MEESE. I am now that you have told me. I did not see that myself.

"Mr. RUDMAN. As a matter of fact, he expressed some surprise because he had told Colonel North not to share that information with anyone.

"Both of those events took place while Mr. Casey was still alive. I am talking about the admiral's knowledge in his mind that Casey didn't know and Colonel North's discussions with you in November of 1986.

"The only evidence that this committee has before it that Mr. Casey knew about the diversion was Colonel North's testimony here, which was some several months after Mr. Casey died.

"Mr. Casey, it is my understanding from your testimony, denied to you that he had knowledge of the diversion before it was disclosed.

"Am I correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir, he told me and in my presence he told then Congressman Wright and a group of people gathered at the White House the same thing.

"Mr. RUDMAN. I wanted to clear that record.

"Attorney General MEESE. I am glad you did, Senator, because Mr. Casey, in my opinion, was one of the most honorable people that ever served the Government and the people of the United States. I think the fact that he is not able to defend

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			himself means that the record should not contain an assumption necessarily that at any time he was not telling the truth or lying when he made the statements that were made in various fora that I have discussed. "Mr. Casey was a person that I would believe without question and I think that under the circumstances, I appreciate very much you bringing this up. "Mr. RUDMAN. I think it is important because it will be a matter in dispute in our report, I am sure, but I think it is curious that the only time we have this statement made is after Mr. Casey is no longer around to discuss it. "Now we know that Mr. Casey had numerous meetings with Colonel North, 35 at Langley by count of our staff and others that we are aware of. "I think it is important that the state of that evidence be known. I want to ask a few questions about that meeting that was covered yesterday." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 21-23.)
86/11/22-657 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE-CASEY MEETING, AND CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-CASEY MEETING, AND CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Sen. Rudman's question continues from preceding entry: "[Mr. RUDMAN.] It is my understanding that just a few hours before your meeting with Casey, you learned about what we call the diversion memo; correct?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

"Attorney General MEESE. I learned about it, yes, sir.

"Mr. RUDMAN. I think it's fair to say that you were shocked when Brad Reynolds told you about the existence of it?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I was.

"Mr. RUDMAN. As a matter of fact, Mr. Cooper described your comments with some politeness and said that you exclaimed something like, 'Oh, gosh, oh, darn,' I think he said.

"Attorney General MEESE. I think that is close enough.

"Mr. RUDMAN. You thought it was pretty significant?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I did.

"Mr. RUDMAN. I mean, it raised a whole line of new issues in your mind?

"Attorney General MEESE. It certainly did.

"Mr. RUDMAN. When you got to his house that night, he told you, of course, about the Furmark conversations, which indicated there might have been Israeli involvement, some U.S. involvement, am I correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. The bulk of that conversation was really about the Canadians and these money lenders and what they were griping about to Mr. Furmark, and that they were threatening to go public with this thing and even commence a lawsuit. That was the principal subject, and he also indicated to me, I believe at that time, that he had some documents relating to that that he would send me.

"Mr. RUDMAN. He also, I believe, told you the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Canadians were claiming that money from this transaction had been converted to other U.S. and Israeli projects; is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. Not in as many words. What he said was that Mr. Furmark had told them that as a means of pressing their claim, they would even say that moneys had been used for other U.S. and Israeli projects, and it was clear to me that what Mr. Furmark had said to Mr. Casey was not that Mr. Furmark or Mr. Casey believed that had happened, but that they were going to use that as leverage to try to get the United States to pick up the difference in what they felt they were owed. "Mr. RUDMAN. I think that is exactly what occurred, and here is my question: Didn't you draw a connection at that point between this memo which had really shocked you and your associates just a few hours before, and now you are hearing a story about other uses or diversions of U.S. funds? Did you make a connection in your mind at that point? "Attorney General MEESE. I didn't make a connection in the sense of saying this must be connected, but I put in my mind this is going to deserve further investigation after we find out what the so-called diversion memo was about itself, and whether in fact that had happened. "Mr. RUDMAN. But you chose for reasons you explained yesterday not to ask Casey about the specific diversion that you were aware of? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. I chose not to talk to anyone until we learned more about

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			it and found out what we had and went into it in a systematic rather than a casual way." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 23-26.)
86/11/22-658 NOVEMBER 22, 1986 (SATURDAY)		MEESE-CASEY MEETING, AND CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE-CASEY MEETING, AND CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. RUDMAN. Let me give you a problem with that. It seems to me there is a fundamental conflict in that and it may be because we don't understand your state of mind at that point. Even giving it that, you claim, and I believe you, that you had not thought of this as a criminal investigation even at that point, I take it; is that correct? [Sic.] "Attorney General MEESE. That is right, it was not a criminal investigation at that point and at that point we didn't know whether this memo accurately portrayed anything that had happened. "Mr. RUDMAN. It wasn't criminal then; it was political, just a problem with a capital 'P' but it wasn't criminal? "Attorney General MEESE. I would call it a fact-finding inquiry to determine what in fact had happened in the implementation of a governmental policy, administrative in nature rather than criminal. "Mr. RUDMAN. I'll accept that. And if it was not criminal and it was administrative and you were trying to find facts, the thing some of us have difficulty with is, since you weren't worried about anybody being involved in a crime, why

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			didn't you ask your close and trusted friend Bill Casey? You have related this story about Canadian investors. Let me tell you about something that actually happened, we think. Why didn't you do that and ask him then and there? That is very puzzling to many people. "Attorney General MEESE. I'm glad you gave me the chance to answer that because it isn't puzzling to me. I've gone into complex fact-finding inquiries before, spent a good portion of my life as a lawyer doing those kinds of things. One of the things you do is you follow particular leads and get the information on those leads before you start asking people who were not otherwise involved about them. "Even as close a friend as Mr. Casey, I felt it was better to find out all that we could know with the person who, to our knowledge, would probably have the most information about it, in this case Colonel North, before I started talking to Casey about it or Secretary Weinberger or any of the other people who might possibly have information." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 26-27.)
86/11/22-660 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		MEESE-CASEY MEETING, DIVERSION, AND CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. COHEN. I was curious, in response to Senator Rudman's inquiry about the diversion situation, about the only consistent testimony we have is the nature of the expletive you used. [See 86/11/22-657.] Everybody recalls exactly	MEESE-CASEY MEETING, DIVERSION, AND CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		what you said when you were finally confronted with that diversion--very clear. All the people involved know what you said. "But something obviously changed in your mind from that point on. It was no longer simply a sort of a fact-finding inquiry on a civil matter. Something went off in your head, I think you used the word 'a siren'--Senator Rudman said sirens must have been going off and you agreed. [See 86/11/23-400.] "Attorney General MEESE. I agreed it was a wholly different situation than when we started at noon on the 21st of November. "Mr. COHEN. It became so on Saturday after you talked with Director Casey, more so, because then you learned about the so-called Canadian businessmen seeking to perhaps extort money out of the United States? "Attorney General MEESE. No. I honestly didn't think that that had any particular relation. I didn't think that that had any connection. "There was nothing Mr. Casey told me that would indicate it did, although it was worth coming back to and looking at later on to see if there might be a connection. "Quite frankly, when I got the documents the following Wednesday that related in much more detail, again there was no connection. "Mr. COHEN. You certainly found a connection as of Sunday afternoon after you talked to Colonel North? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir.	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. COHEN. At that point in time, hadn't--in your vast experience as a prosecutor in California and elsewhere on the part of this Government, at that point in time, once you learned from Colonel North himself that indeed a diversion had taken place, didn't that click in your mind that now we had the potential for the violation of criminal statutes? "Attorney General MEESE. We had the possibility of criminal statutes being violated or at least the potential for that. That is why I decided to look to see whether there were criminal statutes. "Mr. COHEN. Basically it is no longer a fact-finding inquiry. Something went off in your mind. You said wait a minute, we have a serious problem, not only about the diversion memo but now we have it from Colonel North himself that funds were in fact diverted. "In your mind, at least, it is no longer a civil inquiry; you are leading up now at this point in your mind that there is the very real possibility of a violation of existing law? "Attorney General MEESE. I didn't know of the violation of any existing law at that time. What was in my mind--my mind set at that time was we had a continuing civil inquiry but there was a potential in the future for determining it might have criminal implications, which in fact had occurred--or at least suspicions along that line had occurred by the following evening sufficient that we were able the next day to refer to the Criminal Division."	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 54-57.)	
86/11/22-661 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		MEESE-CASEY MEETING, DIVERSION, AND CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. COHEN. I found it somewhat curious, Mr. Attorney General, that all of the evidence involving presidential knowledge and approval of the Israeli transfers was either altered or shredded. "Do you have any idea why such an effort was made to alter the evidence or destroy it with respect to that transaction? "Attorney General MEESE. Obviously the presidential finding that was signed on the 17th of January is still in existence. I believe the committee has copies of that. "Mr. COHEN. I am talking about prior to January 17. "Attorney General MEESE. Apparently--I don't know. "Mr. COHEN. What is the problem? Is it because there is no finding? Did the President have an oral finding? Was it because it was retroactive in application? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't know. We found numerous documents relating to that. There were numerous memoranda in the NSC. "Mr. COHEN. They were all altered. "Attorney General MEESE. Why they were altered, I don't know. "Mr. COHEN. To reflect it was not a U.S.	MEESE-CASEY MEETING, DIVERSION, AND CRIMINAL ISSUES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

either authorization or--indeed, almost no acquiescence. I don't understand what the effort was to portray this as somebody else's idea and the U.S. had no connection at that time.

"Attorney General MEESE. I am not sure that is correct, Senator.

"As the story was told to me in November by various people, including Colonel North, there was no--at that time, there was no hesitancy to acknowledge the United States involvement.

"As has been pointed out here, Mr. McFarlane even went to great lengths to indicate presidential involvement earlier, rather than later, at a particular point in his testimony.

"So I don't really know the answer to your question."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 57-58.)

86/11/22-700
NOVEMBER
21-22, 1986
(SATURDAY)

CLUES ABOUT THE DIVERSION: SOFAER'S DEDUCTION
SOFAER ACCOUNT:

See col. 3.

CLUES ABOUT THE DIVERSION: SOFAER'S DEDUCTION
SOFAER ACCOUNT:

On Friday afternoon, Sofaer asks his deputy, Mike Matheson, to get him the cost of the various weapons involved in the arms transfers:

"Q. He gave you those figures, and what did you conclude when you looked at the figures?

"A. I concluded that the fair market value of TOWs was substantially in excess of what the DOD received from the CIA as payment.

"Q. And did that lead you to conclude that there was probably a surplus of funds that had been generated in this transaction?

"A. I didn't conclude anything, but it led me to mention to the Secretary on Saturday the 22nd

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			at the end of the meeting with him, after he had spoken to the Attorney General, that I was very concerned about the possibility that there was a surplus of funds. And that I had no idea how it was used, but that I also was concerned about the presence of Southern Air Transport in the picture. "And Mike Armacost mentioned the fact that there had been this contact in May of '86 from people involved with the [redacted.] And he was concerned about money being diverted for freedom fighters around the world essentially. "Q. What did the Secretary say? "A. The Secretary didn't say anything, he just listened. "Q. This was after the Secretary had met with the Attorney General? "A. Yes. "Q. And so the record is clear, the meeting between the Secretary and the Attorney General took place [in] the morning, that Saturday before lunch? "A. Yes, took place early in the morning." (Sofaer, Senate Dep., 6/18/87, at 67-69.)
86/11/23-100 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)	"SHREDDING PARTY" AND DIVERSION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	"SHREDDING PARTY" AND DIVERSION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCFARLANE. . . . [T]he next meeting I had with him [North] occurred on Sunday morning. He called me at home. My wife and I were getting ready to go to church--it was about 9:15--asked if I could--asked if I could meet with him on Sunday morning later on, and I told him all right, what about noon in my office, and he said fine, he	"SHREDDING PARTY" AND DIVERSION McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		would like to bring his attorney with him, so as to make sure of an accurate record of events that he had to have in mind. "So I went to my office at noon that day downtown and waited for Colonel North, put on some coffee. At about 12:30, I imagine, Ollie arrived alone and came into the office and we began to talk about odds and ends, and he stated that having been associated with the whole thing for a long time, that he thought that the President was in a very solid position and that there really was only one matter that concerned him, and it was the matter of the channeling of funds to the contras from the Iran account. "And I said, well, that was approved, wasn't it, and he said yes, you know it was, you know I wouldn't do anything without approval. "And I said, well, all you have to do is lay it out, do the right thing. And he said, I believe, something to the effect that it is a matter of record in a memorandum that he had done for Admiral Poindexter, I believe he said February or March--it may not have been February or March--and he said something like, I must see what can be done about that memo, or words to that effect. "And your mention of shredding, I don't know if it occurred on that date or on the way downtown with certainty, but it was one of those, I believe. "Mr. LIMAN. Mr. McFarlane, when he told you that it had been approved, you know I wouldn't do anything that wasn't approved--did you ask him who	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		conveyed that approval? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 182-83. See id., 5/11/87, at 176-79; 5/13/87, at 135-37, 172-74; 7/14/87, at 283-85 [shredding party references].)	
86/11/23-105 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		DIVERSION: THE PROBLEM MEMO AND APPROVAL McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. On Sunday, November 23rd, Mr. McFarlane, you met with Colonel North in your office prior to North's interview with the Attorney General. Did Colonel North tell you at that time that the only potential problem that he saw was a memo he had written regarding the diversion of Iranian arms sales profits to the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, sir. "Mr. RODINO. Let me ask you whether or not you know how Colonel North would have known that the memo had been found at the Department of Justice? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't believe that he said that he did know that, and my assumption was that he did not know. I did not know. The way he stated it at the time, he said, having gone through all of this in my mind, the only thing that I can think of that might be a problem is the channeling of money from the Iran account to the contras. "And I said, 'Well, that was approved, wasn't it, Ollie?' And he said, 'Yes, it was. You know I wouldn't do anything that wasn't approved. But	DIVERSION: THE PROBLEM MEMO AND APPROVAL McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		it is a matter of record, in a memo that I, North, think I wrote in February or March of 1986,' and that is all he said. "Mr. RODINO. He didn't say that there was a possibility that that memo had been found by someone at the Department of Justice? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir. If he knew that, he didn't say so." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 223-24.)	
86/11/23-300 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW COOPER ACCOUNT: Meese, along with his assistants Cooper, Reynolds and McGinnis, interviews North for about four hours, starting at 2 p.m. North discusses having received a call from McFarlane in November 1985 about problems the Israelis were having with a shipment of oil-drilling equipment. Cooper testified about the North interview: "Ms. NAUGHTON. Did Colonel North tell you he had doubts about the story that it was oil drilling equipment? "Mr. COOPER. He did. He indicated that he thought it probably wasn't really oil drilling equipment, but he also made the point that he thought he could pass a lie detector test to the effect that is was oil drilling equipment. "Ms. NAUGHTON. From whom did he claim he first learned that there were HAWKs on that plane? "Mr. COOPER. He said that jokingly, by the way. "Ms. NAUGHTON. From whom did he first learn	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW COOPER ACCOUNT: Cooper testified on North's interview with the Attorney General, and North's discussion of the November 1985 shipment. See column 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

that there were actually HAWKs aboard the plane?

"Mr. COOPER. He identified, I think, two people who had told him they were HAWKs: Mr. Secord, who[m] he identified as somebody whom he had enlisted to assist in this effort in November; and[] Mr. Nir from Israel, as having at some point advised him, but Secord apparently was the first person to advise him and advised him in the immediate aftermath of the events.

"Ms. NAUGHTON. Was Colonel North eventually questioned about the contra diversion memo?

"Mr. COOPER. Yes, he was.

"Ms. NAUGHTON. And who presented the memo to him?

"Mr. COOPER. The Attorney General. The Attorney General was the dominant interviewer by far during the time that he was there.

". . . .

"Ms. NAUGHTON. Can you recall as specifically as you can what the Attorney General asked him?

"Mr. COOPER. I think the Attorney General was asking about finances, finances that were involved in this whole Iran initiative, and he asked him about the monies that went to the Nicaraguan resistance.

"Ms. NAUGHTON. What was Oliver North's reaction when the Attorney General asked him if any of these funds went to the Nicaraguan resistance?

"Mr. COOPER. He appeared to be visibly surprised and not expecting to hear that question.

"Ms. NAUGHTON. Can you describe to us what his reaction was?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. COOPER. Well, I think he--my best recollection is that he paused for a moment, silent, before he responded, and then he responded that--in a way that was responsive, and certainly did not--he acknowledged the transfer to the contras. But it was just obvious surprise on his face. "Ms. NAUGHTON. Did he ask if there was a cover memo? "Mr. COOPER. Yes, he did. I have a general recollection to that effect. Whether it was immediately, I don't recall, but he did ask that question. "Ms. NAUGHTON. Did the Attorney General ask Oliver North[,] should we have found one? "Mr. COOPER. The Attorney General asked something to the effect--first of all, I think Mr. Reynold[s] said, no[,] there was no cover memo[,] and somebody--and I suspect it was the Attorney General--I think that it was--said essentially, 'Why did you ask that question? Is there a cover memo with this? Should we have found one?' "North's response, again to the best of my recollection, was, 'No, I just wondered,' or something to that effect." (Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87, at 94-98.)	
86/11/23-350 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Do you have any reason to believe that the Attorney General was aware prior to [November 23] that the proceeds from the Iranian arms sales were used to support the	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: North discusses with Meese the proceeds of the Iranian arms sales. See col. 2.

contras?

"Mr. NORTH. No, I have no reason to believe that he was. But when he asked me, I told him.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, when he asked you, did you tell him that the difference was in accounts controlled by General Secord, or did you tell him that the difference went from the Israelis directly to contra accounts?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not recall the specifics of that conversation. It was a--to put it mildly--a very long night before and a very difficult week prior to, and I have no real recollection of that interview other than the fact that it did indeed happen on Sunday afternoon, and that when the Attorney General asked me, holding--one of the two of us holding the memo of April which delineated, as a part of that memo, that residuals would be used for aiding the Nicaraguan resistance, I do recall that the Attorney General asked me point bla[n]k, 'Did this happen?'

"I told him that transaction did not happen. He then asked me if anything like that had ever happened, or words to that effect, and I told him it had.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you listen to his press conference on the 25th of November?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes, I did.

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . [D]o you recall him saying in his press conference that the money had gone straight from an Israeli account into contra accounts and had not been handled by any U.S. persons?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't recall that specific part

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		of it, but I do recall that there was something like that, yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Did he get that from you? "Mr. NORTH. He may well have, and I am not denying that at all. . . . " . . . . "Mr. NIELDS. You knew that the residuals went into accounts controlled by General Secord, not accounts controlled by the contras? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you recall the Attorney General saying that they had gone directly from Israeli accounts into accounts controlled by the contras? "Mr. NORTH. I do not recall that specific wording, but I don't dispute that he said it. I am sure if it is on the transcript, he did. "Mr. NIELDS. My question is, did he get that from you? "Mr. NORTH. He may well have." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 131-34.)	
86/11/23-352 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on his question to the Attorney General, when presented with the Diversion Memo, whether a cover memo had been found: "Mr. RODINO. Was there a cover memo, Colonel? "Mr. NORTH. I honestly don't recall, Congressman Rodino. It was not uncommon for me to put cover memoranda on my memos. You have certainly seen many of those in which I did.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"There were also occasions when I did not, and it was not a question asked in subterfuge of the Attorney General. It was simply a straightforward, bald question by a person who was surprised that the document still existed. And I don't mean that lighthearted. I mean very seriously, it was an honest, straightforward question. I just did not remember.

"Mr. RODINO. Well, the reason that I asked, Colonel, is that reference is made to the fact that you did refer to a cover memo and I wondered why you would refer to it if such a cover memo did not exist.

"Mr. NORTH. Well again, I was inquiring as was there a cover memo with this document. They had found a document that I truly did not believe existed any more, and they put it before me in that Q and A session that they had and I asked the question, was there a cover memo with this? Because obviously it is an incomplete memo.

"Mr. RODINO. Let me ask this, Colonel. Since you have been very honest and truthful with the committee in telling us that you shredded a number of documents, did you shred any cover memo, any of the five documents that have been referred to and testified to?

"Mr. NORTH. I do not recall specifically shredding that cover memo or any other. I shredded many, many memoranda in that period of time from early October through the time of my departure.

"Mr. RODINO. Colonel North, Mr. McFarlane has testified that on November 23, 1986, on Sunday

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		morning before your interview with Attorney General Meese, you told Mr. McFarlane that there was a memo describing the diversion that may cause a problem. Is that a fact? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall that part of the conversation. What I do recall assuring him, as I had assured others, to include Admiral Poindexter, that the documents pertaining to the use of residuals to support the Nicaraguan Resistance had been taken care of. I assured him of that fact and I assured Admiral Poindexter and in both cases I was wrong. "Mr. RODINO. Did anyone tell you on Saturday afternoon, Saturday night or Sunday morning, or at any time before your interview with Mr. Meese, that the diversion memo had been found by attorneys from the Justice Department? "Mr. NORTH. No, sir, they did not. In fact they didn't tell me until well into the interview with Mr. Meese." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 198-201. See JHICI Ex. OLN 1 [Diversion Memo].)	
86/11/23-360 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: North inscrutably summarized what he had told the Attorney General: ". . . I do recall telling [sic] the Attorney General the truth about the fact that there had been funds diverted, if that is the word you want, or the residuals from the transaction or from different transactions transferred to the use of the contras.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"I don't recall the specifics of what else I told him. That was for me the deepest, darkest secret of the whole activity, and I think I told [sic] the Attorney General that part, too, although I don't recall it specifically. "But as far as the specifics of the rest of what I told him about, whose accounts and things like that, I do not recall." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 135.)	
86/11/23-370 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. When you met with the Attorney General on the afternoon of the 23rd of November, he asked you about the diversion, correct? "Mr. NORTH. He did. He asked me specifically about that memorandum [sc. Ex. OLN 1 (the Diversion Memo)]. "Mr. LIMAN. And is it true that he asked you who knew about the fact that proceeds from the sale of Iranian arms were being used to support the contras? "Mr. NORTH. I think he may well have. I, again, am not entirely clear on that afternoon. I was up til very early in the morning before it. I had a meeting with Mr. McFarlane on it. And I suppose he may well have. Again, I do not have detailed specific recall of that. I took no notes during that meeting. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that you told him that Admiral Poindexter knew, that Richard Secord knew and that Mr. McFarlane knew? "Mr. NORTH. That sounds right.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that you did not tell the Attorney General of the United States that Director Casey knew?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't recall that I didn't.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, was it part of the plan at that stage that you would not name Director Casey?

"Mr. NORTH. I[t] had always been part of the plan that Director Casey would know nothing of the support to the Nicaraguan resistance.

"Mr. LIMAN. And who else was it part of the plan who would not know anything about the support to the Nicaraguan resistance?

"Mr. NORTH. Other Cabinet officers who had to testify and appear and things like that. It was a very closed circle of people who knew.

"Mr. LIMAN. Which other Cabinet officers?

"Mr. NORTH. Well, the people who didn't know. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . [I]t was always part of the plan that Director Casey . . . would not know. Is that in essence what you said?

"Mr. NORTH. If you mean by the plan, the fall guy plan, yes.

"Mr. LIMAN. And so, the fall guy plan was that even though Casey knew, you would not finger him, to use a colloquial expression?

"Mr. NORTH. Your expression, counsel, not mine.

"Mr. LIMAN. You wouldn't name him?

"Mr. NORTH. That is correct.

"Mr. LIMAN. . . . [W]ere there other people who knew things that you were also not supposed to

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		name? "Mr. NORTH. Not that I know of. I know of no other people who actually knew. . . . "But I had specifically talked to the Admiral, and I could well have said to the Attorney General on the 23rd, I guess it was, that Sunday, that, 'Oh, by the way, the President knows', but I had asked the Admiral on Friday if the President knew, and the Admiral had told me no. "And so, when the Attorney General asked me about the President, I told him no." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 147-50. See id., 7/9/87, at 152-53. Compare North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 130 [North testifying on whose behalf he would play the scapegoat: "For who[m]ever necessary, for the Administration, for the President, for however high up the chain they needed someone to say that is the guy who did it, and he is gone and now we have put that behind us, so let's get on with other things." See 84/10/03-800 for context of quote.].)	
86/11/23-380 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: CASEY'S ROLE CONCEALED NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, when . . . you were speaking to the Attorney General on the 23rd, you understood that the Attorney General was not just the chief legal officer of the United States, but he was a confidant and friend of the President; correct? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. You understood that the Attorney	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: CASEY'S ROLE CONCEALED NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

General was an adviser of the President?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes, I did.

"Mr. LIMAN. Why didn't you tell the Attorney General, an adviser to your Commander in Chief, that Director Casey knew?

"Mr. NORTH. As I said, I don't know that I did or I don't know that I didn't. I don't recall that conversation in any detail.

"It was consistent with a long pattern that Director Casey did not know about any support outside that provided by the CIA for the Nicaraguan resistance.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel--

"Mr. NORTH. This was part of that.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel North, as late as November 23, were you still prepared to conceal from the Attorney General facts relating to Director Casey?

"Mr. NORTH. I was prepared at that point to continue not to reveal the diversion, as you put it, had even occurred. You recall, I removed those files. His people had been going through them that day. I thought I had gotten them all.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, who[m] were you protecting?

"Mr. NORTH. What do you mean, who[m] was I protecting? I was protecting the lives and safety of the people engaged in the operation.

"Mr. LIMAN. Explain to us how telling the Attorney General of the United States that Director Casey approved a diversion would jeopardize lives, other than perhaps put him in jeopardy of the kind of investigation that you have been through?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. NORTH. Well, I don't know, other than the fact that this investigation could indeed result in lives being put in jeopardy. I don't think that a specific--you know--thought went through my mind on that issue. "Mr. LIMAN. Was it just instinctive that you don't mention the name of the Director when you are talking to the Attorney General about knowledge of support for the contras? "Mr. NORTH. It was instinctive, counsel, from my earliest days of contact with the Director, that his relationship and mine not be something that was publicly bandied about. And until these hearings, I don't believe that most people in Washington knew that the Director and I communed as often as we did." (Nort[illegible]stim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 155-57. See generally id., 7/14/87, at 131 [North: "On the number of occasions I walked into the Director's office or when meeting with the Director and he would tell me to put away the notebook, that if I couldn't remember it, I didn't belong in the business."].)	
86/11/23-390 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. Mr. McFarlane told the committee that he met with Colonel North on Sunday morning prior to his interview with you and that Colonel North was unhappy because he felt that there was a record of the diversion. "And I guess my question to you is, can you think of any way that he might have learned of the

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			discovery of the record of the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I know of no way he could have, and I would personally be very surprised if he had learned about it because when we presented him with the memo that afternoon, Sunday afternoon, he certainly seemed surprised. "Mr. NIELDS. I was going to ask you about that. He seems like a fellow who is pretty cool under fire. Everyone has told the committee that he exhibited clear surprise when the document was shown to him. "Would you describe how he exhibited this surprise? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, I'm not sure I can describe it except to say that he was obviously--I would describe him as being shocked that we had the memorandum and that we were raising this issue with him. "Mr. NIELDS. Was this in words, was this a facial expression? "Attorney General MEESE. I think it was a combination of words and facial expression, primarily facial expression and body language, if you will. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, I guess we are on the subject of that interview and I have a number of questions about it. "I take it it occurred at 2:00 on Sunday afternoon, the 23rd? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. Again I'm referring to notes of that. I believe you have notes as one of your exhibits, do you not? "Mr. NIELDS. Exhibit [EM] 47.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Attorney General MEESE. And I will refer to your Exhibit 47, and use my copies of the notes which again are a little easier to handle. We met actually at 2:13 p.m. on Sunday the 22nd [sic] of November. Colonel North, myself, Mr. Reynolds, Mr. Cooper, and Mr. Richardson. And what part of the interview do you want me to talk about? "Mr. NIELDS. There are a number of different subjects and what I would like to do is take them in order. "Attorney General MEESE. All right. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it that when you originally started this weekend inquiry, the issue, the principal issue on the table was this business of the Hawk missiles and the oil-drilling equipment. "Now, you had heard one version from Colonel North on Thursday, the 20th. What did he tell you on that subject on the 23rd? "Attorney General MEESE. Perhaps it might be better if I gave you the interview just as it happened. I don't want to prolong this. "Mr. NIELDS. It is going to be a very long--this is 30 pages of handwritten notes, Mr. Attorney General, and if you read them all, we are going to be here a long time. "What I would like to do is on this subject, because there are a lot of notes on it, is ask you whether you have a recollection of what he told you about his state of knowledge and then if there are particular parts of the notes that would be helpful, I will refer you to them. "Attorney General MEESE. All right."

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 117-21; JHICI Ex. EM 47 [Richardson notes of Meese interview with North, 11/23/86].)
86/11/23-391 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Meese response continuing from preceding entry:] "[Mr. MEESE.] I cannot recall in sufficient detail to answer those questions. I can when my recollection is refreshed by the notes; the only thing I wanted to say as a preface to this was that he mentioned to us that he had discussed with Mr. McFarlane the philosophy of--rather, that--excuse me, I am recalling from notes here. "He said, first of all, that he was totally unwitting of the 508 TOWs until after the fact, that he did not know that. And in answer to your specific question, he said that Bud McFarlane had called him as to this shipment in November 1985, which you are referring to now, I believe. "He said that the call was from Geneva. He said that Bud told him Rabin had a problem, he needed to move something around. He said that he had discussed with McFarlane the philosophy of Israeli's helping moving something to Iran, and I presume it is in that phone call. "He said that as a result he called Mr. Rabin back and that they wanted him to send a man to help with a big problem relating to a port. "I believe that was the . . . situation [in a European city]. And he said, and Rabin told him, we wanted to move some things that would support

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			what you want to do. "And he said that Rabin's assistant told him that they were moving items which would support the rapproachement with Iran. "Mr. North told us at that time he got in touch with Richard Secord who was an international businessman, and he had Mr. Secord go to see the person in . . . [the European city]. He said that Rabin had told him it was oil-related equipment. "He said that he had several more conversations with Bud McFarlane, that he encouraged him to call the port officials and he thinks he did. "He said that the Israelis aborted the move, this initial shipment. He then went on to say that Mr. Secord went to Tel Aviv pursuant to an Israeli request. "It was clear to him that this was a high-priority shipment. "You want me to go on with his narrative of this event? "Mr. NIELDS. I think you only had to go on a couple more lines and I will ask you, you don't have to read it, I will simply ask you whether it isn't the case that Colonel North told you that Mr. Secord was sent to Israel, to Tel Aviv and that after he got there he had learned that the shipment was Hawk missiles and that is how Colonel North found out they were Hawk missiles? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. He did that apparently after he had called the CIA and got the name of a proprietary airline. "Mr. NIELDS. So that Colonel North's version

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			of the facts during this interview was that he had originally been told it was oil drilling equipment by Mr. Rabin and that he found out that the shipment had been Hawk missiles after Mr. Secord went to Tel Aviv-- "Attorney General MEESE. That's right. "Mr. NIELDS. --which, as we have heard previously in these hearings, was a number of days after Mr. Secord had first been sent over and indeed after the missiles had actually been shipped. "Attorney General MEESE. That's correct. So that that was sometime after the whole transaction had taken place." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 121-24; JHICI Ex. EM 47 [Richardson notes of Meese interview with North, 11/23/86].)
86/11/23-392 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, the second topic I want to ask you about is the topic of diversion, and my first question is: Would it be correct to assume that prior to your interview you had studied the document that Mr. Reynolds had found in NSC files? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I had. "Mr. NIELDS. And did you ask Colonel North, among other things--well, I guess maybe I should say first, did you verify from him that a diversion had in fact occurred, not only had been planned but had occurred?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Attorney General MEESE. Well, I did ultimately. But what I did really was to take him through all of his knowledge of the transactions, or lack of knowledge of the transactions, that had occurred in 1985 and 1986 and exhausted what his information was on everything without any mention of the diversion, so that I would get, without letting him know that we knew of that, all the information that we could about what he knew about the matters pertaining to what we might call the conventional aspects of the Iranian initiative. "And we did that and, as you say, it goes on for several pages, meetings in London, the fact that he felt that the November operation was a mess, that he felt that if he got involved they could do it right, and that for that reason he did get involved, particularly early the following January, the events that I knew about in the meeting with the President, the events that led up to the meeting with the President, and so on--talked about the finding that had been developed in the work in early January--he said that work started in mid-December--and talked about the entire thing through meetings with Sporkin and Casey and others, preparatory to the meeting with the President on the 7th. "Then there was more discussion of the Hawk missile shipment in November of 1985. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it you eventually addressed the topic of diversion. "Attorney General MEESE. Then we also talked about Mr. Ledeen. "We really tried to get everything that he

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			knew. And then talked about the return of the Hawks. And then after what is recorded here as twelve pages of information that we got on all the other aspects of it, then I asked him about the memo. "I showed him the memo and asked him if it was something he prepared. "Mr. NIELDS. I don't want to skip over things, but I think the only thing we need for our present purposes, since we have these notes, is--I take it it's correct that he verified there had been some diversion of funds to the contras. "Attorney General MEESE. Well, what he did, I showed him the memo and then he went into a reference to the original shipments and so on, and then he acknowledged the fact that there was a diversion of funds, yes, and that--he said that--I'm trying to find the spot here where I mentioned to him--I said, now this memo--he had talked a lot about the relationship with Israel and that sort of thing, and he said that the Israelis were interested in helping us, and then he said--I got him back to talk about the memo and I said it appears to be written between the 4th and the 7th of April and it mentions the use of money that was transferred. "And he said yes, that as a part of transfers that had taken place--and I have here the date of the 16th of May--money was deposited to the Israeli account and that some of this money was used for Israeli replacements, and he said that there was $12 million in residual funds that went to the Nicaraguan resistance."

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 124-27; JHICI Exx. EM 44 [Diversion Memo], EM 47 [Richardson notes of Meese interview with North, 11/23/86].)
86/11/23-393 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask him who knew-- "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. --that funds had been diverted to the resistance? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I asked him, and as the notes--there is a lot more about how this all came about. But I said was this ever discussed with the President, and he said not as far as he knew, not with North. "And I said was it discussed with Poindexter, and he said he was the point of contact with the President, and he described Poindexter apparently--that he was the point of contact with the President and that that's why he would not--he, North--would not have discussed it with the President. "He said Fortier was involved, too, because he became the principal deputy, and then I said--or at least in the course of this I said who else knows. "In the course of this discussion, and the notes show it, he would wander off into other topics, or at least the conversation, the discussion wandered off into other topics about the amount of money, who got them, how it was

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			handled, and I asked how much more is there to it? And I said, who else is involved, Mr. McFarlane or Poindexter? He said that he had told McFarlane in April or May of 1986 that there were--and then he said very clearly--there were only three who could know in the United States, meaning the United States Government, and that was: McFarlane, Poindexter and North. "Mr. NIELDS. Did he tell you whether Director Casey knew? "Attorney General MEESE. He said again there were only three who knew. I didn't ask him specifically about Casey or anybody else. I said, 'Who knew?' And he said, 'There were only three who could know in the United States, and that was McFarlane, Poindexter and North.' "Mr. NIELDS. Let me turn the question around: Did he tell you that Director Casey knew? "Attorney General MEESE. Absolutely not." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 127-28; JHICI Ex. EM 44 [Diversion Memo], EM 47 [Richardson notes of Meese interview with North, 11/23/86].)
86/11/23-394 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW : DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 5: "Mr. NIELDS. Now, the next topic I want to ask you about is what he told you on the subject of flow of funds involved in the diversion, and I think you should turn to page 12 [of Ex. EM 47], and then you will want to come back to page 16 of these notes. And in the middle of page 12, it says 'Money moved to CIA account', and then there

is 'Iranians' with an arrow, 'Israelis', and then an arrow, 'CIA account', then an arrow, 'Army'.

"Attorney General MEESE. This was our discussion before we had any knowledge that we had the memo and he was discussing the general flow of money as a part of what I have described as the conventional aspects of the Iranian Initiative, and he said the money moved to a CIA account, and then he went into it in more detail.

"He said the Iranians gave the money to the Israelis, the Israelis put the money in CIA accounts, and the CIA, in turn, reimbursed the Army for the original purchases.

"Mr. NIELDS. So even prior to the time that you had shown him during the interview this memo, he was already telling you that the money went directly from the Israelis to the CIA account, and he completely leaves out Secord and Hakim's account, private enterprise, or anything of this sort.

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. As a matter of fact, I didn't learn about any of those aspects of it until much later.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, then, if you will turn to page 16, about two-thirds of the way down, it says: 'Israeli offer', and then there is an arrow to Calero, then another arrow, 'Open three accounts in Switz, Switz', and then it says, and gave numbers to Israelis, and then there is another dash, 'Dollars to accounts.'

"Attorney General MEESE. Right.

"Mr. NIELDS. What is he telling you there?

"Attorney General MEESE. He is saying there,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			you have to go back a few lines above that when he says this was an Israeli idea. He said they wanted to be helpful in regard to the contras. And he said he guessed the money got to them from this. He said the contras knew the money came, in effect, from Israel and appreciated it. "And then he said that Israel, the Israelis, made an offer through North to Calero, Calero being a representative of the Democratic Resistance Forces, and that Calero would open three accounts in Switzerland, and that then North gave the numbers of those accounts to the Israelis and that the Israelis deposited the money to those accounts. He then said that the CIA had no knowledge of this." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 128-30; JHICI Ex. EM 47 [Richardson notes of Meese interview with North, 11/23/86].)
86/11/23-395 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 6: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. I take it, I just want to make this clear now, because it it important: Did Colonel North tell you during that interview that the money had gone directly from the Israelis to contra accounts? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir, he did. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, that was different from what you had learned from reading the memorandum, the so-called diversion memorandum. Isn't that true?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Attorney General MEESE. If I could, I would like to have you refer me to that exhibit so I can refresh my recollection. "Mr. NIELDS. Yes. It is Exhibit Number [EM] 44. And the relevant part of it is at the bottom of page 2. "Attorney General MEESE. I read here, if I am reading the right part, it says 'By Monday, the 7th of April, the Iranian Government will transfer $17 million to an Israeli account in Switzerland, the Israelis will in turn transfer to a private U.S. corporation account in Switzerland the sum of $15 million, and then on Tuesday, April 8, or as soon as the transactions are verified, the private U.S. corporation will transfer $3.65 million to a CIA account in Switzerland, CIA will then transfer this sum to a covert Department of the Army account in the U.S.' "It goes on to say on Wednesday, April 9-- "Mr. NIELDS. You don't need to read further. The part of it that I have reference to is the $15 million going to a private U.S. corporation account. "Attorney General MEESE. Right. "Mr. NIELDS. And then if you read the next paragraph, it shows $3 million going to the CIA for a difference of something under $12 million. "Attorney General MEESE. Right. "Mr. NIELDS. And then on page 5 it states that the residual funds, including $12 million, will go to the contras. So I take it it is correct that this document shows the diversion, so to speak, coming out of a U.S. corporation

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			account. "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, my next question is: Didn't you ask Colonel North about the flow of funds reflected in the diversion document during your interview? "Attorney General MEESE. No, we let him tell it exactly as he was telling it. He had the document, we showed him the document, I don't think he read it carefully. I think he knew the document. "Mr. NIELDS. Then I would like you to turn to page 17 of the North interview. "Attorney General MEESE. Oh, yes, excuse me, yes, we did ask him because--it says Iranians to Israel to an account corporation, to the CIA account. "Mr. NIELDS. So there is a reference right there to the corporation account. "Attorney General MEESE. Right. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, what did he tell you about that? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall that he said, I don't recall anything that he told us about that account other than it was an account of a corporation. I think my own view was that it was probably a blind account for the CIA, or at least a blind account of some sort. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, this is important, so I don't want to jump over it. The document indicates that the $15 million went into this corporation account. "Attorney General MEESE. Right.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. NIELDS. And that the moneys coming out of the corporation account were the ones going to the contras. "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, did North confirm that or deny it during this interview? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I think he confirmed that the money did go to an account of a corporation. He didn't go into any of the details about it, but I see from the notes here, I don't have an independent recollection, but he did say, apparently from this, that it did go to the account of a corporation." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 130-33; JHICI Exx, EM 44 [Diversion Memo], EM 47 [Richardson notes of Meese meeting with North, 11/23/86].)
86/11/23-396 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 7: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. . . . There is one other topic that I would like to ask you about coming out of these notes, and it is on page 19. And I guess we ought to start at the bottom of page 18 of the notes. "And there it is written, question, 'What else like Nicaraguan angle?' And I take it somebody, either you or someone else, wants to know if there are any other troublesome aspects that you haven't heard about yet. "Attorney General MEESE. Or any other diversions like the Nicaraguan situation. And his

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			answer was nothing. "Mr. NIELDS. It is nothing, but then on the top of the next page the note-taker has written down, apparently coming from Colonel North, 'If this doesn't come out, only other is November Hawks deal.' "Now, did Colonel North suggest to you during the interview that you keep the diversion information from coming out? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't know. I don't recall that he did. It is entirely possible that he did say that we shouldn't let this come out, but I can't actually recall that independently, and I don't see anything in the notes here that say that. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you make a response to it? "Attorney General MEESE. I am sure I didn't. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, during this interview, if I understand your testimony, Colonel North told you in effect that Casey did not know of the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Now-- "Attorney General MEESE. As a matter of fact, that seems to be indicated again, because there was a note here again on page 17, it says, 'No other U.S. official involved, just McFarlane and Poindexter are knowledgeable.' "Mr. NIELDS. Now, according to Colonel North's testimony before this committee, that was false. He told you that the money was funneled into three contra accounts in Switzerland. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

"Mr. NIELDS. According to information the committee has, that was also false. He told you that Defense Minister Rabin had told him that oil drilling equipment was to be shipped in November of 1985. According to his testimony here before this committee, that was also false.

"Now, my question to you is: following his interview, did you believe the representations that he had made? Did you accept them as true, or did you have question about them?

"Attorney General MEESE. I accepted them as true and had no reason to believe otherwise. He had been very forthcoming in response to what we had asked him and had laid out the whole scheme that was basically consistent with the memorandum that we have.

"Mr. NIELDS. Will you describe his demeanor during the interview?

"Attorney General MEESE. Obviously he was a little more concerned and upset, I would say, because we had the memo, and that was a source of concern to him because, in effect, what had gone on there was something he didn't realize anyone else knew, and it was a highly sensitive thing from his standpoint because it had to do with his efforts to get funds to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, and so I think that my view was he was mostly concerned because if this got out this would impede his efforts to help the democratic resistance in Nicaragua.

"Mr. NIELDS. In answering your questions, did he do so in a forthright manner?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. He was

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			basically forthright, and I didn't think, he certainly did not appear to be concealing anything." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 134-36; JHICI Exx. EM 44 [Diversion Memo], EM 47 [Richardson notes of Meese interview with North, 11/23/86].)
86/11/23-397 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW : DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW : DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 8: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, at the end of your interview, you now confirmed the diversion. At that point in time did you believe that you were dealing with something other than confusion, something serious? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, very definitely, in that there was a whole new aspect of this situation. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you regard it at that point in time as now a matter proper for criminal experts? "Attorney General MEESE. No. There was no--at that point we still hadn't figured out whether there was any criminality involved, whether this was an authorized activity, whether anyone else knew. "There was a possibility certainly down the line that there might be criminal aspects, but certainly what happened had happened per se there. There was no obvious criminality at that point. "Mr. NIELDS. Again, I must ask you this question because the committee has information

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that there may have been some more shredding between that time and the time when it was finally referred to the criminal division. Did you give any consideration at that time either referring it to your criminal division or independently taking some steps to secure files? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I don't believe anybody did give any consideration to that at that time. I think there were various reasons. One is that there was no hint to us of any destruction of documents. "Secondly, we had all the documents, because we had been given access to all the documents to our knowledge at the National Security Staff offices. And Colonel North had been very forthright and forthcoming in his answers. "So that there was nothing that at that point would have given us a hint. I must say it is always easy some eight months later to look back, and it certainly looks a lot different to us now than it did then but at that time there was nothing that did give us that hint." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 136-38; JHICI Ex. EM 47 [Richardson notes of Meese interview with North, 11/23/86].)
86/11/23-398 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 9: [Continuing, after lunch recess, from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. This morning I think you testified that Colonel North showed surprise when

you disclosed the so-called diversion memorandum [Ex. EM 44] to him.

"Now, I take it he had written the memorandum.

"Attorney General MEESE. If I may, I will just take a moment so that I can find those notes again and be sure--

". . . .

"Attorney General MEESE. The reason that I raise the question is that I am not sure that he did in fact admit to us that he had written the memorandum.

"I might say also, Counsel, as part of your question I ought to clarify something I mentioned this morning. The shock and surprise actually did not come when we originally presented the memorandum itself, but at the point where he got in the memorandum to the explanation of the diversion process.

"There was some lead-on material up until that point and it was not until he got to the second page and saw what was contained therein which related to the diversion scheme that he actually showed the shock and surprise.

"Mr. NIELDS. Maybe I can shorten this.

"Attorney General MEESE. I can't remember precisely whether he said that he had written the memo or whether he indicated that he was not sure. I said--I said is it something you prepared with terms of reference dated April 1986 and then it had reference to the 13th of September and so on.

"And I am not sure whether we ever did actually get him to state that he did prepare the memorandum.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"I will see if I can find that later on and try to see if I can find that in the notes. But I certainly know that it ultimately was established that this had come from files to which he had access and I believe he may have indicated to us he had prepared it. "Mr. NIELDS. And he was certainly familiar with the information in it dealing with the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. So the surprise wasn't at the information, he was already familiar with the information? "Attorney General MEESE. The surprise was, without any question, that we had the copy of the memorandum that had that information in it. "Mr. NIELDS. The memorandum that had that information in it was something within the scope of your request for information relevant to the Iranian arms initiative? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. We asked for any documents relating to the Iranian initiative. "Mr. NIELDS. How did you interpret his surprise that you had a memorandum referring to the diversion which was well within the scope of your request? "Attorney General MEESE. Just that he was in fact surprised and didn't realize that we had it. "Mr. NIELDS. Well, let me ask the question in a slightly more leading way perhaps. "Did you understand that he had not intended for you to see that document?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Attorney General MEESE. I don't know whether he intended for us to see it or not. He certainly was surprised that we had seen it or appeared to be." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 140-42; JHICI Ex. EM 44 [Diversion Memo].)
86/11/23-399 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 10: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Did that raise in your mind the possibility that Colonel North had or would try to select the documents which would be made available to you and your people? "Attorney General MEESE. I didn't really have any basis on which to make a judgment like that. We had asked Admiral Poindexter to have all the documents pertaining to the Iranian initiative made available. "Our contact had been originally with Commander Thompson in this regard to me and to our people who had be[e]n there. There had been no hesitancy or reluctance in giving information to us. "As a matter of fact, when as they were perusing some of the material they thought that there might be some additional material that might not be there, they made a request and that additional material was produced. "Mr. NIELDS. But now something new had happened which was that Colonel North had expressed shock that you would have a relevant

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			document, and my question is did that raise in your mind a suspicion that Colonel North either had or would prevent you from getting access to other relevant information? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't know whether he was surprised that this document was still around or what the basis of his shock was. All I can tell you is he was surprised. We felt that at that point by the time we had talked with him and that was the reason for our going through the day Saturday before talking to Colonel North, was to be sure we had all the documents present at the NSC staff office, and it was our belief at that time that we did. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. I take it that as of the finish of your interview with Colonel North on Sunday, you still did not regard this as a fitting subject for investigation? "Attorney General MEESE. Not at that point, but we had much to do yet. We had to talk with people, including Admiral Poindexter. We had to talk to others in the White House to be sure that it had not been authorized and we had a number of things yet to be done." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 143-45. See id., 7/29/87, at 280-85 [further on the North-Meese interview, 11/23/86].)
86/11/23-400 NOVEMBER 23, 1986		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1:	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(SUNDAY)		"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . I want to talk about the North interview. "At the end of that interview, you showed Colonel North the memorandum and you asked him several questions about it, you and your associates did, am I correct? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. Actually, it was in the middle of the interview, after about an hour of discussion. "Mr. RUDMAN. One of the questions asked was whether or not there was a cover memo that indicated some approval of some kind, am I correct? "Attorney General MEESE. That came up in the course of the question that was asked as to whether the President knew about this or whether this had been shown to the President, and he said, 'Is there a cover memo,' and I understood what he was talking about because the memo that we had at that time was not the kind of thing you would give directly to the President; it was the kind of thing that might be attached as an addendum to a decision memo to the President. And, of course, we said that no such cover memo had been found. "Mr. RUDMAN. At that point you asked him whether there were any other files that might contain those memos, is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. RUDMAN. Do you remember what his response was? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe that he said he didn't know but he would check, or words to that effect. But that was really in regard not	See col. 2.

to files that were of the type we had seen. I was asking him whether there was a separate file kept by the National Security Council staff of approved policy documents where the President had approved them. I thought that there might possibly be a file of Presidential memoranda where once the President signed off on it, it was kept separate in a more secure environment than, say, normal routine memoranda such as the ones we saw. I say routine meaning the process, not in terms of its contents.

"Mr. RUDMAN. At that point in time there were several things that existed that in the minds of some at least were major alarm bells that were going off that maybe this wasn't just the matter that you had thought it was.

"Number one, you certainly had enough evidence in the few days before this that some strange things were going on in terms of statements that people were going to be making to the Congress, people in the State Department saying that statement is not right, people telling you things which subsequently--and Mr. Cooper--which subsequently turned out to be, I'll say, if not true, certainly misleading. You certainly had some concerns at that point that some things were going on down there that didn't make much sense. Is that a fair observation?

"Attorney General MEESE. I would say, as I did yesterday, that we had concerns that there were differences in recollection that should be resolved, yes.

"Mr. RUDMAN. There were some major

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		differences in recollection. "We are talking about something where obviously you have either got a cover story or you have got somebody with a terrible memory who's confusing oil-drilling equipment with missiles? "Attorney General MEESE. Actually, what we had was a situation in which different people who were in different parts of the world had differing recollections, which were easily explainable in terms of the fact that the people who couldn't remember particular things or remembered them differently were occupied in probably the biggest event in the history of the Presidency, President Reagan's meeting with the General Secretary of the Soviet Union, and to me it was understandable that they didn't have pinpoint recollection or even general recollection. "I have been in situations with the President, and frankly the big event shuts almost everything else out of your memory. So those were the reasons why it didn't seem particularly strange to me, but it certainly did raise issues in which there were differences of recollection that I felt ought to be resolved. "Mr. RUDMAN. If that didn't set off a loud alarm bell, certainly the diversion must have set off sirens? "Attorney General MEESE. No question that it did." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 28-31.)	
86/11/23-401 NOVEMBER 23,		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986 (SUNDAY)		MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. RUDMAN. At this point you have Colonel North, who is a can-do fellow who's carrying out orders. He['s] sitting in your office and tells you that he will try to find some things for you. I just-- "Attorney General MEESE. No. No, I asked him the question. I didn't ask him to find anything. I asked him the question, 'Is there a separate file of Presidential documents?' He said, 'I don't know; I'll check.' We didn't leave it at that. I sent my people over to talk with Admiral Poindexter the next day to see if there was such a file. "Mr. RUDMAN. He said he would check on it? You didn't ask him to do that but he said he would? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, but we certainly didn't leave it at that. We went ahead and found out for ourselves whether there was any such separate file. "Mr. RUDMAN. The question is a simple one in light of what we all know. Even if the conflicts in memory were just that, they weren't, of course, but they might have appeared to be, and then you found the diversion memo. Didn't you have any concerns at all to let the fellow who was in the center of this back to where all the records were in terms of your fact-finding investigation, even assuming it was not a criminal matter? "Attorney General MEESE. Senator, none of the people there had any such concerns, including	MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

myself. One of the reasons we didn't is we had already been showed all the records. Our people had completed their search and their review of all the records that had been given to us by Admiral Poindexter and his people.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Of course, you know what happened thereafter from testimony.

"Attorney General MEESE. I understand that there was some shredding, although I do understand that most of the shredding had been done prior to our people even getting on the premises and most of it had been done prior to the meeting with Colonel North.

"Mr. RUDMAN. There was some left, evidently, because we have White House records supplied to us by the Secret Service that show that Colonel North went back to his office that night, sometime after his meeting, and was there till roughly 4:00 in the morning, and when one of the secretaries came in the next morning, the shredder bag was full. So I dare say there might have been something there that you might have found interesting?

"Attorney General MEESE. It may be that there were. I don't know.

"Did the committee, when they talked to Colonel North, ask him what documents he did in fact shred?

"Mr. RUDMAN. I don't think Colonel North had a clear recollection of what documents were shredded. I think there were so many that were shredded over a period of time that some of them were, I am sure, legitimately part of the National Security files and others, of course, we will

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		never know. That, of course, is one of the major problems. ". . . ." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 31-33.)	
86/11/23-405 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Chairman INOUYE. Can I now touch upon the diversion memo [Ex. EM 44]? "Was it apparent from the face of this memo that it was a draft and not an original? ". . . . "Attorney General MEESE. Was it obvious that it was a draft? "Chairman INOUYE. Yes. "Attorney General MEESE. I can't recall again whether it was obvious or not. It appeared to be a draft. I believe there has been testimony or notes to that effect. "Chairman INOUYE. Did you ask Colonel North what happened to the original of the memo? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, the memo itself--again we asked about the memo, and my recollection is that he indicated finally that it had been a memorandum prepared either by him or under his direction, and I don't remember any conversation, and again I would have to look at the memorandum to whether it was clearly a draft, whether he mentioned it was a draft or just exactly what it was. "Chairman INOUYE. Did you ask the colonel whether he had sent this memorandum to Admiral Poindexter?	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Attorney General MEESE. I believe--again, I would have to refer to my notes--I believe that there was--

"Chairman INOUYE. I believe you did not ask him.

"Attorney General MEESE. Let me look at my notes if I may and see whether we asked him about that or at least Mr. Richardson's notes. We asked whether it was something that he prepared, and ultimately we found out that it was. First he said he didn't--I think at first he hesitated as to whether or not he had prepared it, but ultimately acknowledged that it had been prepared by him or under his direction. And I am looking now to see whether we--what was asked about it.

"Chairman INOUYE. What I would like to know is did you ask him whether he had sent that memo on to the admiral?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. That is what I am trying to find now, Mr. Chairman. I don't believe that there as any discussion as to this particular memorandum. There was a discussion whether Admiral Poindexter knew about this, but not as to the scheme. But I don't find any particular reference and I can't recall at this time, Mr. Chairman, whether we specifically asked him whether he had passed it on to Admiral Poindexter.

"Chairman INOUYE. I am certain you were aware that he was a subordinate to the Admiral?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir.

"Chairman INOUYE. Wasn't it important to know whether the head man got the memo, whether he knew

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		or approved of the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, there was no question in what Colonel North told us that Admiral Poindexter did know about it and did know about this. He said that he was one of the three people in the government who did know about it. "Chairman INOUYE. Did you also ask him whether he approved the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall that question specifically being asked. "Chairman INOUYE. When you were first advised of this diversion, you were startled to a point where you said things that you would not ordinarily utter, and so it was very important to you, wasn't it? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. Did you ask Colonel North who authorized the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall whether it was asked specifically in those words. It did--it was--and again I am--I think we asked whether this had been discussed with the President, and Colonel North said not as far as he was concerned, and then it was asked about--or he said that Admiral Poindexter was the point of contact with the President, and that Mr. Fortier might be involved too because he was the principal deputy. I think that was the discussion that was had on that subject. "Let me just see if there is anything else that would shed a light on that. I think there is--he definitely told us that Mr. Poindexter was knowledgeable about this. I don't know whether	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		the question was asked in the form of did he authorize it? "Chairman INOUYE. When a decision of this magnitude is made, I am certain in your office, as in other offices, there are other drafts and memos. Did you ask the Colonel whether there were other memos relating to the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall whether that was asked. It may have been asked after I left the meeting." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 111-15; JHICI Exx. EM 44 [Diversion Memo], EM 47 [Richardson notes of North interview, 11/23/86].)	
86/11/23-410 NOVEMBER 21 AND 23, 1986 (FRIDAY AND SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW, AND WHETHER THEY MET ALSO ON FRIDAY, 11/21/86 MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. MITCHELL. You met with Colonel North in your office on Sunday afternoon? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. MITCHELL. You confronted him with the memorandum which made reference to the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. Right. "Mr. MITCHELL. You testified that he acted surprised. Mr. Cooper testified that Colonel North then asked if you had found a cover memo. [See 86/11/23-300.] "Attorney General MEESE. No. He asked that in a different sequence. The way in which that occurred, we showed him the memorandum, we showed him the portion of it that pertained to the diversion scheme. We then--at some point during the conversation after that he was asked was this	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW, AND WHETHER THEY MET ALSO ON FRIDAY, 11/21/86 MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

ever shown to the President or does the President know about this. It was at that time he asked if there was a cover memo.

"As I mentioned, I believe in answer to either Senator Rudman or Senator Cohen's question, I understood what he was talking about because a document such as the so-called diversion memo would not have been presented to the President as it was. If it had been presented to the President, it would have had a decision memorandum or cover memo with it, and I understood him to be talking about that.

"Mr. MITCHELL. I will get back to that in a moment. I have some more questions about it, but I just wanted to go on.

"Later that evening, as we now know--and of course you could not have known then--at about 11:00 Colonel North returned to his office. He was there until 4:15 the following morning and, according to his testimony and other evidence, he shredded many documents that night.

"He also shredded many documents on Friday afternoon after learning that lawyers from your office were going to be coming over there to review documents. None of us probably will ever know exactly how many documents or what they were.

"You said yesterday that looking back with hindsight is easy, that things look different now than they did eight months ago, and of course you're right, but there isn't any alternative because a fundamental principle in our democracy is public officials must be accountable for their actions and accountability necessarily involves

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

review and evaluation of past actions.

"Every member of this panel goes through it whenever we meet constituents and are called upon to defend and explain past votes, past decisions, past statements.

"So I would like to ask you some questions on that, recognizing that there is hindsight involved and you could not have known all of these things at the time.

"The first involves testimony by Colonel Earl, who was an associate of Colonel North . . . .

"This is Colonel Earl's deposition, page 65 . . . .

"Colonel Earl is describing a meeting he had and a discussion he had with Colonel North on that Friday afternoon, November 21st, and this is Colonel Earl speaking. [See 86/11/21-538 through -542.]

"He says he, meaning Colonel North, mentioned that he had asked--he had said to the Attorney General or asked the Attorney General can I have or will I have 24 or 48 hours. He didn't say both, he said one or the other. I can't recall whether he said 24 or 48 hours, but he asked for that--and he told me that the Attorney General had said something like that he didn't know whether he could have that much time, something like that. Again, I am not quoting.

"And then it goes on to describe further the meeting.

"My question to you is: Did you talk with Colonel North on the afternoon of Friday, November 21st?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Attorney General MEESE. I do not believe that I did. To the best of my recollection, I did not. "Mr. MITCHELL. You can recall no such conversation? "Attorney General MEESE. I can recall no such conversation, no, sir. "Mr. MITCHELL. Either in a meeting at the White House or anyplace else, or a telephone conversation? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't believe I attended any meeting at the White House on the afternoon of the 21st. I also do not believe I had a telephone conversation with Colonel North, and I'm sure that I never had a conversation such as that. "Mr. MITCHELL. You would remember it if he had asked you something like this? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe I certainly would, yes." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 85-88.)	
86/11/23-411 NOVEMBER 21 AND 23, 1986 (FRIDAY AND SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW, AND WHETHER THEY MET ALSO ON FRIDAY, 11/21/86 MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. MITCHELL. So you did not have any such meeting. "On the securing of the documents, it is with hindsight, but a reasonable case can be made that the time at which preservation of documents should occur is the time when inspection of documents occurs, that is, if it is important enough to look	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW, AND WHETHER THEY MET ALSO ON FRIDAY, 11/21/86 MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

at documents, it ought to be important enough to think about preserving them.

"I gather from what you are saying is that you were acting in good faith, it simply didn't occur to you at that point on Friday that any steps should be taken to preserve documents from destruction?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct, it did not occur to me or anyone else, and we follow the same process as I mentioned that you do in your investigating committees here.

"Mr. MITCHELL. When did you first think about the possibility of criminal investigation?

"Attorney General MEESE. The first real thought that I gave to the possibility of criminal investigation was probably on Monday afternoon--the investigation was probably Tuesday, the 25th.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Well, before you go any further, recall what you just said in response to Senator Cohen.

"Attorney General MEESE. There I said the possibility that criminal laws might possibly have been violated.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Criminal implications I think--

"Attorney General MEESE. Criminal implications, right.

"Mr. MITCHELL. --was on Sunday when you talked to Colonel North?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Would that have been the first time that entered your mind?

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Attorney General MEESE. Criminal implications, yes, I'm sure. "Mr. MITCHELL. But you still did not think about securing documents at that point? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, Senator, we already had examined all the documents and we already, in fact, had the key document, the evidentiary document known as the diversion memo, which was the significant document--a copy of that in our possession. "Mr. MITCHELL. When you say we had examined all the documents, you had examined all the documents that you had seen until then, but in fact there were a great many documents that you never did see? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, we don't know whether those were relevant documents, irrelevant documents, or what they were. "Mr. MITCHELL. Do you think Colonel North spent from 11:00 in the evening until 4:15 the next morning destroying irrelevant documents? "Attorney General MEESE. I think he probably did. I think there were a lot of documents that he destroyed that had no relationship to the Iranian initiative or had any relationship to the contra diversion of funds. "There were probably a lot of other things that he may well have destroyed [--] documents that he didn't want anyone to see. "Mr. MITCHELL. On what do you base that opinion? "Attorney General MEESE. That is just a guess, as much speculation as yours that there	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		were relevant documents." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 88-91.)	
86/11/23-412 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: A QUESTION OF PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL MEESE ACCOUNT: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. MITCHELL. In the notes taken of the meeting with Colonel North, there is one part of it that raises questions in my mind, particularly in light of your response to Senator Cohen's questions, that when you brought the diversion memo to Colonel North's attention, you at that point thought of the potential criminal implications. "It is page 15 of the notes, Exhibit [EM] 47. "You may wish to refer to those; the last six lines or actually last eight lines. "The notes read, 'If President okays something into working files of.' "The next line read: 'AG: If RR approved it, you'd have it? Don't think it was. Other files there it could be in? To verify it didn't go forward?' "Then there is a star circled, 'OLN will check.' "Do I gather that that represented a conversation between you and Colonel North in which you asked him if the President had okayed something, into which working files it would go? And then you asked him if RR, meaning President Reagan, approved it, 'you'd have it,' meaning Colonel North, and he said, 'Yes,' but he didn't	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

think it was approved?

"And then you asked him are there other files it could be in to verify it didn't go forward? And then you asked Colonel North to go back and check his files to see if there were any memorandum which included approval by the President?

"Is that a summary?

"Attorney General MEESE. No. That is not what this says.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Would you go ahead and tell us what it says?

"Attorney General MEESE. What it says, I asked if the President okays something, does it go into the working files of the NSC or--and I don't remember--it doesn't indicate what his response was. I assume he said something like yes.

"I said, 'If he approved it, you'd have it,' in other words? And he said, 'Yes, I don't think it was approved,' or words to that effect. Then I said 'are there other files that it could be in'--and there, that is a shorthand for me asking, I do recall this independent of the notes--would there be another file it was kept, say by Admiral Poindexter of approved presidential findings or approved presidential documents? And I said I would like to find out about that to verify that it didn't go forward.

"And he said, as I recall, that he would check into that.

"As I mentioned, I believe in answer to Senator Cohen's question, we didn't leave it to Colonel North to check into whether there was

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE GENERAL CONTRAS IRAN

another file. We had our own people go over and check into it independently.

"Mr. MITCHELL. What does the star mean next to--

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't know. That is Mr. Richardson--he apparently put a star there. He put stars on various things. Put a star on the previous page. Well--

"Mr. MITCHELL. I represent to you Mr. Richardson has said the star designated an action item, something that was to be done by someone after the meeting.

"Do you know, in fact, who went to check the records other than Colonel North?

"Attorney General MEESE. Other than--I think Mr. Richardson and Mr. Reynolds--I think it was Mr. Richardson went back to check with Colonel [sic (Commander)] Thompson as to whether there was a separate file of approved presidential decision memoranda.

"Mr. MITCHELL. So your testimony is that this was not Colonel North going back to check, but rather someone from your staff?

"Attorney General MEESE. No. No. I think Colonel North said he would check and let us know about that, but I also say that in parallel we also checked separately."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 92-94; JHICI Ex. EM 47 [Richardson notes of North interview, 11/23/86].)

86/11/23-420
NOVEMBER 23,

NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE ISRAELIS' ROLE AND OF THE PRESIDENT'S

NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE ISRAELIS' ROLE AND OF THE PRESIDENT'S

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986 (SUNDAY)		VIEW OF THE IRAN INITIATIVE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. JENKINS. . . . I want to turn to Exhibit [EM] 47, . . . the notes of the interview of Colonel North, and I know that inferences can be drawn that are sometimes, inferences are wrong, and I want to ask you about a couple of statements that Colonel North gave you during this interview. "First of all, did Colonel North keep insisting to you that this was entirely an Israeli operation? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe he indicated to me that it was an Israeli proposal initially, but that the United States agreed to participate in it and to replenish the weapons and otherwise participate in it, and in effect adopted this or adopted the participation in it. "Mr. JENKINS. Did he state to you that it was his idea to continue the operation or was he saying that it was entirely an Israeli--it appears to me, from looking at the notes and from your press statement that you made subsequent to this, that you were contending at the press conference that this was an Israeli operation and that we had some knowledge of it. "Attorney General MEESE. No, I think there was no question about United States participation, but in '85 it was primarily the relationship, the transactions between--that took place were between [I]srael and Iran, and the United States role was in replenishing arms for Israel, but there was no question in my mind that at least after the fact we had condoned the shipments, and there was some	VIEW OF THE IRAN INITIATIVE MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

confusion, some differences of information we received as to exactly what happened.

"We knew that the original idea came from the Israelis, or we had been told that, that the actual weapons shipments in '85 had been Israeli shipments, the United States had participated later by replenishing the weapons to Israel.

"Mr. JENKINS. Please turn to page 13 so you might explain this portion of the notes, if you are on page 13. North believes--about the center of the page--'North believes that R.R. authorized it himself because "M"'--McFarlane I am assuming--'wouldn't go off on his own.'

"Then down below, 'North went to talk with R.R., with Reagan, strategic relation, and with Ronald Reagan it always came back to the hostages drawn to the linkage. Terrible mistake to say that Ronald Reagan wanted the strategic relationship because Ronald Reagan wanted the hostages.' What was he telling you?

"Attorney General MEESE. He was saying in his contacts with the President, the President's main focus was on freeing the hostages.

"Mr. JENKINS. And at that point when he made that statement, I am assuming the next part is your statement--

"Attorney General MEESE. Right.

"Mr. JENKINS. That 'R.R. talked about both, not agreed to arms, add hostages.' What did you mean by that?

"Attorney General MEESE. I told him that in my contacts, the meeting I had attended, he talked about both. This was about both the strategic

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		relationship and the hostages. If it was just the relationship, I didn't think he would agree to the arms, and I am not sure what 'add hostages' means. "Mr. JENKINS. But Colonel North was insisting that the President's primary concern was getting the hostages released? "Attorney General MEESE. That was his comment, and I felt that that was incorrect, because I had heard the President talk in January of '86, and I had heard the President talk again on both the 10th of November, 1986, when he met with members of the National Security Council, and again on the--I believe the 13th of November, 1986, when he had talked with people in the Congressional Delegation. "Mr. JENKINS. So you were simply trying to straighten out Colonel North's belief-- "Attorney General MEESE. I apparently made that comment in the course of the discussion, yes." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 280-83; JHICI Ex. EM 47 [Richardson notes of Attorney General's interview with North, 11/23/87].)	
86/11/23-421 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE ISRAELIS' ROLE AND OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF THE IRAN INITIATIVE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. JENKINS. Now, . . . turn to page 18 [of Ex. EM 47] . . .: 'Question, what else like the Nicaraguan angle? "'Answer: Nothing.'	NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE ISRAELIS' ROLE AND OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF THE ORAN INITIATIVE MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"And then on the top of the next page, 'if this doesn't come out, only other is the November Hawks deal. Think someone ought to step up and say this was authorized in November.'

"What does that mean, 'someone ought to step up'?

"Attorney General MEESE. I think what it means is--I don't have a specific recollection, but from the notes, I would conclude that he said that he thought that somebody ought to come up and say that the November Hawk shipment was, in fact, authorized by the President.

"Mr. JENKINS. Which it was.

"Attorney General MEESE. It was certainly in the signing of the finding after the fact. Whether the President had authorized it before or not, I think this may be one of the things that the President indicated he can't remember exactly when it was authorized.

"Mr. JENKINS. What does that sentence mean, 'If this doesn't come out, the only other thing is the November Hawks deal'?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall, but it looks like he might conclude that the diversion of funds not be made public or not come out.

"Mr. JENKINS. That is the way I read it, too.

"Attorney General MEESE. Right.

"Mr. JENKINS. Was he asking that you keep this quiet?

"Attorney General MEESE. I would conclude that. I don't recall that part of the conversation, but I certainly think that would be a fair conclusion here.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. JENKINS. No one responded to him on the proposition to keep that quiet? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't remember what was said at that time. I know in my own mind that was not a reasonable proposition. "I did say, it looks like from this again and I'm drawing conclusions here based on notes, that I have to share it with the President and see if he was aware of it. "Mr. JENKINS. To see if he was aware of the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. The diversion, right. "Mr. JENKINS. Well, that is the same conclusion that I came to in reading those notes, and I simply wanted to know if that was a proper inference to be drawn, that there was a desire to button this thing up; is that right? "Attorney General MEESE. Right." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 283-85; JHICI Ex. EM 47 [Richardson notes of Attorney General's interview with North, 11/23/86].)	
86/11/23-430 1985-86		NORTH ON THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. MITCHELL. . . . You said yesterday that former CIA Director Casey told you he knew nothing about the diversion. Your words were, and I quote you, 'It was Mr. Casey himself who told me on Tuesday morning that he had known nothing about it.' "As you know, Colonel North told this committee that he had told Mr. Casey of the	NORTH ON THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

diversion, that he showed Mr. Casey a written memorandum describing the diversion, and that Mr. Casey knew in advance of the diversion, and in Colonel North's words, 'was enthusiastic about it.' [See entries starting at 86/00/03-500.]

"Now, those statements are in direct conflict as to Mr. Casey's knowledge. They cannot both be true.

"My question to you is, which of those statements do you believe, Mr. Casey's statement to you that he knew nothing of the diversion, or Colonel North's statement to this committee that Mr. Casey did know of the diversion?

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, Senator, it is always hard to judge credibility when you have not had the opportunity to observe the witnesses yourself, and in the case of Colonel North, I was not here and did not see him testify. I saw an occasional glimpse of his testimony, but I could not really have the same vantage point that you had at that time.

"But let me say this--

"Mr. MITCHELL. You interviewed Colonel North?

"Attorney General MEESE. I'm coming to that. Rather than judging the credibility of the individuals, but rather as to which statement is true, it seems to me that we would have to look at the statement that was given to me at the time that this matter first came up when there was no jeopardy to the individuals involved and at a time when Mr. Casey was still available to refute any statement that might have been true or untrue.

"And at that time Colonel North said to me,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		without any question, that there were only three people in the government who knew anything about this: himself, Admiral Poindexter and Mr. McFarlane. And so it would seem to me, if I had to judge, that the statement given at that time probably has the most value as an accurate statement. "Mr. MITCHELL. You are saying then that you believe Mr. Casey's statement to you? "Attorney General MEESE. I do believe Mr. Casey's statement to me, based upon that kind of rationale, yes. "Mr. MITCHELL. And you disbelieve the statement made later by Colonel North? "Attorney General MEESE. I'm not in a position to evaluate that, but it seems at odds with what he told me on the 23rd of November. "Mr. MITCHELL. You interviewed Colonel North at considerable length in your office? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I was present for two hours of the interview and others in my office interviewed him about an hour and-45 minutes beyond that." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 67-70.)	
86/11/23-431 1985-86		NORTH ON THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit [EM] 47 represents notes taken by one of your assistants of that [11/23/86] meeting. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir, that is correct.	NORTH ON THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Colonel North told you in that meeting that an Israeli official, Mr. Rabin, had told him that Israel was shipping oil-drilling equipment to Iran in November '85, and that he, Colonel North, later learned about the Hawks from General Secord.

"Are you aware that Colonel North testified here, contrary to what he told you, that he knew all along that the '85 shipment to Iran contained Hawk missiles? [See 86/11/20-500.]

"Attorney General MEESE. I did not know that until I heard it addressed briefly yesterday, and now in more detail by your statement.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Colonel North told you, according to your recollection and the notes of the meeting, that Admiral Poindexter was totally innocent until after the fact with respect to the November '85, shipment.

"Are you aware that Colonel North testified here, contrary to what he told you, that Poindexter was involved before the fact in coordinating the '85 shipment? [See generally 85/11/23-230, 85/11/26-060, 85/11/26-700.]

"Attorney General MEESE. I'm aware of it now that you have said--

"Mr. MITCHELL. You were not previously aware of that until I raised it with you?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is right.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Colonel North told you that Israel decided how much money would be diverted to the contras and that U.S. involvement was none.

"Are you aware that Colonel North testified here, contrary to what he told you, that General

Secord had control over the funds set aside for the contras and other projects? [See 86/00/04-708, -740; 86/11/23-350.]

"Attorney General MEESE. I'm aware of what he said here now.

"Mr. MITCHELL. You are learning of this for the first time?

"Attorney General MEESE. General Secord, yes.

"Mr. MITCHELL. You are learning here for the first time what Colonel North said about General Secord's control over the funds?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, that was not mentioned to us at all in November.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Have you become aware of it since then or are you learning of that now for the first time?

"Attorney General MEESE. I am learning it now for the first time.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Colonel North told you that the diversion of the funds to the contras was Mr. Nir's idea.

"Are you aware that Colonel North testified here, contrary to what he told you, that the diversion was Mr. Ghorbanifar's idea? [See entries starting at 86/00/01-010.] Are you learning of that now for the first time?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. I had not known that.

"Mr. MITCHELL. You were not aware that that was Colonel North's testimony?

"Attorney General MEESE. I'm learning that now. I did not follow Colonel North's testimony in detail.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Colonel North told you that the CIA had no knowledge of the diversion. As you know now--

"Attorney General MEESE. He said very definitely.

"Mr. MITCHELL. As you know, Colonel North testified that, contrary to what he told you, that Mr. Casey knew about the diversion. [See 86/00/03-500.] You were aware of that prior to today?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Colonel North told you that Mr. Calero opened three Swiss bank accounts and that he, Colonel North, gave the account numbers to the Israelis so the Israelis could deposit arms sales funds into those accounts. [See generally 85/07/00-160.]

"Do you recall that statement to you by Colonel North?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Are you aware that Colonel North testified here, contrary to what he told you, that the funds to be diverted were placed in Swiss bank accounts under General Secord's control?

"Attorney General MEESE. I'm aware of it now that you have told me, yes. I had seen reference to this in the newspaper, I believe, in general terms, but not in as much detail as you have explained it.

"Mr. MITCHELL. When Colonel North made those statements to you, did you find him to be credible and did you believe him?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir, I found him to be credible and I did believe him." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 70-73; JHICI Ex. EM 47 [Richardson notes of North interview, 11/23/87].)	
86/11/23-432 1985-86		NORTH ON THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. MITCHELL. Are you learning today for the first time that Colonel North's testimony to this committee was contrary to what he told you in several aspects? "Attorney General MEESE. I have heard of this during the time that he was testifying from things told to me by people watching the testimony, by some of the news accounts, but not in as much detail as you have explained them today as to the fact that different statements were made before this committee apparently than we made at the time when Colonel North talked to me on November 23, 1986. "Mr. MITCHELL. How do you feel about that? Does it bother you? "Attorney General MEESE. It does bother me that there is a discrepancy. I can appreciate the problem of the committee in trying to determine which is correct and which is not correct. "There is one aspect of it, that when he made the statements before the committee, there were two things that were different. One is he was under oath. And, secondly, he was under a grant of immunity. That may be something that will be	NORTH ON THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

of help to the committee in determining which statements are credible and which are not.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Just a few moments ago you argued that his statement to you regarding Mr. Casey should be believed over the statement to the committee because he was not in jeopardy at that time?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I am just saying that they are different considerations. The other major difference is that Mr. Casey is not available to rebut his statement, which I think is probably more profound than even immunity and oath.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Apart from what you call discrepancies, you are the Attorney General of the United States.

"Attorney General MEESE. Sure.

"Mr. MITCHELL. You are conducting a fact-finding inquiry at the explicit request of the President of the United States. Does it bother you that apparently you were told things that were not true; therefore, you, yourself, made public statements to the American people that turned out to be incorrect on the basis of statements made to you?

"Attorney General MEESE. It certainly bothers me if statements were made to me that were untrue. Fortunately, the basic outlines that I revealed to the American people were essentially true and remain essentially true. The details as to what you indicate here, most of which I did not really talk to the American people about, remain the same as I talked about them on 25 November, but the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		more profound question you raise that untrue statements were made to me by anyone, I absolutely find it a matter of great concern to me. I don't condone under any circumstances anyone lying under any circumstances whatsoever, including whether it is a fact-finding investigation, testimony before a congressional committee, statements to the President or statements to me as Attorney General, and I thing there is no reason, justification or excuse for it whatsoever. "Mr. MITCHELL. May we take it that you condemn such actions? "Attorney General MEESE. I do indeed." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 73-76.)	
86/11/23-500 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)	AFTER THE NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you, when you returned from your meeting with the Attorney General on the 23rd, go to your office and do shredding of documents that day? "Mr. NORTH. I honestly don't remember, but I know I shredded documents after that fact. You are talking about after the-- "Mr. LIMAN. After your meeting with the Attorney General where he confronted you with the diversion memo. "Mr. NORTH. I think what I did, if I remember at all accurately, I--by this time, it was becoming increasingly difficult, in your words. My recollection is that I went back to the White House to try to call Admiral Poindexter on the telephone and he had, on a rare Sunday afternoon,	AFTER THE NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	AFTER THE NORTH-MEESE INTERVIEW NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	I guess when he could get away with his family, gone to the Redskins game. . . . "As I recall, he was not yet home, and it was probably then, if I called Mr. McFarlane, that I called him, and probably from the Sit Room. I would guess I probably went back to my office at that point and for some time continued to clean up the files. "I would also point out to the committee that I destroyed documents that had absolutely nothing to do with either Iran or the Nicaraguan resistance, that no longer would be applicable in the event that I was soon to be transferred." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 183-84.)		
86/11/23-510 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH CONTACTS POINDEXTER ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEMO POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. When was it that you learned that the Attorney General had found the so-called diversion memo? "Mr. POINDEXTER. On Sunday night, the 23rd, Colonel North called me at home. "Mr. LIMAN. And you were surprised? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I was surprised. "Mr. LIMAN. What-- "Mr. POINDEXTER. But by that time I was--I guess my mood was one of resignation in that I was getting awfully tired of the issue at that point. "Mr. LIMAN. And why were you surprised? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Because, as I have said, I didn't think any memos existed on this subject. "Mr. LIMAN. Did Colonel North--	NORTH CONTACTS POINDEXTER ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEMO POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think it is important here, people have described this memo as the smoking-gun memo. The only thing that it showed, it revealed the actions that were involved with transferring the funds, but the concept was approved in February, the conversation I had with Colonel North, I approved it at that time. I approved it in a broad, general way that didn't really require any further return to me to carry it out. ". . . . "Mr. POINDEXTER. And that was, by the way, the only thing that I recall." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 82-83.)	
86/11/23-512 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH CONTACTS POINDEXTER ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEMO POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NORTH CONTACTS POINDEXTER ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEMO POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. And after the Attorney General interviewed Colonel North Sunday evening, you testified Colonel North spoke to you? "A. Right. "Q. And of course he informed you that the diversion memo, he had been questioned about that? "A. Right. "Q. Did Colonel North on that occasion indicate to you in any words or words to the effect that after he had been presented with the diversion memo, he had said to the Attorney General words to the effect, 'Does this count? I haven't been given my rights'? "A. I don't think I knew that. "Q. Well, do you know if that happened? Do you have any knowledge that happened?

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"A. I don't have any knowledge that happened. "Q. Had he ever commented to you along those lines thereafter? "MR. LIMAN: Show the consultation. "MR. BECKLER: What is that? "MR. LIMAN: I said show the consultation. "MR. BECKLER: I have a continuing objection. . . . ". . . . [Discussion among attorneys about attorney-client consultations and their being noted on the record.] "THE WITNESS: Would you repeat the question? "MR. LEON: I will try. I don't know if I can repeat it from memory, but the substance of the last question was whether or not, after the evening of the 23rd, after the conversation you had with Colonel North that evening, did he or anyone else at any time thereafter indicate that -- "MR. BECKLER: He being North. "MR. LEON: Right. Indicate to you that North had made a statement to the Attorney General in his interview on Sunday afternoon to the effect, 'Does this count? I haven't been given my legal rights'? "THE WITNESS: I don't recall that." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 85-88.)
86/11/23-515 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		NORTH CONTACTS NIR NORTH NOTEBOOK ENTRY: North calls Nir and informs him that he has been interviewed by the Attorney General. North says that Meese has asked him about the diversion	NORTH CONTACTS NIR NORTH NOOTBOOK ENTRY: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		of some of the Iran arms money to Nicaragua. North asks Nir to have Israel accept responsibility for the plan, but Nir rejects the request. North's notes quote Nir as saying, "I cannot back this story." (North notebook entry, 11/23/86 [Committee Document Q 2650]; Iran-Contra Report, at 262.)	
86/11/23-900 SOMETIME IN LATE NOVEMBER 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS HAKIM ACCOUNT: Hakim testifying on the end of his contact with the Second Channel: "Mr. NIELDS. Did you continue meeting with the Iranians following the shipment of TOWs in late Octover and the release of the hostage? "Mr. HAKIM. Very much so. When we were not meeting, we were in constant telephone contact. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you, indeed, continue to meet even after there had been some disclosures about the fact that the U.S. was shipping arms to Iran? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir. "Mr. NIELDS. But I take it there came a time in late November of 1986 when the meetings essentially ceased? "Mr. HAKIM. That was the time that I was asked--I don't know if the meetings stopped or not. I was asked by Mr. Cave on behalf of the U.S. Government to arrange for one final meeting between the Iranians and the Americans, and this time with the presence of the State Department representative and a gentleman by the name of Charles Dunbar, accompanied Mr. Cave.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"I arranged with the Iranians to come to Frankfurt. I briefed them when they arrived as to what was happening, and I told them that after this introduction I will not be able to be in contact with them as the representative of the delegation. "They accepted to meet Mr. Dunbar and Mr. Cave. They asked me if I were prepared to also participate in the meeting. I checked with Mr. Cave. I said, 'I am prepared to attend a meeting. The Iranians are showing a sign of anxiousness, and they would feel more comfortable if I participated.' I believe he went back and checked with Mr. Dunbar, came back to me, said there is no problem in my participating. "At that time, I had my attorney with me in Europe, Mr. Janis. He actually had come with me to Frankfurt. Then I told Mr. Cave to inform Mr. Dunbar that I would be prepared to participate in the meeting if he would accept for my attorney to be also present. He refused. "Therefore, I did not participate in the meeting, and I really don't know what continued or discontinued after that introduction." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/4/87, at 51-53.)
86/11/23-970 NOVEMBER 23, 1986 (SUNDAY)		CLUES ABOUT THE DIVERSION: SOFAER'S DEDUCTION SOFAER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	CLUES ABOUT THE DIVERSION: SOFAER'S DEDUCTION SOFAER ACCOUNT: Late Sunday night, Cooper and Sofaer speak about the Attorney General's investigation. Cooper asks about Sofaer's concern that a surplus of funds had been created:

"Q. . . . And he said, how did you know about that? What had led you to that? And I explained to him that I just thought there was a spread, that cost price and sale price might be very different. He didn't say anything, but he led me to believe that that might be significant in the story. He did not explain to me what had happened.

"Q. Cooper didn't tell you on the 23rd that the day before representatives of the A.G. had found the so-called diversion evidence?

"A. No, he didn't at that time. I told him that, at a minimum, I was scared that Southern Air Transport had been given a lot of money for its arms shipments to the Middle East to subsidize it, in effect, for doing the work it was doing in Central America for the FDN.

"Q. But these were concerns that you were generating based on inferences? You at that time knew nothing about the fact of any diversion from the Iran program to contras or elsewhere?

"A. Not until the Attorney General's press conference.

"Q. On the 25th of November?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Okay.

"A. Anyway, I also asked him about the Secretary's testimony and was the Attorney General satisfied with it, is there any other information that he needed, et cetera. And he assured me that the Secretary had given the Attorney General a full and credible story as far as he could tell, and that the problems that they had lay

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			exclusively elsewhere." (Sofaer, Senate Dep., 6/18/87, at 69-71.)
86/11/23-990 NOVEMBER 23-24, 1986 (MONDAY, late night)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Do you recall that on Monday morning, the 24th, the shredder was full and overflowing? "Mr. NORTH. I don't remember that it was necessarily Monday, but I do remember that happened at some point, yes." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 184.) NORTH AT HIS OFFICE: EARLY MORNING, 11/24 NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Do you remember, Colonel, that in the early morning of--between Sunday night and Monday morning after your interview with the Attorney General that the alarm in your office was tripped because you were there shredding? "Mr. NORTH. I don't recall the alarm being tripped, but I do remember being in the office until very, very early in the morning. "Mr. LIMAN. And it is Exhibit [OLN] 155, but if you remember being there until early in the morning, that is enough, and you were there shredding; am I correct? "Mr. NORTH. Can we take a look at the exhibit? Does the exhibit say I was there shredding? "Mr. LIMAN. No. The exhibit just gives your explanation of what happened; 155. "Mr. NORTH. What it is is an indication from	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	the Security Center that the alarm in my office had gone off and that the alarm was cleared and I was there until 0415 in the morning. "Mr. LIMAN. And the following morning, Miss Browne told us that the shredder was full. "Does that refresh you? "Mr. NORTH. I don't deny that. I don't remember that it was. I fully and completely have testified, Counsel, that I shredded documents I believe right up until the morning of the 25th when I departed." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 192-93; JHICI Ex. OLN 155.)		
86/11/24-000 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)	THE FALL GUY OWEN ACCOUNT: Owen speaks with North at the OEOB. North says he is going to resign. Owen: "I believe he may have said, once again, that he was going to be the fall guy." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 47.)	McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, on Monday you saw the Attorney General? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And on that occasion you told the Attorney General that you had heard about the diversion on the tarmac? [See 86/05/28-400.] "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. The Attorney General asked you if you knew anything about it and it was in response to his question that you told him that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell the Attorney General about what Oliver North told you about a shredding party? [See 86/11/21-150.] "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, I didn't." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 183.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/24-001 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	McFARLANE-MEESE INTERVIEW: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . On Monday, did you have a second interview with Mr. McFarlane? "Attorney General MEESE. Mr. McFarlane came in on Monday and we had a further interview primarily to discuss with him what we had learned on Sunday and to find out what he might know about it. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask him whether he had been aware of the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I did. "Mr. NIELDS. And what was his response? "Attorney General MEESE. And I would like to look at the notes here, but I think my recollection is that he indicated that he had become aware of it in April or May of 1986, when he was preparing to or was actually on a trip to Tehran, after he had returned from civilian life to take on a special assignment and that at that time he was told more or less in passing by Colonel North about the diversion program, and he was given to believe at that time that it had been authorized. "If you will permit me just a moment, I will see if I can find my notes and confirm that my recollection is correct. "Actually, I don't think there are any notes of that particular conversation, but I believe my recollection is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask Mr. McFarlane who

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			else knew of the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. I asked him what he knew about it, and I believe the only things that he told me were that he knew, of course from Colonel North that Admiral Poindexter he believe[d] knew and that that was all that he knew who might have any knowledge of it. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask him why he hadn't disclosed the diversion to you in your earlier interview? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall whether I did or not. It was a very hurried conversation with him. He got there late and I was on my way to a meeting with the President at the White House so there was not an awful lot of time to talk with him." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 145-47.)
86/11/24-002 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERVIEW PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. MITCHELL. In your testimony yesterday and today, you referred frequently to your notes which formed a significant basis of your recollection of the interviews that you conducted. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Mr. MITCHELL. On Friday, Saturday and Sunday, November 21, 22 and 23, you interviewed Mr. McFarlane, Secretary Shultz, Judge Sporkin and Colonel North. On each of these occasions, a member of your staff was present and that person took notes, and it is on those notes that you have frequently relied in your testimony here. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERVIEW PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERVIEW PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Mr. MITCHELL. In your meeting with Colonel North on Sunday, he confirmed that a diversion had taken place, and he told you that Mr. McFarlane and Admiral Poindexter were the only other persons in the administration who knew about the diversion. "I am struck by the fact that on the following day, Monday, November 24th, you met briefly with Mr. McFarlane and interviewed him again, and at that meeting you were alone, and you took no notes, is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. MITCHELL. You next spoke with Donald Regan, the President's Chief of Staff, interviewed him, and you were again alone and took no notes. "Attorney General MEESE. That wasn't next. Actually, I talked with Mr. Regan late in the day on Monday, the 24th. "Mr. MITCHELL. When you did talk with him-- "Attorney General MEESE. I talked with him and the President, I met with h[im] and the President and did not take notes at that time. "Mr. MITCHELL. I think Mr. Regan's recollection is contrary to yours, but when you did talk with him and the President, it was you and the[y], and you took no notes? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. MITCHELL. On Monday afternoon you spoke with the Vice President, and you were alone with him and took no notes? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. MITCHELL. Later on Monday afternoon, again you interviewed Admiral Poindexter, and		

again were alone with him, and you took no notes, is that correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. MITCHELL. On the following morning--

"Attorney General MEESE. Actually, the sequence is different. The Vice President was, I think, the last person I talked with on that evening.

"Mr. MITCHELL. But at each of the meetings that I have described with Mr. McFarlane, with Admiral Poindexter, with the Vice President, with the Chief of Staff and the President, you alone were present and took no notes?

"Attorney General MEESE. When I was with the President and the Chef of Staff, there were three of us.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Right. The next morning, you visited Mr. Casey at his home on your way to the office, is that correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. MITCHELL. And one of the note-takers for you at the meetings Friday, Satuday and Sunday was one of your assistants, Mr. Richardson?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Was Mr. Richardson with you in the car at the time you drove to Mr. Casey's home?

"Attorney General MEESE. He was with me. He was riding in to the office with me that morning.

"Mr. MITCHELL. When you went in to see Mr. Casey, you left Mr. Richardson in the car?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"Mr. MITCHELL. In your meeting with Mr. Casey, it was again alone, and you took no notes

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	of that meeting? "Attorney General MEESE. It wasn't a meeting. It was a quick conversation, yes. "Mr. MITCHELL. In your conversation, right? "Attorney General MEESE. Right." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 76-79.)		
86/11/24-003 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERVIEW PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry] "Mr. MITCHELL. The result of that, of course, is that as to the interviews that you conducted on Friday, Saturday and Sunday, your recollection has been supported and you have relied extensively on notes taken at those meetings. As to the critical events of Monday and Tuesday, there is only your undocumented recollection. Is there a reason why at each interview you had, up to and including the meeting with Colonel North, there was always another member of your staff present who took notes but that with respect to every interview thereafter you were alone and no notes were taken, or is that pure accident? "Attorney General MEESE. It is not totally pure accident. It is pure accident in a general sense, but they were totally different types of conversations. In the meetings that I had with Secretary Shultz, the meeting with Mr. Sporkin, the meeting with Mr. McFarlane, the meeting with Mr. North, all of these are what you might call interviews where we were seeking to elicit a great deal of information and in which notes were important in order to record that information	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERVIEW PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERVIEW PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

which we were hearing in each case for the first time.

"The other conversations that took place were not for the purpose of eliciting great amounts of information. They were either casual conversations, conversations in which I was the original person present, for example, with the President and Don Regan, in which I don't usually take notes in those quick meetings, or they were meetings in which I was seeing people to confirm information we already had in the long interviews that had already taken place, and it was just by happenstance, in that case it was an accident that nobody was there, because Mr. McFarlane came in just as I was leaving for the White House.

"In the case of Admiral Poindexter, I was just trying to confirm what we already knew, and he did in fact confirm it. Had he not confirmed it, I am sure we would have gone through the usual interview process with him and taken a detailed statement from him.

"Obviously, with the Vice President and the President, it is not normal in those conversations to take notes, and the same was true with Don Regan, who[m] I talked with to my recollection--after I had met with h[im] and the President at 4:30, I went into detail with him before going to the Vice President, detail in terms of what we were going to do the next day. It was at that time that I think he again said to me that he had known nothing about this."
(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 79-81.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/24-004 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERVIEW PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. MITCHELL. Giving you every benefit of the doubt, I think it is difficult to understand that you did not regard Admiral Poindexter, one of the three people in the government who was alleged to have information about it, the President's National Security Advisor, as a person not [sic] sufficiently important enough to have an interview with, but rather a casual conversation. "Attorney General MEESE. The reason that there was no interview was that what he said-- "Mr. MITCHELL. But you couldn't know before hand what he was going to say, could you? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I was trying to find out because I had very little time between the NSPG meeting and my meeting with the President. I though it important to confirm with Admiral Poindexter, the idea being there would have been ample opportunity to go into a formal interview situation had that been necessary. "Mr. MITCHELL. I will leave it at that and say it is really very difficult to accept. "Attorney General MEESE. I don't understand why it is difficult to accept. "Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Poindexter was a central figure. "Attorney General MEESE. But everything that he told me was totally consistent-- "Mr. MITCHELL. But you could not have known before you talked to him with he was going to say.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERVIEW PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INTERVIEW PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	That is the purpose of having someone there to record the meeting. "Attorney General MEESE. That is right, but had he said anything differently than that, we would have had a more formal interview to get that information. I explained that circumstances, that I was literally rushed into his office to try to verify this before I was due in the President's office. And it may be strange to you, it may strike you that truth being stranger than fiction, but I take offense at the idea that it is hard to accept, because what I have told you is the absolute truth of what happened. So if there is any question in your mind, I want to get that settled right now. "Mr. MITCHELL. I am just saying it is hard to accept. "Attorney General MEESE. As long as there is no question as to that being the truth, I will accept your statement. "Mr. MITCHELL. No, it is just very hard to accept. There are some questions that could have been asked, we can leave it at that." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 81-82.)		
86/11/24-005 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY, 10 a.m.)			THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES WELD ACCOUNT: The Attorney General calls his Assistant for the Criminal Division, William Weld between 10 and 11 a.m. They discuss Weld's request, made at a staff meeting the previous Friday (see above at 86/11/21-090), that the Criminal Division and FBI

be involved in the investigation of the Iran arms deals.

"Q. And when he called you, what did he say to you?

"A. He said words to the effect of, 'I just want you to know with respect to this Iran matter that the fact that the Criminal Division is not involved is not negligence or a product of sloppiness, and you should not be concerned that matters are, you know, falling between the cracks. This is being done that way on purpose.'

"Q. Okay.

"Did he allude to what was being done?

"A. No. I took his statement to refer to my expression of concern at the Friday meeting. My inference was that someone had reported to him that I had expressed this view with some warmth, and he should--that he might want to give me a call to make sure that I understood that the matter was being handled.

"Q. But did he tell you by whom or what was being done?

"A. No, that is just about all he said.

"Q. Do you recall what your response was?

"A. I said, 'Ed, I--I gather--or I did--I did register a concern at the Friday meeting about you doing this research, and my only thought is that if you tried to carry too much water here that some may spill on you.' Those were my words.

"Q. Can you tell us what you meant by that?

"A. Well, if you are going to be responsible for making a representation to a court in a court paper, you have to be very sure of your facts, and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			I guess my meaning was that it would be difficult for him to be sufficiently on top of both the facts on the Iranian arms sales by the government and the facts in the Evans case to be able to make a clean statement that, you know, the activities in Evans had no connection with the activities that the government had been carrying on." (Weld, House Dep., 7/16/87, at 23-24. For Meese account, see 86/11/21-086.)
86/11/24-006 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT: [Sen. Mitchell's question continues from his comment ending 86/11/24-004:] "[Mr. MITCHELL.] I would like to turn to another question, that is the securing of documents. You began your fact-finding inquiry on the morning of Friday, November 21. "Attorney General MEESE. Actually, it was the afternoon of Friday, November 21-- "Mr. MITCHELL. You met with the President in the late morning I think and began-- "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, the inquiry itself started that afternoon. "Mr. MITCHELL. Almost immediately thereafter, sometime Friday you made the decision to examine certain documents, is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. We made the decision to review the NSC documents to provide a basic documentary background for our fact-finding inquiry, right. "Mr. MITCHELL. But the decision to secure	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	documents was not made until the following Tuesday afternoon, as you have testified here previously? "Attorney General MEESE. Actually, Senator, we follow the same procedure that you do in your committees. We made a request for the documents, and we expected that that request would be fulfilled, and indeed it was fulfilled the next day. "Mr. MITCHELL. You in fact were acting in good faith that you expected those with whom you were dealing to act in good faith? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. MITCHELL. But unforuntately, as we now know, on Friday afternoon and late Sunday night Colonel North shredded large numbers of documents. "Attorney General MEESE. We know that now some months later, yes." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 83-85. See 86/11/25-730 and -731 [the Attorney General's investigative procedures and truth-seeking].)		
86/11/24-007 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)	NORTH TELLS EARL ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL EARL ACCOUNT: North tells Earl that the Attorney General had shown him the Diversion Memo at their meeting the previous day. After they had discussed the memo, according to Earl, North said to the Attorney General -- or to his assistants and the FBI representative(s) present -- "[S]ince you didn't warn me of my rights['] or because -- well, I am not sure of his words. I will just say [']since you didn't mention my rights or warn me of my		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	rights, does this count?[']" (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 84-85.)		
86/11/24-008 NOVEMBER 21-24, 1986 (FRIDAY - MONDAY)		POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION, GENERALLY MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. Let me ask you a final question, Mr. Attorney General. You talked a while ago about Poindexter and we have heard that you felt it was unnecessary to ask him anything further because you heard all that you needed to know apparently, and . . . I am going to refer you to your Exhibit No. [EM] 42, I am wondering, however, in looking at Exhibit No. 42, which is a list of the interviews that you were going to conduct, and you have Mr. McFarlane, Mr. Shultz, Mr. North, Mr. McMahon, Mr. Sporkin, CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations, Mr. Thompson, Secretary Weinberger, the Vice President, Deputy General Counsel CIA, Operations, and then another CIA. "But there is no mention of Admiral Poindexter and there is no mention of Director Casey. "Attorney General MEESE. No. There is also no mention of Don Regan, no mention of the President on there. But I think that these were people that undoubtedly would have been talked to as well." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 299-300; JHICI Ex. EM 42 [Attorney General's list of persons to be interviewed, 11/21/86].)	POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION, GENERALLY MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
86/11/24-010 NOVEMBER 24,	THE FALL GUY NORTH ACCOUNT:	THE FALL GUY NORTH ACCOUNT:	THE FALL GUY NORTH ACCOUNT:

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986 (MONDAY)	"Mr. LIMAN. . . . [F]or some months, you had been telling friends like Mr. Owen that you were going to be the fall guy? "Mr. NORTH. I may well have, as I believe I have already testified. I may well have told Mr. Owen and perhaps others that if this whole thing came down to creating a political controversy or embarrassment, and remember again that Mr. Owen did not know, I don't believe, anything about the Iran initiative, that I would be the person who would be dismissed or reassigned or fired or blamed or fingered or whatever one wants to use as a description, that I was willing to serve in that capacity. "All of that assumed that this was not going to be a matter of criminal behavior, but rather one of deniability for the White House, the Administration or whatever for political purposes, and when I say political purposes, I am speaking of not only domestic, but the international ramifications. That is one of the essentials of plausible deniability in a covert operation. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, are you saying, Colonel, that you were prepared to take the rap for political purposes, but not for criminal purposes? Is that what I just heard? "Mr. NORTH. Precisely." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 128-29.)	See col. 1.	See col. 1.
86/11/24-050 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TELLS REGAN, THEN THE PRESIDENT, ABOUT THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . During that weekend of	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TELLS REGAN, THEN THE PRESIDENT, ABOUT THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 1: See col. 2 and next entry.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		the 22nd and 23rd, did you have any involvement in the [Attorney General's] investigation? Did you have any discussions with anyone at the White House? "Mr. REGAN. No. "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . Now, on November 24th, you were told by the Attorney General about the diversion of funds; is that correct? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . He told you before the information got to the President? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. Not in detail but just as--there has been some diversion of funds here, apparently, and this is information we got to get to the President. "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . What was your reaction when you heard that information? "Mr. REGAN. Horror. "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . Did you then meet with the President and the Attorney General that morning and give the President this information, or exactly what did you do? "Mr. REGAN. The President had a political leader coming in from, I believe it was an African political leader coming in around 11:30, so we shoe-horned Ed Meese in for just a few minutes to alert the President that he had some bad news, but I think this is the phrase he used. He said, 'I have a few things to button up, then I want to get back to you and tell you the full story.' So we agreed that we would meet after the NSPG meeting in the Oval Office. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Did he say anything in this	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		initial conversation about anything in connection with the diversion of funds? "Mr. REGAN. I think he may have said a possible diversion of funds, but no names were specified nor amounts nor any details. "Mr. SMILJANICH. You were then present after the NSPG meeting with the Attorney General and the President when the Attorney General gave the President a little more details about what he had discovered? "Mr. REGAN. That's right. "Mr. SMILJANICH. It was just with the three of you in the Oval Office? "Mr. REGAN. That's it. "Mr. SMILJANICH. What was the President's reaction upon-- "Mr. REGAN. Deep distress, deep distress. "You know, the question has been asked, I've seen it in the paper time and time again: Did the President know? Let me put it this way. This guy I know was an actor, and he was nominated at one time for an Academy Award, but I would give him an Academy Award if he knew anything about this when you watched his reaction to express complete surprise at this news on Monday the 24th. He couldn't have known it. "Mr. SMILJANICH. It would be fair to say, based on his reaction, he didn't think it was such a neat idea? "Mr. REGAN. No, I don't--I wouldn't characterize it that way at all." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 74-76.)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/24-051 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TELLS REGAN, THEN THE PRESIDENT, ABOUT THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . Now, you knew nothing about the fact that there had been a mark-up of the cost of these missiles in connection with their shipment to Iran? "Mr. REGAN. That's what Meese told us. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Your understanding was this was a direct cost transaction? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. All right. You had a term for that, you have a term for your understanding of what kind of deal this was on Wall Street? "Mr. REGAN. On Wall Street the deal, as I understand it, was NPH. "Mr. SMILJANICH. What does that stand for? "Mr. REGAN. 'No profit here.' That is, you're selling it at cost, no profit. That's what I thought we were doing, selling it out of our stocks or replenishing Israeli stocks at our cost. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Was a 600 percent mark-up consistent with a vision of a new bilateral relationship with Iran? "Mr. REGAN. I'll say one thing, that may be another way to try to balance the budget. "Mr. SMILJANICH. What was said on this afternoon of November 24 about the future status of both Admiral Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel North? "Mr. REGAN. Nothing specifically. I	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TELLS REGAN, THEN THE PRESIDENT, ABOUT THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 2: See col. 2 and preceding entry.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		indicated to the President that this is very serious. As a matter of fact, in that meeting I told both Ed Meese and the President, I said, 'We got to get this out right away.' It was then close to 5:00. I said, 'There is no sense going with it tonight; let's go with this tomorrow. But we are going to have to get it out.' "I told the President later, after Meese had left, I said, 'I think John Poindexter has got to go. We just can't have a guy like that around here if he didn't follow up on this.' Because you got to remember, at that point, what Meese had told us was that Poindexter said, 'I should have been supervising North better, and I didn't. I didn't look into this.' "I also suggested at that meeting that taking a lead from the tragic Challenger disaster, that we had better have a commission look into this, but nobody would believe it if just Ed Meese looked into this, that he wanted to start a criminal investigation. I thought that was proper, but just as NASA wanted to investigate itself and come up with the Challenger report, and I said no, and we ended up with a Rogers Commission. I said absolutely not. We are going to have to have our own commission, independent people, and that was the birth of the Tower Commission right then and there, that afternoon. "I don't recall any conversation regarding North on Monday afternoon. "Mr. SMILJANICH. It was just determined at that point that Admiral Poindexter would have to resign?	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. REGAN. The President didn't assent, didn't disagree. He is not the type that likes to go around firing people. ". . . . "Mr. REGAN. Ironic statement, coming from me. "Mr. SMILJANICH. At any rate, you told the President you believed that Admiral Poindexter would have to resign and you took the President's silence as assent to that decision? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. And nothing was said about Lieutenant Colonel North's status that evening? "Mr. REGAN. Not on Monday afternoon." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 76-79.)	
86/11/24-052 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		THE PRESIDENT AND, LATER, CASEY LEARN ABOUT THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT: Regan compared the reactions of Casey and the President to news of the diversion: "Mr. COURTER. . . . You indicated that the demeanor of Bill Casey being almost, if not expressionless--I mean, I know the man as well. Sometimes his outward manifestations would not reveal what was going on inside. But how would you compare his deameanor when you told him about the diversion with the President's demeanor when he was advised about the diversion? "Mr. REGAN. Well, I characterize Casey as being, what, stolid, phlegmatic, or unreadable; whereas the President visibly was shocked by this and recoiled when he heard it, every manifestation of surprise and horror at what he had just heard.	THE PRESIDENT AND, LATER, CASEY LEARN ABOUT THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. COURTER. Your feeling at that particular time was that he grasped the significance, political and otherwise? "Mr. REGAN. Oh, yes. He looked like a guy that had really been punched in the stomach. (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 167-68.)	
86/11/24-060 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		MEESE TELLS THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE TELLS THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. What happened when you met with the President at the White House? "Attorney General MEESE. I met with the President at about 11:00 o'clock or a few minutes after 11:00. I believe he was running slightly late or I was. I met with him and with Don Regan. We did not have Admiral Poindexter with us at the time, and I related to him what we had found over the weekend in my interview with Colonel North, that we had found evidence of a diversion of funds from the Iranian initiative to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua and then related generally what we had found out in fairly brief form. "And the President was quite surprised and indicated he had not known anything of this and I believe Don Regan said at that time or at least indicated that he was surprised. As I went into this, the President was interrupted because after I had told the story of what we had found and so on, he was interrupted because he had an appointment with a visitor from overseas, I believe it was Chief Budalase from South Africa, and so the meeting was adjourned until after the National Security Planning Group meeting that

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			afternoon, and I was asked to come back and continue with the President as to what steps we ought to take. "I do remember the President indicating that we were going to have to be sure that this--work out a way to get this out as soon as possible, and I told him that I still had other people I needed to talk to, one of whom [w]as Admiral Poindexter. "Mr. NIELDS. Mr. Regan has told the committee that the subject of the diversion did not, in fact, come up until your meeting with the President reconvened in the afternoon and in your press conference the following day, you made reference to having told the President in the afternoon. "Do you feel certain that you told him in the morning as opposed to the afternoon? "Attorney General MEESE. I can't be sure. My best recollection is I think I told him at least initially in the morning that we had found something unusual. I don't think I was able to tell him the whole story in the morning because of the interruptions that I mentioned." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 147-48.)
86/11/24-062 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		MEESE TELLS THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NUNN. I believe yesterday you testified that when you told the President you had found the diversion memo, quoting you from yesterday's testimony, 'The President was quite surprised and indicated he had not known anything of this, and I believe Don Regan said at that time, or least	MEESE TELLS THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

indicated, that he was surprised.'

"Is that right?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. NUNN. When you said that the President said he had not known anything of this, what did the word 'this' mean to you? as that the diversion memo?

"Attorney General MEESE. He indicated that he did not know anything about the diversion scheme. I talked to him about the diversion scheme.

"Mr. NUNN. Did you ask him that question?

"Attorney General MEESE. Not precisely, no.

"Mr. NUNN. Did he volunteer that?

"Attorney General MEESE. He said this is a shock to me, or surprise to me. I can't recall the exact words. But it was clear from his reaction--

"Mr. NUNN. His reaction to what? What had you told him?

"Attorney General MEESE. About finding the memo and having the conversations with Colonel North, and in essence, the whole diversion scheme.

"Now, that was told to him in brief initially and then in more detail when we got together in the afternoon, as I recall.

"Mr. NUNN. So the first thing he said to you was he didn't know anything about it?

"Attorney General MEESE. No. He indicated that to me by his surprise and shock at what I had told him, and in the course of that indicated he knew nothing about it.

"Mr. NUNN. When he said that, you took that to mean the whole diversion scheme, not simply the memo?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. NUNN. Did the President ask you at that stage who had carried out this diversion?

"Attorney General MEESE. I told him, and I think much of this was probably told in the afternoon, rather than the morning--

"Mr. NUNN. The afternoon would have been after you had discussed this with Admiral Poindexter?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. And I told him then what the scheme was, the sale of weapons, the profits, and then the profits being diverted.

"I mentioned Colonel North and I believe I told him about the bank accounts and that sort of thing.

"Mr. NUNN. Did he ask you about the money? And how much there was?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't remember whether he asked or whether I told him or gave him an estimate of what we thought it might be.

"Mr. NUNN. Did he ask you whether the money went to the contras?

"Attorney General MEESE. I think I told him that we had been told the money did go to the contras.

"Mr. NUNN. Did he ask you who authorized the decision?

"Attorney General MEESE. I believe I told him, particularly in the afternoon, what Admiral Poindexter had told me, namely that he knew about it, but had not stopped it and allowed it to go

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		forward. "Mr. NUNN. Did the President ask you whether Admiral Poindexter thought he had authority to approve that diversion of funds? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't believe that he did, no, sir. "Mr. NUNN. Did he ask you anything about whether Colonel North felt he had the authority to carry that out? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't think the question of authority ever came up because it was clear to both the President and myself that nobody had that authority. "Mr. NUNN. It was clear in what way? Did you discuss it? Did you have a discussion with the President that no one had that authority? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't know whether we said it in that many words, but there was certainly no question in either of our minds that no one had that authority." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 199-202.)	
86/11/24-063 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		MEESE TELLS THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NUNN. Did [the President] say anything to the effect, golly gee, I wish they had consulted with me, or anything like that? Or why did they think they could possibly have the authority to do that? Did he express any sense of outrage? "Attorney General MEESE. I think he expressed real concern that this had happened because--and a	MEESE TELLS THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		lot of this was obviously in both of our minds, that this was a major blow, that it cast a cloud upon both the Iranian initiative and on the assistance to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua. "Mr. NUNN. It sounds as if it was more the terms of you reading each other's feelings rather than expressed words, is that a fair statement? "Attorney General MEESE. I think on the part of all of us, Mr. Regan, the President, myself, we both [sic] had a generally similar reaction, yes. "Mr. NUNN. Did the President ask you whether he should fire someone at that stage? "Attorney General MEESE. I think at that point he said--this is now on the afternoon of Monday--I think the question came up, and I don't know whether he raised it or whether Don Regan raised it, about whether Admiral Poindexter should be relieved of duty, and the President said that was one of the things he wanted to think about overnight, because he wanted to consider several things that ought to be done. "Mr. NUNN. Did you talk about relieving Colonel North or did the President say that? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't think that came up until the following morning. "Mr. NUNN. Who brought that up? "Attorney General MEESE. It was either--I think it was Mr. Regan, but I'm not positive. I think it came up in the whole general discussion of the different things that ought to be done. "Mr. NUNN. Did the President concur in the termination of Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North, or was it his reaction to this in terms of	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		outrage? In other words, were they terminated based on your recommendation or based on the President's own feeling? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, it was ultimately the President's decision. I think it was primarily to a great extent Mr. Regan, as the Chief of Staff of the White House, who probably made the significant recommendations in that regard." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 202-04.)	
86/11/24-066 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: THE PRESIDENT'S INFORMATION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. . . . You have testified that on November 21st of 1986, President Reagan instructed you to ascertain all the facts concerning the Iran arms transactions. "Since you were aware that this initiative was in your words rigidly compartmentalized, at what point in your investigative process did you plan to ask the President what he knew so that you could both assume and check the accuracy of other information that you had received? "Attorney General MEESE. It would have been after I had put together the information obtained from the other individuals who were involved. "Mr. BOLAND. When you informed the President of the diversion on November 24th, did he indicate to you what instructions, if any, he might have issued concerning the provision of military support to the contras during the period between October 1st of 1984 and October 18 of 1986?	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: THE PRESIDENT'S INFORMATION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir. I don't believe that came up in the conversation." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 263.)	
86/11/24-070 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		MEESE TELLS THE VICE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE TELLS THE VICE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Chairman INOUYE. Did you discuss the diversion with the Vice President of the United States? "Attorney General MEESE. I did on Monday, the 24th, yes, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. Who was present at this meeting? "Attorney General MEESE. I was present with the Vice President, the two of us. "Chairman INOUYE. No one else? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir. "Chairman INOUYE. Did you take notes on this meeting? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I didn't. It was a brief conversation. It was more of informing him of what was going on, but in the course of that I did ask him if he knew, or he said he didn't know, one of the two. "Chairman INOUYE. You are trying to recall now what he said? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't remember whether he volunteered, I certainly never knew anything about that, or whether I asked him if he knew; I can't recall." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 119.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/24-150 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)			NSPG MEETING ON IRAN, AND POINDEXTER'S INVITING DoS INVOLVEMENT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "NSPG on Iran. GPS criticizes policy and argues for its cessation. PRESIDENT does not agree. "Later that day, during WHITEHEAD meeting with GPS, POINDEXTER returns call from WHITEHEAD. POINDEXTER says State must get involved and can take lead if it wants. POINDEXTER says 'I want to get out of it.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/25-015.)
86/11/24-155 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		NSPG MEETING ON IRAN: NO MENTION OF DIVERSION SHULTZ ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NSPG MEETING ON IRAN, AND POINDEXTER'S INVITING DoS INVOLVEMENT SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BELNICK. On Monday, November 24, there was an NSPG meeting on Iran. The record reflects there was continued discussion of points you had been raising about ending arms sales to Iran and criticizing the policy, and I take it there was no discussion at that meeting of the NSPG about what the Attorney General had discovered over the weekend concerning . . . what has been referred to as the diversion? "Secretary SHULTZ. I perhaps don't have my dates lined up, but in my mind, when the Attorney General started his investigation, he--I heard about that Friday night, and he asked to see me early Saturday morning, and that is when I had my

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			interview with him. "Mr. BELNICK. That is right. "Secretary SHULTZ. And then I went off for the weekend and then this all broke open early the next week. "Mr. BELNICK. Tuesday was the date of his press-conference. Monday was the NSPG. And the discussion so far as we have been able to see related solely to Iran. And you have no recollection of the Attorney General discussing what he had discovered during the weekend at that time before the press conference, before the morning of the 25th? "Secretary SHULTZ. No, I don't. Perhaps that was the NSPG meeting at which, again, Admiral Poindexter and Director Casey were explaining this initiative, and I think Mr. Cave--that was the first time I saw him in action, came and he explained to us about Iran. "Mr. BELNICK. Talking about the second channel? "Secretary SHULTZ. I think maybe that was the meeting. "Mr. BELNICK. Do you recall a bit later in the day on November 24 that Admiral Poindexter called the State Department, returning a call from Secretary Whit[eh]ead, and at that point, in a seeming reversal of what he had been saying up until then--this was on Monday, the 24th, the night before the press conference, Poindexter said that he thought State had to get involved and take the lead in the policy, that he wanted to get out of it?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. That is right. "Mr. BELNICK. He didn't tell you what was moving him at that particular point in time? "Secretary SHULTZ. No, but I was very glad to hear that, because it enabled us to get hold of it and inform ourselves better on the one hand and do things about it on the other, which we proceeded to do." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 115-17.)
86/11/24-160 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		NSPG MEETING ON IRAN: NO MENTION OF DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	NSPG MEETING ON IRAN: NO MENTION OF DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. I think as you indicated earlier you were to report on the results of your investigation to the NSPG at the 2:00 o'clock meeting. "Attorney General MEESE. Not that I was to report to the NSPG. The President or Don Regan asked me if I would complete my review or as much of it as possibl[e] by 2:00 o'clock, at which time the NSPG was going to meet on the Iranian subject, so that I would be prepared to participate in that meeting on the basis of what we had learned. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you mention at that meeting the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I did not, for the reason that I had not had a chance to discuss it fully with the President as yet. "Mr. NIELDS. Originally as I understand it, you were going to do an inquiry to straighten out the differing stories with respect to the Hawk shipment in November of 1985.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Did you report on that subject at the NSPG meeting? "Attorney General MEESE. I contributed to the discussion and I believe I have some notes on that which constitute one of your exhibits [sc. Ex. EM 49]. . . . ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. Your notes on the second page of the exhibit begin with the words 'DTR.' I take it that is Mr. Regan? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct, Donald Regan. "Mr. NIELDS. And he is the one, apparently, who raises the subject and says, 'Question re: Hawk missile shipment, who authorized, who knew, was RR told?' "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And then you write down a remark by JMP; that is Admiral Poindexter? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And he says, 'Bud handling by self from July until December 1985, no documentation.' "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. That is what I have written down. "Mr. NIELDS. Do you recall his saying anything further? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall anything further and I recall that only from looking at the notes. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, Admiral Poindexter has testified before this committee that he had destroyed the original signed finding that related

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			to this Hawk shipment. "I take it you would have regarded that as documentation of significance to the inquiry that you were conducting over the weekend? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I certainly would. "Mr. NIELDS. And he has also told us that once he saw that and destroyed it, that the pieces began to fall back together and he began to recollect his involvement in that shipment. "I take it from your notes that he did not come forward with any information on the 24th? "Attorney General MEESE. No, he did not, not as to that at least. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, from your notes I take it that Mr. Regan had inquired who authorized the shipment, who knew, was RR told. "Did anyone ask the President or did the President respond in any way to that question? "Attorney General MEESE. Not that I can recall, and I have made no notations that he did. This was not necessarily a verbatim account of what was go[ing] on. It was notes that I took to refresh my recollection, but I have no notation here as to anything the President might have said at that stage." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 149-52; JHICI Ex. EM 49 [Meese notes of 11/24/86 NSPG Meeting].)
86/11/24-170 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		POINDEXTER SEES THE DIVERSION MEMO POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. . . . Do you recall seeing this document [Poindexter Dep. Ex. 16; the Diversion Memo]?	POINDEXTER SEES THE DIVERSION MEMO POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"A. Yes. I recall seeing it, but the time that I recall seeing it is -- well, until I saw this --

"Q. This being your handwriting?

"A. My handwriting here.

"You see, I am not sure -- I think what this is, as I told you earlier, on Sunday, the 23rd of November, Colonel North called me -- maybe I didn't say this yet. Colonel North called me at home on Sunday the 23rd after he had finished meeting with the Attorney General most of the day; and I was getting ready to sit down and eat dinner. I think it was on a non-secure line.

"Colonel North said, 'Admiral, I spent all day with the Attorney General, and his people turned up a memo on the contra connection to the Iranian project.' He said, 'I've explained everything to the Attorney General.' I can't remember my exact reaction, but at that point I was going pretty tired.

"But anyway, I said, 'Well, I'll see you in the office tomorrow.'

"He came into the office on Monday, explained that the Attorney General's people had found a memo and -- in his safe which revealed the contra connection. I believe I probably said something to the effect at the time I was surprised there was anything in writing on it. I said, 'I don't remember the memo that you are referring to. Send me a copy of it.'

"Later in the day, either -- well, it would have been Monday the 24th, I guess -- later that day, he apparently sent a copy over and the first

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		time I recall seeing this together was the following morning on the 25th. After I had breakfast, after seeing the Attorney General early in the morning, and also talking to Don Regan, Commander Thompson came in. I said, 'Did Ollie ever send over that memo?' He brought what I believe -- this is a copy of what he brought in at that time. "I think the timing on this note on the top was sometime that last week in November. "Q. You mean the note that you wrote 'keep this together for me. Iran. J.P.' You believe you wrote that when you were given the copy in November? "A. That's right." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 176-78; Poindexter Dep. Ex. 16 [= JHICI Exx. JMP 34, OLN FH 8; the Diversion Memo].)	
86/11/24-178 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Now, there came a time when the Attorney General asked you about your knowledge of the diversion, am I correct? "A. That is correct. "Q. And that was on the Monday? "A. That is correct. "Q. Did you tell that Attorney General that you had approved the diversion? "A. My recollection is that I told the Attorney General that I had a general knowledge of the diversion. "Q. Why didn't you tell him you had approved	POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

it?

"A. I don't know. Instinct thought it was better not to at the time, I think. [Sic]

"Q. Instinct for what?

"A. I just wasn't sure what was going to happen at that point, and just decided to say it that way, which was true.

"Q. When you say what was going to happen, what do you mean by that?

"A. Well, it wasn't at all clear. I offered to resign, and it wasn't clear whether I would or wouldn't at that point, and I just decided to be cautious.

"Q. Was the Attorney General upset about the diversion when he talked to you?

"A. No, he was not.

"Q. Did he suggest to you in any way that this might lead to an independent counsel or criminal prosecution?

"A. No, he did not.

"Q. He didn't give you warnings, I take it?

"A. No. It was a very informal chat in my office that lasted a very short period of time.

"Q. Was Don Regan with him when he was asking you these questions?

"A. No, he wasn't. It was just Ed Meese and me.

"Q. Did the Attorney General ask you whether the President knew?

"A. I don't recall he asked me that question.

"Q. Did you have your meeting with Don Regan -- was it afterwards?

"A. No. Well, it was afterwards, yes, the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		following day. "MR. BECKLER: This would have been on what day now? "THE WITNESS: Tuesday, the 25th." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 17-19. For Poindexter testimony following this excerpt on his meeting with Donald Regan, see 86/11/25-311.)	
86/11/24-179 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. When you met with the Attorney General on Monday morning, the 24th, you met with him alone, correct? "A. Yes. "Q. Do you know if when you met with him he had already met with Robert McFarlane? "MR. LIMAN: That day? "MR. LEON: That morning, yes. "THE WITNESS: I don't know that. "BY MR. LEON: "Q. Do you know if he had met that morning with President Reagan? "A. I am not sure of that. He had been in my office earlier in the day, while I was tied up with Senators, and my secretaries reported to me they asked him if he wanted them to interrupt and he said, 'No, I'll come back later.' He was in the White House. I don't know who[m] he was seeing. "We finally did get together sometime before lunch, as I recall. I don't know why he was there. "Q. Do you recall if he reported to you when	POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		you met with him that he had already spoken with the President? "A. I don't recall his saying that. "Q. Do you recall if he told you that Bud McFarlane had confirmed having knowledge of the diversion? "A. I don't recall his saying that. It was a very slow conversation. "Q. Recount the conversation as best you can recall. "A. Well, my recollection is that his main objective was to find out if I was aware of the diversion. And I told him I was generally." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 88-89.)	
86/11/24-180 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, when did the Attorney General speak to you about the diversion? "Mr. POINDEXTER. On Monday, the 24th. . . . My recollection is that he came to see me for about five minutes early afternoon. "Mr. LIMAN. . . . [D]id he ask you what you knew about this diversion? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It was a very brief conversation. My recollection is that he started off by saying, 'I assume you are aware of the memo that we found in Ollie's files', and I said, 'Yes.' He said, 'Were you aware of this?' And I said that I was generally aware of the transfer of funds or the plan to transfer funds, and I told him that I was prepared to resign and that I trusted him to recommend to me the timing of my	POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		resignation, and that was the--essentially the end of the conversation. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you tell the Attorney General that you had approved the diversion by Colonel North? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not use those words. I told him that I was generally aware of the transfer--of the plan to transfer the funds. I was being very cautious at that point. "Mr. LIMAN. Can you tell us why you didn't tell him that Colonel North was acting pursuant to your authority? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I wanted--in continuing the plan that I had always had of providing deniability to the President, I did not want to provide that detailed information at the time, because I wanted the President and his staff to be able to say they didn't know anything about it. "Mr. LIMAN. Is it a fact that the Attorney General didn't ask you whether you had told the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I do not recall his asking me whether I had told the President or his asking me whether I had approved it." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 86-88.)	
86/11/24-183 NOVEMBER 24-25, 1986 (MONDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: POINDEXTER INTERVIEWS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. . . . Is it your testimony that Attorney General Meese at no time asked you about the source of your authority for the diversion? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He did not ask me that	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: POINDEXTER INTERVIEWS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

question.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Is it also your testimony that he never asked you specifically whether the President knew of the diversion?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't believe that he asked me that. I certainly don't recall it.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Did he discuss with you at all any discussions he had had with the late Director Casey in the last 72 hours on the issue?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. He did not. The meeting that he had with me on Monday, the 24th, was a very short meeting.

"Mr. RUDMAN. What was the concern that he was expressing? He was there on a fact-finding mission for the President; is that correct?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct.

"Mr. RUDMAN. He was going to go public with the diversion memo--you knew that, I assume?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not know that.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Did you know it shortly after?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I guess I would have had to have concluded that on Tuesday morning, the 25th, after my meeting with him in his office, but I didn't know when they were going to go public, I don't believe, until I heard from my staff that he was going down to the press room at whatever hour it was.

"I think that was really the first indication that I had that they were going to go public.

"Mr. RUDMAN. When he was in your office and on any occasion you spoke to him after the diversion memo was discovered, at any time from that time until the time you resigned, did you

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		have any discussions with Attorney General Meese that would give you some indication of what his concerns were about this diversion memo that he had found? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The only thing that comes close to that is that in the meeting with him in his office around 7:30 on the 25th, he indicated to me that he didn't think that there were any criminal problems. "He did say that these people were still looking into it, but that at that point he didn't see any problem. And we really didn't have any other discussion. "I knew from own assessment that it was going to be a politically volatile issue and I was going to receive a lot of criticism, and the reason that I decided what I did at the time in February '86 was that I hoped that most of the criticism would be reflected on me." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 175-77.)	
86/11/24-185 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Following the NSPG meeting [see entries starting at 86/11/24-150], did you arrange an interview with Admiral Poindexter? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. For some reason I wasn't able to reach him in the morning and so I did go up to his office immediately following the NSPG meeting and had a conversation with him at that time. "Mr. NIELDS. How long? "Attorney General MEESE. I would say it was a	POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

very short conversation, probably about five or ten minutes, because I was due in the President's office as soon as I could after that meeting, but I did want to see Admiral Poindexter before I saw the President.

"Mr. NIELDS. Would you describe your conversation with Admiral Poindexter?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I described to Admiral Poindexter what we had found, that we had found a memorandum that indicated a diversion of funds. I indicated that we had talked with Colonel North, that Colonel North had verified that there was such a scheme and that a quantity of money had been taken from the so-called profits of the arms transactions and had been transferred through a series of bank accounts to the freedom fighters, and that, told him, in essence, what we had found.

"And I asked him whether he knew about this, and he said that, and I believe his exact words or close to his exact words, 'Ollie has given me enough hints about this so that I generally knew, but I did nothing to follow up', or 'stop it' or words to that effect.

"And then I asked him, I said, have you told anyone else or does anyone else in the White House know? And he said, no.

"Mr. NIELDS. Was that the sum and substance of your conversation?

"Attorney General MEESE. I think those were the salient parts of the conversation.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask him whether he had ever received a final version of the document that you had talked to Colonel North about?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, I did not. I didn't go into any more detail than that. Those were the key elements that I wanted to know before I talked to the President and then since I was already late for the President's office, I went there almost directly.

"I may have stopped by to pick up Don Regan or he may have already been in the President's office, but Admiral Poindexter did not go with me at that time.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask him whether there had been any other documents referring to the diversion which had been sent up the line by Colonel North?

"Attorney General MEESE. No. I asked him only whether he had told anyone else or anyone else in the White House knew and he said no.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask him whether he had told the President?

"Attorney General MEESE. Implicitly, yes, when I asked who else in the White House knew or whether he told anyone else in the White House, and he said no.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, Admiral Poindexter testified before this committee that he did not recall your asking him whether he had told the President. Did you make any notes of that interview?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, I did not.

"Mr. NIELDS. Was there anyone else there?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, I was the only one with him, and I did not actually ask him in

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		the exact words 'did you tell the President?' I said, 'did you tell anyone else in the White House or does anyone else in the White House know?' "I think I may have related to him what Colonel North said about who knew. "Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask him whether he had approved of the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. I didn't ask him separately, he had already indicated what his participation was in the words that I mentioned to you, that he knew enough about it, that he knew what was going on, had a general knowledge, but that he did nothing to either follow up on that or stop it." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 152-55.)	
86/11/24-187 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NUNN. . . . Now, Attorney General Meese, when you talked to Admiral Poindexter on Monday, November 24th, you said it was a brief conversation of ten minutes and he essentially confirmed what you already knew. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Mr. NUNN. And that is that he knew of the diversion of funds to the contras? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Mr. NUNN. Admiral Poindexter has testified that he told you he was generally aware of the diversion and then I think you testified yesterday [see 86/11/24-185] that Poindexter told you, quoting from that testimony--this is quoting you as to what Admiral Poindexter told you--Ollie has	POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

given me enough hints about this, the diversion, so that I generally knew, but I did nothing to follow up or stop it, or words to that effect; is that correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. That's correct.

"Mr. NUNN. Did you ask Admiral Poindexter who approved the diversion?

"Attorney General MEESE. I did not ask him in so many words. I did ask him whether he had ever told about this to anyone else in the White House and he said no.

"Mr. NUNN. Did you ask him specifically whether he had told the President of the United States?

"Attorney General MEESE. I didn't ask him specifically whether he had told the President. I asked if he had told anyone else in the White House or discussed it with anyone else in the White House, and he said no.

"Mr. NUNN. So you didn't ask whether he had told the President directly?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, because that was included in the answer that I had received and the question I asked.

"Mr. NUNN. Did you ask him if he had approved the diversion?

"Attorney General MEESE. Not in that many words, but I did ask him what he knew of it and he told me, in essence, that he had allowed it to go forward.

"Mr. NUNN. So you took that as tacit approval?

"Attorney General MEESE. He told me that that was the extent of his involvement, and I took that as tacit approval, the fact that he allowed it to go forward.

"Mr. NUNN. But I believe that you testified that you did not believe he had authority to approve that.

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. NUNN. Did you ask him if he thought he had authority?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I did not.

"Mr. NUNN. So you never discussed that with him.

"Did you ask him when he learned of the diversion?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't believe I asked him precisely when, nor did he tell me precisely when he had learned.

"He indicated, as you quoted, that Colonel North had given him hints over a period of time.

"Mr. NUNN. Did you ask him why he did not tell the President of the United about the diversion?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I did not.

"Mr. NUNN. He just said he didn't tell anyone in the White House other than the named individuals.

"Did you ask him if Colonel North had discussed this or had approval from anyone other than him, that is, anyone other than Admiral Poindexter?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, I did not, because in our conversation with Colonel North he had indicated that Admiral Poindexter was the only

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		one in the White House who knew about it. "Mr. NUNN. What about outside the White House? "Attorney General MEESE. The only one he had indicated outside the White House in the Government or had been in the Goverment was Mr. McFarlane. "Mr. NUNN. Did you ask him whether anyone outside the White House in the Government, other than Mr. McFarlane, knew about the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. He told me that. He said that there were only three persons in the United States Government who knew this, and those were himself, Mr. McFarlane and Mr. Poindexter." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 193-96.)	
86/11/24-188 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NUNN. Did you ask [Poindexter] about who knew [about the diversion] outside of the United States Government? "Attorney General MEESE. No. sir. He told me those were the people that knew it. "Mr. NUNN. He said in the Government. Did you ask him about people not in the Government? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir. "Mr. NUNN. That didn't occur to you? "Attornty General MEESE. That did not occur to me. "Mr. NUNN. Did you ever have any conversation with Admiral Poindexter or ask him any question about whether Colonel North and Director Casey had	POINDEXTER-MEESE INTERVIEW MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

discussed this issue?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I did not ask Admiral Poindexter, because Colonel North had told me that, again, just who in the Government knew about it, and I asked Admiral Poindexter only whether he had told anyone in the White House.

"Mr. NUNN. So you never asked Admiral Poindexter if he had told or discussed this with Director Casey?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I did not.

"Mr. NUNN. Did you ask Admiral Poindexter under what authority he had approved this diversion by Colonel North?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I did not.

"I don't know whether you were present earlier, Senator Nunn. but at that time I testified why this was so brief and why I didn't go into more extensive questioning, and that was that I was literally on my way to talk with the President and my main purpose was to verify what I had been told by Colonel North the previous day, and particularly as to whether anyone in the White House knew about it and what the knowledge was on the part of Admiral Poindexter.

"Mr. NUNN. I heard that.

"Did you ask Admiral Poindexter anything about the money, where it went?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I did not.

"Mr. NUNN. And how much it was?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir.

"Mr. NUNN. Did you ask him anything about whether the contras got the money?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I did not.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. NUNN. I understand the rush of events that day, but it seems to me that there were also no direct questions asked by you to Admiral Poindexter. "Attorney General MEESE. That's correct. I mentioned already the time frame and also the fact that we had had a detailed account of this whole thing by Colonel North the previous day. "Mr. NUNN. But you were trying to determine--as you said, from the President your directive was to see how you would resolve various conflicts, and it seems to me you gave very short treatment to whether or not the two key players in this may themselves disagree. "Attorney General MEESE. The purpose was to resolve the conflicts and to get a coherent story on the Iranian initiative. "We had a totally different situation with regard to the discovery of the diversion of funds, and there the primary objective was to verify what in fact had happened, get an account of all of the essential facts and then determine what the next steps would be. "So the mission considerably changed from Friday noon when it started until roughly Sunday evening when he had a great deal more information." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 196-99.)	
86/11/24-200 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)			PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON IRAN: At a White House photo opportunity, the President states, "I didn't make a mistake." (N.Y. Times, 11/25/86, at A1.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/24-400 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		MEESE HAS A SECOND MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	MEESE HAS A SECOND MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Would you describe the conversation you had with the President after your interview with Admiral Poindexter? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I then related in more detail to the President, and also added what I had just learned from Admiral Poindexter about his knowledge and participation. There was a discussion then in the President's office between Don Regan and the President and myself about the next steps to take. "I indicated that I probably ought to do some additional checking or at least there were other people that I wanted to talk with. One of them just touch all the bases with the Vice President. "And also there was a discussion of--I know distinctly there was a discussion: should John Poindexter be relieved of his duties? "And the President said he would like to think about it overnight as to what steps should be taken and we agreed to meet again in the morning, I believe, at nine o'clock. ". . . . "Attorney General MEESE. Let me also say there was one other thing. The President said at that time, again, reiterated what he had said to me on a previous occasion, that was that we want to be sure that we get this out as soon as possible or words to that effect. "And that was one of the--there were several

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			things he had in mind, but that was one of the things we were going to talk about the following morning." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 155-57.)
86/11/24-500 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		DoJ ACTIVITY: TOM GREEN INTERVIEW COOPER ACCOUNT: Tom Green meets with Reynolds and Cooper of the Attorney General's office at about 2 p.m. for an hour and a quarter. The meeting is held at the DoJ. Green states that he represents North and Secord but is "not there in the capacity of a lawyer representing a client. And in fact," according to Cooper's testimony, "[H]e was rather cagey . . . but it was just not clear to me exactly who it was that he did represent as a lawyer, if anybody." Cooper testified he believed Green had discussed the matter with North and Secord, as well as Hakim. "Mr. KAPLAN. Can you describe for us the substance of the meeting? "Mr. COOPER. . . . Mr. Green presented an understanding of the contra diversion that was at odds with the one that we had received from Colonel North, and he opened his discussion of that element of it by saying that Colonel North is the ultimate Marine, and he wants to step forward and take the spears in his own chest. I think that is the formulation he used. It sticks in my mind. But that it is important for us to know that there is another, little different version of	DoJ ACTIVITY: TOM GREEN INTERVIEW COOPER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

this whole matter.

"Mr. KAPLAN. And was there any resolution to the meeting? How did you leave things after Green went through an explanation of his knowledge of the diversion and of the participation of North, Secord and Hakim as evidenced by your notes?

"Mr. COOPER. There was--the conclusion of it, at least on this part, was along the lines that this matter, if made public, this contra element of it all, would be--there could be lives lost, and it was--he expressed an earnest hope that it would not be necessary to make it public.

"Mr. KAPLAN. Did you or Mr. Reynolds make any representations to Mr. Green in that regard?

"Mr. COOPER. The only--there was an understanding reached. We certainly did not respond one way or another to his--to that point. But Brad did assure Mr. Green, as I recall, that he would do him the courtesy of letting him know prior to the time that the matter was made public.

"Mr. KAPLAN. What was done by you or Mr. Reynolds with the information that Mr. Green conveyed to you during that meeting Monday afternoon?

"Mr. COOPER. We outlined it to the Attorney General and probably to others in the room. I don't remember who was gathered on that occasion, but we did--I do recall in the Attorney General's office outlining the alternative version.

"Mr. KAPLAN. Were any recommendations made to the Attorney General on the basis of the information you received from Green.

"Mr. COOPER. I don't--well, I don't recall any, none in particular. You might be able to refresh my memory, however.

"Mr. KAPLAN. Do you know whether Mr. Reynolds did, in fact, call Mr. Green prior to the disclosure of the diversion on Tuesday, November 25?

"Mr. COOPER. No, he didn't.

"Mr. KAPLAN. Are you aware of any further meetings between Justice Department officials and Mr. Green relating to the matters at hand in these hearings?

"Mr. COOPER. Yes, I understand that Mr. Reynolds met again with Mr. Green and someone else from the Justice Department, some few days later. I don't remember, however, I was not present, and I just don't know what transpired at that meeting."

(Cooper Testim., JHICI, 6/25/87, at 142-47.)

86/11/24-510
NOVEMBER 24,
1986
(MONDAY)

DoJ ACTIVITY: TOM GREEN INTERVIEW
REYNOLDS ACCOUNT AND HAKIM RESPONSE:

During a discussion of which lawyer represented which client at what time, Sen. Rudman summarized for Hakim a portion of William Bradford Reynolds' testimony:

"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . It is my understanding that . . . Mr. Green became your lawyer for a time on the 24th of November; is that correct?

"Mr. HAKIM. Yes, sir.

"Mr. RUDMAN. And he was your lawyer at a time that you were at a meeting with Mr. Secord, who[m] he principally represents, and Colonel North, who is now represented by another attorney; is that

DoJ ACTIVITY: TOM GREEN INTERVIEW
REYNOLDS ACCOUNT AND HAKIM RESPONSE:

See col. 2.

correct?

"Mr. HAKIM. That is correct, sir.

". . . .

"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . I just want to put something into the record, Mr. Hakim . . . .

"It is disturbing to me from many points of view--this hearing, professional ethics and other things--on the 18th of May of this year this committee interviewed William Bradford Reynolds of the Justice Department.

"Mr. Reynolds was talking about some discussions they had with a number of people involved in this. . . .

"On Monday November 24 Reynolds was telephoned by Tom Green--that is the day I believe you had the meeting; correct?

"Mr. HAKIM. I believe so.

"Mr. RUDMAN. That is the day Mr. Green was representing you?

"Mr. HAKIM. I believe so, sir.

"Mr. RUDMAN. . . . On Monday, November 24, Reynolds was telephoned by Tom Green, whom he knew well from years of law practice in Washington. Green said he was not calling on behalf of any particular client, but that he had represented Secord and North in the past. Green further stated that he thought that the government should have certain information which it apparently did not then have. Reynolds consulted with Meese, who agreed that Reynolds and Cooper should meet with Green.

"Reynolds, Cooper and Green met later that day. Green rambled on about Secord's and Hakim's

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		enterprise. He said that the fiasco of the November, 1985, shipment brought North into the picture, but that North had performed throughout simply as a facilitator. Green stated that the arms initiative was intended to develop a relationship with moderates in Iran. Green offered that Hakim came on the scene to open the channels based on his relationship with--and I will leave the name blank. "Green further discussed the January 17 Finding, and the 'third-party' language contained in that Finding. To implement the January 17 Finding, Green stated that the government had turned to Secord. Green attributed diversion to Hakim, who believed that only Iranian funds (not United States funds) could be and had been used to aid the contras. Green was very harsh on Ghorbanifar. "But the man representing you on that day is talking to the Justice Department and saying you are responsible for the diversion. Does that surprise you, Mr. Hakim? "Mr. HAKIM. Yes." (Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/5/87, at 2, 6-9.)	
86/11/24-700 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		REGAN MEETING WITH CASEY: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. SMILJANICH. Now during the afternoon or going into the evening of November 24th, Director Casey had been trying to reach you; is that correct? "Mr. REGAN. That is correct.	REGAN MEETING WITH CASEY : DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 1: See col. 2.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. He told you he had something he wanted to talk to you about, he urgently wanted to talk to you?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Did you meet privately with Director Casey that night?

"Mr. REGAN. I couldn't find a time that was mutually convenient. I came back from the meeting with the President and Ed Meese, immediately got a couple of members of the staff working on a presidential statement for the following morning, and going through a lot of other things.

"As a matter of fact, believe it or not, after hearing all of this stuff, that night we had a meeting on the budget that was scheduled, that couldn't wait. So I had to sit through a budget meeting.

"But I told Casey that--he asked if on the way home, I could stop by Langley and meet with him. So I said yes, I would stop by for a few minutes on my way home to dinner.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. And you did so?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes, I did.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. The meeting was just two of you?

"Mr. REGAN. Just the two.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Any notes?

"Mr. REGAN. Not by me.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. At this meeting, you told Director Casey about the fact that you and the President had learned that day that there had been a diversion of funds from the sale of these munitions to Iran?

"Mr. REGAN. I did.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. And what was Director Casey's reaction?

"Mr. REGAN. Well, you don't get much facial reaction, or didn't get much facial reaction from Bill Casey. You wouldn't know exactly how he was taking this news. It did seem to surprise him, because originally he asked, he said, 'Where are we? Why can't we get this thing straight? Why can't we get a story out?'

"And then I told him of what Meese had told the President and me that afternoon, and he said, 'What are you going to do about it?'

"I said, 'We are going to go public with it tomorrow.' I said, 'We have to get this story out. We can't sit on this one.'

"And he said, 'Well, do you realize the consequences of what you are doing?' He said, 'You are going to blow the whole Iranian thing and possibly blow the lives of these hostages.'

"I said, 'Be that as it may,' I said, 'How the hell can we'--excuse me-- 'how can we sit on this stuff for any longer? I mean, the thing is an absolute disgrace that we haven't put it out yet. And on top of that, now that we have this possible criminal act,' I said, 'how can we sit on it?'

"He said, 'Well, I guess you got to do it,' but, he said, 'I hope you realize, you know, this is going to cause quite a few upsets and is going to be a major story.'

"I said, 'I know it, Bill, but that is the only thing we can do.'

"Mr. SMILJANICH. He specifically mentioned one of the dire consequences might be a cutoff of further funding for the contras?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. And he also stated that he believed the Iranian Government would be angry and upset to learn that they had been charged a markup and what had been done with that residual?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. He was also concerned about congressional reaction to this matter in general; is that correct?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Did he recommend that anything be done specifically?

"Mr. REGAN. No.

"I didn't, you know--I was doing most of the telling rather than asking him what we should do. And he didn't volunteer except, you know, 'Have you realized what you are doing?' that type of thing.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Then the meeting ended?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes. It was a short meeting. I wouldn't say more than 20, 25 minutes."
(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 79-83.)

86/11/24-701
NOVEMBER 24,
1986
(MONDAY)

REGAN MEETING WITH CASEY: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION
REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. SMILJANICH. . . . [W]as anything said at that meeting about the fact that Admiral Poindexter was going to resign the next day?

"Mr. REGAN. No.

REGAN MEETING WITH CASEY: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION
REGAN ACCOUNT, Part 2:
See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. SMILJANICH. Now, you talked about the fact that after you told Director Casey this information, and he described some of the dire consequences that he saw would result from this disclosure, let me ask you this: What was it that Director Casey wanted to see you so urgently about that evening? "Mr. REGAN. As I recall, it was that he was wondering, you know, what is the President's state of mind at this point. You know, we are going round and round here, we don't seem to be able to get a straight story, what is the President thinking at this point. "Mr. SMILJANICH. But I had the impression from your description of the fact that he wanted to see you that it was very urgent, that there was something in particular he wanted to see you about that evening? "Mr. REGAN. Well, whatever it was, if it were something either entirely different or either part of the Iran-contra affair, he never did bring it out, because I think the news that I gave him was the only subject we discussed that evening. "Mr. SMILJANICH. So if he had something specific and urgent that he wanted to talk to you about, when you described the diversion, whatever it was he wanted to talk to you about was passed over? "Mr. REGAN. I guess so." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 84-85.)	
86/11/24-704 NOVEMBER 24,		REGAN MEETING WITH CASEY: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION	REGAN MEETING WITH CASEY: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986		REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. Let me talk a moment about the diversion conversation you had with Mr. Casey, I think on November 24th, the evening. According to the House deposition, you indicate you did have a conversation. In the Senate deposition, I think you indicated you did not have a conversation about the diversion. Today you are indicating that you, in fact, had that conversation. You stated to the House that the Director did not express surprise or chagrin on being informed. And when Casey warned that the disclosure would endanger lives, we might be cut off for some time with contact with Iran, that they would be enraged for being over-charged, did he indicate that to you? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. COHEN. Did that give you any indication he was aware of the over-charging mechanism that was employed? "Mr. REGAN. I didn't analyze it at that point to be very frank with you, Senator. I had a lot of other things on my mind. I wasn't analyzing what Casey's role might have been." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 128-29.)	REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
86/11/24-705 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		REGAN MEETING WITH CASEY: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. COURTER. Mr. Regan, there has been testimony by Oliver North that he advised and talked to Director Casey about the diversion of proceeds from Iran to Central America, and that	REGAN MEETING WITH CASEY: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

the Director throught it was a neat idea to proceed.

"There has been testimony by Ed Meese, the Attorney General, that he had a conversation with Director Casey and Casey indicated that he was unaware of the diversion.

"You had a conversation, I believe, on the evening of the 24th when you drove by and you advised him. Did he indicate to you that that was the first time he heard about it?

"Mr. REGAN. He did not say one way or the other whether he knew of the diversion or he didn't know of the diversion. As I explained earlier this morning, he heard me out as to, you know, the extent of what Meese had told the President. I briefed it. I didn't give him everything, but in brief what had happened.

"Then he gave me the downside. Do you know what you're risking by going public with all of this?

"Mr. COURTER. When he gave you the downside, was he advocating, as was Admiral Poindexter, nondisclosure or was he just making sure you knew all the facts or all the possible ramifications of disclosure?

"Mr. REGAN. I would say in retrospect that he was advocating, but it was a biased type of advocacy. In other words, he was showing me that there would be some real danger if we persisted in this. In other words, he was leaning toward trying to advise not to do it, leaning that way but not absolutely saying it.

"Mr. COURTER. My feeling would be that you

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		were very persuasive because apparently the next morning when he had a conversation with Ed Meese, he came around to your point of view, and my recollection of Ed Meese's testimony was by that following morning, he was articulating the need to release it because of the political damage to the President? "Mr. REGAN. Well, I think anyone in that position, particularly as learned a man and as experienced a man as Bill Casey, reviewing in his mind the pros and cons of the situation, would have to come down and say, you know, you cannot keep this any longer. You have got to go public with it." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 165-67.)	
86/11/24-706 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)		REGAN MEETING WITH CASEY: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT: Asked whether he thought that Casey was hearing about the diversion for the first time when Regan told him of it on November 24, Regan testified: "That is a very difficult question for me to answer. "As I said yesterday, he did not indicate to me that he did know of the diversion. On the other hand, he didn't say that he did not know of it. It seems to me that you gentlemen will have to look a little bit more into some of the stories that I have read someplace, I have no personal knowledge of this, about this Canadian group that somehow or other were loaning money to carry on	REGAN MEETING WITH CASEY: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		the transactions and the[ir] not getting their amount of money. "This was told to Casey as I recall from what I read in October, and then he raised that question with Poindexter and others about this money. "Whether or not at that point he could have learned of the diversion, I don't know, but it would seem to me that if he were that involved to where he had a story from a third party that as head of the CIA he would have run it down a little bit more. I don't know." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 12. On the Casey-Furmark discussion, see entries starting at 86/10/11-100.].)	
86/11/24-800 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)	"WHEN THE POLITICAL FRATRICIDE IS FINISHED" POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH PROF, Part 1: "Mr. LEON. . . . This is a PROF note on November 24, 1986. It is not an exhibit. . . . ". . . [It is] from Colonel North to yourself. . . . ". . . . "Mr. LEON. . . .[T]here is no window into the mind of a person, but this might be a helpful insight of the situation at the time. Let me read it, if I may. It is very brief. "'There is that old line about you can't fire me, I quit. But I do want to make it official so that you know I sincerely meant what I said to you over the course of these last several difficult weeks. I am prepared to depart at the time you and the President decide it to be in the best	"WHEN THE POLITICAL FRATRICIDE IS FINISHED" POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	"WHEN THE POLITICAL FRATRICIDE IS FINISHED" POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	interests of the Presidency and the country. I am honored to have served the President, you and your predecessors these past five-and-a-half years. I only regret that I could not have done so better. My prayer is that the President is not further damaged by what has transpired and that the hostages will not be harmed as a consequence of what we now do. "'Finally, I remain convinced that what we tried to accomplish was worth the risk. We nearly succeeded. Hopefully, when the political fratricide is finished, there will be others in a moment of calm reflection who will agree. Warmest regards, Semper Fidelis, Oliver North.' "Let me focus your attention on two aspects of that PROF note. Do you remember receiving it, Admiral? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I do. "Mr. LEON. This was the very day it was clear you were going to have to resign, and the Colonel was going to be leaving as well, the NSC? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. "Mr. LEON. The diversion had been brought to the attention of the President of the United States by the Attorney General? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I knew the Attorney General knew. I assumed the President knew at that point, but I wasn't sure of that. "Mr. LEON. This was 5:44 in the evening on that day, was it not? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Right. "Mr. LEON. Now the first portion of it is, 'I remain convinced that what we tried to accomplish		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	was worth the risk.' With respect to accomplishments, was it your impression that what Colonel North was referring to is the accomplishments of keeping the contras alive and opening a second channel and getting the hostages out? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That was my understanding of what he was talking about. "Mr. LEON. And with regard to the risks that he was asking, or that were worth taking, was he talking about the risks of political fratricide that he refers to here? The risks to career? You had turned down, in order to stay at the White House, had you not, command of the Sixth Fleet? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. At the beginning of the second term, I had a decision to make whether to resign my White House Commission at that point and return to the Navy or to offer to the President to stay on into the second term. "Mr. LEON. Is it safe to say in the Navy that command of the Sixth Fleet is a very, very important and cherished post? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It is a very cherished post, and I am not at all sure but that my wife wouldn't have preferred that we go to the Sixth Fleet." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 104-06.)		
86/11/24-801 NOVEMBER 24, 1986 (MONDAY)	"WHEN THE POLITICAL FRATRICIDE IS FINISHED" POINDEXTER RESPONSE TO NORTH PROF, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. LEON. Was he also talking here about risks to his life, Bud McFarlane's life? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think he probably was.	"WHEN THE POLITICAL FRATRICIDE IS FINISHED" POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	"WHEN THE POLITICAL FRATRICIDE IS FINISHED" POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

"Mr. LEON. And risks to the relationship to Congress perhaps? Were these risks that were taken?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. This was--these were high-risk operations that we were involved with.

"Mr. LEON. Let me ask you this, Admiral. Having gone through what you have gone through now, many of these risks having materialized, do you think that the progress that was made toward these goals was worth the risks that were taken?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I think so, in the long term.

"We did keep the contras alive. We have them funded now. And I am convinced that Congress will see fit to continue to fund them. I think although these hearings are difficult and consume a lot of time, and I'm not really sure that I'm in favor of them, they do have one advantage, that is an opportunity for the American people to understand the issues better, and I think as a result, the prospect of freedom and democracy in Central America has improved.

"Mr. LEON. With regard to the last portion of this, where he says 'Hopefully when the political fratricide is finished, there will be others in a moment of calm reflection who will agree' that the risks were worth running, did you have that hope that he had at that time?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, it is hard to judge how history will evaluate this time period. I certainly hope that with--as time passes and people develop a perspective on what happened, what we were trying to do, that it will be a favorable judgment.

"Mr. LEON. You share today Colonel North's hope at that time?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes that is right.

"Mr. LEON. No further questions, Mr. Chairman."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 106-08.)

86/11/24-900
NOVEMBER 24,
1986
(MONDAY)

NANCY REAGAN'S CALL TO REGAN: THE ROLLING HEADS

REGAN ACCOUNT:

"Mr. FASCELL. . . . [I]n answer to one of Mr. Courter's questions, you said, 'Yes, I got a call from the First Lady, but it wasn't really very significant.' I just--but it is interesting because it seemed to be rather significant as I read your deposition, and I wanted to get your own remarks there to you. It said, 'Did you speak to the First Lady that night', meaning after you had been out to Bill Casey that evening, that is on the 24th, and you said 'Yes.'

"'What did she have to tell you?

"'She was very upset at the news apparently her husband had told her and, or the implication that heads would have to roll.

"'Do you recall how she told you that, what she said?

"'I can't recall the specifics, but that was the thing, there would have to be a housecleaning of people that had let Ronnie down. I seemed to have the impression that mine was one of the heads that would have to roll.

"'What gave you that impression?

"'Well, when people talked about a thorough housecleaning, starting at the top, one gets the impression one may be considered.

"'Did she mention Oliver North or John Poindexter in that housecleaning?

"'She didn't mention North, she may have mentioned Poindexter.

"'Did you tell her that steps were already taken or going to be taken?

"'Yes. That was one of the things I was doing was working fast and furiously to try to get this information out and to have an investigation and let the facts come out.'

"That is as far as I am going to read. My comment simply is, Mr. Regan, you certainly have mellowed with time, and as a matter of fact, it was so fast and remarkable in just a couple short weeks, I would recommend you some way to some winery somewhere to make wonderful wine

"Mr. REGAN. I am not sure I get the point.

"Mr. FASCELL. That is a compliment, Mr. Regan.

"Mr. REGAN. Oh, it is? Okay. I will take it as such."

(Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 189-91. See id., 7/30/87, at 162 [Regan on the call from Nancy Reagan: "I don't think it was significant to this hearing."]. See generally id., 7/30/87, at 93-94 [Regan: "When I heard all this description of fall guys coming out in the press from these hearings, I asked my staff, I asked, 'What is the derivation of fall guy, where did that term ever come from?' I didn't know whether it was a movie

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	stunt man who took the falls for the hero or what it was. It turns out it's a wrestling expression dating back from the 19th Century, when they had fixed wrestling matches. You recall in wrestling it is two falls out of three, and one guy would be the fall guy. . . . [T]he fall guy was the guy who agreed to lose. I never agreed to lose, so inasmuch as I didn't do that, I am not sure I am the fall guy in that sense of the word. As far as spears in the breast are concerned, I don't mind spears in the breast, it's knives in the back that concern me. Now as far as chaos is concerned, I am not sure what could have been done about the chaos. . . ."].)		
86/11/25-005 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		CASEY-MEESE MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. Prior to the meeting [with the President] at nine in the morning, did you have a meeting early in the morning? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. I met with Mr. Casey at about 6:40 or so. "Mr. NIELDS. How was that arranged? "Attorney General MEESE. I was just leaving the house about 6:30 and Mr. Casey called me and said that Don Regan had told him about the diversion of funds the night before and he wanted to talk about it, and I said that probably rather than talking over the phone, it would be better for me to drop by his home. I had mentioned earlier to you that he lived very close to me. So I dropped by there on the way to work. "Mr. NIELDS. Would you describe the	CASEY-MEESE MEETING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

conversation you had with Director Casey that morning?

"Attorney General MEESE. Basically I had told him what we had found and he had already heard the story generally from Don Regan. He indicated to me that he had been surprised by what Don Regan told him, and he also said we have got to get this out as soon as possible.

"Mr. NIELDS. Did you ask him whether he had known of it earlier?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't think I did, because he had indicated to me in the conversation that he had been surprised and had not known of it before Don Regan told him.

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it then that you did not ask him--

"Attorney General MEESE. I didn't ask him point blank, did you know about it before Don Regan told you, but he certainly indicated that in the conversation. I can't remember the exact words.

"Mr. NIELDS. I take it then you didn't ask him whether he had ever discussed it with the President or anybody else?

"Attorney General MEESE. No, I did not.

"Mr. NIELDS. Was that the sum and substance of your conversation with Director Casey?

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, it was, because while we were talking, we were interrupted by a phone call for me by the White House switchboard and Don Regan was trying to reach me, and they had called my car and my car [sic; see 86/11/24-002: John Richardson stayed in the car

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		while the Attorney General met with Casey] told him I was inside and so they reached me in Mr. Casey's home or perhaps the call somehow got to the car and ultimately to me, I am not sure of the exact sequence. "And then I talked with Mr. Regan and he indicated that he would be asking for John Poindexter's resignation that morning." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 157-59.)	
86/11/25-006 1984-86		CASEY'S ROLE IN THE FALL GUY PLAN AND THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. STOKES. . . . Mr. Attorney General, listening to our testimony over the last two days, it is obvious to me that Director Casey was a man for whom you had tremendous respect. He was a man whom you knew very well, you worked very closely with. And obviously in your testimony, he was a man of great integrity. "Knowing everything that you now know about this case, including conversations you had with Mr. North about it and your interviews with him, do you believe that Director Casey devised a so-called fall guy plan under which Colonel North was to be the fall guy and the one, so to speak, to take the hit? "Do you believe that? "Attorney General MEESE. Again, Mr. Stokes, I condition my answer only on the fact that I have not heard the testimony that you and the members of the committee have. But that to me would be uncharacteristic of Mr. Casey based upon my	CASEY'S ROLE IN THE FALL GUY PLAN AND THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		knowledge of him. "Mr. STOKES. Now, I want to ask you also with reference to Director Casey if you can conceive of him, knowing his relationship to the President of the United States, knowing the role he had played in the President's campaigns and his affection for the President, his high regard for him, if you can see him encouraging Colonel North to divert these funds from Iran without the President's approval? "Attorney General MEESE. It would be hard for me to imagine that occurring, based upon what I know of Mr. Casey, including what I believe would be his appreciation of the tremendous dangers of doing that to policies he thought were very important as well as to the legal and ethical aspects of it." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 219-20.)	
86/11/25-007 1980 - NOVEMBER 25, 1986		CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION, AND HIS CONTACT WITH MEESE MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. . . . Mr. Attorney General, you have had a long-standing relationship with former Director Casey, have you not? "Attorney General MEESE. I have known Mr. Casey since 1980, January of 1980, yes. "Mr. RODINO. I would note, Mr. Attorney General, that you are quoted in the July 14, 1980 edition of The Washington Star as saying, 'I discovered Casey. He is a rare brand of Irish humor, experience and sagacity.' "Do you consider him also a personal friend? Was he a personal friend?	CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION, AND HIS CONTACT WITH MEESE MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, he was.

"Mr. RODINO. Your calendar logs reflect numerous calls and meetings with Mr. Casey over the years, some at his home.

"For example, is it fair to say that your professional and social relationship brought you into frequent contact with Director Casey?

"Attorney General MEESE. I would say relatively frequent, yes.

"Mr. RODINO. The testimony that we have had before the select committees has indicated, Mr. Attorney General, that Mr. Casey was aware of the 1985 Hawk shipment roughly contemporaneously, Mr. Casey knew of the diversion before the fact and may even have suggeted it; Mr. Casey was shown a diversion memorandum drafted by Colonel North for presidential approval as early as February 1986. Mr. Casey also spoke to Colonel North several times a week, according to the testimony.

"Mr. Casey had specific and detailed knowledge of contra resupply operations, and Mr. Casey, according to the testimony, told Colonel North that someone senior to him would have to take the hit.

"Now, leaving aside, Mr. Attorney General, your numerous contacts with Mr. Casey throughout 1986, you spoke to him, met with him repeatedly during the period November 20 to November 25, through that period, 1986, and I would like to recite: Thursday, November 20, phone call and meeting with others of at least one and one half hours; Friday, November 21, a phone call after your interview of Mr. McFarlane; Saturday, November 22, a morning phone call, an afternoon phone call, and a one-hour meeting at Mr. Casey's home.

"The afternoon call from Mr. Casey came just six minutes after Colonel North called you. That day, I would note the diversion memo was discovered at the White House. Then again on Monday, November 24, a meeting with Casey and others.

"Tuesday, November 25, a 6:30 a.m. phone call and subsequent meeting at Casey's home.

"Now, Mr. Attorney General, is it your testimony that Director Casey, a friend and collegue of some years and of some consequence did not share with you any of his extensive knowledge about the 1985 arms sales, the diversion to the contras, Colonel North's activities at any time throughout the 1986 until he talked with you the morning of November 25, when he told you Mr. Regan told him of the diversion?

"Attorney General MEESE. That was the first time that he told me of any matter pertaining to the diversion of funds that we have been discussing here, yes, sir.

"Mr. RODINO. I have got to conclude from that, Mr. Attorney General, that you are saying that Director Casey knowingly withheld vital information from you and your inquiry knowing that you on November 25 already had started your inquiry?

"Attorney General MEESE. Mr. Rodino, I have no basis on which to conclude that. Throughout his life and my knowledge of Bill Casey from 1980

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		to 1987 when he passed away, I always knew Bill Casey to be an honorable man, and I have no information personally that anything he told me was other than the truth. "Mr. RODINO. But I recited to you a set of facts which have been testified to which Director Casey knew of. My question to you as: Did he then knowingly withhold this information from you at a time when he knew you were conducting your inquiry? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, you are talking about facts that have been related to you by other people. Bill Casey has never been before this group to defend himself, so I can't make a judgment on what he withheld or didn't withhold. All I know is what he did tell me." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 210-13. See 86/11/22-655.)	
86/11/25-010 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		DIVERSION: WHO KNEW NORTH ACCOUNT: North clarified his authorization to divert the Iranian arms funds: "Well, if I may clarify, what I testified to yesterday is my assumption that the President knew and then I subsequently testified that I was told he did not know. "I know that Admiral Poindexter knew, I know that Mr. McFarlane knew at a point in time when he was no longer in the Government, and Director Casey knew. "Aside from that, I can't speak with certainty as to who else inside the Government knew for	DIVERSION: WHO KNEW NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		sure, although there were certainly a number of people who by the time November of 1986 came along certainly had great suspicions or belief that it was happening. "But the only ones that I know for sure whom I confirmed it with were those three." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 122-23.)	
86/11/25-012 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVERSION: OFFICIAL STEPS MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. NIELDS. I take it it was decided at some point in the morning, as you said, to get the facts out. "Attorney General MEESE. Well, actually we developed a whole series of steps. The first step was to take care of the problem of the resignation and the transfer, resignation of Admiral Poindexter, and the transfer of Colonel North. "A second decision was to convene a special review board to immediately start work and make sure that, make recommendations to ensure that this kind of thing couldn't happen again. The President was very firm on that. "Thirdly, to let the rest of the National Security Council members know, and, in fact, a meeting was convened at 10:15 for that purpose. "Next, to let the Congress know, and a meeting was called for 11:00 o'clock for that purpose. "And, finally, to, or next after that was to let the American people know, and a press conference was scheduled for 12:00 o'clock for that purpose, and I believe at that time, although I am not positive whether it was then or	DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVERSION: OFFICIAL STEPS MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		immediately after the news conference, that I indicated I would be meeting with our Criminal Division people in the Department of Justice. I had already started activity on Monday to look into the possibility the criminal laws may have been involved." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 162-63.)	
86/11/25-013 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING, 11/25/86 MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. I am interested in what was said between you, the President, the Vice President, and Donald Regan before Admiral Poindexter joined you in the Oval Office on November 25th of 1986. "What kind of a briefing did you provide for that group, absent Poindexter? "Attorney General MEESE. On the 25th of November 1986, this was at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, I believe--you recalled--I believe the Vice President was there. "I know Mr. Regan was there. I know the President and I were there. "I think at that time I don't believe I provided much of a briefing inasmuch as I had told the President and the Vice President the previous evening what I had found out. It was more a matter of discussing the action steps to be taken which included the appointment of the special review board, the termination of Mr.--Admiral Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel North as members of the White House staff, or the NSC staff, the convening of the National Security Council members to advise them, the convening of a meeting with	PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING, 11/25/86 MEESE ACCOUNT: See col.1.	PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING, 11/25/86 MEESE ACCOUNT: See col.1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	the congressional leadership, and the holding of a news conference to announce this to the American people. "Those were the things we talked about on that morning. "Mr. BOLAND. Did you indicate to that group what Poindexter's version was of the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe I talked to them about that the previous day, or at least I certainly had the President. I believe at least in summary form, the Vice President." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 264-65.)		
86/11/25-015 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		NSPG MEETING: DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVERSION DoS CHRONOLOGY: See col. 3.	NSPG MEETING: DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVERSION DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS learns at NSPG that POINDEXTER has resigned, NORTH has been relieved, and a diversion of funds has occurred." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/11/26-100.)
86/11/25-025 NOVEMBER 20-25, 1986 (THURSDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVERSION WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION AND DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVERSION WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. EGGLESTON. . . . [T]here has been testimony that on November 20th, a dispute had arisen about what people knew about the November, '85, Hawk shipment. . . . [D]id you know-- "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, I did not know about it until all this formal exposition of the whole matter was made by Admiral Poindexter. "Mr. EGGLESTON. On November 20, 1985, did you

know that various people in the administration were having a dispute about the state of the government's knowledge about that transaction?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't know that I did. I know that there was a lot of discussion revolving around it. I don't know if the point was specifically being made as to who knew or who did not know.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. Were you contacted, if you recall, prior to November 21st about what you may have known about that Hawk shipment, if you recall?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. By anybody?

"Mr. EGGLESTON. By the Attorney General or anyone?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, the Attorney General called me over that weekend to tell me that he was--if I have the weekend correctly in mind--that he had been asked by the President to gather all the facts about the situation, and that it would be helpful if we could assemble data that we might have or refresh our memories in order to enable him to carry out this investigation. I believe that was over that weekend.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. It is your recollection, though, that that took place over the weekend--

"Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, I think so. I was at a hospital in Washington at that time, and I believe that is where the call from him came in.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. And did . . . the Attorney General ever get back to you, to your recollection, to find out your knowledge?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. We had a meeting then

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			in the Oval Office on, I believe, the Tuesday after that weekend, and at that time the Attorney General was reporting to us that he had found and had told the President, I believe the day before, maybe hours before, that there appeared to be some diversion of funds that the Iranians had paid to the contras, and I was pretty horrified about that. "That was the first I had ever heard about it, and the President was still very angry about it, and was saying that we have to go make public statements about this immediately, never mind the form of the statements, we have to tell people about this immediately, and directed the Attorney General to go out and make a full statement to the press after that meeting, and the Attorney General did that within, I guess, a half an hour after that meeting broke up. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Who attended the meeting, if you recall that you just discussed? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, Mr. Shultz was there and I think Mr. Casey was there, and Admiral Poindexter was there. Don Regan I believe was there. "Those are the ones I have in mind were there. "Mr. EGGLESTON. When you learned about this diversion, were you also told that Admiral Poindexter had had some supervisory role in it? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, I think at that time it was just the fact that it had apparently had happened, that Ed Meese had found in the course of this fact-finding investigation he had been making over the weekend, that as soon as he

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			found it, he reported it to the President and the President was very distrubed and angry and directed at the meeting that I attended, which was either the day after, some hours after he had been notified that this had to be made public at once. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Do you recall whether there was any discussion about Admiral Poindexter being relieved or being reassigned? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Not at that time that I recall, no, I don't think so right at that meeting. This was a short meeting and a pretty horrifying meeting and it didn't have anything else except this thing had been found and obviously we all agreed as the President said that it had to be reported." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 142-46.)
86/11/25-030 NOVEMBER 25, 1986		DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVERSION: PRESIDENT'S REACTION WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. Now, you did not know the diversion, I take it, until November of 1986? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. It was at that meeting that the President was told, the 24th, 25th, he had been told either a few hours before that meeting, which was some time in the middle or the day before, and he was still extremely angry about it and that is the first time I had heard about it." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 216.)	DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVERSION: PRESIDENT'S REACTION WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: According to Weinberger, the President "was . . . extremely angry about it." See col. 2.
86/11/25-040		DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVERSION TO CONGRESSIONAL	DISCLOSURE OF THE DIVERSION TO CONGRESSIONAL

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		LEADERS, AND CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MCCOLLUM. . . . I know you have eloquently made some nice statements about Director Casey, but the fact of the matter is we know from the testimony--we don't have him, unfortunately, here to rebut it in any way; but we have heard it a lot from other sources--Colonel North, Admiral Poindexter--Mr. Casey at all of this time knew fully about this diversion; some people didn't know who knew what but in the end everybody has agreed he knew about it and was intricately involved in that process. "But he not only didn't tell you about his knowledge when you chatted with him but, as I recall, he denied it. "And I would like to call your attention to a particular exhibit. This is Exhibit Number [EM] 53 in your book. This is a set of notes that was taken by one of your--one of the staff members at a meeting with members of Congress just before this announcement was made on the 25th of November. "It's an exhibit that was prepared, by the handwriting, it says here, of Mr. Richardson. This was a congressional briefing where the President attended, where Admiral Poindexter, I think, had already exited from the scene, but you were there and Mr. Wright was there, the Speaker of the House, Mr. Casey was there apparently, from looking at these notes. "I would like you to look at those.	LEADERS, AND CASEY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVERSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Mr. Shultz apparently was there--Secretary Shultz appears to have been there.

"Do you recall who all was at that briefing session?

"Attorney General MEESE. To the best of my recollection, it was the President, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, I believe that Mr. Regan was there, I was there, several members of my staff were there, and there may have been others--I can't tell you all the people that were there--in addition to the leadership of the Congress, the leaders of the House and Senate, the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate, the Minority Leaders of both Houses, and there may have been others besides that from the Congress. But it was quite a group of people from the Congress.

"Mr. MCCOLLUM. Well, unfortunately the exhibit does not have the pages marked, but if you will flip ten pages over into this, you will see a discussion that starts at the top with Mr. Wright's name.

"These are Mr. Richardson's notes made at that meeting with the President?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes.

"Mr. MCCOLLUM. If you have found that--

"Attorney General MEESE. I have found it.

"Mr. MCCOLLUM. I would like to go over that with you and see if you agree with me that's what this says.

"It says Wright says Poindexter vaguely aware. RR, that's President Reagan, I assume--he says yes. Wright says, done with tacit blessing. RR

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		says Ed?--he's turning to you, he's meaning you there, right. Then it says, you are quoted as saying allowed it to go forward, and then Wright, the Speaker of the House, says CIA know--Casey? That's what it looks like because the next one says Casey--now it's Casey:--Mr. Casey was there, then, is that not correct? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Casey's answer there reads what? "You read it to us. What did he say when-- "Attorney General MEESE. It says, no, I didn't. "Mr. MCCOLLUM. And I think that's significant. The point is that even at this moment in the presence of the President and in the presence of the leadership of the House and the Senate, on the 25th of November, the day that this became public--the diversion did--Mr. Casey is still withholding the fact that he knows, not only withholding but saying I didn't know. "My point of this, and I could go through the same litany Mr. Nields did this morning--I'm not going to go through all of that--there were numerous occasions in Colonel North's interview and in the interviews with Mr. McFarlane where you were not given the full facts, you were misled. "Is that not true? "Attorney General MEESE. Mr. McCollum, since I did not have the benefit of watching their testimony except very occasionally, I couldn't say for sure, but I will accept your characterization of it."	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 253-56; JHICI Ex. EM 53 [Richardson notes of Congressional briefing on 11/25/86].)	
86/11/25-050 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	DoJ ACTIVITY: TOM GREEN INTERVIEW SECORD ACCOUNT: Secord sends his lawyer, Tom Green, to speak with William Bradford Reynolds. "Mr. Reynolds informed him--Mr. Green--that he agreed . . . we should slow down, take this thing a step at a time, we will lay it out for you, give you all the details we can. We should not rush into the public with this story until you at least have the facts. . . . Mr. Reynolds agreed. Minutes later, . . . Mr. Meese went before the American people and made his pronouncements and betrayed all of us and it is unforgiveable." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 132-33.)		
86/11/25-120 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	SCAPEGOAT NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	SCAPEGOAT NORTH ACCOUNT: North testified on his role as scapegoat: (1) ". . . I had made it clear to Mr. McFarlane, I made it clear to Mr. Casey, and I made it very clear to Admiral Poindexter that I recognized that there would come a time when you may have to have a political -- I emphasized the word 'political' -- fall guy or scapegoat or whatever. I never in my wildest dreams or nightmares envisioned that we would end up with criminal charges. It was beyond my wildest comprehension right up until the 25th." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 140.)	SCAPEGOAT NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		(2) "I didn't seek the credit and I didn't want the blame. I was simply willing to take the fall if somebody needed a political scapegoat. That is what I was willing to do." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 152-53.)	
86/11/25-124 PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 25, 1986	THE FALL GUY PLAN: McFARLANE'S KNOWLEDGE McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: See col. 2.	THE FALL GUY PLAN: McFARLANE'S KNOWLEDGE McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Finally, I would like to say something about all the talk going around about who was to be the fall guy that took place during Ollie's testimony. "No such plan existed, to my knowledge. I know I wasn't party to any such planning before I left Government at the end of 1985. But I don't doubt for a minute that Ollie would have offered to step forward to protect me or his Commander-in-Chief or both. "It would be as much in character for him to do this as it would have been for him to throw himself on a grenade to protect his comrades, colleagues in battle, but surely we can agree on one thing: Ollie North should not be the fall guy or scapegoat or sacrificial lamb for anyone." (McFarlane Testim. JHICI, 7/14/87, at 207. Compare Hakim Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 266 [Hakim: "[B]y this time [5/86] I had become extremely fond of Lieutenant Colonel North. To me, he is an amazing person. I know it is something in this man that--he has got two loves. One is his country, and to a point that he is, in my mind, the biggest satisfaction that can be given to him is if he would enter into an	THE FALL GUY PLAN: McFARLANE'S KNOWLEDGE McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		environment that he could get killed for his country. I sensed that so many times. The other love that he has is his family, and he especially during the time of the second channel, I witnessed him being torn apart between these two loves."].)	
86/11/25-130 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE FALL GUY PLAN POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE FALL GUY PLAN POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. You heard a good deal of the testimony from Colonel North about the fall-guy plans, and the discussions that he had with Mr. Casey, that there was a plan discussed with Mr. Casey that he would be the fall guy and that Casey said that may not be high and--'You may not be senior enough, and you may need somebody more senior.' "Was that ever discussed with you, Admiral? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It was not. Several times over the years, Colonel North would say to me, and it was usually when he was depressed about something--which often, you know, this was a very frustrating project. We didn't have total control of what was happening. It was a very high-risk situation, and he--Ollie would often say that, 'Look, I can always be sacrificed', or something like that. I don't recall the word 'scapegoat' ever being used. I believe that every time he said that, I told him, number one, that it wasn't necessary, that it really couldn't be done that way. I've been in Washington long enough to know that such plans don't work, and I told him to forget about that. "I was not a party to any plan to make Colonel	THE FALL GUY PLAN POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		North or to make me, for that matter, a scapegoat. The decision for me to accept responsibility for what I did was ma[d]e in February, 1986 when I decided to approve Colonel North's plan for providing funds to the contras. I accepted that responsibility then and knew that if it became public, I would have to leave. Simple as that." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 5/16/87, at 89-90.)	
86/11/25-132 1985-86	THE FALL GUY PLAN POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE FALL GUY PLAN POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. And had you had any conversations with Oliver North from November 21 through November 25 in which Oliver North had expressed to you the view that he was prepared to take the responsibility for what happened? "A. I can't be certain of that time period. "Q. Well, broaden the time period. "A. Broaden the time period a great deal, maybe for a year or more. Periodically Ollie would indicate that he was 'willing to take the rap', and I always told him ~~when he said~~ that that was a ridiculous position and that he had no need to say that. "Q. What did you mean by that? "A. Well, that, number one, you see, I had never felt that we were doing anything illegal. I still don't. It's controversial. It's a political issue, and I think with hindsight Ollie was thinking about it in the same terms, that it was a political issue and he may at some point become a political burden. "But I've been around Washington enough to	THE FALL GUY PLAN POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		know that that sort of thing is just not possible, that if there was a leak and if the operations were exposed that they would be a big political issue. It would be very controversial and there was no way that Ollie should or could accept responsibility for all of our operations in support of the President's policy. "Q. Now what operations were you referring to? "A. The support of the democratic resistance in Nicaragua and the Iranian project. We knew the Iranian project would be controversial from the very first discussion I can recall with the President on the 7th of December. "Q. Did North use words like 'scapegoat', that he would be a scapegoat? "A. I don't ever recall that term. "Q. Now you've probably heard in the testimony the people quoting him as saying that that was his role? "A. I can't honestly say I recall that word being used, but I do recall that in testimony coming up." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 243-44.)	
86/11/25-135 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE FALL GUY PLAN NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE FALL GUY PLAN NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. MITCHELL. You also said at one point Mr. Casey said you might be too junior a person to be the fall guy, there wouldn't be plausible deniability then, and he suggested that Admiral Poindexter might have to be a fall guy. Do you recall that testimony?	THE FALL GUY PLAN NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Mr. NORTH. I'm not sure I recall that kind of thing happening right towards the end. That wasn't at some point during earlier phases of this activity. I think it was after the revelations of the McFarlane trip and the press queries about it here in this country.

"And at some point, probably after the first week of November, talking with Director Casey, or in that time frame, Director Casey indicating 'you're not big enough, buddy; it's probably going to go higher.'

"Mr. MITCHELL. And my question is, did you or anyone else ever tell Admiral Poindexter that he was under consideration as the fall guy?

"Mr. NORTH. I don't recall a specific conversation, Senator. I said, 'Boss, it's now you, not me.' I do recall, again right towards the end, discussing with Admiral Poindexter the fact that it was more likely that both of us would leave.

"Mr. MITCHELL. So did anything ever become of that suggestion?

"Mr. NORTH. We both left, sir.

"Mr. MITCHELL. You both left. So--it may turn out Mr. Casey was more correct than he realized at the time.

"Mr. NORTH. He was right about a lot of things, Senator.

"Mr. MITCHELL. During your discussions with Mr. Casey, Mr. McFarlane and Mr. Poindexter about the plan, did a question ever arise among you as to whether what was being proposed was legal?

"Mr. NORTH. In which case? Across the board

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		on all activities? "Mr. MITCHELL. No, on the plan, the fall guy plan. I'm limiting it to that now. "Mr. NORTH. Oh, no, I don't think--first of all, we operated from the premise that everything we did do was legal and therefore the fact that there would be somebody who took the blame, as it were, was not inconsistent, I don't think, with any of the rest of what we did. "Mr. MITCHELL. So your answer is, no, there was no discussion? "Mr. NORTH. I do not recall any discussion about the legality of somebody standing up and saying, 'I did it all and I'm gone.' I don't recall any such discussion. "Mr. MITCHELL. Did the quesion ever arise as to whether what was being proposed was appropriate since it necessarily involved false statements by high public officials? "Mr. NORTH: No. And, in fact, I'm not sure they are false. I think you have before you the culprit who did all these things, and has come here and testified to that. "Mr. MITCHELL. Well, of course, you didn't intend that there would be such an investigation and such testimony. "Mr. NORTH. I surely hoped that there wouldn't be, Senator." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 30-32.)	
86/11/25-137 NOVEMBER 25, 1986	THE FALL GUY PLAN REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE FALL GUY PLAN REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. JENKINS. As you know, Colonel North has	THE FALL GUY PLAN REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
(TUESDAY)		indicated that he was scheduled to be the fall guy, and when Admiral Poindexter did not speak up in behalf of Colonel North, but when this was discovered, at the time he talked with you, at the time he talked with the President, the impression that he gave was that he didn't really know anything about this except in general terms and that the operation was, in fact, one operated by Colonel North more or less alone. Is that the impression he gave all of you? "Mr. REGAN. Well, I wouldn't say alone, but the impression was given that somebody else was doing this and North was responsible, he should have looked into it a little bit more, but didn't. "Mr. JENKINS. The Admiral didn't speak up for Colonel North at that time at all? "Mr. REGAN. No, I don't believe so. "Mr. JENKINS. He was letting him shoulder most of the responsibility? "Mr. REGAN. Well, that was just the first--the first blush of this. That was in his conversations with me on the morning of the 25th and in the same morning with the President. "Mr. JENKINS. But he volunteered no support whatsoever for North at that time? "Mr. REGAN. Well, except to say that he thought that whatever it was that North was doing, North was doing it with the purest of motives, that he was trying to help the contras. "Mr. JENKINS. And when he said that he was doing it with the purest of motives, of course, at the same time, as he has testified here, he was calling the shots apparently for North?	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. REGAN. Well, as I say, that I learned from this committee, from the testimony before this committee, and was quite surprised when I read it." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 53-54.)	
86/11/25-140 1987	THE FALL GUY PLAN GEORGE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE FALL GUY PLAN GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Stokes. . . . [Y]ou indicated that after Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter testified here, that you discussed that testimony with almost everybody. "Mr. George. It is a national topic, Mr. Chairman. "Mr. Stokes. That is right. Nothing wrong with that, because it is on the lips of everybody in the country, I think. "But based upon those conversations as it relates to the so-called fall-guy plan devised by Director Casey where in the event that the diversion ever hit the light of day, that Colonel North was to take the spears in his chest, what was the consensus of those with whom you have talked? Do you believe that he devised such a plan? "Mr. George. Those at the Agency do not. "Mr. Stokes. From everything you know about Director Casey and how your business operates, do you guys devise those type of plans or does the fall guy? "Mr. George. I have never -- I suppose overseas somewhere, we'll do something to make somebody look like they are guilty of something in	THE FALL GUY PLAN GEORGE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		some intelligence operation, but the fall-guy plan as it came out of your hearings in the United States Government context is [sic], I've never heard of such a thing." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 175-76. See id. at 179-82 ["Please, I'm not sure Bill Casey knew everything and I question a great deal, and it is not mine to question, of the charges made against Bill Casey before these committees and taking the fall after you['re] dead is the last great fall, but there is no doubt about it, Bill Casey was very vulnerable to the 'oh, come on, Bill, those bureaucrats, let's get out and sock it to them.' He may have allowed himself to be convinced." For context of quote, see 86/01/17-092.].)	
86/11/25-155 NOVEMBER 24-25, 1986 (MONDAY - TUESDAY)		DIVERSION: ALERTING THE ISRAELIS OF ITS EXPOSURE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Let's go to November 25, 1986. . . . ". . . . "Q. Did you have any conversation with [North] about a conversation or proposed conversation between the Vice President and Peres of Israel? "A. I am not certain. "Q. Did you ever have any discussion -- "A. May have. I just have no recollection. "Q. Did you ever have any discussion with the Vice President about trying to persuade Israel to acknowledge responsibility for the diversion of funds?	DIVERSION: ALERTING THE ISRAELIS OF ITS EXPOSURE POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"A. Did I ever have any conversation with anybody?

"Q. With the Vice President?

"A. With the Vice President?

"I don't believe so.

"Q. With anyone?

"A. I don't think so.

"Q. I said with anyone. I want to make sure you heard that.

"A. I don't think so.

"MR. BECKLER: Subject to refreshing your recollection. If you got documents there that catalogue the conversation, we will be happy to talk about it.

"THE WITNESS: Would you rephrase the last question, please?

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. Did you have any conversation with anyone in November of 1986 about inducing Israel to accept responsibility for the diversion of proceeds from the Iranian arms sales to support the contras?

"A. I don't recall any conversation like that.

"MR. BECKLER: On that date?

"THE WITNESS: On that date.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. Or in November of 1986?

"A. Nor in November of 1986.

"Q. Do you recall any conversation as to whether Israel was aware of the diversion?

"A. Yes.

"Q. With whom did you have that conversation?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"A. I had a conversation with Colonel North at some point, the latter part of November, as to whether Nir was aware -- "Q. Aware of the diversion? "A. -- of the diversion. "Q. Was this before or after the Attorney General had spoken to North? "A. I think it was after. It was probably on Monday. "Q. Monday would have been the 24th? "A. Probably. "Q. What do you recall of that conversation, Admiral? "A. I simply recall telling Colonel North that he needed to be sure that the Israelis were not surprised, or words to that effect. "Q. Do I understand that what you were conveying to him was that he should advise the Israelis that this was going to come out? "A. That is correct." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 9-12.)	
86/11/25-170 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS, 11/25/86 NORTH ACCOUNT: (1) "It is entirely likely that I was shredding documents as late as the morning of the 25th." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 183.) (2) ". . . I shredded documents I believe right up until the morning of the 25th when I departed." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 193.)	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS, 11/25/86 NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	SHREDDING DOCUMENTS, 11/25/86 NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.
86/11/25-210	NORTH'S DISMISSAL		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	HALL ACCOUNT: Fawn Hall testifying on the events in North's office at about the time of the Meese press conference: "Mr. BELNICK. On November 25, . . . do you recall speaking to Colonel North before the Attorney General's press conference? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. What did Colonel North say to you? "Ms. HALL. It was shortly before noon, and there came a time when the conversation started between us and he[,] I believe[,] was in his office. I am sitting at my desk and he commented the President had fired him. I said, 'Ollie, come on.' He said, 'No, I'm serious.' I became emotional. As a matter of fact, I started crying. I was very upset. "Mr. BELNICK. Did Colonel North tell you why he had been fired? "Ms. HALL. No, sir. ". . . ." (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 294.)		
86/11/25-308 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL MEESE ACCOUNT: While he is at an early morning meeting with Casey at Casey's house, the Attorney General receives a call from Regan (see 86/11/24-002 and 86/11/25-005: John Richardson takes the call in the Attorney General's car): "Attorney General MEESE. . . . [Regan] indicated that he would be asking for John	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	Poindexter's resignation that morning. "Mr. NIELDS. . . . [W]hose decision was it to ask for John Poindexter's resignation? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, ultimately it was the President's. And I think at that point it was Don Regan's strong recommendation that John Poindexter should resign. "Mr. NIELDS. What was done with respect to Colonel North and whose decision was that? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, that came later in the morning, when we were talking with the President, and the question was: should Colonel North be allowed to resign? And I believe it was Mr. Regan, but I am not positive, but the resolution in any event was, well, he is just on detail from the Marine Corps, so he can just be transferred back to the Marine Corps. "Mr. NIELDS. Was it decided by anyone that he would be fired? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, I think when you--I don't remember the words actually 'fired', I remember the words 'generally transferred back to the Marine Corps'. That could be interpreted as being fired in the sense of a White House position, but there was a difference in the position that Colonel North held related to that which Admiral Poindexter held. "Admiral Poindexter actually was appointed. He was a commissioned member of the White House staff as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, whereas Colonel North was one of many military personnel that were detailed to the White House, so there was a		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	technical difference in terminology as to the two. "Mr. NIELDS. Whose decision was it that Colonel North be transferred? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, ultimately it was the President's decision, and I don't know who suggested it, I think it was Mr. Regan, but there was general agreement by all that were there that that should, in fact, happen. "Mr. NIELDS. What was your position on it? "Attorney General MEESE. I certainly concurred. "Mr. NIELDS. And for what reason? "Attorney General MEESE. On the basis of his involvement in the diversion of funds which was an unauthorized activity and something which had not been approved and would not be approved by the President had he known. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, were you under the impression that it had or had not been approved by Colonel North's superior, Admiral Poindexter? "Attorney General MEESE. I would say that my impression was exactly as I had been told by Admiral Poindexter, that he had condoned or allowed the activity to go forward." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 158-61.)		
86/11/25-310 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		POINDEXTER MEETING WITH MEESE, THEN REGAN POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you also speak that day or the following day to Don Regan? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The following day I was en route to the White House Office in my car, and Ed Meese called me on the car phone just about the	POINDEXTER MEETING WITH MEESE, THEN REGAN POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

time we were pulling through the Southwest gate, and he asked if I would meet him over at his office. He said he was en route to the office, he would be there in about five minutes, I told him that I would.

"We diverted [sic], went over to his office. Ed came in. He said that he thought that the time had come that I should submit my letter of resignation. I said, fine, I was prepared to do that, as I told him yesterday; he indicated a sense of regret. He said that he did not feel at that point that Colonel North had done anything illegal. We talked about Colonel North also being transferred back to the Defense Department.

"I departed, went back to the White House, walked down a corridor to Don's office. He was tied up in a meeting. I left word I would like to see him when he finished, went back to my office, sat down to eat my breakfast, and a few minutes later Don Regan came in, and I told him that I was going to resign.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did Don Regan ever ask you what you knew about the diversion?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall [his] doing that.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did he ever ask you whether you had told the President?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't recall his doing that."

(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 88-89.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/25-311 NOVEMBER 25,		POINDEXTER MEETINGS, 11/25/86 POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:	POINDEXTER MEETINGS, 11/25/86 POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986 (TUESDAY)		Poindexter testified on his meeting with Donald Regan on November 25, 1986 and, later that morning, with the President: "Q. What did Don Regan say to you about the diversion and what did you say to him? "A. I think, as I recall, I told him the same thing that I had told the Attorney General, that I had general knowledge of the diversion and that I was going to resign. "Q. Did Don Regan put the question to you, 'Did you tell the President about it?' "A. I don't recall that. He may have. I just don't recall it. "Q. Did anyone say to you, other than the Attorney General and Don Regan, 'Admiral Poindexter, why did you do such a stupid thing as le[t]ting this happen?' "MR. BECKLER: I have got to object to that. "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. Okay. Did anyone say to you, Admiral Poindexter -- did either the Attorney General or Don Regan say to you, 'Why did you let this happen?' Words or substance. "A. That sort of expression was never made. "Q. Did they scold you in any way? "A. None whatsoever. "Q. There was no sense of reprimand? "A. None. "MR. BECKLER: Off the record. "(Off the record.) "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. Did they compliment you for the fact it was a way of getting funds for the contras from	See col. 2.

the Ayatollah?

"A. No. I don't recall that.

"Q. Did they express sympathy for your situation?

"A. Yes, they did.

"Q. Who was it that expressed sympathy? The whole White House group?

"A. The Attorney General, Don Regan, the President and Vice President.

"MR. BECKLER: Let's clarify that.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. What did the Vice President say?

"A. That may be an unfair characterization.

"Q. If we know what he said --

"A. I can't remember exactly what he said. The impression I have at this point was that he, with the others, regretted that the situation --

"MR. BECKLER: What situation, that you were resigning?

"A. That I was resigning. That is what I was going to say.

"BY MR. LIMAN:

"Q. Were you going to say that the situation really made it necessary for you to resign?

"A. As I have said before, my whole rationale in telling the Attorney General on Monday that I was prepared to resign was that I thought that would give the President more latitude in how he handled the case."

(Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 19-21.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/25-313 NOVEMBER 25,		REGAN'S MEETING WITH POINDEXTER, AND POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION	REGAN'S MEETING WITH POINDEXTER, AND POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986 (TUESDAY)		REGAN ACCOUNT: Regan described his meeting with Poindexter on November 25: "Mr. REGAN. Well, again, this is a very vivid recollection in my mind. He was sitting at the end of this conference table having breakfast from a tray, and I went in and in my normal fashion said, you know, 'What['s] going on, John?' You know, 'What the heck happened here?' "And he was very careful, deliberate. John is a deliberate person. He adjusted is glasses, he dabbed at his mouth with his napkin, put it down. He said, 'Well, I guess I should have looked into it more, but I didn't.' "He said, 'I knew that Ollie was up to something, but,' he said 'I didn't know what.' And he said, 'I just didn't look into it.['] "I said to him, 'Why not? What the hell? You are a vice admiral. What is going on? "And he said[--w]ell, I suppose this will get me into trouble now with one of my old neighbors from my old neighborhood back in Cambridge, Massachusetts[--]but, he said, 'Well, that damned Tip O'Neill.' "He said, 'The way he is jerking the contras around, I was just so disgusted,' he said, 'I didn't want to know what he was doing.' [See entries starting at 86/10/18-250 on Tip O'Neill.] "Mr. SMILJANICH. You didn't have any discussion with Admiral Poindexter about any authorization he might have received in connection with this matter? "Mr. REGAN. No. I told him then--I said,	REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 3.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

'Well, John, when you go in[ ]to see the President at 9:30, I think you better make sure you have your resignation with you.'

"Mr. SMILJANICH. What did he say?

"Mr. REGAN. He said[,] 'I have been thinking of that.' He said, 'I will.[']

"Mr. SMILJANICH. And at the 9:30 daily national security briefing, Admiral Poindexter submitted his resignation?

"Mr. REGAN. He came in and immediately started the discussion by saying--he told the President he was sorry for what had happend and again repeated that he probably should have looked into it more, but didn't. And he was submitting his resignation.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. What did the President say?

"Mr. REGAN. Well, it was a very sorrowful moment, a very hushed moment. The Attorney General was there, as I recall. And the President nodded and said, 'I understand.' He said, 'This is a shame that it has happened this way, that a man with your great naval record,' so on, 'has come to this end,' but he said, 'That is it,' and there was a sort of an awkward silence.

"Poindexter left the room.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. What was decided with regard to the future of Lieutenant Colonel North on the NSC staff?

"Mr. REGAN. His status was different from that of Admiral Poindexter. Admiral Poindexter was what we term a commissioned officer. That is, he was a presidential appointment. And as such, would have to resign. Lieutenant Colonel North

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		was detailed by the Marine Corps to the National Security staff. "I said later at the 10:15 meeting, where members of the NSC, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and so forth were being briefed about what had happened, I told Cap Weinberger that I thought North should be detailed back to the Marine Corps, that he shouldn't stay on the NSC staff. "Mr. SMILJANICH. And is that, in fact, how the situation was handled? "Mr. REGAN. As far as I know, yes. Because later at the 11:00 o'clock meeting with the Congress, Cap Weinberger did tell the Senators and Representatives present that North was being returned to the Marine Corps for further assignment." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 86-88. See id., 7/30/87, at 238-43 [Regan's further comments on his meeting with Poindexter].)	
86/11/25-314 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		REGAN'S MEETING WITH POINDEXTER REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. MITCHELL. You recall that conversation with Admiral Poindexter. At that time, did you find him to be a credible person and you believed what he said when he told you that? "Mr. REGAN. Oh, yes. John Poindexter is a fine man and I had no reason to not believe him. Everything he had ever said, my relationships with him were above board. I had no reason to think he was devious or anything except 100 percent truthful.	REGAN'S MEETING WITH POINDEXTER REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Mr. MITCHELL. As you may know, if you have followed these hearings, Admiral Poindexter's testimony to this committee was quite different from what he told you on that morning. He testified here regarding that decision, and I will just read portions of it.

"He said, 'I felt that I had the authority to approve it because I had a commission from the President which was in very broad terms. My role was to make sure that his policies were implemented. I was convinced that we could properly do it and that the President would approve, if asked. I made a very deliberate decision not to ask the President.

"'On this whole issue, the buck stops here with me. I made the decision. I felt that I had the authority to do it. I thought it was a good idea. I was convinced that the President would in the end think it was a good idea.'

"In view of what Admiral Poindexter told you when you asked him about it, as you have testified here to today, were you surprised to hear his testimony before this committee?

"Mr. REGAN. I think I was rather startled.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Startled?

"Mr. REGAN. I had never dreamed that the admiral was that much involved in the technical details of the diversion, never knew anything like that could have occurred, if he were aware of it.

"I was very much surprised at that.

"Mr. MITCHELL. You received from your conversation with Admiral Poindexter a totally different impression regarding his knowledge of the decision; is that fair to say?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes. That it was a lack of supervision. A lack of a superior investigating something going on in his own area; and a failure to perform necessary oversight.

"Mr. MITCHELL. But he never conveyed to you the impression that he had made a specific decision which he felt was in his authority and made a deliberate decision to approve it and not tell the President?

"Mr. REGAN. No. He never conveyed that impression to me by words, language, or anything else.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Indeed Attorney General Meese testified that when he asked Admiral Poindexter about it, Admiral Poindexter replied, and I quote Attorney General, 'Ollie has given me enough hints about this so that I generally knew, but I did nothing to follow up.'

"I gather you were present when the Attorney General briefed the President on this matter.

"Mr. REGAN. On the 24th, yes.

"Mr. MITCHELL. On the 24th.

"Did the Attorney General report to the President words to this effect or did this occur later?

"Mr. REGAN. No. He reported words to the effect that you have just uttered.

"Mr. MITCHELL. So that the President, along with the Attorney General, and you, had the impression that Admiral Poindexter had some vague knowledge, but no one of you w[as] informed to the effect as Admiral Poindexter testified here that

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		he had been fully informed and made a specific decision? "Mr. REGAN. No. Furthermore, Senator, the following morning at 9:30 when he resigned, actually turned in his resignation to the President, he did not tell the President that he had condoned the idea of the diversification, that he knew all about it. He again talked in much the same language as he had to the Attorney General and to me about failure to supervise rather than actually [being a] participant. "Mr. MITCHELL. So the story that Admiral Poindexter told this committee is different in very significant respects than that which he told you, told the President, and told the Attorney General last fall? "Mr. REGAN. That is right." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 239-43.)	
86/11/25-318 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION: "IN THE TRADITION OF A CAPTAIN ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY" POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION: "IN THE TRADITION OF A CAPTAIN ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY" POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Admiral, I want to begin by asking you about some events on November 25, 1986, which is the date that you resigned and the day that Oliver North was fired. Did you meet that morning with the President? "A. I did. "Q. With the Vice President? "A. He was there. "Q. Who else was there? "A. Don Regan and Ed Meese. "Q. Was Mr. Casey there?	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION: "IN THE TRADITION OF A CAPTAIN ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY" POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"A. No.

". . . .

"Q. Did Colonel North join the meeting at all?

"A. No, he did not.

"Q. Did you discuss at that meeting the fact that you would be resigning?

"A. Yes, although I wouldn't have really called it discussion.

"Q. Tell us what happened at the meeting.

"A. It was my regular 9:30 morning meeting with the President, and I came in and told him that I was certain that the Attorney General had told him about his conversation with Colonel North on Sunday and the memo that they had found, and I told the President that I was aware of the transfer of funds to the contras and that I thought it was best that I resign to give him as much latitude as possible. And he said that he regretted it and said something to the effect that it was in the tradition of a captain accepting responsibility.

"And I stood up to leave, shook hands with everybody. Everybody said nice words. And I left the office. I was only there about five minutes.

"Q. Did you know at that time that Oliver North was going to be fired?

"A. I did not. In fact, that was not my understanding at all.

"Q. Your understanding was that Oliver North was going to be prepared to resign; am I correct?

"A. That he would simply be transferred back to the Defense Department.

"Q. Had he already sent you a notice requesting the transfer?

"A. I'm not certain of that.

"Q. But had you discussed that with him?

"A. Let me think a minute.

"(Counsel conferring with the witness.)

"A. As I recall, the Attorney General called me in the car on my way in to the office just about the time we were to go through the southwest gate, and he asked me if I could meet him at his office and I said fine. He said why don't you just go right over and I'll be there in a few minutes. I did that.

"And then when I got back to the White House I walked down the corridor to see Don Regan. He was in a meeting, and I left word with his secretary I'd like to see him when he finished. And I walked back to my office and sat down to eat my breakfast. And Don Regan came in and then I think shortly after that -- that would have been about 8:00 or 8:30 or something like that -- I think I probably called Colonel North and told him that I was going to resign and that he should be transferred back to the Defense Department.

"I asked him what he wanted to do, as I recall, and I can't recall whether he answered me or not. But either in that conversation or some previous conversation at least the impression I had[] at this point was that he wanted to go to the National Defense University essentially for a year's sabbatical.

"And the reason that I said I was unaware when I left the 9:30 meeting that he was going to be

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		fired, my impression from talking to Ed Meese was -- and I can't remember his exact words, but my impression was simply that Ollie should be transferred back to the Defense Department. "Q. And that was in conversation with the Attorney General that took place [t]hen that gave you that impression? "A. In his office about 7:30 in the morning on the 25th. And the first I knew that Ollie's departure was to be characterized as firing was when I heard the press conference." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 239-43.)	
86/11/25-319 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION: "IN THE TRADITION OF THE CAPTAIN ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY" POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION: "IN THE TRADITION OF THE CAPTAIN ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY" POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. And the President, I think you said, commented to you that the captain has to take responsibility? [See 86/11/25-318.] "A. He didn't say it quite that way. He said it is in the tradition of the captain accepting responsibility. "Q. Is that the naval tradition? "A. Yes, it is. "Q. And in this case the captain was the admiral, not the commander-in-chief? "A. That is correct. "MR. BECKLER: Remember, an admiral can be a captain, the captain of a ship It is possible in the sense, you know -- "MR. LIMAN: Okay. "BY MR. LIMAN: "Q. And the words of the Attorney General,	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION: "IN THE TRADITION OF THE CAPTAIN ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY" POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		were they to the same effect, about being sorry that you had to resign? "A. Yes. "Q. And Regan? "A. The same. "Q. Do you have any knowledge as to whether the Vice President knew anything about the diversion prior to that Monday or Tuesday? "A. I have no reason to believe that he did. "Q. Or his National Security Advisor? "A. Not to my knowledge." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 7/2/87, at 21-22.)	
86/11/25-320 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, on the 25th of November you submitted your resignation to the President. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall what the President said? "Mr. POINDEXTER. It was a very short conversation. As I recall, when I came into the Oval Office at 9:30 for my normal meeting, the Vice President was there, Chief of Staff Don Regan, Ed Meese was there, and, of course, the President. "I sat down, and my best recollection of the conversation was that I said, 'Mr. President, I assume that you are aware of the paper that Ed Meese has found that reveals a plan to transfer funds to the contras. I was generally aware of that plan; and I would like to submit my resignation to give you the necessary latitude to	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		do whatever you need to do.' "And the President responded and said that he had great regret and that this was in the tradition of a Naval officer accepting responsibility. And I shook hands with everybody and left the office. That was the last time I saw the President." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/16/87, at 91.)	
86/11/25-322 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. STOKES. Admiral, you have on several occasions said that if this whole matter ever leaked out, I was prepared to resign. "Tell us, Admiral, how did you know that if it did leak out, that you would be permitted to resign, as opposed to being fired, as Mr. North was? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I didn't know that. "Mr. STOKES. You did not know that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not. That was an assumption on my part." (Poindexter, Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 228-29.)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.
86/11/25-324 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION WITH THE PRESIDENT POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. You have probably answered this question a million times but I will ask it once more. You have testified that you made the decision to authorize the diversion and that while you did not inform the President, you believed that if he had been asked for his approval, he	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION: DISCUSSION OF THE DIVERSION WITH THE PRESIDENT POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		would have given it. You have indicated that you ultimately discussed the diversion with the President on November 25th of '86. Do I understand your testimony to be that while you told the President that you were generally aware, you did not tell him that you had been the one who authorized it? Did he give you reason to believe then, at that time, that he would have approved the diversion? "Mr. POINDEXTER. The issue didn't come up, Mr. Boland. As I have testified, the President didn't ask me whether I had approved it and I did not volunteer it at that point, so the issue didn't come up. "Mr. BOLAND. Did he indicate he was disappointed, really disappointed that he did not know anything about it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. He did not indicate that to me." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 54-56.)	
86/11/25-330 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL NORTH ACCOUNT: North agreed, as early as 1984, that willingly he "would be the person who would be dismissed or reassigned or fired or blamed or fingered or whatever one wants to use as a description." On November 25, Poindexter resigned. North testified, "Admirals should be treated differently than Lieutenant Colonels." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 128, 131. See id., 7/9/87, at 125 [North: "I believe that the words that were used [were] that I had been dismissed."]. See also	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	id., 7/8/87, at 152 [North: "I was summarily fired"].)		
86/11/25-335 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Chairman INOUYE. . . . Mr. McFarlane, a question has been bothering many of us here. . . . [W]hen this matter exploded on the front pages last November, and events began to proceed, . . . Admiral Poindexter, was permitted to resign, a rather honorable step. "On the other hand, to the surprise of many, Colonel North was, as he says, dismissed. "Do you know why Colonel North was dismissed and the Admiral was given the honorable path of resigning? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't know, Mr. Chairman. I wasn't there. I think it was a tawdry way to treat a man like Ollie. "Chairman INOUYE. You don't think it was the right thing to do? "Mr. MCFARLANE. No, sir, I don't. "Chairman INOUYE. I th[i]nk all of us here agree with you." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 267-68.)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.
86/11/25-336 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOKS. Now, Mr. Secretary, according to testimony we have already heard, it was decided on Monday, November 24 and Tuesday, the 25th by you and General Meese and the President that Colonel North should be fired from the NSC staff, Admiral	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	Poindexter should be allowed to resign as adviser as a result of their role in the diversion of profits from the Iran arms sales. "Now, these steps were taken with such haste on the morning of November 25th that Colonel North apparently said he learned he had been fired from a TV broadcast. That is the new method that they use down there? "Mr. REGAN. It is one method. There are other ways. "Mr. BROOKS. They send Carlucci to visit? "Mr. REGAN. No. I found out the same way. I don't know what his problem is. "Mr. BROOKS. You don't seem very sympathetic. "Mr. REGAN. Well, what's sauce for the goose. "Let me explain about Colonel North. I think I did it this morning, but I will repeat it again. "It was my recommendation to the President and to the Secretary of Defense and to the acting head of the National Security--the acting National Security Adviser that Colonel North should not be fired, [but] reassigned back to the Marine Corps for further assignment. He obviously had done something that was unauthorized. We didn't know the dimensions of it then. "We had some knowledge, but not the complete knowledge that we now have. "It seems to me to have such a person remaining at his post at that same desk and the like wouldn't be prudent at all. "You can imagine the criticism we would have had had Colonel North stayed on as many have suggested or Admiral Poindexter stayed on in view		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	of this. "Now, I think we did the right thing. Cap Weinberger did make certain that the Marine Corps recalled Colonel North from the billet with the National Security Council back to headquarters. "He is still a Marine colonel. He was not fired in that sense of the work. He wasn't without a job. "Mr. BROOKS. Still on the payroll.? "Mr. REGAN. Yes." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 156-57.)		
86/11/25-338 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	NORTH'S DISMISSAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. Do you know who recommended to the President that Oliver North be fired? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't know that. I was surprised and disappointed that that came out the way it did." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 177.)	NORTH'S DISMISSAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	NORTH'S DISMISSAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.
86/11/25-339 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. JENKINS. . . . Admiral, I'll be brief. "The decision to fire Colonel North was made by whom? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't know the answer to that, Mr. Jenkins. "Mr. JENKINS. Was it someone within the administration? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Again, I simply don't know. I did not play a single part in that decision. "I'm unaware--I assume that it--the decision	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	came about as a result of the President's meeting with his advisers after I talked to him at 9:30 on the 25th, but I did not participate in that meeting and I don't know whether the decision was taken there or when. "In my meeting with Ed Meese the morning of the 25th, it was my understanding that Colonel North would simply be transferred back to the Defense Department. "Mr. JENKINS. The ultimate decision, of course, was made by the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't--I really don't know that. "Mr. JENKINS. We don't even know who fired North? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Unfortunately, the only thing that I know about it is what I heard and I suppose you heard on the television with Ed Meese in the White House press room. "Mr. JENKINS. Who made the decision to relieve you of your responsibilities? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Oh, the President clearly. "Mr. JENKINS. Who made the decision to commence a criminal investigation of you and Colonel North and others? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Again, Mr. Jenkins, I don't know the answer to that. "Mr. JENKINS. Was it someone within the administration? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Presumably. "Mr. JENKINS. Well, I thought I was going to establish very clearly that it wasn't the Congress that fired Colonel North or relieved you of your		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	responsibilities or started a criminal investigation, and obviously we can't. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I would attest to that, Mr. Jenkins; it wasn't the Congress." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 110-11.)		
86/11/25-400 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "MR. LIMAN. Now, you then--did you hear the press conference of the President and Attorney General Meese? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I did. "Mr. LIMAN. And was it then that you learned that Colonel North was being removed, not just reassigned? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, and that was a great surprise to me. That had not been discussed with me. That day, I don't know how that came about, but I think it was a mistake. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, Admiral, as you sat there and you listened to the press conference and the Attorney General describing the diversion as an aberration in the President's policy, talking about potential criminal investigations and all of the other things he said, the concerns that you had about this being a potential political disaster if it ever came out must have seemed to you to be coming true with a vengeance, right? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, I must say that at that moment that didn't dawn on me, because it frankly was several days after that that began to dawn on me, and that's when I got an attorney.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Did you make any contemporaneous record in your notes, or any other place, at the time that you decided to give the President deniability, that you were not going to tell the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I did not write that down. "Mr. LIMAN. So that you created a situation where it would be only your word to corroborate that of our Commander in Chief? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 5/16/87, at 92-95.) See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Mr. LIMAN. Well, even before you got an attorney, and that is the period I want to talk to you about, I mean you realized this was now a major political issue as you listened to the Attorney General and you read the newspapers, right? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I realized that the, frankly, and I intend to be very frank here, that the media and the newspapers were blowing this all out of proportion and there was significant pressure from Congress for the administration to appoint an independent counsel, and I thought, and still think, that it was a gross overreaction to an issue. "I think with hindsight some mistakes were made in terms of handling the issue in November, and I think that in the effort to make sure that the White House was not accused of cover-up, that we moved too fast, and I accept some of that responsibility in that I don't think with hindsight that I should have resigned when I did. We should have stayed around to get to a full explanation as to what we were trying to do and the reasons-- "Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, you said that one of the reasons you did not tell the President about this was because you realized that it would be controversial and you wanted the President to be able to deny it. "Mr. POINDEXTER. That's correct. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Well, hadn't the controversy now occurred that you had anticipated in February of		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	'86 when you decided not to tell the President? You now were having a controversy that had become public? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is a statement of fact. "Mr. LIMAN. Did--can you tell us why you didn't then stand up and say, 'I, Admiral Poindexter, made the decision and did not tell the President of the United States'? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, that is a hypothetical question, and before I made the decision to retain attorneys, I was obviously giving it a lot of thought, but I did not want to make that kind of decision until I have had an opportunity to consult with attorneys. And after I did, I followed the advice of my attorneys. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, you talked about how much you wanted, you know, how your desire was in acting here to provide the President with deniability. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Correct. "Mr. LIMAN. Deniability usually, in covert operations, has another word, an adjective that precedes it called plausibile deniability, right? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that's the usual term of art. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you make any contemporaneous record in your notes, or any other place, at the time that you decided to give the President deniability, that you were not going to tell the President? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I did not write that down.		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Mr. LIMAN. So that you created a situation where it would be only your word to corroborate that of our Commander in Chief? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. LIMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 5/16/87, at 92-95.)		
86/11/25-404 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. RUDMAN. Do you think that Mr. Meese in his public statements overreacted to this whole matter or do you think the he underreacted? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I testified yesterday, since that time, with hindsight, I think I made an error in agreeing to resign so soon. It would probably have been better if I had not, and if we had resisted the temptation to go public so quickly until we had many more facts sorted out. "And our rationale, my rationale for doing what I did--and by 'our' there, I meant Colonel North and me, not anybody else--that would have made things simpler, I believe. "Mr. RUDMAN. Admiral, the last questions I want to ask are difficult questions. They are not meant to be, but we are looking at policy and I expect some people will be looking at this as a matter of history and maybe somebody will learn something from it. "And I pick up off your last answer, which you answered a few days ago. Maybe it was yesterday; it seems like a few days ago. I have a clear	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

picture of the President of the United States during this period--I think it might have been the weekend after North was fired, you resigned--walking out of the White House to board Marine 1 to go to Camp David and somebody in the press yelling to him across the area, 'Mr. President, won't you tell us what has happened and what's involved and whose idea it was?' I remember the President standing in front of cameras there holding his hands up and shrugging his shoulders with a very plaintive look and saying, 'I wish somebody would tell me.'

"I understand that you had great personal concern at that time. But I don't think anyone has ever got into your personal courage. What I don't understand is why it took us so long to get to where we got yesterday.

"[Counsel conferring with witness.]

"Mr. RUDMAN. I want to know, as the National Security Adviser to the President of the United States, as one who did not feel he was acting as a criminal, as one who was carrying out the policies that he believed his Commander in Chief wanted, why before you left your assignment you did not say to the President, 'Mr. President, I may get in trouble about this, but I want you to know, and you may say that what I did you did not authorize me to do, and I take responsibility for it,' and thus not have had the agony that we have had for the last eight months, because I happen to believe your testimony. I believe you when you say you did not tell the President.

"Mr. BECKLER. Senator, there is one thing

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	that you said, that 'you did not authorize me to do.' There was never testimony by Admiral Poindexter that he was not authorized. "Mr. RUDMAN. What I meant to say was that the President, you did this on your own, you authorized it and you did not notify it, you did it on your own based upon what you perceived to be your general authority from the President, which is your testimony. "Why was that not done, Admiral? That is something that baffles many people in America. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, this was a very difficult time in November. I was very tired, as I have testified. I think that if I had thought about the whole issue more rationally, at that point I should not have agreed to resign right away. In fact, the events of the 25th snowballed very rapidly. I frankly had no idea that Ed Meese was going to go out and, whatever time it was, 11:30 or whatever, to make this announcement. "My meeting with the President at 9:30, as I recall, I thought was--it was the first opportunity to tell him that I wished to resign because of the transfer, and it was going to be a difficult issue." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 178-80.)		
86/11/25-405 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. RUDMAN. If I could interrupt, you didn't have any pressure to resign at that point, if I	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

understood you, or did you? I want to know that.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think I did. When I talked to Ed Meese on Monday, the 24th, I told him that I was prepared to resign, but I would leave it up to him, and I don't think I said this, but my intent was to him and the President as to the timing of when I resigned.

"And so I frankly, on the morning of the 25th when I got the call from Ed in my car, I was surprised that he wanted me to come right over. So the unusual method of setting up that meeting and my diverting from going into the White House to go over to his office, and his telling me that 'I think you should resign today.' I assumed that that was also coming from the President at that point, and so I didn't really think I had any options at that point.

"Mr. RUDMAN. But by--

"Mr. POINDEXTER. With hindsight, I probably should have objected and made a case for slowing it down.

"Mr. RUDMAN. But by your previous answer, I think if I understand your previous answer, the one about delaying your departure, you believed that had you stayed, at least the President would have had all the facts and not made some of the statements he made based on erroneous information.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I am not sure, Senator, what erroneous statements he has made.

"Mr. RUDMAN. We don't have to get into that, but I will tell you the President has been in the position of having to correct a number of statements since he, himself, has become aware of

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	some of this information, and certainly he was not--everybody who could help him who was directly involved was gone; isn't that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. RUDMAN. And you were not in a mood to talk to people down there. I assume you retained counsel. I assume counsel said, look, from this point on, you take advice from me; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. And, of course, the problem was that there was pressure in the media and from the Congress to establish an independent counsel. I don't think I had anticipated that. "That put the whole situation in a different light and was one of the--the talk of that made me realize that I really should retain counsel, and after that, I did take their advice." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/17/87, at 180-82.)		
86/11/25-407 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE FALL GUY PLAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE, POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. . . . On November 25th the Attorney General came before the American people and stated to the people of this country that you had not approved these things and only had a very general knowledge that something of this nature may have been occurring, and as a result of that, it seems to me, that there was a decision made that Colonel North be fired and that you would be permitted, however, to resign.	THE FALL GUY PLAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE, POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	THE FALL GUY PLAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE, POINDEXTER'S RESIGNATION AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"If Colonel North did not in any way act without authority, and you, as his supervisor, were aware of this, how could you have permitted Colonel North to be fired while you were being permitted to resign? "What is the significance of that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Rodino, I did not permit that. That was as much a surprise to me as it was to everybody else. "Mr. RODINO. Did you do anything about it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I knew nothing about it ahead of time. "Mr. BECKLER. I am sorry. He didn't hear your last question, which was 'did you do anything about it?' "Mr. RODINO. Did you do anything about it, Admiral? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. At that time it was already done. Ed Meese went out in the press conference unbeknownst to me and characterized the two departures the way he did. I was unaware that that was intended. In fact, I had a discussion with Ed that morning at 7:30 in his office, to which I have testified before, in which we talked about my resigning my commission. "Colonel North only had one commission, the commission as a Marine officer. I was in a different situation. I had two commissions. So it was discussed that I would resign and I understood that Colonel North would simply be transferred back to the Marine Corps to continue his duties with the Marines. "It wasn't until the press conference that I		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	learned that he was going to be fired. Now, I don't know of any plan to make Colonel North a scapegoat. "I know that he has testified that he and Bill Casey talked about it, and Colonel North mentioned to me several times unrelated to Mr. Casey that he was willing to be the fall-guy, and every time he said that I told him that was nonsense and that he should quit thinking in those terms. "Now, Ed Meese's comment at the press conference was obviously too general. He had not asked me, and he did not know whether I had-- "Mr. RODINO. And you didn't tell him? "Mr. POINDEXTER. And I didn't tell him, that is right, because of the reasons I explained. I think you missed some of the hearing this morning. But the whole point there was that I thought that the President would have much greater deniability if the White House simply knew as little as possible about it until after I had gone. "Mr. RODINO. Did you do anything at all to try to clear up the statement that the Attorney General had made that you were only generally aware, that you hadn't approved? "Mr. POINDEXTER. At that point I did not, because it was pretty clear that, after the press conference in which he, the Attorney General, indicated that a criminal investigation was commencing, at that point I became cautious. "Mr. RODINO. Don't you think that at that time it might have also been prudent to acknowledge that you had been the one who had been responsible and, therefore, clear everything for		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	everybody? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Rodino, at that point I wanted to have an opportunity to consult with attorneys, which I did later, and since that time I have taken their advice." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 148-50.)		
86/11/25-408 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY-TUESDAY)		DIVERSION: QUESTIONS POINDEXTER WASN'T ASKED BEFORE HE RESIGNED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. MITCHELL. . . . You were asked earlier why you didn't say last November what you said last week, that you made a deliberate decision to withhold from the President knowledge of your prior decision to divert funds from the Iran arms sale to the contras. What I find most striking about your answer is not so much what you didn't say, but rather that you weren't asked about it, and I want to ask if I understood you correctly to say that you met with the President when you resigned; you met with Chief of Staff Don Regan, and you met several times with Attorney General Meese in the week immediately preceding your resignation, and that not one of them ever asked you to explain your decision or whether you had told the President. Is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. There were three significant meetings involved of those that you have described. There was a short meeting with Ed Meese in my office on Monday, November the 24th. There was a meeting--well, there were four, I guess--the second meeting was with Ed Meese in his office the morning of the 25th.	DIVERSION: QUESTIONS POINDEXTER WASN'T ASKED BEFORE HE RESIGNED POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Don Regan came into my office while I was eating breakfast. It was about a 5-minute conversation, and then I had 5 or 10 minutes with the President, the Vice President, Don Regan, Ed Meese at 9:30 on that morning. "All these conversations were very general in nature, not any sort of inquiry or investigation or detailed questions, and I was not asked those questions. "Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever discuss with any of those three men or with any other person what you would or would not say if asked about your decision approving the diversion and the President's knowledge of that diversion? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I was not asked and have not discussed that with anybody except my attorneys. "Mr. MITCHELL. So you have no agreement, arrangement or understanding of any kind, express or implied in any way with any person regarding your testimony on your decision approving the diversion and your decision not to notify the President of that fact; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. You are absolutely correct. I have not had any such conversation. "Mr. MITCHELL. And you have no knowledge of any agreement, arrangement, or understanding of any kind, express or implied, regarding the testimony of any other person or any aspect of the subject matter of these hearings; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. None whatsoever." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 193-96.)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "As I have testified earlier, I did not establish the time table for my departure from the White House. There was a meeting which I did not attend after my 9:30 meeting with the President in which I assume this issue was discussed. "With hindsight, I have also testified earlier, that I think that the decision to have me resign that day was premature. On the preceding day, on Monday, I had indicated to Ed Meese that I was prepared to resign; but then I was, frankly, surprised when he informed me the following morning that I should resign that day. "You know, I don't know what factors went into the discussion with the President at the meeting that followed mine, but with hindsight, I think it would have been better if I had stayed and if we had pulled together all of the facts so the President could have explained it. "Now, I am not naive enough to believe that that would have completely solved the problem. I think, as I have testified, I think that that would have increased the speculation as to whether the President knew or didn't know eventually. I don't know. Hindsight is always very good. We have to go on the basis of what happened." (Poindexter Testim., 7/21/87, at 99-100.)	POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.
86/11/25-410 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT: ". . . [The Attorney General's] report led me to conclude that I was not fully informed on the nature of one of the activities undertaken in connection with this initiative. This action	THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		raises serious questions of propriety. ". . . . "Although not directly involved, Vice Admiral John Poindexter has asked to be relieved of his assignment as assistant to the President for national security affairs and to return to another assignment in the Navy. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North has been relieved of his duties on the National Security Council staff. "I am deeply troubled that the implementation of a policy aimed at resolving a truly tragic situation in the Middle East has resulted in such controversy. As I've stated previously, I believe our policy goals toward Iran were well founded. However, the information brought to my attention yesterday convinced me that in one aspect, implementation of that policy was seriously flawed. "While I cannot reverse what has happened, I am initiating steps, including those I've announced today, to assure that the implementation of all future, foreign and national security policy initiatives will proceed only in accordance with my authorization. ". . . . "And now, I'm going to ask Attorney General Meese to brief you." (N.Y. Times, 11/26/86, at A10.)	
86/11/25-413 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT: "Why don't I tell you what is the situation, and then I'll take your questions.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"On Friday afternoon--or Friday at noon--the President asked me to look into and bring together the facts concerning the--particularly the implementation of the strategic initiative in Iran and, more precisely, anything pertaining to the transfer of arms. "Over the weekend, this inquiry was conducted. Yesterday evening, I reported to the President. We continued our inquiry and this morning, the President directed that we make this information immediately available to the Congress and to the public through this medium this noon. "Let me say that all of the information is not yet in; we're still continuing our inquiry. But he did want me to make available immediately what we know at the present time. What is involved is that in the course of the arms transfers, which involved the United States providing the arms to Israel, and Israel in turn transferring the arms--in effect selling the arms--to representatives of Iran, certain monies which were received in the transaction between representatives of Israel and representatives of Iran were taken and made available to the forces in Central America which are opposing the Sandinista Government there. "In essence, the way in which the transactions occurred was that a certain amount of money was negotiated by representatives outside of the United States with Iran for arms. This amount of money was then transferred to representatives, as best we know, that can be described as representatives of Israel. They, in turn,	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		transferred to the C.I.A., which was the agent for the United States Government under a finding prepared by the President, signed by the President in January of 1986--and, incidentally, all of these transactions that I'm referring to took place between January 1986 and the present time. "They transferred to the C.I.A. the exact amount of the money that was owed to the United States Government for the weapons that were involved plus any costs of transportation that might be involved. This money was then repaid by the C.I.A. to the Department of Defense under the normal procedures. And all governmental funds and all governmental property was accounted for and statements of that have been verified by us up to the present time. "The money--the difference between the money owed to the United States Government and the money received from representatives of Iran was then deposited in bank accounts which were under the control of representatives of the forces in Central America." (JHICI Ex. OLN 15.)	
86/11/25-414 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE: QUESTIONS (1) AMOUNT DIVERTED "Q. How much money, sir, was involved? "A. We don't know the exact amount yet. Our estimate is that it is somewhere between $10 and $30 million. ". . . . "Q. Sir, you said that between $10 million	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE: QUESTIONS See col. 2.

and $30 million surplus funds from the Iranian arms sale may have been diverted to--

"A. I said, 'may have been transferred.'

"Q. The published reports . . . suggest that only $12 million total was spent for these--

"A. That's right.

"Q. So what is the total cost of the arms?

"A. Well, the difference is it was $12 million worth--approximately--worth of arms that was transferred from D.O.D. stocks.

"Q. And somehow the Israelis sold them for $10 million to $30 million more than that?

"A. That's my--that's the best of our understanding at the present time, yes.

"Q. Did you know that they were selling them at a premium?

"A. No one at a command level in the United States Government did, no."

(2) PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE

"The President was told as soon as we found out about it. The President knew nothing about it until I reported it to him. I alerted him yesterday morning. We still had some more work to do. And then I gave him the detail that we had yesterday afternoon."

(3) WHO KNEW

"The only persons in the United States Government that knew precisely about this--the only person--was Lieutenant Colonel North. Admiral Poindexter did know that something of this nature was occurring but he did not look into it

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		further. ". . . . "CIA Director Casey, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, myself, the other members of the N.S.C., none of us knew. "Q. When you say Poindexter knew, do you mean he approved of it? "A. No, Admiral Poindexter knew generally that something of this nature was happening; he did not know the details. "Q. When did he learn that? "Q. He did not try to stop it, though? "A. I don't know precisely when he learned it. He knew of it sometime during last year. "Q. Did he try to stop it, sir? "A. He did not try to stop it." (JHICI Ex. OLN 15.)	
86/11/25-415 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE: QUESTIONS (cont'd) (4) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION "This turned up in the course of the investigation. The first thing that triggered, if you will, an inquiry was the fact that as people prepared their testimony--because this had been done in a rather compartmentalized way--as people prepared their testimony for the Hill on Friday, there were certain things where there appeared to be more facts out there than we had already put together. "It was a matter, then, of the President requesting me to talk with everyone who had any participation at all, because one agency was doing	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE: QUESTIONS (cont'd) See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		one thing, another agency was doing another thing. There was very little paperwork. And to determine precisely what all of the facts were, because he wanted to be sure that he had all of the information about anything that may have occurred in the course of this whole situation. "That was--it was during the course of that inquiry that this information was found and then was followed out to the conclusions that I've mentioned." (5) DIVERSION MEMO "Q. How did you discover it, Mr. Attorney General? "A. How did we discover it? In the course of a review of documents, we came across a reference to the possibility of differences in amount between the funds being paid by Iran and the amount of the actual weapons, that was one thing. And secondly, there were some references to this in one particular document that we found. While it didn't reveal the whole situation, we then used that as the basis for proceeding further and discussing with one of the participants what this all meant. And that's how this was discovered." (JHICI Ex. OLN 15.)	
86/11/25-416 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE: QUESTIONS (cont'd) (6) POINDEXTER "Q. In your conversations with Admiral Poindexter, how does he explain not having alerted anyone that this was going on? As you said, he	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE: QUESTIONS (cont'd) See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		was aware that something was happening. "A. Again, I'm not going into any precise conversations with anyone while the inquiry is still proceeding. Let me just say that he did not notify anyone of this, particularly the President or any of the other members of the National Security Council. "Q. General, did he quit or was he fired? "A. Admiral Poindexter resigned--or actually, requested reassignment to the Navy--of his own accord. Before anyone ever raised any question about this, he did this of his own volition because he felt that it was his responsibility to take that action to avoid any possible confusion over this matter and to allow the President to have a new start in terms of his National Security operations." (7) NORTH'S ACTIONS: CRIMINAL ASPECTS "We are presently looking into the legal aspects of it, as to whether there's any criminality involved. We're also looking precisely at his involvement and what he did, so that the conclusions as to whether there's any criminal acts involved is still under inquiry by us. [Sic.]" (JHICI Ex. OLN 15.)	
86/11/25-417 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE: QUESTIONS (cont'd) (8) PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF PRIOR SHIPMENTS ". . . The President did not have full details of all of the aspects of transactions that	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE: QUESTIONS See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		took place prior to the [January] finding. There . . . was at least one transaction that we know about in which Israel shipped weapons without any authorization from the United States. There was another transaction of a similar nature, although there was probably knowledge on the part of people in the United States about it. "Q. Mr. Meese, at what point did the President know? You said he didn't have the full details. What details did he have about those transactions and when did he have them? "A. The President--this is one of the things that we're recollecting now. The President was informed generally that there had been an Israeli shipment of weapons to Iran some time during the late summer, early fall of 1985. And then he later learned, in February of 1986, details about another shipment that had taken place in November of '85, which had actually been returned to Israel in February of '86. "Q. Mr. Attorney General, Admiral Poindexter has told reporters that the President verbally authorized that shipment, in September of 1985, from Israel to Iran. Does your information dispute that? "A. Our information is that the President knew about it, probably after the fact, and agreed that--with the general concept of continuing our discussions with the Israelis concerning these matters. That's the information I have. "Q. Who has the authorization ability, if not the President? "A. To my knowledge--to my knowledge, nobody	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		authorized that particular shipment specifically. "Q. The Israelis did it on their own? "A. That's my understanding, yes." (9) PRIOR ATTORNEY GENERAL INVOLVEMENT "Q. We've been told that the President was operating, from the beginning of this operation in June or July of 1985, on legal opinions--not written, but oral--from you. One could ask, then, are you sorry that you gave the advice that the N.S.C. should do this operation, or-- "A. The only legal opinion that was involved had to do with the routine concurrence with the finding of January 1986. That's the only legal opinion, or legal advice, that was asked for or that was given." (10) SCAPEGOAT "Q. What's to prevent an increasingly cynical public from thinking that you went looking for a scapegoat and you came up with this whopper, but it doesn't have a lot to do with the original controversy? "A. Well, the only thing that I can say is that we have been very careful to lay out the facts for you and for the American public just as rapidly as we've gotten them. Much--much different than we would do in a normal inquiry or investigation, when we usually wait until the inquiry is complete. But the President felt that, in the interests of getting the full story out, that he should make the statement that he did today and that I should appear before you and	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		answer questions. Which I think you will agree is doing everything we can to be sure that there is no hint that anything [sic] is trying to be concealed." (JHICI Ex. OLN 15.)	
86/11/25-418 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. Now, you knew about the diversion that took place of the proceeds of the Iranian arms sale to support the contra effort; is that correct? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I authorized that. "Mr. SARBANES. If you would turn to Exhibit [JMP] 72, this is a press conference that Attorney General Meese had on November 25th, and he was asked, 'General Meese, who in the NSC was aware that'. . . ". . . . "Mr. SARBANES. . . . '. . . that this extra amount of money was being transferred to the so-called contras or under their control? Did Admiral Poindexter specifically know?' They go on to ask about others. "And in his response, General Meese said none of us knew. "'When you say that Poindexter knew, do you mean he approved of it?' "'No.' This is General Meese responding. 'No. Admiral Poindexter knew generally that something of that nature was happening. He did not know the details.' "In fact, you knew more than generally, did	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		you not? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I--as I have testified before, Ed Meese did not ask me if I had approved. It was a very short session, informal session in my office, and I told him I was generally aware. He didn't ask me any more questions. "At that point, I didn't provide any more information. And I didn't suggest to Mr. Meese that he say this. You'll have to talk to him about it. "Mr. SARBANES. But on the basis of the actual facts, this is a misleading response by the Attorney General, is it not? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I--again, you will have to ask Mr. Meese to evaluate that. I don't plan to. "Mr. SARBANES. Well, you would not have briefed the Attorney General to give this response on the nature of your involvement, would you? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Say that again. "Mr. SARBANES. You would not have briefed the Attorney General to give this response on the nature of your involvement? "Mr. POINDEXTER. No. "Mr. SARBANES. This is not an accurate reflection of your involvement, is it? "Mr. POINDEXTER. As I have testified, I did not know that Ed Meese was going to go out in the press room for a session until shortly before he was on the air." (Poindexter Testim., 7/20/87, at 39-41; JHICI Ex. JMP 72 [Transcript of Attorney General's press conference announcing the diversion, 11/25/86].)	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/25-420 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. NIELDS. Now, during the course of the press conference [Ex. EM 54], did you make various statements about who was aware of the diversion and who was not aware of the diversion? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I believe that I did. "Mr. NIELDS. And what did you say with respect to Director Casey? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe that I said that Director Casey was not aware of the diversion. I would have to, of course, check--I believe that is what I said. "Mr. NIELDS. That is correct, and it is at page 3 of Exhibit [EM] 54, you need not turn to it, it is a simple question and answer that has to do with Director Casey, and you say CIA Director Casey and various other-- "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. --Cabinet officials, none of us knew. "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, did you make various statements also during the course of that press conference about the flow of funds, how the moneys were routed from Iran to the contras? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I did. And I think I ought to add that I also made a number of statements during that press conference that I was providing information on the basis of what we then knew, that the information we had was preliminary,	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

certainly fragmentary, that we did not have the complete picture, and that I was giving the best information we had as of that time.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. In the middle of [page 6 of Ex. EM 54] the following question is asked: 'One final follow-up, then, how did Colonel North--let me put it this way--these transfers of moneys, did they go only through one man, Colonel North, were there no other people involved?'

"And your response is: 'No transfers of money went through anyone. Bank accounts were established as best we know by representatives of the forces in Central America. And this information was provided to representatives of the Israeli Government, and the funds are--or representatives of Israel, I should say--and these funds were put into the accounts. So far as we know at this stage, no American person actually handled any of the funds that went to the forces in Central America.'

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct, that's what we had been told by Colonel North on Sunday.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, just referring back to this morning's question and answer. We went over some questions and some answers, and I think you indicated that Colonel North told you the money was flowing through the account of a U.S. corporation. [See 86/11/23-395.]

"Attorney General MEESE. Well, I think there were two different accounts that were given by Colonel North. One was the way the system went

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		when it was, when he was describing the conventional flow of moneys or the flow of moneys during what I have characterized as the conventional aspects of the Iranian Initiative, and then he gave us a different picture when he was talking about the diversion of funds to the Freedom Fighters in Nicaragua. And so when I was talking about this then in response to the question you cited, I was talking about what he indicated to us was the way in which the funds were diverted. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, I think we also this morning went over the so-called diversion memorandum [Ex. EM 44] which also showed the $15 million going into the account of a U.S. corporation, and then from there to the contras. Did you have that in mind when you were describing the flow of funds at the press conference? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, what I had specifically in mind is what I testified to this morning and which was, is included in the notes of the interview with Colonel North on page 16 where it says: Israelis, it says, 'Israeli' --singular--[']made an offer, Colonel North contacted Calero, who opened three accounts in Switzerland, North gave the numbers to the Israelis, the moneys went to those accounts, CIA had no knowledge.' That is what I was referring to when I answered that question at the news conference." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 163-66; JHICI Exx. EM 44 [Diversion Memo], EM 54 [transcript of Meese news conference].)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/25-421 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, again, I don't want to belabor it, but I think you also indicated, and this is reflected at page 17 of your notes of your conversation with Colonel North [Ex. EM 47], that you specifically confronted him with the diversion memorandum [Ex. EM 44] and the flow of funds reflected there, and that he described it again as being Iranians, Israel, account corporation, CIA account, Army Weapons. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. But that my understanding was the accounting of the flow of the legitimate funds, the funds that went ultimately into the CIA account and into the Army weapons account, rather than the money that was diverted to the Freedom Fighters, which, as I understood, went directly from the Israelis into those secret bank accounts, at least that is what he had told us on that day, so that money was diverted from the normal flow of funds which is reflected on page 17. "Mr. NIELDS. But I think you also indicated earlier, and perhaps this is incorrect, but I think you indicated earlier that the flow indicated on page 17 was taken out of the diversion memorandum itself, which showed the money, the $15 million, going into the corporate account and then on to the contras. "Attorney General MEESE. Well, I am not sure. This has a question mark next to it here as to	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		what the exact flow was. It is true that in the diversion memo, there was one flow that was described, there is another flow that is described by Colonel North when he told us how it was established and how the funds went into the Swiss bank accounts directly from the Israelis. "So to the extent that there seems to be a discrepancy, I think the notes reflect it as it was told by us, and certainly as to what the question that I was answering in the news conference was based upon the rather definitive account that Colonel North had given us as to the flow of moneys specifically that got to the contras. "Mr. NIELDS. This question about the flow of funds, I take it, was of some potential legal significance. "Attorney General MEESE. Well, it was, and, of course, I anticipated, as in fact it was due to be followed up by more investigation after the news conference, and as a matter of fact, I had in mind at the time of the news conference that there would be extensive investigative activity, as I mentioned in my opening statement this morning. "But it was the President's desire that we present to the American people, as well as to the Congress, as rapidly as possible the information that we knew at that time, without waiting around for further investigation, so that there would be no hint that anyone was trying to cover up the facts and withhold the facts from the American people. "Mr. NIELDS. I take it that the legal	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		significance was that if the money went from the Iranians to the Israelis to the Nicaraguan Resistance, it might well be that the U.S. Government had no control over those funds, whereas if it went through, if it went into the account of a U.S. corporation acting as agent for the CIA, as you indicated before, or Colonel North, then perhaps the U.S. Government would have control over the funds. "Attorney General MEESE. Well, I am not sure--actually we didn't do a legal analysis at that time because that's something we were intending and have intended and have done since that time. But I am not sure that that would affect the legal significance. It may have been a factor, but it certainly may not have been definitive. "Because as we then, on the afternoon of the 25th, explored the various legal theories, that any profits from the sale of American weapons made by anyone who was acting in any capacity as an agent of the United States could, under a constructive trust theory, those funds could very well be a part of, be property of the United States, and so I am not sure of the particular way in which the bank account[']s flow had any real significance based on the constructive trust theory." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 166-69. See JHICI Exx. EM 44 [Diversion Memo], EM 47 [Richardson notes of North-Meese interview, 11/23/86], EM 54 [transcript of Meese news conference, 11/25/86].)	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/25-422 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Did you also at that press conference make reference to the U.S. Government knowledge and participation in the pre-finding Israeli shipments? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe I did, but you may want to refer me to the specific portion of it here. ". . . . "Mr. NIELDS. . . . It is a page that starts off, 'That was after.' "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, here we have it. "That was after the information had come out, and then-- "Mr. NIELDS. Down at the bottom of the page there is a question: Would you please clarify the whole question of the President condoning a third country shipment prior to signing this order? "And I take it that was the question on which there had been some confusion last week and you had done the weekend inquiry in order to resolve the confusion. "Attorney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. Your answer is: This is still being looked into. The President did not have full details of all the aspects of transactions that took place prior to the finding. There were--there was at least one transaction that we know about in which Israel shipped weapons without	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

any authorization from the United States.

"What was that statement based on?

"Attorney General MEESE. That was based upon my understanding at that time from Colonel North primarily, but also I believe from Mr. McFarlane, that the original TOW shipment, which took place, I believe, in the latter part of August or the early part of September 1985, had been undertaken by the Israelis without any prior knowledge of the United States.

"Mr. NIELDS. Thank you.

"Then your answer continues: There was another transaction of a similar nature, although there was probably knowledge on the part of people in the United States about it and this--and the question, when was that?--you continue your answer--is one of--there was a transaction, one transaction in late August or September, and there was another transaction in--of '85, in November, and in the November transaction actually those weapons were returned to Israel, it's our understanding. That was the whole--both of those transactions took place between Israel and Iran and did not involve at that time the United States.

"And then the question comes back: At what point did the President know?

"You said he didn't have the full details.

"You answered yes.

"The question: What details did he have about those transactions and when did he have them?

"And you respond: The President--this is one of the things that we're recollecting now--the

President was informed generally that there had been an Israeli shipment of weapons to Iran sometime during the late summer, early fall of 1985, and then he later learned in February of 1986 the details about another shipment that had taken place in November of '85, which actually had been returned to Israel in February of '86.

"What was the basis for your statement that the President learned in February of '86 details about the November '85 shipment?

"Attorney General MEESE. I can't recall now, but I believe that we had been told that by one of the participants. Whether it was Colonel North or Mr. McFarlane, I'm not sure.

"Again I might say that there was considerable confusion during the course of the press conference with questions being thrown at me from a number of members of the press. I was trying to recall details as best I could at that time without notes, and to testify--to account to the press for what we knew.

"This was why, as you will see, this press conference is replete with statements that I was telling what we knew at that time and telling to the best of our knowledge and indicating to the press that that might not be a full and accurate account, and that much more would be forthcoming later."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, AT 169-73; JHICI Ex. EM 54 [transcript of Meese news conference, 11/25/86].)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/25-423		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, on the subject of the flow of funds, did you get a telephone call from the Prime Minister of Israel at the end of the day in which he straightened the story out? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, I did. And if I may refer you to Exhibit [EM] 56, it's a page from my spiral notebook dated the 25th of November 1986. At 4:40 p.m. I received a call from Shimon Peres, then the Prime Minister of Israel. "Mr. Peres is a man that I was well acquainted with. I had been a guest in his home. And he told me that they had transmitted the defensive weapons upon United States request. "He said the money--and I'm reading now from my notes--he said the money had been paid directly by Iranians, not Israelis, to the account of an American company in Switzerland. The Israelis were only told the amount, they didn't know the end user. "He said they were releasing a statement to that effect in Israel in twenty minutes and he said--he wound up by saying they want to be helpful to us in any way they could. "Mr. NIELDS. Now, Exhibit [EM] 63 is a memorandum done in the Criminal Division based on the information that you had released at your press conference, and on page 3 it states, 'It seems to me clear from the information made public by the Attorney General that funds available to the Department of Defense were used to store, transport, load and ship to Iran the arms	MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		eventually turned into aid to the contras.' "And then down below it says, 'If the above information is true, it appears to me fairly clear that anyone who designed the Iran operation to deliver weapons to Nicaragua, concealed that information from the President, and then ordered the deal to go forward, could reasonably be said to be in violation of the Boland Amendment.' "Do you agree with that statement? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, I'm not sure. I had not seen this memorandum until preparation for this hearing, and I would think there was certainly a possibility this could be true, depending upon what branch of the government that individual was in. "I would have to look at the Boland Amendment that was in effect at that particular time and do that analysis. I have not done that." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 173-74; JHICI Exx. EM 56 [Meese notes of call from Prime Minister Peres, 11/25/86], EM 63 [Draft Memo from Weld to Martin, re Independent Counsel Request]. See Meese Testim., JHICI, 11/28/87, at 202-03 [Meese on whether the contents of Ex. EM 63 reflected his opinions: "I don't know whether they do or not since I haven't had a chance to study it, but there is no reason to believe they do or don't really."].)	
86/11/25-425 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. In response to press questions at your November 25, 1986 press conference, you	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

said, 'I will say this. I think every member of the administration owes it to the President to stand shoulder to shoulder with him and support the policies that he has, the policy decisions he has made, as well as to stand by him when something has happened which the President didn't know.'

"My question to you, Mr. Attorney General, were you suggesting, knowing that you were going to be an independent impartial enforcer of the law, an investigator, if you will, how could you stand shoulder to shoulder, ask anyone to stand shoulder to shoulder with anyone in support of the President's policies?

"Attorney General MEESE. Mr. Rodino, I think I would have to find out the context in which that question was asked and what the question was that I was answering, and I am looking now. Do you have a citation as to where that appears in the press conference?

"Mr. RODINO. It is at your press conference of November 25th.

"Attorney General MEESE. I know the date, and I know the place. I am wondering where in the press conference it is. I think we referred to that as exhibit--perhaps Mr. Nields could be of assistance here in identifying the exhibit and the spot.

"Mr. RODINO. We will move on to that.

"Attorney General MEESE. Let me say, because I think it is important, what was the question that that was responding to, Mr. Rodino?

"Mr. RODINO. The question is your statement that you make about standing shoulder to shoulder with him, meaning the President and supporting the policies that he has, and my question is that how can you be an independent enforcer of the law and suggest to those whom you might be then investigating that they should stand shoulder to shoulder with the President and tell a witness to do so?

"Attorney General MEESE. I was never talking to any witness in that press conference. I was talking to members of the press, and I believe the question had to do with what members of the Cabinet should do in regard to the President's policies, it had nothing to do with witnesses or law enforcement. It was a totally different question. That is why I am trying to find the context.

"Mr. RODINO. Even though it was a fact-finding inquiry, you were going to be interviewing Cabinet members as well?

"Attorney General MEESE. This was after that fact-finding weekend was over. This was the news conference on Tuesday, the 25th, and I had already done the fact-finding which revealed this possible diversion of money to the contras.

"Mr. RODINO. Your investigation was not complete at that time, was it, Mr. Meese?

"Attorney General MEESE. The inquiry was pretty much over because we had found this rather astounding piece of information and that would then be the basis for a criminal investigation, among other things, which would be taken on by others. But at the time that I was talking in the abstract to the press, it had nothing to do with law enforcement, criminal investigation or talking to witnesses; it was, I believe, an abstract question that somebody had asked me in regard to the role of Cabinet members vis-a-vis the policies of the President.

"Mr. RODINO. Well, I am still puzzled, because it would suggest to me that this was almost like a signal being sent to people who later on [were to] be interviewed at a later date by the Criminal Division.

"Attorney General MEESE. In no way was it a signal to anyone who was going to be interviewed by the Criminal Division.

"Mr. RODINO. It could be construed as such?

"Attorney General MEESE. Not to anyone who understood what I was saying. This was an abstract question relating to Cabinet members and how they should follow or oppose the policies of the President, and I believe my statement was that a person, in essence, should follow the policy of the President or if they couldn't, then they should resign from the administration, and I feel that today as far as Cabinet members are concerned. It had to do with policy matters and nothing to do with law enforcement or criminal matters."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 218-21. See JHICI Ex. EM 54 [Washington Post transcript of the Attorney General's press conference of 11/25/86].)

86/11/25-430
NOVEMBER 25,

CONTRAS: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL

IRAN: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND NORTH'S DISMISSAL

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986 (TUESDAY)-		MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. HEFLIN. . . . [I]n your press conference that you had on the 25th of November at which you announced the resignation of Admiral Poindexter and the dismissal of Colonel North, you used there that there could have been from 10 to 30 million dollars diverted from profits of the arms sale to the contra use. "How did you calculate that bracket of from 10 to 30 million? "Attorney General MEESE. As I mentioned at that news conference, we didn't have all the facts at that time so we had to do some rough calculations, and I said, I believe on some 40 occasions, that there was more to come, more information to come, and that we didn't have total information on which to base the different items of information that were being revealed. "But in that particular matter, I believe Colonel North told us that in the one transaction that he remembered clearly, that he thought that there were about $12 million that had resulted from that transaction which had gone to the Freedom Fighters in Nicaragua. He said he thought it was either two or--that there was either one or two additional situations. "And so trying to get some kind of a bracket, as you say, I indicated in the news conference that the amount was probably somewhere between 10 and 30 million dollar[s], just getting a rough approximation based on what we had been told on the previous Sunday. "Mr. HEFLIN. I'm led to believe that--and it	MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

may be erroneous, but this is my understanding--that relative to the decision to terminate Colonel North rather than allow him to resign, that this decision was made largely between you and Mr. Donald Regan, perhaps with the President.

"Who recommended--whose idea was it that Colonel North be fired rather than being allowed to resign his position?

"Attorney General MEESE. Senator, I can't remember for sure.

"It was not a matter of firing him per se. It was a matter of transferring him back to the Marine Corps where he was on detail.

"Mr. HEFLIN. Well, it comes out to the public he was fired.

"Attorney General MEESE. It comes out the same way, I agree with you.

"I think there was no question in anybody's mind that his continued service on the National Security Council staff was probably not advisable at that point, and therefore it was a matter that his situation was different than that of Admiral Poindexter, who was on appointed or--in terms of the White House parlance--had a commission from the President which he would have to resign.

"Colonel North was in a different category. He was assigned to the White House or to the National Security Council staff by the Marine Corps, so it was simply a matter of having that detail be removed and he be transferred back. So there were two different types of personnel actions.

"As far as who--it was decided--it was

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		discussed among the three of us at least--there may have been others there--the three of us being the President, Mr. Regan and myself. "I can't recall exactly who said what, but I think it is obvious that Mr. Regan, as the Chief of Staff of the White House, had a major role in it." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 137-40. See id., 7/29/87, at 146-53 [the Attorney General's press conference and North's dismissal].)	
86/11/25-432 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND THE FALL GUY PLAN MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. ASPIN. . . . Mr. Attorney General, let me just go back over one thing, and I am kind of intrigued by the question that Mr. Stokes raised about Mr. North being the fall guy. [See 86/11/25-006.] "And I was looking at your testimony, at the transcript of your press conference the time you announced the diversion and laid it out, and as you have said, there are a lot of points in it which you put in a lot of qualifiers and other things, saying we didn't know and we weren't sure, but on the part about who knew and what they knew you were pretty firm at that point. "Here you are saying--here is the question: Attorney General Meese, who in the NSC was aware that this extra amount of money was being transferred to the so-called contras, or under their control? Did Admiral Poindexter specifically know? Who else knew and did the CIA	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND THE FALL GUY PLAN MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		know? Was CIA Director Casey aware of this? "Your answer was: The only person in the United States Government that knew precisely about this, the only person was Lieutenant Colonel North. Admiral Poindexter did know that something of this nature was occurring, but he did not look into it further. "If I could follow up, sir, what about CIA Director Casey? "CIA Director Casey, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Casp[a]r Weinberger, myself and other members of the NSC, none of us knew. "When you say that Poindexter knew, do you mean that he approved of it? "No. Admiral Poindexter knew generally that something of this nature was happening. He did not know the details. "Did he try to stop it, though? "I don't know precisely when he learned it. He knew of it sometime during the last year. "But did he try to stop it, sir? "He did not try to stop it. "That is pretty definitive and pretty categorical. There is no 'Well, we think at this point.' I take it from your subsequent testimony that this definitive opinion about what Admiral Poindexter knew or did not know, your testimony yesterday mainly, came from that brief meeting you had in his office; is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct. What I was relating there in the passage that you quoted was, first of all, what Lieutenant Colonel	

North had told me about his own knowledge, and, secondly, what Admiral Poindexter had told me about his participation.

"Mr. ASPIN. But you went with a flat statement and you did not ask Admiral Poindexter the flat question, I take it, is what you are telling us? Your testimony yesterday, you said you got from the conversation that he knew something about it but you didn't press him--

"Attorney General MEESE. I got from him what he told me, which was all he told me at that time, that he knew about it, namely, that Colonel North had given him hints about what was going on so that he had a general knowledge and that he didn't follow up on that or do anything to stop it.

"Mr. ASPIN. I'm surprised that you went with such a flat statement at the press conference, given the kind of sketchy information that you had at that time.

"Attorney General MEESE. I felt it was important to tell all that we knew at that time so I related, I think almost verbatim, what Admiral Poindexter had told me about his participation.

"May I say--

"Mr. ASPIN. But without any qualifiers?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, because I did remember exactly what they had told me.

"I might say also that there were qualifiers before and after that about our general state of knowledge that could be applied to that, and furthermore what I was doing was talking about what people had said they had done. I was not attaching any evaluative content to it, as to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		whether they were guilty of crimes--" (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 241-44. See JHICI Ex. EM 54 [transcript of the Attorney General's press conference, 11/25/86].)	
86/11/25-433 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND THE FALL GUY PLAN MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. ASPIN. Did you ever follow up with Admiral Poindexter any other questions about--I mean when he resigned, you talked to him on the morning of the 25th and told him that it was time to resign? "Attorney General MEESE. I talked to him very briefly on the morning of the 25th and I did not go into further discussion of a substantive nature. "Mr. ASPIN. You told him that now is the time to resign? "Attorney General MEESE. I told him that I was sure his resignation was going to be requested and that it was time. "He had talked to me about that the previous day. "Mr. ASPIN. Do you relay your feelings about the case of Colonel North? Admiral Poindexter said that you at that time said that Colonel North was not guilty of anything at that point. [See 86/11/25-310.] Do you remember that? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall specifically that, but I certainly may have said that because at that point we had made no	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND THE FALL GUY PLAN MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

evaluation of any criminal activity.

"Mr. ASPIN. But the diversion then, in your mind, at that point was not a criminal activity?

"Attorney General MEESE. At no time did we establish for sure that it was a criminal activity.

"Mr. ASPIN. So at that point you did not believe that the diversion was a criminal activity; is that right?

"Attorney General MEESE. I didn't know that it was or certainly for sure. As a matter of fact, we were at that time in the process of examining to see whether there were any applicable laws, and that was going on late Monday night, and then it was further going on on Tuesday.

"Mr. ASPIN. Why would Admiral Poindexter get the word from you that he should resign?

"Attorney General MEESE. It was basically because the afternoon before when I was talking with him, he said to me, I knew when this started to come out--he said, I knew when I heard from Colonel North that if this came out I would probably have to resign, and he said, I trust you more than anybody else to--

"Mr. ASPIN. To make that call?

"Attorney General MEESE. In general he trusted me for advice generally in the whole thing, and so I felt that the next morning that it was only fair that he hear from me what the probable consequences were.

"Mr. ASPIN. Why did you think that it was important for him to resign at that moment?

"Attorney General MEESE. Several reasons.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		One is that there was no question in the Chief of Staff's mind at the White House that he would have to resign, and he ultimately had the primary responsibility to the President and also, in my mind, I didn't see how he could continue in view of this unauthorized activity having taken place under his watch, where he knew of it--just as he testified here and as the President said that day, he took the responsibility for it. He was unfortunately responsible. "I have very high regard for Admiral Poindexter as well as for Colonel North, both as individuals and for the fine job they did for the Administration, and this whole matter has been a matter of great sorrow to me." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 244-46.)	
86/11/25-434 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND THE FALL GUY PLAN MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. ASPIN. If I was a real cynic like Courter, I might put together the facts as I see them and come to the conclusion that you--I don't know whether you personally or Mr. Casey--somehow somebody was operating a plan A and plan B. "Plan A was we cannot tell a lie, Ollie did it. Plan B was we cannot tell a lie, John Poindexter did it. "Let me lay out the evidence for that. First of all is the nature of the investigation that you conducted and your very definitive statements here	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND THE FALL GUY PLAN MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		at the press conference. Second is the evidence of--that is, that John Poindexter did not reveal right away that he in fact had authorized the diversion and had not told the President. "The committee was very puzzled why Poindexter didn't say that right away and avoid an awful lot of speculation over those months in the paper as to whether the President knew or didn't know. He didn't come forward right away and I think it is because you were operating plan A. "It is consistent with North's testimony before this committee that he was willing to take the political fall but not the legal fall. It is consistent with North's testimony of a conversation that he had with Bill Casey where he, North, said that he would be willing to be the fall guy if this ever came out and Casey remarked to him, well, you're probably not big enough, we would have to go probably higher to Poindexter. "[] It is certainly consistent with the fact that Poindexter was allowed to resign and North was fired. And it is consistent with the fact that you told Poindexter now--that now was the time to resign. I think you were operating under plan A. And if plan A did not succeed--and it looks like plan B did--my question is, what was plan C? "Attorney General MEESE. All of the imagination that you put into that is incorrect. There was no plan A, no plan B. I have no idea what plan C might be conjured up in your imagination. "Mr. ASPIN. So you are not going to confess?	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		No? "I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 246-48.)	
86/11/25-445 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: RECAP MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. SARBANES. . . . General, I want to direct your attention to your opening statement. On page 2 of that statement, you say that the administration has thoroughly cooperated with the independent counsel and will continue to do so. You then stated, as the concluding sentence, 'It is imperative both in fairness to the independent counsel and to those individuals who have been involved in the Iran-contra matter that its efforts not be prejudged or impeded.' "I take it by that you would mean that any assertions, whether the independent counsel should or should not prosecute are really not appropriate? He should be allowed to do his job without receiving counsel from outside as to what decision he should reach? Is that the import of that sentence? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, Senator. "Mr. SARBANES. Now, did I understand you earlier to say in response to Congressman Aspin that you continue to have a very high regard for Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North, that you said you had a high regard? [See 86/11/25-433.] You continue to do so? "Attorney General MEESE. I have a high regard for both of those gentlemen, yes, sir. "Mr. SARBANES. In light of some of the	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: RECAP MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		testimony that they gave to you which subsequently proved not to be correct or accurate? "Attorney General MEESE. Senator, I think you have to look at an individual on the basis of all the things you know about them. I know about Colonel North, that he has an exemplary war record, a record of heroism, and that he worked very hard for the President for things that he believed in for the country, that he has continually exhibited, in the time I knew his work at the White House while I was there, a high degree of enthusiasm and at great personal sacrifice in terms of time with his family and other things. "I know Admiral Poindexter is one of the finest men I have met, a man who has sacrificed a promotion, assignment in the Navy which would have, had he accepted it, gotten him away from the White House at a time when he might well have been the next chief of Naval operations or future chief of Naval operations. He sacrificed those opportunities to do what he thought was a task where he could better serve the President. "I think when you look at a person's record and some things have come out here that would tend to detract from those reputations, but in both cases, I think you have to look at the entire history and experience and background of the individuals, and I can say that I still have high regard for both of them. "Mr. SARBANES. Recognizing the things you have commented about, do you think they leveled with you in full in the course of the factual	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		inquiry which you were conducting? "Attorney General MEESE. This is a difficult question for me to answer for the reasons I stated to the Chairman and others earlier, that I don't have the benefit of much of the testimony that has been given before this committee. I also don't think that it is my place, quite frankly, to sit in judgment upon them." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 248-50. See id., 7/29/87, at 336-37 [Meese on Poindexter's and North's records of service].)	
86/11/25-446 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: RECAP MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. SARBANES. When you met with Admiral Poindexter, I must tell you I find it a puzzlement as to why you never interviewed him, in effect, over the course of your investigation, your inquiry beginning on the 21st of November. "You had an extended discussion with Colonel North, Secretary Shultz, the former National Security Adviser, Mr. McFarlane, but not with Admiral Poindexter. And while you have addressed that matter a number of times in your testimony, it is still a puzzlement to me how you could carry out this inquiry without a proper session with Admiral Poindexter who, after all, was the National Security Adviser, and . . . the significant person in the chain of command. "Attorney General MEESE. Senator, the reason was that we were planning, when we started out this whole matter, to interview Admiral	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: RECAP MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Poindexter. The order of people that we took was primarily to get at those things that I had no knowledge whatsoever about, which were the incidents that took place during 1985. "During 1985, Admiral Poindexter, to the best of our knowledge, had very little to do with that because--with the Iranian initiative, because most of those activities, according to what we had been told, were undertaken by Mr. McFarlane and later on we learned by Colonel North. There is no doubt that had the diversion situation not been discovered, that we would have had an extensive interview with Admiral Poindexter as well. "Mr. SARBANES. Well, why did the discovery of the diversion memo make it even more essential to have such a session with Admiral Poindexter? "Attorney General MEESE. Because we looked at the people who were most knowledgeable. That was Colonel North. We got a complete outline from him as to what had occurred. "The point at which Admiral Poindexter came into that was not in how the whole transaction went forward, but how much he knew, what he knew, and those were the questions that I asked him. "Mr. SARBANES. Now, Colonel North in your interview did not assert that he was doing the diversion on his own, did he? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't believe that he asserted that he was doing it on his own. He told me that Admiral Poindexter knew about it. "Mr. SARBANES. So Admiral Poindexter, who was next in command, above Colonel North, became a key player in that matter, did he not?	

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes. Yes. That's why I talked with him.

"Mr. SABARNES. But only in passing, as I understand it?

"Attorney General MEESE. No. It wasn't in passing. It was for a very specific purpose, to find out what he knew, who[m] he had told, and what his involvement was in this whole matter.

"Mr. SARBANES. That was on Monday?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. SARBANES. You had one meeting with Admiral Poindexter on Monday the 21st [sic (24th)]?

"Attorney General MEESE. Right. [See above at 86/11/24-185 through -188.]

"Mr. SARBANES. And on Tuesday morning, you summoned him to your office in order to tell him he was to resign?

"Attorney General MEESE. I heard from Secretary--from Mr. Regan that it was his feeling that Poindexter would have to resign that day and that he was going to recommend this to the President. I felt, for the reasons I mentioned, I believe, to Mr. Aspin, that just on the basis of the confidence that Admiral Poindexter had in me that I wanted to tell him that because of our conversation of the previous day.

"Mr. SARBANES. When you went to the President to say that you thought this job ought to be done, I take it that's how it originated; is that correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. I--we are now talking about Friday the 21st of November?

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Mr. SARBANES. Yes. "Attorney General MEESE. At that time I told him I felt someone should put together a coherent account of all of the things that had transpired with regard to the Iranian initiative so there would be a factual overview on which we could depend for testimony and for public statements. "Mr. SARBANES. But you went to the President with that idea? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 251-54.)	
86/11/25-447 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: RECAP MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. SARBANES. Did you ever ask the President what he knew about the various matters in the course of carrying out your inquiry? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I did not. At that stage, no. "Mr. SARBANES. Did you at any stage before the press conference on the 25th of November? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I didn't. Well, yes, I talked to him about this and learned that he knew nothing about this diversion, which was the main subject of the press conference on the 25th. "Mr. SARBANES. Now, you said just a few minutes ago that another part of it that you were looking at was the--what occurred in 1985, which, as I understand, was one reason you placed such an importance on McFarlane's testimony rather than Poindexter's, since he was the National Security	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: RECAP MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Adviser at that time. "Attoney General MEESE. Yes. "Mr. SARBANES. I take it that related to the November shipment amongst other things? "Attorney General MEESE. There were two shipments in 1985, one of TOW missiles, 500 missiles, I believe in, I think, August or September; and then the Hawk missiles that were shipped in November of '85. "Mr. SARBANES. Now, did you ask the President about his knowledge on either of those matters? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir, I did not. I'm sure we would have gotten into that later on, but as was already testified today, as soon as we learned about the diversion, that changed entirely the focus of what we were discovering and what would be presnted to the American people. "Mr. SARBANES. Now, you didn't ask Admiral Poindexter about it either? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir. "Mr. SARBANES. Although the testimony here has subsequently revealed that with respect to the November shipment, the President signed a finding and Admiral Poindexter tore it up, which would have been highly relevant information for your inquiry, would it not? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Mr. SARBANES. When you--when did you find out that there had been a shipment to Iran in November of 1985? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe I found it out in November of 1986. "Mr. SARBANES. And when you found it out, did	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		you find out it had been a shipment of arms? "Attorney General MEESE. Well, initially I think the information I got was that it was first known to be a shipment of oil-drilling parts, but that later it was discovered that it was a shipment of arms. "Mr. SARBANES. Now, when you interviewed Mr. McFarlane, he told you it was a shipment of oil-drilling parts; is that right? "Attorney General MEESE. I think by that time, I think he told me that he had been told by Mr. Rabin that it was a shipment of oil-drilling parts." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 254-56.)	
86/11/25-448 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: RECAP MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. SARBANES. You testified yesterday at some length about being told that they were interrupted at the Geneva Summit about this matter, that a phone call was placed to the Prime Minister of a friendly country to intervene for the shipment to go through. Did it stike you as strange that that kind of high-level intervention should have been necessary in order to move a shipment of oil drilling parts? "Attorney General MEESE. Senator, we were told either by Mr. McFarlane or Colonel North, or perhaps both, that Mr.--that the representative of Israel had indicated that this was a very important shipment that had to do with the--with a project in which the United States was interested,	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: RECAP MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

namely the Iranian Initiative or the Iranian relationship that was going on at that time.

"Mr. SARBANES. It did not strike you as strange that you would be intervening with the Prime Minister of a country to move through oil drilling equipment?

"Attorney General MEESE. At that time, I knew that these were arms. Mr. McFarlane indicated he had been told by Mr. Rabin that it was oil drilling equipment. All I know is that he considered it important enough and a significant enough shipment that he felt that it was proper for him to intervene.

"Mr. SARBANES. You did not ask Mr. McFarlane that question?

"Attorney General MEESE. I don't recall asking him that question per se, no.

"Mr. SARBANES. Well, I find it very difficult, because Judge Sofaer, in his deposition--in fact, when he called Cooper in your department about . . . the statement that was to appear in Casey's testimony that no one in the United States Government knew that the November shipment was Hawks, as opposed to oil drilling equipment, and he responded that the claim was impossible in light of what he knew to have been the conversation between the Secretary of State and McFarlane in November of 1985; and then we went on to say, 'Yes, and I also thought it was untenable as a matter of logic that the CIA would not have reacted in the way that Casey's testimony indicated; that is, with a warning that they would not do this again. Generally the whole thing

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

smelled to me like the kind of thing you see in a trial, and I presided over hundereds.'

"This is Judge Sofaer in his disposition. 'In a narcotics case, for example, where they refer to the drugs as shirts or something like that. You always have some kind of purchase that you use to describe what you are selling when you don't want to talk about it directly.

"'Question: And here it was oil drilling equipment?

"'Answer: Right. Oil drilling bits.' [See above at 86/11/20-580.]

"Now did you have the same suspicion?

"Attorney General MEESE. Senator, I don't think I had the same suspicion in the same sense because I knew what was involved there. It was a matter of my finding out what people recalled, what their recollection was. As I was going through this, it was not a matter of cross-examining people at that stage or even trying to resolve conflicting accounts, but trying to find out what people did remember so that we could put these different pieces together. I think that obviously Mr. Sofaer at this stage, as I would with all the information that is now available, might have a very different view.

"Mr. SARBANES. Well, let me ask you a couple of follow-up questions on testimony that was given in the course of the day. At one point when it was--the question was put to you, 'Why, when you met with Director Casey on Saturday night, the 22nd of November, you did not raise with him the diversion that you had found out about mid-day of

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		that day through the discovery of the diversion memo by Mr. Reynolds?' "And you responded, amongst other things, and said, 'Well, the committee would be criticizing me now had I told Casey for tipping him off' [see 86/11/22-653], and that just prompts me to put the question to you: Was one of the reasons for not telling Casey that Saturday night to guard against such a danger? "Attorney General MEESE. No. No. No, Senator. I had no idea at that time of any such danger, so to speak. It was just, as I mentioned earlier, the natural lawyer's instinct, I think, that you don't tell somebody about something, even someone as close friends as Mr. Casey [sic], until you know all the details when you are in the process [o]f finding facts. "Mr. SARBANES. Were you aware of the close relationship apparently between Director Casey and Colonel North? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I was not. Not until I heard testimony here." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 257-60.)	
86/11/25-449 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: RECAP MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 5: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. SARBANES. Now, in response to Senator Mitchell earlier today, I think you indicated the view that the documents that Colonel North destroyed on Sunday night, late Sunday night, early Monday morning, from 11:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m., were irrelevant.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: RECAP MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"Attorney General MEESE. I didn't say they were irrelevant. I said they may have been irrelevant. I have no idea. [See 86/11/23-411.]

"Mr. SARBANES. A reasonable person could certainly proceed on the view that North, having had an interview with you at some length on Sunday afternoon, and then going to his office at 11:00 that night and engaged in extensive shredding until 4:00 in the morning, that pertinent documents might well have been shredded. That is not an unreasonable view to take, would you say?

"Attorney General MEESE. It is not an unreasonable view after the fact, learning those things, although I have--I think one of the things that we did know at that time was that we had been through the documents. Our people had been through the documents. They had, in fact, discovered this particular document that led to the discovery of the diversion.

"Mr. SARBANES. Of course, the diversion was an alarm bell, amongst other things, because the covert operation with respect to Iran was being done pursuant to a Presidential finding, which you had been involved in preparing, as I understand it. In fact, I think the legal analysis came from you for the January 17 finding, is that correct?

"Attorney General MEESE. No. I concurred in the legal analysis that was presented by General Counsel Sporkin.

"Mr. SARBANES. Well, I think General Counsel Sporkin gave us some testimony that indicates he was relying upon you. I mean each of you may have been relying on the other in that instance, but in any event, that finding did not authorize taking the money from the transfer of arms to Iran and using them for the contras. That is very clear, isn't it?

"Attorney General MEESE. That is correct.

"Mr. SARBANES. Is that the basis on which you became alarmed about that situation?

"Attorney General MEESE. I became alarmed on the basis that it was--that when I learned about the diversion of funds, that was certainly a far cry from what the President had authorized on the 7th of January and the finding of the 17th of January, 1986 and a far cry from my--from anything I had ever heard authorized by him.

"Mr. SARBANES. Finally, would you take the view that establishing a covert opration of the sort that North, Secord, and Hakim had set up outside of the channels of accountability is a totally unacceptable way to proceed?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir.

"Mr. SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 260-62.)

86/11/25-450
NOVEMBER 25,
1986
(TUESDAY)

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE
SINGLAUB ACCOUNT:

Singlaub on the Attorney General's announcement:

". . . I only wish I had known beforehand of our intent to deal in arms with the Iranian government. Unfortunately, I, like most other Americans, knew nothing -- either directly or indirectly -- about the Iranian arms deal until it was announced to the public by Attorney General

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Edwin Meese." (Singlaub Testim., JHICI, 5/20/87, at 187; see id., 5/21/87, at 187, 236.)
86/11/25-460 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	LEDEEN-NORTH CONTACT LEDEEN ACCOUNT: "Q. When did you next_speak with Colonel North after November 21? "A. I believe the next time was the afternoon after the Attorney General's press conference. "Q. Did you watch some of the press conference on television? "A. Yes. "Q. And did you call Colonel North shortly after the press conference? "A. Yes. ". . . . "Q. What did you say to him? "A. I told him sorry, and if there was anything I could do to help, I'd be happy td do it. And he said that he had gone, he had resigned the day before, that he had met at ten in the morning with the Attorney General, the President, with Poindexter, and I think with Don Regan, and they had gone over the problem, and they had asked Ollie what he thought ought to be done. "And he had given them a list of his priorities in which he said he thought the important things were the country, the President, the Democratic resistance, the hostages--I don't remember the order, but they were things of that nature.		

"And that he was way down near the bottom of that list, and he would do whatever was necessary. And that he then went back to his office, and the next thing he knew, someone called him to urge him to turn on the television set because the President had just announced that Ollie had been fired.

"Q. Was he surprised that he had been fired?

"A. I don't think he was so much surprised that he had been fired as he was surprised that he had not been informed of his having been fired before the public announcement.

"Q. And was he disappointed about that?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Did you ask him about the alleged diversion of funds to the contras which Attorney General Meese had discussed in the press conference?

"A. No.

"Q. Why not?

"A. My call was--I was making a condolence call. I wasn't making an investigative journalist call. It seemed to--it would have been in bad taste, I thought.

"Q. Did Colonel North say anything else about the meeting he had had at ten o'clock with the President, and the other people you described?

"A. No."

(Ledeen, Senate Dep., 6/19/87, at 24-26. See id. at 36 [North's 11/25/86 morning meeting with the President, Poindexter, Regan, and Meese]. See also id., 6/22/87, at 289-91 [Ledeen's conversation with North after the Attorney

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	General's press conference].)		
86/11/25-465 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND COY'S CONVERSATION WITH NORTH COY ACCOUNT: "Q. When is it that you first heard that there may have been a diversion of the purchase price of the Iranian funds to the contras? "A. The day Meese stood up at the press conference. "Q. You had not heard about it, not even heard about it prior to that time? "A. No. "Q. . . . [W]here were you when the press conference was taking place? "A. I was in my office upstairs[.] ". . . . "Q. After you learned on the press conference, did you have a conversation with North? "A. Yes. "Q. Where was North? "A. In his office. "Q. Was he alone? "A. I don't think so. But I can't tell you who was in there with him. I focused on North. "Q. Did you have a conversation with him? "A. Yes. "Q. What did you say to him? "A. As soon as Meese said that there was some diversion of money, it hit me as a shock. I went downstairs and asked Ollie what that was all about. Was there any -- and he didn't respond.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND COY'S CONVERSATION WITH NORTH COY ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

"He just sat there.

"Q. He didn't respond verbally?

"A. Didn't respond verbally, and he didn't -- nod, nod his head yes or shake his head no[.] He just sat there, sort of gave a shrug as if to say I am not going to tell you anything, or can't tell you anything, that was it.

"Q. Did you turn and walk out?

"A. Yes. I wanted to hear what else was going to come on I didn't know about.

"Q. Had you heard by that time he had been fired? I can't remember when that appears in the press conference.

"A. I think the press conference was on Tuesday.

"Q. It was, Tuesday the 25th.

"A. On Monday I recall some conversation that -- I will screw the days up, Poindexter sent a PROF note to everybody indicating he was leaving, quitting. I don't know if that was a Monday or Tuesday. I can't recall. Then there was conversation. Ollie said he was going to resign as well. Then it was announced at the press conference, I think."

(Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 78-80. See Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 18-19 [Coy's contact with North after the Attorney General's press conference]. See generally Coy, House Dep., 3/17/87, at 113-27; Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 11-20 [Coy on events between 11/21 and 11/25/86].)

86/11/25-470 AFTER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNOUNCEMENT:
NOVEMBER 25 CONTACT FROM NORTH, AND ON 12/3/86,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
AND DECEMBER 3, 1986	FROM THE PRESIDENT POINDEXTER DEPOSITION ACCOUNT: "Q. Did North call you after the Attorney General announced that he had been fired? "A. I think he probably did. I don't have a good recollection of -- well, I do remember one thing that was said, and I can't remember -- it was sometime on the 25th he called and indicated that Dick Secord wanted to call me or would be calling me or something like that, but I don't recall any comment from him at the time in the vein of objecting to what the Attorney General had said. "Q. Did he tell you that the President had called him? "A. No, I don't believe so. My recollection is that his call to me was earlier in the day, possibly right after the press conference. "Q. Did the President call you after the press conference? "A. No, he did not. The last time I spoke to the President was in that 9:30 meeting. "Q. Has he written to you? "A. Well, yes, he has. He wrote me a letter on -- was it dated December 3 -- "MR. BECKLER: Somewhere around that, the actual last day. "THE WITNESS: I think it's in the boxes of documents that are over in the law firm. Did you see it? "MR. LEON: I recall seeing it. "MR. EGGLESTON: I think it is December 3. "MR. BECKLER: It's not substantive.		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"THE WITNESS: You know, it's a departure letter, what we call a departure letter." (Poindexter, Senate Dep., 6/17/87, at 244-45.)		
86/11/25-480 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH HALL ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH HALL ACCOUNT: At some point in the afternoon, after the Meese press conference, North goes to a hotel and leaves Fawn Hall the number at which to reach him. "Mr. BELNICK. Sometime in the afternoon did you receive a telephone call from the White House operator? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Would you tell us about that call? "Ms. HALL. Sometime late afternoon, the phone rang, I answered it, it was the White House operator saying the President would like to speak with Colonel North. I asked her if she would hold a moment. I placed a call to the hotel and told him the President would like to speak with him and I was going to go ahead and give the operator the number and have her call. He said yes, and I did so. "Mr. BELNICK. Did you subsequently learn from Colonel North whether he had spoken to the President? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. And what did Colonel North tell you about his phone call with the President? "Ms. HALL. He said the President called him an American hero and that he just didn't know. "Mr. BELNICK. The President said that he, the	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH HALL ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		President, just didn't know? "Ms. HALL. That's what I recall Colonel North saying. "Mr. BELNICK. Did Colonel North explain what he understood that reference to mean? "Ms. HALL. No, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. You didn't ask about it? "Ms. HALL. No, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. In the afternoon of November 25, the same day as the Attorney General's press conference, do you recall that Colonel North's office was sealed by the NSC staff? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir." (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 296-97.)	
86/11/25-510 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH:- PRESIDENT'S UNAWARENESS OF THE DIVERSION NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH: PRESIDENT'S UNAWARENESS OF THE DIVERSION NORTH ACCOUNT: North hears directly from the President that he was unaware of the diversion: "And on November 25, the day I was reassigned back to the United States Marine Corps for service, the President of the United States called me. In the course of that call, the President said to me, words to the effect that, 'I just didn't know.'" (North Testim., JHICI, 7/7/87, at 25.)	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH: PRESIDENT'S UNAWARENESS OF THE DIVERSION NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
86/11/25-520 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	NORTH'S DISMISSAL AND THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	NORTH'S DISMISSAL AND THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NORTH. I had assumed from the day I took my post at the National Security Council that	NORTH'S DISMISSAL AND THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

those things which required the approval of the President, and I sent forward memoranda soliciting that approval and I got the authority to proceed on various initiatives, had indeed received the approval of the President. I've testified to that.

"Mr. LIMAN. And it wasn't until Admiral Poindexter answered your question that that assumption was shaken?

"Mr. NORTH. It wasn't shaken. He simply denied that the President knew.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you ask him, 'Admiral Poindexter, why did you not discuss this with the President'?

"Mr. NORTH. No.

"Mr. LIMAN. Why not?

"Mr. NORTH. First of all, I am not in the habit of questioning my superiors. If he deemed it not to be necessary to ask the President, I saluted smartly and charged up the hill. That's what lieutenant colonels are supposed to do. I have no problem with that.

"I don't believe that what we did even under those circumstances is wrong or illegal. I told you I thought it was a good idea to begin with. I still think it was a good idea, Counsel.

"Mr. LIMAN. And have you wondered why, if it was a good idea, that the President of the United States dismissed you becuase of it?

"Mr. NORTH. Let me just make one thing very clear, Counsel. This lieutenant colonel is not going to challenge a decision of the Commander in Chief for whom I still work, and I am proud to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		work for that Commander in Chief, and if the Commander in Chief tells this lieutenant colonel to go stand in the corner and sit on his head, I will do so. And if the Commander in Chief decides to dismiss me from the NSC staff, this lieutenant colonel will proudly salute and say[,] '[T]hank you for the opportunity to have served,' and go, and I am not going to criticize his decision no matter how he relieves me, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. Has anyone given you an explanation, Colonel North, on behalf of the President, of why he did not think it was a good idea and dismissed you? "Mr. NORTH. The President of the United States saw fit to call me later the same day and in the course of that call, which was also intensely personal, he told me words to the effect 'I just didn't know.' "I have no reason to disbelieve what the Commander in Chief told me, sir. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you say to him, 'I received approval from Admiral Poindexter and Director Casey'? "Mr. NORTH. I did not say those words to the Commander in Chief. I simply expressed my thanks for having been able to serve him for five and a half years and my regrets that my service had brought forth a political fire storm and difficulties when all I sought to do was to help, and that what I may have done was to hurt him." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 153-55.)	
86/11/25-526	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: ITS STATUS	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: ITS STATUS	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: ITS STATUS

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	AT POINDEXTER'S AND NORTH'S DEPARTURES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. RUDMAN. . . . I want to ask you what is probably the single-most important question that we can ask you, which is one that none of us understand[s], and if you could explain it to us, we would be very grateful. "By the morning that it was decided that Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter would be relieved of their posts, although you had major portions of the story, to your credit, there were many things that you didn't have. You didn't know how much money was involved from the people who were involved with it. You didn't know who the agents were. You didn't know who else in government knew. I could go on. "One thing came through loud and clear from both Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North: No matter what else you might want to say about their testimony, it was clear, at least to me, that they were very loyal to this President and they were very loyal institutionally to the office of Commander in Chief and the President, and what we have a hard time in understanding is, I understand the pressure, but we are talking about maybe one o[r] two more days; how is it that the President, through [h]is Attorney General, or the President directly on your recommendation did not get these two people into an office at the White House before they left, before there had been a prosecutor, before you even thought it was a criminal matter, and asked to write a report on who did what to whom and when and how it was paid	AT POINDEXTER'S AND NORTH'S DEPARTURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	AT POINDEXTER'S AND NORTH'S DEPARTURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	for? Why didn't you get the whole story that would have foreshortened our job by a matter of months? There might have been facts disclosed at that time that we still don't know. "Attorney General MEESE. First, we did know how much money was involved. Colonel North had told us that he thought that there was--there had been in this one particular situation about $12 million involved, and he felt that that had happened two or three times. That was the basis for my statement during the news conference, that it was somewhere between $10- and $30 million that was involved. So we did have the word from Colonel North already at that time as to how much money was involved. "Secondly, as to who the agents were, Colonel North in his description of what he had told us, and we had no reason to think he would change that on further questioning, indicated how this had happened, I related that yesterday, and indicated that he was the one who had worked with the democratic resistance forces in setting up of the bank accounts and who was doing the different actions. "And, thirdly, he had already told us, as had Admiral Poindexter, who in the government knew, so we knew exactly what their story was on those points. "I think those are all reasons why we knew a great deal at that time. But to go on, at that point there was no doubt in my mind that it was in fact a criminal investigation that would be needed to ensue, and therefore we did bring the criminal		

division or the criminal attorneys and the FBI into it immediately, and they would have been the ones to question both Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North. And by the time they were prepared to do that, of course, they had gotten attorneys.

"Mr. RUDMAN. That may be, Mr. Attorney General, but I would submit to you, having great respect for the criminal justice system, that under these extraordinary circumstances that two members of the Armed Forces, a rear admiral and a lieutenant colonel, both with distinguished military careers, with all that you have said being so, would have been able to tell Mr. Commander in Chief anything he asked them, and I'm just surprised that someone didn't put them into that situation and thus avoid the country much of the agony.

"For instance, had we had a statement from Admiral Poindexter in writing signed and witnessed as to what he told this committee dated the 25th day of November, I dare say that we wouldn't have any lights in here at all.

"Attorney General MEESE. The interesting thing, Senator, is that what he told this committee when he was here was exactly what he had told me in terms of the President's knowledge or anyone else in the White House.

"Mr. RUDMAN. But, of course, by the time he left the White House, that statement was unavailble to this committee.

"Attorney General MEESE. No.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Oh, yes."

(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 33-37.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/25-527 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: ITS STATUS AT POINDEXTER'S AND NORTH'S DEPARTURES MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Attorney General MEESE. I am saying he [sc. Poindexter] told me exactly what he told the committee. So suppose he had said to anyone else two days later what he told me on Monday, the 24th, how would that have made any difference? "Mr. RUDMAN. I think a great difference would have been if we had had from Admiral Poindexter before he left the White House, and Colonel North, a written description of what they did. I think there was an obligation to do that to the President. "Attorney General MEESE. Senator, let me also say the President could not have had them to do that without reading them their rights under section, I believe, 31 or 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. A whole different set of circumstances had come into play by that time than what we had when I talked with Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter on the 23rd and 24th. "People can make the statement, 'I should have read him his Miranda rights.' Obviously, there was no reason to read them at that time. By the 25th, there certainly was reason to read him his Article 32 or Article 31 rights--as the case may be--under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. "Mr. RUDMAN. I think, all things being equal, taking Colonel North's testimony that he would 'literally stand on his head' if he had been	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: ITS STATUS AT POINDEXTER'S AND NORTH'S DEPARTURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: ITS STATUS AT POINDEXTER'S AND NORTH'S DEPARTURES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

ordered by the Commander In Chief, it would have been time to have history made and read them their Article 31 or 32 rights. I think this matter was so important that the President of the United States was entitled to all of the facts from his two subordinates before they left the White House, [c]riminal charges notwithstanding. That is my view.

"Attorney General MEESE. My view, Senator, is that we had all of that information before they left the White House and that not one thing that has been said since that time by Admiral Poindexter, and only in the case of Mr. Casey has it varied from what we were told on that Sunday and Monday. [Sic.]

"Mr. RUDMAN. Well, you would agree, I expect, with Secretary of State Shultz who said that at the time that all of this was happening, the people that were advising the President--he was not speaking of the Attorney General, he was speaking of the people at the NSC--had kind of a built-in conflict of interest, that they were hoping the great communicator would bail them out. You would agree the President was not well served by his people when he was trying to make a forthright statement to the American people, not only wasn't the President dealt with very accurately, but you were not dealt with, it seems to me, in an open and direct way. Would you agree with that?

"Attorney General MEESE. I think there were instances where that occurred, yes."
(Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 37-39. See

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	86/11/25-550 [Regan on questions remaining unanswered at the time of North's and Poindexter's departures from the NSC].)		
86/11/25-530 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH SECORD ACCOUNT: After AG Meese announces his findings publicly, Secord receives two calls from North's office telling him that Poindexter and North are resigning. Later that day, Secord goes to a hotel near his office to avoid the press. North arrives. The phone rings twice. The first call is from the Vice President, and Secord's understanding of that call is that it is "essentially [a] laudatory call, sad. Very short call." The second call is also for North. "I [sc. Secord] didn't realize it was the President for a few seconds until I saw him stand up at attention. He is a good Marine, you know." North says two yeses, Mr. President, one thank you, and one "I am just sorry it had to end this way" while Secord tries to take the phone to talk with the President. But Secord isn't fast enough; North hangs up. (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/6/87, at 135, 176.) NORTH-SECORD SECOND MEETING SECORD ACCOUNT: In his JHICI testimony 3 days later, Secord described a second meeting on November 26, 1986 at the Embassy Suite Hotel at Tyson's Corner: "Mr. BOLAND. What was the date? "Mr. SECORD. November 26.		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Mr. BOLAND. November 25th? "Mr. SECORD. 26th. "Mr. BOLAND. 26th? "Mr. SECORD. Yes, sir. ". . . . "Mr. BOLAND. Was Tom Green present? "Mr. SECORD. Yes. "Mr. BOLAND. Was [Brendan] Sullivan present? "Mr. SECORD. Yes, as I have already testified. ". . . . "Mr. SECORD. This is November 26. "Mr. BOLAND. 1986, yes. I am talking about 1986." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/8/87, at 189-91.)		
86/11/25-536 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH EARL ACCOUNT: "MR. LIMAN: Do you definitely remember the conversation that you have placed on the landing of the stairs? "THE WITNESS: Do I definitely recall it? "MR. LIMAN: Yes. You do recall it. Did you invent it? "THE WITNESS: No. I recall that conversation. In our previous discussion of certain things you tend to remember because of the gravity of them or whatever. That one is in that category. I recall that. " . . . . "THE WITNESS: My recollection is being at the top of the spiral staircase in our office after Colonel North had either resigned or been fired,	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

depending on which version was real, and after the President's phone call to Colonel North, that he, Colonel North, was at the top of the stairs and turned to me, and I think Craig Coy was beside me on the right, and confided that one of the things the President had said in the phone call was that he, the President, recognized or that it was important that he, the President, not know -- words to that effect. I don't have the exact quote.

"MR. LIMAN: But that was the substance?

"THE WITNESS: That was the substance, yes.

"BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming)

"Q. And you understood that the thing he couldn't know was what we've called diversion?

"A. That's the way I've interpreted it.

"MR. LEON: But it was he could not know, not he did not know -- that he can't know. It was he could not know?

"MR. KIRK: Or not know.

"MR. LEON: You see, that's where I get confused, and there seems to me to be quite a bit of distinction between I did not know, I could not know, and I can't know.

"MR. LIMAN: You have testified before the grand jury on this one.

"MR. BELNICK: And on this record also.

"MR. LIMAN: Yes, and on this record. You've been through this any number of times.

"THE WITNESS: And it's could not know, as opposed to didn't know -- could not know or can't know as opposed to didn't know. Didn't know is something different."

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		(Earl, Senate Dep., 5/22/87, at 144-48.)	
86/11/25-537 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH EARL ACCOUNT: Earl testified he never asked North what the President knew about the diversion: "Q. Did you ever ask Oliver North point blank whether the President knew about what we call the diversion? "A. No, sir. "Q. And is the only reference that Oliver North knew, that Oliver North made with respect to that concerning the President the one that occurred on the staircase or the stairwell? "A. I think so. I think that is the only reference to it. It's the only one that I can recall right now, and I don't think there was anything else. I don't want to foreclose absolutely the possibility that there was some cryptic reference, but I can't recall anything." (Earl, Senate Dep., 5/30/87, at 66-67.)	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
86/11/25-540 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH NORTH RESPONDING TO EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH NORTH RESPONDING TO EARL ACCOUNT: After his phone call with the President, North returns to his office and speaks with Robert Earl: "Mr. NIELDS. . . . Did you say to him [Earl] in words or substance that the President had said to you, 'It is important that I not know?' "Mr. NORTH. Counsel, I don't recall the conversation that way. I am sure that what I said was basically what I told you yesterday, and that is that the President had told me, 'I just didn't	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH NORTH RESPONDING TO EARL ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		know,' and it may be that the President said it is important that I, Lieutenant Colonel North, understand that he did not know. But I wouldn't have characterized it the way you have just indicated, I don't believe." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 2.)	
86/11/25-544 AROUND NOVEMBER 25, 1986	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH COY ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH COY ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Q. Now I want to take you to the day when you participate in a conversation on the second floor landing at suit 302 with Colonel North and Colonel Earl. Do you have in mind the conversation I'm talking about? "A. I know what you're talking about. "Q. Now do you remember what day that conversation took place, whether it was on the same day as the Attorney General's press conference or the next day? "A. I frankly don't recall exactly, but the more I think about it in trying to put these things into some sequence I would have to put my money on Wednesday, that it was on a Wednesday. But others have suggested it was on Tuesday. "Q. You're not 100 percent sure? "A. I'm not 100 percent sure, but my guess is, if I had to put money on it, I'd put it on Wednesday. "Q. In any event, it came after -- "MR. MC GRATH: You might want to explain why you think it's Wednesday. "THE WITNESS: Well, the reason I think it's Wednesday is because I think the point in the	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH COY ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		conversation that you're interested in is reference to the President. "BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) "Q. Correct. "A. And when I've been asked about this before I frankly didn't have any -- that's not the part of the conversation that I remember. But through questioning I'm trying to come up with how I recall the conversation, is [sic] essentially the President calling Ollie. It was a confirmation of the President calling Ollie, saying that he was sorry that he had to let him go. And prior to hearing about Secord's testimony I was under the assumption that the President had called him at home. I didn't think that he had called him in the office. I was pretty sure I would have heard about that. "And I have some recollection of a newspaper article that said the President had called Ollie. So if he had called him on Tuesday, it couldn't have been a newspaper article, so I'm assuming it was on Wednesday. "Q. Okay, fine. Assuming it was on Wednesday, tell us what you recall about the conversation -- and this is a conversation involving you, Colonel Earl and Colonel North? "A. Well, it was in the evening and Ollie had come in and had walked upstairs and was going to say goodbye and see you later. I had heard him come in and he was over talking to Bob and then I think he came over to my side, but he may not have. I could have walked out into the open area there.	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"And Ollie said he was sorry it had to end this way and didn't mean for it to end this way, didn't think it would end this way. "Q. Ollie said that he, Ollie, was sorry? "A. Yeah, and I remember him kind of banging his hand on the bannister and thinking it was too bad all this had to happen. And then there was some mention of the President's phone call, that he had in fact called and said he was sorry that he had to let Ollie go, but he had to -- something along those lines. "But that's about it. "Q. I believe you told me when you spoke prior to today, Craig, that you joined that conversation with North and Earl after it had been in progress. "A. Yeah, I think that's true. "Q. But so far as you know the President's phone call to Ollie was a subject that came up while you were there. That's the impression anyway, as I understand. "A. I suppose to. [Sic.] "Q. You have no way of knowing? "A. No." (Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 21-23.)	
86/11/25-545 AROUND NOVEMBER 25, 1986	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH COY ACCOUNT: See col. 2.	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH COY ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Q. Now do you have any recollection of hearing Oliver North say, in words or in substance, that the President had also said to him -- that is, North -- during that telephone	THE PRESIDENT'S CALL TO NORTH COY ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

conversation that there were certain things that he, the President, couldn't know or shouldn't know?

"A. No, I don't recall that.

"Q. Nothing like that at all?

"A. No. That sounds too much like a Watergate-James Bond kind of thing. I think I would have recalled something like that and it just didn't strike me as anything like that in the conversation, and it doesn't match anything that I heard or happened subsequent to that. When I was first asked to go up and testify to the Senate Intelligence Committee, I mean, all the words we got were tell them everything you know.

"So that's why I've been here willing to do that and anxious to do that.

"Q. Have you been told that Colonel Earl has a distinct recollection that North said about the President's call that the President had said to him, in words or in substance, that there are certain things that I as President can't know or that they tell me there are certain things that I can't know? Has anyone told you that Colonel Earl distinctly recalls North saying that about the call?

"A. No.

"Q. I've just told you. Does that affect your recollection in any way?

"A. Not really.

"Q. By the way, when is the first time that you recall, Craig, that North had talked about a phone call from the President during that landing conversation?

"A. When I was over talking to the Independent Counsel they asked about the same conversation and they asked me to recall the conversation, and my recollection initially was just of Ollie saying goodbye and banging his hand. They asked specifically about the President and that conjured up some memory of that conversation, but that's it.

"And I've scoured my brain, you know, trying. It feels like a toothpick or with a grinder, you know, trying to find the little brain cell in there that may have heard something like that, but I can't find it. It's just not there.

"Q. But prior to the time -- and I take it that's within the last month or so -- that the Independent Counsel said to you wasn't there a reference to the President and a Presidential call to North in that landing conversation you hadn't recalled that there was any reference to the President?

"A. That was not the event in the conversation that springs to mind. I hadn't even thought about it, to tell you the truth. It was not something that when you ask me to describe something that I would throw in as something to describe the event.

"Q. Do you know whether it was typical for North to have conversations with the President?

"A. Typical?

"Q. Yes. Did North talk about conversations with the President, regularly?

"A. No. He said he met with him and talked with him on occasion, but it was not a typical,

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		everyday occurrence. "Q. Was it unusual for North to talk to the President, so far as you know? "A. Yeah, I think so." (Coy, Senate Dep., 6/1/87, at 23-26. See id., at 58-61 [the conversation on the landing].)	
86/11/25-550 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	THE WHITE HOUSE INVESTIGATION: ITS STATUS AT POINDEXTER'S AND NORTH'S DEPARTURES REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOKS. Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North were moved so quickly that there wasn't any time to get additional information from them about their knowledge of that Iran arms sale and diversion to the contras, aside from the rather hurried inquiry--superficial inquiry, in my opinion--that the Attorney General had undertaken over the previous weekend. "My question is on Monday and Tuesday, was there any discussion among high-level officials about getting additional information from these two key officials? Did they talk about talking to them? Getting a statement before they left the White House? And wouldn't a good, clean statement by them as to the fact situation have eliminated several months of this hearing and these problems? "Mr. REGAN. In hindsight, that might have been appropriate. But you have to remember that at that time, our interest was in making this information public to Congress, to the American people. We didn't have that much time to sit down to go through an interrogation of suspects. "As you know, even the Tower Commission with	THE WHITE HOUSE INVESTIGATION: ITS STATUS AT POINDEXTER'S AND NORTH'S DEPARTURES REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	THE WHITE HOUSE INVESTIGATION: ITS STATUS AT POINDEXTER'S AND NORTH'S DEPARTURES REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	90 days of work didn't come up with all of the facts that this committee has been able to assemble. "I have heard more that one member of this committee give an opinion that we may never know the whole story anyway. It is very difficult to do that. "I am not copping a plea here. I am only explaining. You have two choices here: Do it fast or take your time, get all the information and then come up with it. "We chose the thing of let's get as much information out as we have. Remember that the President had told the Attorney General, conduct a criminal investigation. "The Tower Commission--I talked to John Tower on the afternoon of the 25th, to Ed Muskie and to Brent Scowcroft. They all agree[d] right away and we announced the Tower Commission on the 26th. "We were able to get out that very quickly as the three-man committee promised to go to work right away. "We felt confident that the story would be there and regardless of whether the President personally cross-examined Poindexter or not, well, very frankly, that was one of those things that in the--at the moment it seemed better to do it the way we did it rather than another way." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 157-59. See 86/11/25-526, -527 [Meese on questions unanswered at the time of North's and Poindexter's departures from the NSC].)		

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/25-560 JULY 1987 HEARING TESTIMONY		CONFLICTS BETWEEN NORTH'S AND POINDEXTER'S TESTIMONY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. MITCHELL. . . . Now, one of the purposes of this committee is to try to determine what happened and to lay the facts before the American people. A difficult part of that will be to reconcile, if possible, the many conflicts in the testimony we have heard. "You and Colonel North have been the two most knowledgeable witnesses, because you were at the center of these events. Perhaps inevitably, the record is filled with conflicts in your testimony with that of Colonel North. "I would like to mention just a few of those that I deem important and then I want to ask you, first, whether or not I have accurately summarized your aspect of the testimony and then I want to ask you about the resolution of those. "Most significantly, in my view, is that Colonel North testified that he prepared and sent to you five memos which included references to the diversion of funds to the contras from the Iran arms sale, each of which specifically asked you to brief the President and obtain his approval. [See 86/00/04-100.] "You have said that you cannot recall seeing those memos except possibly the one that survived [see 86/04/04-130, -140, -702; 86/04/04-115], indeed just a short while ago, in response to a question by Mr. Rodino, you said you didn't think the other four memos ever existed [see	CONFLICTS BETWEEN NORTH'S AND POINDEXTER'S TESTIMONY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

86/00/03-505].

"Excuse me?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Senator, I listened to Colonel North's testimony quite carefully. Because, for one thing, I knew that he would be aware of details that I was not; and so to help fill in the full picture, I thought that that was important.

"I don't recall him testifying positively that there were indeed five. That conclusion was jumped at by several members of the committee, but I don't think you will find in there any very positive statement.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Really, there was, Admiral. In fact, in his testimony under oath, he said five or six. [See 86/00/04-100, -200; 86/09/15-510.]

"Mr. BECKLER. I think if I may, Senator, comment as well?

"From the record, there is a certain amount of ambiguity if you really looked at it as to the exact number that were mention[ed].

"I am not sure if it was that clear. I think that is all the admiral is saying. We are not really here to dispute that point.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Okay. Thank you.

"My time is running and I wanted to get through a couple of areas.

"Colonel North testified that on November 21st, he assured you that he had gotten rid of all of the memos, referring to the diversion [see 86/11/21-500, -510, -512], whatever the number, and you say that you cannot recall any such conversation [see 86/00/04-503; 86/11/21-515].

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"You testified at your deposition that you instructed Colonel North not to put anything in writing concerning the diversion. [See 86/00/04-131, -502, -503; 86/11/21-515. But see 86/00/04-130, -503; 86/11/21-515.] Colonel North denied that you gave him any such instruction [see 86/00/04-500; see also 86/04/07-301], and he further testified that had he received such an instruction for you, he would not have prepared and sent several separate memos--I have five in my mind, but whatever number--for briefing the President on obtaining his approval [see 86/00/04-500, -501]. "Colonel North testified that you were aware that the chronologies prepared in November 1986 were false. [See 86/11/18-400; 86/11/20-160.] You have said that you were unaware of any deliberate falsification. [See 86/11/18-160, -162, -163, -164. But see 86/11/18-170.]" (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 196-99.)	
86/11/25-561 JULY 1987 HEARING TESTIMONY		CONFLICTS BETWEEN NORTH'S AND POINDEXTER'S TESTIMONY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Sen. Mitchell's summary continues from preceding entry:] "[Mr. MITCHELL.] Colonel North testified that at the meeting on November 20th, to prepare testimony for Mr. Casey to give to Congress, that you knew as well as he did that the testimony was wrong. [See 86/11/20-520. For Poindexter, compare 86/11/18-161; 86/11/20-537, -538, -540.] "Colonel North testified that his PROF note to	CONFLICTS BETWEEN NORTH'S AND POINDEXTER'S TESTIMONY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

McFarlane in which he spoke of your request to him to prepare a memo for the President referred to the one surviving memo which mentions the diversion. [See 86/04/07-301.] You said that it didn't. [See 86/04/07-308. Compare 86/04/07-310.]

"Colonel North testified that he told you no later than November 21st that he had destroyed documents. [See 86/11/21-500, -510.] You have said that he didn't. [See 86/11/21-515. See also 86/11/21-450.]

"Colonel North testified that he discussed with Mr. Casey, Mr. McFarlane, and with you what Mr. Casey originally called and what Mr. North testified as the fall guy plan. [See 84/03/21-100; 84/10/03-800; 86/11/21-420, -780; 86/11/25-120,-135.] You denied any such discussion. [See 86/11/21-795; 86/11/25-130, -407.]

"Colonel North testified that on November 21st, he asked you whether you had told the President of the diversion and you said you had not. [See 86/11/21-115, -120, -512.] You cannot recall any such conversation. [See 86/11/21-117.]

"Now, obviously, human memory is such that different people can and frequently do recall the same events differently, particularly with respect to minor details. But as the number and importance of conflict in testimony increase, so also does the likelihood that someone is not telling the truth.

"Now, before I ask a question about these conflicts, if I have misstated your testimony in

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		any way in this summary, it was inadvertent and I want to give you the opportunity to correct it before I ask a question about it. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think you have misstated my position in several aspects." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 196-99.)	
86/11/25-562 JULY 1987 HEARING TESTIMONY		CONFLICTS BETWEEN NORTH'S AND POINDEXTER'S TESTIMONY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. MITCHELL. In which respect? Why don't you state what would be the correct reference. I have the transcript reference here, but why don't you go ahead and state in what respects you feel I have [misstated testimony]. "Mr. POINDEXTER. Senator, I think this tactic of quoting what Colonel North said and quoting what I have said without--and they are not direct quotes, they are your interpretations of what I said[--]is a highly unfair way to do it. "As you pointed out, people have different recollections. I have told you things that I can't recall. I am not saying that Colonel North didn't tell me those things on the 21st. I simply don't recall it. "Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that is what I said. "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think that necessarily is a conflict, just because I can't remember it. "I don't think I said that the April memo was not prepared as a result--or it wasn't the memo that Colonel North referred to in the one PROFS	CONFLICTS BETWEEN NORTH'S AND POINDEXTER'S TESTIMONY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

note. It may very well have been. I just don't simply recall seeing it. And it wasn't fair even to describe that memo as requesting the President to approve the transfer of funds. That is in a different section of the memo.

"The memo was asking for me to get the President's approval on the first part of the memo, that part about the transfer of funds is in a background section. [For text of memo, see 86/04/04-010, -011.]

"It is pretty clear to me that when Colonel North wrote that he understood that was approved, and it was a reminder to me that that amount of money in his view would be available to be transferred to fulfill the objective that I had approved back in February of 1986.

"Mr. MITCHELL. May I read you what you I [sic] on that PROF note, Admiral?

"Maybe perhaps it is that I read so many that some of them are running together, but what I said on that was Colonel North testified that his PROF note to McFarlane in which he spoke of your request to him to prepare a memo for the President referred to the one surviving memo which mentions the diversion. [See 86/04/07-301.]

"Mr. POINDEXTER. But then what did you say I said?

"Mr. MITCHELL. You said it didn't.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I didn't say that. [Compare 86/04/07-308 with 86/04/07-310.]

"Mr. MITCHELL. You didn't say that?

"Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, this is the exact problem I was referring to. This is our eighth

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		day up here. We have nine coming up tomorrow. We had probably 600 pages of transcipt and testimony. Senator Mitchell is going to point out inconsistencies. I concede--I hope there are inconsistencies. There should be inconsistencies. That is what happens when there is no plan, when there is no-plan to conceal, no plan to coordinate testimony. "There are inconsistencies. I wager for every inconsistency Senator Mitchell could show we can get these transcipts here and show 25 consistencies for every one inconsistency. "I say this is an unfair proceeding to go on and on with these inconsistencies over and over. Let's have facts elicited and questions and answers given, please. "Chairman HAMILTON. Counsel, all of the points that you have just made are points appropriately made by the witness, not by the counsel. "Mr. BECKLER. Mr. Chairman, I have--I have heard that said, that these are facts and questions and statements that can be made by the witness. That is true. But I want to say for this Congress to hear, this witness has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He has an independent counsel investigation underway for criminal activity where he is the primary target of an investigation. I said at the beginning, I have said it throughout these hearings, and I will say it again, and I will say it over and over and over, that I have a right to protect my client. Period.	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Counsel, I don't think you have ever heard a word from this chairman-- "Mr. BECKLER. I have not, sir. "Chairman HAMILTON. --or from any member of this committee which denies you that right. And you will not. "Mr. BECKLER. Thank you, sir. I am not saying what the chairman is saying. I am pointing out I have no complaint with the chairman. I am just pointing out out [sic] this line of questioning. I want to make that clear, Mr. Chairman. "Chairman HAMILTON. Your objection is noted. "Senator Mitchell?" (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 200-04.)	
86/11/25-563 JULY 1987 HEARING TESTIMONY		CONFLICTS BETWEEN NORTH'S AND POINDEXTER'S TESTIMONY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 4: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. MITCHELL. I will proceed to one final question. "I tried to summarize the testimony accurately. I have direct references to transcripts and documents with respect to each. I recognize there may be differences of opinion. I tried to do it in a fair manner. "If you felt it was not fair, I apologize for that. I don't want to be unfair to you or any other witness. "Let me ask you to concentrate on what is for me the most troubling, apparent conflict, I will	CONFLICTS BETWEEN NORTH'S AND POINDEXTER'S TESTIMONY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

say. That is with respect to these memoranda.

"You have said that this was an important decision. Your counsel used the phrase 'politically explosive' in describing it. You adopted that phrase subsequent to his using it.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. He used that because that is the way I have earlier described it.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, right.

"And I agree with Mr. Beckler that any two witnesses describing events over a long period of time, there will be many conflicts. I said that earlier.

"The question we must judge--and this is something we have to do in the course of our proceeding--is to determine, and all persons involved in proceedings which require an evaluation of testimony have to try to judge at what point does the normal expected number of conflicts in testimony reach the level both in number of conflicts and significance that they indicate something else.

"That is really what I was trying to get at. The one that troubles me most is the memoranda. It seems to me this is a very significant thing. You have accurately said, and no one disputes it, that the memoranda did not deal exclusively with the diversion, it was--the one surviving is a five-page memorand[um] in which the diversion is only one paragraph.

"The significance of it, however, was clear to the Attorney General's personnel when they went over and looked at it. The significance has been clear to you.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"You used language to describe it as significant. It is difficult, at least for me--and I speak for no one else--to reconcile that Colonel North's testimony was that he prepared five of these, one for each transaction. "He was quite certain in that, that there were five proposed transactions, some of which did not go through, and he sent them forward for approval, and that you can't recall even seeing them. "Is there any way that we can reconcile that in your mind? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Senator, I think you have in exhibits memoranda that Colonel North prepared for various phases of the operation. Those exist. "They don't say anything about diversion. I have told you that I don't recall seeing any of the memos until the 25th. I did see the one that survived. "I very likely could have seen that in April. I certainly don't recall seeing it. The one thing that I am positive about, and the thing that is important to you is that I made a decision in February of 1986 not to ask the President or tell him about this proposal. I decided to approve that on my own. "I made a very deliberate decision not to tell him, and frankly, whether the memos exist or didn't exist, I frankly don't think they did. "I think Colonel North may be mistaken on that point. He prepared, as you know, an awful lot of papers, probably more than any other staff officer on the NSC staff, and out of all those papers, I think he simply has forgotten.	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"I do not believe there were any more than that one, and I frankly had forgotten that. My operating assumption was that we didn't have anything in writing on it. "I had forgotten, for example, the PROFS note that referred to $6 million. [See 86/05/16-440.] So in my mind, it was not a matter of telling anybody to destroy something. "I, frankly, didn't think anything existed." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 204-06.)	
86/11/25-564 JULY 20, 1987		NSC STAFF: "THEIR ONLY LOYALTY IS TO THE PRESIDENT" POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. MITCHELL. . . . Admiral, you said that you deliberately withheld from the President knowledge of your decision to authorize the transfer to the contras of funds from the sale of arms to Iran because you wanted to protect the President from political embarrassment if it were disclosed. [See 86/00/02-511, -512, -521, -610, -630, -631; 86/00/04-140.] "You approved the diversion within minutes after first learning of it. [See 86/00/02-510, -520.] You sought not advice on whether it was lawful. [See 86/00/02-520, -600.] "You also said that you deliberately destroyed a document, an important document, a presidential finding to spare the President political embarrassment. [See 85/12/05-650; 86/00/02-610; 86/11/21-432, -440, -441, -443, -480, -482.] "You said that you didn't think about whether your action in so doing was lawful. [See	NSC STAFF: "THEIR ONLY LOYALTY IS TO THE PRESIDENT" POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

86/11/21-443.]

"In explaining your actions, at least in part, you said on Friday of yourself and the other members of the National Security Counsel staff, and I now quote you directly, 'Their only loyalty is to the President.' 'Their only loyalty is to the President.' [See 86/00/02-640.]

"With all due respect, Admiral, I disagree with that. When you joined the staff of the National Security Council, you reaffirmed your oath of office. In that oath, you swore to uphold the Constitution of the United States.

"Nowhere in the oath is the President mentioned, let along [sic] the President's political interests. Yet, according to your own testimony, in making important decisions, you didn't consider the Constitution or the laws enacted under it. You based your decision on what you believed to be the President's political interests.

"One of the unusual features of the American system of government is that it combines in one person[,] the President, the duties of the chief of State and the executive head of government.

"Most other countries separate those duties. One result of the[ir] being combined in our system is that for many Americans, the political interests of the President are seen as identical to the national interests. This is not a problem unique to the current Administration.

"You are not the first, you will surely not be the last presidential aide to confuse those interests. But as a result of your making decisions based on your desire to protect the President's political interests, those very interests have been seriously damaged.

"At the same time, at least in the opinion of some of us, the national interest has been damaged. If these hearings do nothing else, let's hope they remind all government officials that their first loyalty is not to any person and not to any office.

"Their first and foremost obligation is to support and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States. The Constitution and the laws. And if government officials remember that, they will best serve both the national interest and the President's political interests.

"Thank you.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Senator, may I respond?

"Mr. MITCHELL. You are free to do so. Certainly, Admiral.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. The President also takes an oath of office where he will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic, I believe.

"What I meant by saying my loyalty and the loyalty of the NSC staff was to the President does not preclude or in any way supersede that oath of office that I took or the President took.

"The job of the NSC staff is to assist the President and advise the President in carrying out his duties to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. That is exactly what we were doing. And I don't find that my expression of the loyalty of the NSC staff to the President

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		in any way abrogates the responsibilities that I took and the other military officers on the staff and those civilians with commissions took to support and defend the Constituion of the United States. "That is what this is all about. That is what we were trying to do. "Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I will simply say that your words were, page 77, line 1756 of the [7/17/87] transcript, 'Their only loyalty is to the President,['] and I suppose we will just on this and other things agree to disagree.[] "Thank you, Admiral." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 207-11.)	
86/11/25-600 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	NORTH'S NOTEBOOKS: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, on this day, November 25, did you find time, this is November 25 when you were dismissed, to write out a list of priorities in your notebooks, things that were important to you? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And was that before or after the press conference? "Mr. NORTH. It was after." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 179.)		
86/11/25-650 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT: Later that afternoon, after the office is sealed, Hall returns to finish filing. She finds the altered documents which she had not completed filing on November 21. She also finds copies of	SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT: Hall finds in North's office altered documents she had not completed filing on November 21. Hall contacts North and later removes the documents from the OEOB. See col. 1 and next entry.	SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT: Hall finds in North's office copies of the PROF notes she had helped North shred, and minutes of the May 1986 Tehran meeting. Hall contacts North and later removes the documents from the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	the PROF notes which she had helped North shred, and minutes of the May 1986 Tehran meeting. Hall calls North to ask him to return to the office. Hall testified, "I tried to convey to him I found the documents. . . . I insisted he come back, and he did so." "Mr. BELNICK. You tried to signal him that the problem was documents and that is why he had to come back? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Did Colonel North tell you to clear someone else into the Old Executive Office Building with him for a return trip? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Who[m] did he tell you to clear in? "Ms. HALL. Tom Green. "Mr. BELNICK. And did he tell you why Tom Green would be coming with him? "Ms. HALL. No. "Mr. BELNICK. You did clear Colonel North and Tom Green for entry, correct? "Ms. HALL. Yes. (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 297-302.)		OEOB. See col. 1 and next entry.
86/11/25-660 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT (cont'd): Hall takes the altered documents, PROF notes and "a stack of other filings that would not look conspicuous," and goes upstairs where she places documents inside her boots. She runs into Earl's office and asks him to help her pull PROF notes from the file. Hall	SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT (cont'd): See col. 1.	SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS HALL ACCOUNT (cont'd): See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	testified, "I did not tell him about the altered documents or the Tehran minutes, only the PROF notes." Earl starts to put the documents in his jacket. Hall testified, "I turned to him and said, 'No, you shouldn't have to do this. I will do it,' and he returned the PROF notes, and I put them in the back, in my back." Earl and Hall then go downstairs. At about the same time, North arrives with Tom Green. North goes to his office. Hall follows him and asks if he can see anything in her back. North replies, "No." "Mr. BELNICK. When you reached the corridor outside 302, did you indicate to Colonel North something concerning the documents that you had with you? "Ms. HALL. Yes. I indicated with a gesture or words that I wanted to give him the documents, and he said--he turned to me and said, 'No, just wait until we get outside,' and we went down the elevator, exited the Old Executive Office Building on 17th St., and again I indicated with a word or gesture that I wanted to pass the documents, and Tom Green said, 'No, wait until we get inside the car.' "We crossed 17th St., got in Tom Green's car on G St., took off, and I started pulling the documents from my boots, pulled them from by back, indicated to Colonel North, I believe at this time, I had not completed the process of replacing the altered documents in the files and that I had started the Xeroxing, but I had, in fact, left the		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	originals in the office. "As we turned the corner, Tom Green was dropping us both off at the parking lot where our cars were parked. Tom Green turned to me and asked me if I was asked about shredding what would I say, and I said, 'We shred every day.' And he said, 'Good.' "We said good night, got out of the car, and went home. ". . . . "Mr. BELNICK. This was in Mr. Green's car? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. You passed the documents to Colonel North in that car? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. And Mr. Green was at the driver's seat when that happened? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. That was on November 25, 1986? "Ms. HALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Chairman, as the committees are aware, and I would just point out for the record that Tom Green has advised the committees that he ceased representing Colonel North on the next morning, November 26, 1986." (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 303-08.)		
86/11/25-670 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. COHEN. Certain documents were taken out of the office at that point [on November 25, 1986]? "Mr. NORTH. I want to clarify the record on	SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	SMUGGLED DOCUMENTS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

that. I had already--after the press conference, I removed documents from the White House, some of which I have just given to the committee in the last few days, and I [sic] subsequently removed documents later on in the evening when I returned to the White House.

"Mr. COHEN. Those documents taken out at that time, that's been testified to by Ms. Hall, those documents?

"Mr. NORTH. You are talking about the later in the evening.

"Mr. COHEN. The ones taken out in her clothing?

"Mr. NORTH. Yes.

"Mr. COHEN. Perhaps I might just get the advice of counsel on this.

"Could you tell me what documents they were? . . .

". . . .

"Mr. SULLIVAN. My letter of December 2nd, 1986, indicates that documents were returned at that time. . . .

"Mr. COHEN. Could I inquire as to whether those documents were for the purpose of either protecting the initiative or protecting yourself in terms of showing that you had higher authority at that point?

"Mr. NORTH. The original attempt of gathering those documents was to destroy them. When I heard the announcement at noon, I removed some of those 168 pages of documents and the remainder of them are the ones Ms. Hall removed from the office later that evening. They were all returned to the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	White House." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 151-52.)		
86/11/25-700 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)	NORTH TAKES HIS NOTEBOOKS HOME NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. Now, when did you take these diaries out of your office, these steno pads? "Mr. NORTH. My recollection is that most--well, I don't know if it is most--some were at home, some were still in the office, and I think, if I remember right, all but the last one, and maybe even that, too, left with me on the afternoon of the 25th. ". . . . "Mr. LIMAN. Is it fair to say that the steno books that you took home contained very sensitive information? "Mr. NORTH. It is likely with interpretation that the steno books are sensitive, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Part of the interpretation is your handwriting. "Mr. NORTH. Well, certainly that, but if you are criticizing my penmanship-- "Mr. LIMAN. There are names in those books. "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And you indeed uttered a prayer to the committee that we treat these books with sensitivity-- "[Witness conferring with counsel.] "Mr. LIMAN. --and respect their security, you did that yesterday as I recall, correct? "Mr. NORTH. I did. "Mr. LIMAN. Now, the home that you took these	NORTH TAKES HIS NOTEBOOKS HOME NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	NORTH TAKES HIS NOTEBOOKS HOME NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	books to is a home that you had a great deal of concern about security for, correct? "Mr. NORTH. Yes. "Mr. LIMAN. And can you explain to me, someone who has never been in a position such as yours, as to why you would be concerned about the security of documents locked in an NSC office, subject to all sorts of security regulations and access restrictions, but not concerned about keeping them at home? "Mr. NORTH. Well, again, as I said, I may have had a few of them at home, I don't really recall how many, if indeed there were. I removed the rest of them on the 25th, along with several hundred [sic] pages of other documents for one purpose, and that was to protect myself. "Because after the press conference, my perspective changed, and it became one of protecting myself, and that was the reason to remove those notebooks from the NSC and take those documents from the White House with me." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 179-82.)		
86/11/25-720 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY, 5:30 p.m.)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES WELD ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES WELD ACCOUNT: William Weld, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, meets with the Attorney General and 8 or 10 others, and lays out for them the potential criminal violations involved which Weld has previously discussed with Charles Cooper and Mark Richard. Weld mentions conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, and false statements. Meese does

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			not volunteer any facts about his weekend investigation or his involvement in the January 17 Finding. (Weld, House Dep., 7/16/87, at 26-31.)
86/11/25-725 1986-87		DIVERSION: CRIMINAL ASPECTS MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	DIVERSION: CRIMINAL ASPECTS MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RUDMAN. Do you have any current thoughts as to whether any other laws or laws period were violated by the diversion, I would suggest two possibilities, the Anti-Deficiency Act and the Miscellaneous Receipt of Money statute, 31 U.S. Code 3302(b)? "Attorney General MEESE. I think it is possible that those laws may be applicable. I am reluctant to make a statement for two reasons. "One is to say that a crime has been committed without full possession of the facts and the ability to relate those facts to statute is something we generally don't do in the Department of Justice; and two, this matter is under investigation by the independent counsel and I would not want to have my viewpoint prejudice what he is doing. "I am sure they will be ultimately answered by the investigation that he is conducting. "Mr. RUDMAN. I assume that you would agree that at the very least probable cause exists to look closely at those two statutes in light of the events that this committee and others have uncovered? "Attorney General MEESE. It does. "As a matter of fact, that was uncovered in our own inquiry because on Monday the 24th of

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			November, I asked our lawyers who were familiar with the facts to look into the same subject that you just raised to see if there were applicable statutes. "They raised some of those same statutes and that was the reason this was turned over to the Criminal Division for a criminal investigation to commence 25 November." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 16-17.)
86/11/25-726 JULY 29, 1987		DIVERSION: LEGAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. STOKES. Mr. Attorney General, yesterday you told us that if you had been asked, that you would advise strongly against the use of excess proceeds from the Iranian arms sales for the contras. "Would you have objected on legal grounds? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. I would have objected on legal grounds, policy grounds, and also practical grounds." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 220-21.)	DIVERSION: LEGAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
86/11/25-727 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES, AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST THEORY MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES, AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST THEORY MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MITCHELL. One final area of questioning. "You testified that finally early the next week, you contacted representatives of the Criminal Division and asked for some analysis of the statutes. And within hours, Mr. Weld came back to you with what you referred to as the

constructive truth [sic (trust)] theory.

"Attorney General MEESE. Actually, I think I had told him I thought there may be a constructive thrust [sic (trust)] theory.

"Mr. MITCHELL. You thought of it before?

"Attorney General MEESE. I thought of it as an abstract theory as we were discussing it.

"Mr. MITCHELL. Basically that is legal talk. What it was was the view that Government property was sold, a profit was made, and if the funds were Government funds, they belonged to the Government and could not be used for other purposes without authorization; is that a fair layman's description of what the legal implications were?

"Attorney General MEESE. That was my discussion in general with Mr. Weld. He, with his people, after several hours, verified that and came back to me and said that he thought there was enough that we could legitimately open a criminal investigation.

"Mr. MITCHELL. My questions is, is it too much hindsight to wonder why you and Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Cooper and Mr. Richardson, all these lawyers, didn't think of that when you saw the diversion memo? It seems a rather obvious thing, that here it was Government property, sold, a substantial profit made, the funds used for another purpose, leave aside the question of legality of aiding the contras for any other purpose, without any authorization.

"I gather that did not occur to you when you saw the diversion memo or when you confirmed the diversion on Sunday?

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Attorney General MEESE. Actually, at that time we were thinking--we were proceeding first of all, to make sure to find out if it was authorized. I think Mr. North in his statement said that he didn't think it was authorized, or words to that effect. "In any event, he mentioned that Admiral Poindexter had known about it. I wanted to find out from Admiral Poindexter whether, in fact, it had been authorized. He said it had not been authorized by anyone who had the ability to authorize it. "It was in the course-- "Mr. MITCHELL. Would you say that again? Admiral Poindexter told you it had not been authorized? "Attorney General MEESE. I said he indicated to me that no one else--the President had not authorized it obviously. He said he allowed it to go forward, but that was not sufficient. So our concentration was on that whole transaction. It wasn't at that point, but it was following that conversation with Admiral Poindexter, or at about that time, that I asked Mr. Cooper to look into this and it was at that time that the ideas of constructive truth [sic (trust)] and things like that started to develop. "Mr. MITCHELL. Would you repeat for me please what you said it was Admiral Poindexter said to you? "Attorney General MEESE. Admiral Poindexter, as I testified yesterday, said he knew about it generally, but that Ollie had given enough hints

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			so that he knew about it generally and that he had allowed it to go forward and hadn't followed up on it. "Mr. MITCHELL. So-- "Attorney General MEESE. So as far as I was concerned, that was clear to me that it had not been authorized by anybody in authority. "Mr. MITCHELL. So your use of the words authorize and authority are characterization of Admiral Poindexter's words, not what he said to you? "Attorney General MEESE. That is correct." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 100-03. See id., 7/29/87, at 132-37, 179, 212 [further on constructive trust theory of diversion]. See generally id., 7/29/87, at 178-81 [who should get the money].)
86/11/25-730 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TRUTH-SEEKING MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Chairman INOUYE. . . . General Meese, I think we should remind ourselves that this panel here is not convened to determine the guilt or innocence of anyone. This is not a court of law, and we are not here to determine the culpability, criminal culpability of anyone involved. "However, if we are to file a final report to the people of the United States, we would have to have available to us the best factual chronology of what did occur, and the problem we have is that the testimony to date has been confusing and contradictory, and I believe that is an	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TRUTH-SEEKING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TRUTH-SEEKING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

understatement.

"And so I wish to call upon you and your eight years of experience as Deputy District Attorney in Alameda County, over two years as Attorney General, and some of the questions I would ask may be redundant and repetitive, but all of us here are eager to get to the truth.

"Now, there is no question here that Colonel North was not honest with you. Admiral Poindexter lied to you, and yet you have indicated to us that you were convinced at that time that they were truthful.

"You depended upon their friendship and long association. Although you have indicated that it might make a difference since these two officers appeared before us under oath that they may be a bit more truthful here, but isn't it true that under Section 1001, it makes no difference whether you are under oath or not, that if you lie to the Attorney General or lie to the Congress, it is still a felony? Isn't that true?

"Attorney General MEESE. Mr. Chairman, that is correct if it is an official statement and so on. There are certain requisites as to the provision of 1001. But in general, the statement you have made is correct.

"Chairman INOUYE. When you were on your fact-finding mission, wasn't that an official function?

"Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir, it was.

"Chairman INOUYE. And that being the case and based upon your experience with the colonel and with the admiral and with the Director of the

Central Intelligence Agency, do you have any advice to us as to how we may determine who is lying and who is not lying?

"Attorney General MEESE. Mr. Chairman, I recognize as you have stated that this is a very difficult and a very important responsibility of the committee. I think that in a sense what the committee, I am sure, wants to come out with are some recommendations and some suggestions as to processes that will assist in more fundamental areas of cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches, and it may well be that as to the narrative account, the factual account which is of course a subsidiary to the legislative function that the committee may have to put almost in parallel the various accounts that have been revealed here both in terms of what was told to me the weekend of the 21st through the 24th of November and what was told to the committee.

"As far as whether any person will be prosecuted, as you mentioned, that is something for other sources to develop, particularly the independent counsel.

"I would only say that in many aspects the different statements that have been made do have a certain consistency, so that I think there are a number of things in which the committee can draw conclusions because as I mentioned in my opening statement, much of the basic outline of what happened, the essential facts, remain the same today.

"I think there is no question that there was, in fact, a diversion of funds. I think we are all

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	agreed to that. I think there is no question that certain people were involved in that. "There is some question about to what extent they may have been involved, but as far as their basic involvement, I think that is pretty well established. "There are certain other aspects which are more murky. The committee itself has the testimony about the involvement of some of the players such as Mr. Secord and Mr. Hakim and others that have been mentioned here about which I had no information because that was not revealed to me over the weekend that we were looking at it. "So I would think that the most important thing is to develop the factual outline as I did where all of the information seems to be relatively consistent and then perhaps to highlight those areas in which there is an inconsistency, but which I don't think will affect the basic responsibilities of the committee in terms of whatever recommendations come out of their several weeks now of investigation." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 107-10.)		
86/11/25-731 NOVEMBER 21-25, 1986 (FRIDAY - TUESDAY)	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TRUTH-SEEKING MEESE ACCOUNT, Part 2: "Chairman INOUYE. I was one of the junior members of a prosecutor's office about 35 years ago in Honolulu, and at that time I was told whenever interviewing witnesses or [on] a fact-finding assignment, I was required to take notes and to submit a memo at the end of my	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TRUTH-SEEKING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TRUTH-SEEKING MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	fact-finding mission or after the interview. "Is this the standard procedure in your office, where your assistants are required to take notes and submit a memo? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir, generally they are, Mr. Chairman. "Chairman INOUYE. Why didn't you as Attorney General of the United States carry out the directive that you have issued to all of your assistants and take notes? I notice that according to the exchange you had with Senator Mitchell, notes were not taken. "Attorney General MEESE. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I think you will remember from my discussion with Senator Mitchell, most of the time in the interviews, the notes were taken and in fact those notes have been relied on here for much of the information about which I have testified and there were only a very few instances that notes were not taken. "Chairman INOUYE: But these were the important interviews, after you began to get suspicious that something was wrong. "Attorney General MEESE. The only interview I would--I wouldn't call them interviews, they were conversations--I would say the only conversation even in which probably notes would be valuable and had I had the time on the occasion, I would have jotted them down although I must say I have a very good recollection of them, would be the discussion with Admiral Poindexter. "Chairman INOUYE. After you made your expletives deleted and were convinced that		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	something was dreadfully wrong, don't you think that at that moment you got very concerned that notes should have been taken? "Attorney General MEESE. I think at that time notes were taken in the ensuing interviews." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 110-11. See entries starting at 86/11/24-002 [the Attorney General's interview and investigative procedures].)		
86/11/25-750 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		McFARLANE CONTACT WITH NORTH: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF DIVERSION, AND NORTH'S STATEMENT IT WAS APPROVED McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane, in London, hears a BBC report of Meese's press conference announcing the diversion of money to the Contras and the White House staff changes. McFarlane hears he has "been identified as someone who was witting of the channeling." Later that evening, McFarlane writes out a statement of his knowledge of the matter: "It said, basically, that I had learned of it in connection with the trip to Teheran in May, that at the time I was advised I took it to be a matter of approved policy, and that during my own service in government, it had not been raised []or discussed." McFarlane then calls the White House, conveys his sympathies to North, and reads him the statement. North says, "Yes, that is accurate." McFarlane's testimony on the events of Nov. 25 continued: "And I asked again, 'Ollie, it was approved	McFARLANE CONTACT WITH NORTH: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF DIVERSION, AND NORTH'S STATEMENT IT WAS APPROVED McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		wasn't it?' And he said, 'Yes, but it was approved. You know I wasn't doing anything that wasn't approved.' "And I said, 'Then don't worry, you did the right thing. Just tell it like it was.' "Then I think we had a few words that I tried to be consoling, and he talked about the difference between how the matter was to be treated and his first meeting that day before the Attorney General's conference and the rather brutal fashion in which he learned of his discharge. And I commiserated and offered some encouraging words, and that was all. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ask Colonel North how they discovered this? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe that he said that -- I asked what happened, I think, and he said, they must have found the memo, or words to that effect. "Mr. LIMAN. Did he say, 'I missed one'? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Something like that. "Mr. LIMAN. That is what you told us? "Mr. McFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/11/87, at 201-03.)	
86/11/25-892 NOVEMBER 25 - DECEMBER 8, 1986		ABRAMS' SSCI TESTIMONY ABRAMS ACCOUNT: On Abrams' Congressional testimony on third-country funding of the Contras, including the Brunei attempted contribution, see Iran-Contra Report, at 148-49.	
86/11/25-895		STATUS OF BRUNEI MONEY, AND ABRAMS'	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		SSCI APPEARANCE DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ABRAMS reports that Brunei money still has not reached the Nicaraguan opposition. HILL instructs that information be given to LEGAL ADVISER SOFAER (out of town). "ABRAMS briefing of SSCI re third country funding of Nicaraguan opposition, does not mention Brunei solicitation, misleads Committee." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/12/01-090.)	
86/11/25-896 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 AND JULY 1987		ABRAMS' SSCI APPEARANCE SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOKS. Now, Mr. Secretary, when Elliott Abrams appeared before us in June, he told us that he misled the Congress about $10 million the Sultan of Brunei tried to send to the contras because he said he wasn't authorized to discuss that matter without going to you. That is his testimony of June 2nd, page 193. He explained that the reason he wasn't authorized to tell us the truth was because your Department had given assurances of confidentiality to the Sultan in the process of soliciting that money. "Now, did you or any other official of the Executive Branch instruct Mr. Abrams not to testify truthfully in regard to this matter? "Secretary SHULTZ. Everybody in the government, certainly anybody that works for me, should know that they must not lie and must not mislead. Nobody has to get my permission to tell	

the truth. They must tell the truth.

"Now, in this case, Elliott had a piece of information that he could not reveal. To do so would have been a breach of faith with the country involved, and they had made--they had said that they would make this contribution on the understanding that it would be a confidential thing. They were going to contribute to the freedom fighters.

"So there are all sorts of ways to handle it when you are in a session, as Elliott found himself in, he wasn't expecting to get questioned about this, but it came I think on the afternoon of the day when there were these revelations, and he was questioned by various Senators on the Senate Select Committee, particularly Senator Bradley--I say this because I had a very long and a good conversation with Senator Boren about all this, among other things he said, he asked me if I would get the transcript and read it. [Sic.]

"And so I did that, both the first meeting with the Intelligence Committee and the second one. And I think that a perfectly acceptable thing, I imagine, to the committee, would have been to say, 'Senator, I don't want to testify on this. I would like to come back', or to say 'The State Department is authorized by law to make solicitations, as you know, and we have made a solicitation that we believe is successful, but I cannot reveal the name of the country because we have given a pledge of confidential[it]y.' That would have, I am sure, been quite satisfactory. There are all sorts of ways that you can respond with candor but without revealing the name.

"Elliott made a mistake, and he knows it. He knew it more or less right away. He discussed it with various people in the department, what to do. And he was told what to do is to go back to Senator Bradley and tell him. You don't have to tell him the name of the country, but tell him, so you correct the record.

"In fairness, I didn't--he didn't lie, so to speak, directly. There wasn't any way for a Senator there to ask him if he had solicited Brunei. There was no way for them to know to ask that question. But it was clear enough that they were asking him about solicitation, as I read the transcript at your suggestion. So he knew he made a mistake. And then he corrected it in a later meeting, and again you asked me to read the transcript, which I did, and I think I told you that I agreed that he made a combative apology. Elliott is a combative person. That is one of his endearing qualities as far as I am concerned; he is a fighter.

"But, anyway, he is full of remorse about this, and in my opinion, he is a first-class person, a person of high character, very able, a person with a real instinct for public service. He performed brilliantly as the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, a real driving force, and I think he has performed brilliantly in his current job, which is a very very tough job. So I have said that I think that he should continue in that job and continue to contribute. And he recognizes that he has a rebuilding job to do.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"And I have talked to some of you, actually, individually about it, and I hope that you will join in the effort to help him rebuild, because he is a good guy. "Mr. BROOKS. Well, Mr. Secretary-- "Secretary SHULTZ. And the people who are really well qualified and have an instinct for public service are rare enough. You want to save them. So that is my feeling about Elliott Abrams." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/24/87, at 120-24. See id., 7/23/87, at 244-45 [Shultz on Abrams, generally].)	
86/11/25-900 NOVEMBER 25, 1986 (TUESDAY)		ABRAMS' SSCI APPEARANCE ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams, appearing before the SSCI, states that "the State Department's function in this has not been to raise money, other than to try to raise it from Congress." After Abrams' appearance, he discusses with Shultz his concern that the Senators were asking about solicitation and he has not told them about Brunei. They decide to seek the DoS legal advisor's opinion. He suggests they call in the FBI, which they do. Abrams then approaches Nick Platt (Executive Secretary of the DoS) on December 4 for authorization from Shultz to go back to the SSCI to disclose the Brunei solicitation. Shultz answers, "[I]f you think you should, go ahead." On December 5, Abrams does. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 193, 201.)	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		At the time of Abrams' SSCI testimony, Shultz is in Europe. Abrams cables him and calls Hill "with a full account of what had happened at the hearing and of the essence of the transcript of November 25 and of the committee's reaction to it." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 205.) After Abrams gives his categorical assurances to Congress that foreign governments are not funding the Contras, Shultz does not inform him of the Saudi contribution. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/3/87, at 113-14.) Abrams testified he believed Shultz shared the view "that this one solicitation of Brunei was a diplomatic activity for which the Government of Brunei had absolutely insisted on total and complete confidentiality, and we had promised it. . . . I think it is fair to say it was our view this was not something that was legally reportable, of necessity[,] to Congress, and it was the general decision not to report it in the interest of confidentiality." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 206-07.)	
86/11/26-100 NOVEMBER 26, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)			SHULTZ MEETS WITH THE PRESIDENT ON IRAN DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS meets with PRESIDENT to discuss State's administration of Iran policy." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/12/08-150.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/26-150 NOVEMBER 26, 1986 (WEDNESDAY, 9:15 a.m.)		THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES WELD ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL ISSUES WELD ACCOUNT: The Attorney General meets with Weld, Burns, Trott, Reynolds, Cooper, Bolton, Cribb, Korten, and Richardson. Meese tells Weld, "Bill, today is the day for the handoff to the FBI and to the Criminal Division." They discuss how to pursue the prosecution. Meese tells Weld "to personally supervise this in the interests of speed." The "prosecutive t[eam]" is to include Jack Keeney (Weld's principal deputy who supervises the Public Integrity Section), Mark Richard (Weld's second principal deputy, supervising the Internal Security and International Affairs Sections), Charles Cooper, Bill Hendricks (with CIA experience) and Alan Carver (a public interest specialist with a military background). Cooper suggests that the criminal investigation be limited to the diversion and that there be only a civil investigation of the arms sales -- "a thought that didn't go anywhere," according to Weld. "It was run up the flagpole and not saluted." (Weld, House Dep., 7/16/87, at 32-36.)
86/11/26-200 NOVEMBER 26, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)	MEESE-CASEY PHONE CALL MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. STOKES. Exhibit [EM] 3 . . . lists your telephone calls for Wednesday, November 26th, 1986. The first one listed is a 7:00 a.m. call		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	from Director Casey which, if I read my copy of it here correctly, was completed at around 8:00 a.m. "It appears that you must have talked for about an hour. ". . . . "Attorney General MEESE. What this means is that Mr. Casey called me at 7:00 o'clock, but I didn't get back to him until 8:00 o'clock in the morning. "In other words, it was completed--it was at 8:00 o'clock. "Mr. STOKES. Completed means you got back to him at 8:00 o'clock? "Attorney General MEESE. It wasn't an hour conversation. "Mr. STOKES. How long did you talk on that occasion? "Attorney General MEESE. I have no idea. I have no recollection of the call at all. "Mr. STOKES. No recollection of the subject matter of the call? "Attorney General MEESE. No, sir." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 221-22; JHICI Ex. EM 3 [Attorney General's telephone logs].)		
86/11/26-500 NOVEMBER 26, 1986 (WEDNESDAY)	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON NORTH: In an interview with Time magazine, the President states, "I do not feel betrayed. Lieut. Colonel North was involved in all our operations: the Achille Lauro, Libya. He has a fine record. He is a national hero. My only criticism is that I wasn't told everything." (Time, 12/8/86, at 18.)	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON NORTH: See col. 1.	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON NORTH: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/11/26-510 UNTIL THE PRESENT TIME	NORTH'S HEROISM REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOKS. Colonel North has been characterized by some as a national hero for having carried of this scheme to divert funds from the Iranian arms sales to the contras which he apparently did without the knowledge or approval of the President, according to the testimony of you and others. "Do you, as a former Marine with extensive overseas duty in World War II, consider Colonel North to be a national hero for coming up with this neat idea? "Mr. REGAN. Well, let me put it this way: I admire the colonel's enthusiasm, his ingenuity, his--obviously I am very impressed by the courage he has shown previously on the battlefield and in his previous assignments. "My question, however, not recognizing him as a real hero, is insofar as I think he might have asked permission or shared with us his plan rather than to put in into effect in an unauthorized way and have this come out. Perhaps had more of us thought about it in a longer period of time, this wouldn't have happened and would have obviated the necessity for our being here today." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 159-60.)	NORTH'S HEROISM REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	NORTH'S HEROISM REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.
86/11/26-700 NOVEMBER 24-26, 1986 (MONDAY-	THE TOWER BOARD: ITS FORMATION REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOMFIELD. . . . Can you elaborate on how the Tower Board was formed? And what was your	THE TOWER BOARD: ITS FORMATION REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	THE TOWER BOARD: ITS FORMATION REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
WEDNESDAY)	role and what the role of the President was in this formation of this board? "Mr. REGAN. As quickly as I heard from the Attorney General that there had been a diversion of funds from this Iranian arms sale to the contras, I realized that this was going to require a major investigation. "The three of us were sitting there in the Oval Office. The President was asking [m]ore detailed questions of Ed Meese. My thoughts were on well, how do we get to the bottom of this? What do we do? "The parallel that occurred to me right away was the very tragic Challenger disaster. . . . ". . . . "Mr. REGAN. But it occurred to me that this group was going to have to work rather quickly. So that night, the night of November 24th, I thought long and hard about what to do. Came in the next day, discussed it with staff and put forth my idea that it should be a small, select group. Recognized it had to be bipartisan. It would have to obviously include former members of the Legislative Branch. "I thought of a jurist. We went through many things as to who should we get and it finally occurred to us that John Tower was by far the best person and was available since he had submitted his resignation as our negotiator in Geneva. The thought--I came up with Ed Muskie's name myself. I have known Ed for years. Knew of his outstanding record as the Secretary of State, as a U.S. Senator, as a distinguished governor. Felt		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	he would be a person that the--at least the Democratic side of the aisle would say we had selected a good person to represent the--that side. "And the third one, of course, Brent Scowcroft, was a natural. Not only a major general in the armed forces, but also a former National Security Adviser. He had the expertise. "We did not approach anyone else, by the way. "Those were the first three and all three of them, as good Americans, said if the President needs me and wants me, I will do it, although each one of them had his own personal affairs that he had to put aside for this. "I asked that they try to make a report--this is the initial decision with them--by the time Congress returned in the third week of January. Gave that as a time frame. They all agreed to it. "In the meantime, I had gone through their names, obviously with the President and he had signed off on all three of them as choices. Called them. They agreed. "We announced it the following day, the 26th." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 205-07.)		
86/11/27-000 SOMETIME IN NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER 1986		SHREDDING AT STTGI DUTTON ACCOUNT: Dutton testifying on documents shredded at Stanford Technology Trading Group International: "Mr. LIMAN. Was there a shredding party at your organization in November and December? "Mr. DUTTON. Excuse me, sir, we don't have shredding parties. There was some business done	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		in the office. We had a great concern about the security of the office because we were being inundated by people that were very interested in what had happened in Central America. They found out that STTGI was involved. It was General Secord's desire that we don't have any superfluous material laying around the office. I had duplicate messages of KL-43 traffic that I shredded. I didn't consider that a shredding party. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you ask Ms. Napier to shred? "Mr. DUTTON. No. "Mr. LIMAN. Was she asked to shred papers? "Mr. DUTTON. I understand she was, yes. "Mr. LIMAN. Do you know what she was shredding? "Mr. DUTTON. Telephone logs. "Mr. LIMAN. Did you see her shred other records? "Mr. DUTTON. No, I did not. "Mr. LIMAN. Is it your testimony that the only records that were shredded were duplicate records? "Mr. DUTTON. My testimony is of my records the only thing shredded were [sic] duplicate records. "Mr. LIMAN. Would it have been everyone else's in that organization? "Mr. DUTTON. The only other thing that I can testify to is the telephone log and that I assisted her in shredding because she was having trouble with it. "Mr. LIMAN. How did you protect operational	

security if you shred a duplicate but keep an original?

"Mr. DUTTON. This wasn't trying to protect operational security necessarily. There wasn't a need for me to carry a huge bundle of excess messages around, two or three copies of the same message, so I got rid of the ones I didn't need. I kept the originals and you have those.

". . . .

"Mr. LIMAN. Who made the decision to have the shredding take place at the offices?

"Mr. DUTTON. For the telephone log I understand it was General Secord, for mine it was my decision.

"Mr. LIMAN. And was it all done at or about the same time?

"Mr. DUTTON. I don't believe so. My records--I would say maybe within a month of each other, or a couple of weeks of each other, but it wasn't all done at the same time.

"Mr. LIMAN. Did you see them do the shredding?

"Mr. DUTTON. No, I did not.
(Dutton Testim., JHICI, 5/27/87, at 129-31. See Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/7/87, at 117-22 [Secord's testimony on shredding at STTGI].)

86/11/27-020
SOMETIME IN
EARLY
DECEMBER 1986

SHREDDING AT STTGI
CORBIN ACCOUNT:

Shirley Napier, staff assistant at STTGI, asks Joan Corbin, a secretary, to shred documents in early December. Most of the shredding takes place on one day, with small amounts of shredding on

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		other days. Napier gives Corbin the impression the shredding is done on instructions from Secord. Secord and Dutton help with the shredding. "[T]elexes and shorthand notebooks and old phone book message pages and just a couple of rolex [sic] cards" are all destroyed. The rolodex cards for Olmstead, David Walker, Tony Greene and, later, Quintero are all destroyed. (Corbin, Senate Dep., 4/10/87, at 7-14, 51-53. See 86/11/19-600 [Napier on shredding at STTGI; note conflicting dates in the various accounts of parties involved].)	
86/11/27-400 NOVEMBER 27, 1986 THANKSGIVING	"WE SHRED EVERY DAY" HALL ACCOUNT: Jay Stephens from the White House Counsel's office calls Fawn Hall to ask whether she knows about "a shredding incident in Colonel North's office." Hall testified, "I told him that we shred every day and I led him to believe that there was nothing unusual about what had occurred." (Hall Testim., JHICI, 6/8/87, at 308-09.)		
86/11/28-200 NOVEMBER 25-28, 1986 (TUESDAY - FRIDAY)	FBI SEARCH OF WHITE HOUSE FILES MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. On November 25th of 1986, the Administration concluded that a criminal investigation of this matter was warranted. The committees have evidence indicating that there was no FBI search of White House files until November 28th. "What was the reason for the delay, the 25th	FBI SEARCH OF WHITE HOUSE FILES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	FBI SEARCH OF WHITE HOUSE FILES MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	to the 28th? "Attorney General MEESE. I have no knowledge of any reason for that delay. I do know, however, that the White House files had already been secured as of the 25th, I believe. At least I gave the order on that date to do it, concurrent with the commencement of the criminal investigation." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 267.)		
86/11/28-205 NOVEMBER 24-28, 1986 (MONDAY - FRIDAY)	START OF THE DoJ CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. RODINO. . . . Let me ask you one other question, Mr. Attorney General, concerning . . . some of the letters that were sent out. You learned of the diversion memorandum on November 22nd. "On November 24th, according to your testimony, you asked Cooper to do a preliminary review of possible criminal issues and then on November 25th, you began a criminal inquiry. "I want to ask why were letters not sent to the White House, the CIA, and other agencies asking them then to segregate and preserve relevant documents? "Why weren't they sent until November the 28th, six days later, actually? And that November 28th, I might tell you, happens to be a Friday, which certainly would give any person who is interested in knowing that these requests were going to be made, giving them an opportunity to destroy those documents. [Sic.] "Now why the delay?	START OF THE DoJ CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	START OF THE DoJ CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Attorney General MEESE. Mr. Rodino, first of all, as far as the White House documents and the NSC documents, a request for those to be sealed and preserved was sent on the 25th, as soon as the criminal investigation was started. Telephonic direction was sent then. I don't know any reason for the delay other than that in the normal process of getting started, I think the 27th was Thanksgiving holiday. "The Criminal Division started on the 25th. It was the 26th by the time they probably got their investigative plan together. "I imagine that is the reason why an additional day was involved. "Mr. RODINO. I think to be fair to you, I am going to point out that I think those letters, some of those letters had been prepared, but somebody just goofed and didn't send them out for a couple of days. "Attorney General MEESE. That I can't tell you because I don't know anything about the preparation or the dispatch of those letters." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 298-99.)		
86/12/01-090 DECEMBER 1, 1986		BRUNEI: AWAITING THE DEPOSIT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "SOFAER is informed of Brunei situation. AMBASSADOR instructed to advise Brunei that if funds still in Brunei's control, they should be frozen." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] continues at 86/12/04-100.)	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/12/01-100 DECEMBER 1, 1986		BRUNEI: AWAITING THE DEPOSIT ABRAMS ACCOUNT: On December 1, 1986, Shultz cables the U.S. Ambassador in Brunei instructing him to tell the Brunei Government if they have not yet sent the $10 million, they ought to stop the deposit because of recent developments. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 134.)	
86/12/01-300 SOEMTIME IN EARLY DECEMBER 1986		TAMBS' RESIGNATION TAMBS ACCOUNT: Lewis Tambs resigns as Ambassador to Costa Rica: "Mr. BELNICK. And when you announced your resignation to the staff in December of 1986, you said in substance that you believed you had accomplished the mission involving the opening of the souther[n] front that you had been sent down to accomplish? "Mr. TAMBS. Yes, sir." (Tambs Testim., JHICI, 5/28/87, at 194.)	
86/12/01-340 SOMETIME IN EARLY DECEMBER 1986		TAMBS' RESIGNATION ABRAMS ACCOUNT: According to Abrams, Tambs gave no notice to the DoS before he announced to his staff in the fall of 1986 at the United States Embassy in San Jose, Costa Rica, "I quit. My mission was to found a Southern Front. I was sent here to set up a Southern Front. I have completed that mission and therefore it is time for me to go." The DoS learned of Tambs' action when an	

Embassy staff member called and asked were they aware of Tambs' resignation. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 41-42.)

Abrams also testified that Shultz had sent Tambs written instructions before Tambs assumed his post in Costa Rica. (Ex. EA 27.) The letter stated, "I want to emphasize that the line of authority runs from the President through me to Assistant Secretary Abrams." Abrams explained, "[T]hat is known as the Motley clause," after Langhorne Motley, Abrams' predecessor, had habitually asked the Secretary "to put that clause in letters of instruction to ambassadors in the Latin America/Caribbean region to make sure they understood exactly how they were to report."

Shultz' instructions continued: "I have directed Assistant Secretary Abrams to issue instructions in my name and serve as the primary communications link between me and the chiefs of mission in his area of responsibility. You should channel all messages dealing [with] policy proposals, policy implementation, program activities, and post[ ]operations to or through him with the understanding that for extraordinary situations there are channels of direct communication with me that are available for your use." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 45-46. See id., 6/2/87, at 255 [Communications with ambassadors go through Department of State channels. Shults had so informed Tambs in his letter of instructions.].)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/12/01-500 EARLY DECEMBER 1986	THE PRIVATE DONORS: GARWOOD GARWOOD ACCOUNT: Ellen Garwood speaks with Carl Channell about contributing to the Oliver North Legal Defense Fund. Channell tells her North "was in a position where he was going to need perhaps legal defense, and he also needed, Mr. Channell said, some money -- he would like to have some funds for educating his children." Channell asks for a $10,000 contribution. Garwood sends $5,000 from her own account and $5,000 from her husband's. Soon after, she gets a call from Andy Messing, whom she knows to be a Marine and a friend of North's. He, in turn, is seeking her donation for another North Legal Defense Fund. "I said, 'I have already given to Mr. Channell.' "And he said, 'Do you know that Mr. Channell takes 35 percent for his own organization, for his overhead, and so on?' "And I said, 'No, I did not.' ". . . . "I didn't know anything about that, and perhaps I should have inquired more, but I didn't. "At any rate, I said, '. . . You are raising an official Marine-backed legal fund to defend Colonel North.' "And he said he was, and he explained that to me, and I said, 'Well, I shall ask Mr. Channell to send back what I sent to him . . . .'" Garwood then calls Channell to tell him what		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	Messing has said. "Well, he was disappointed. . . . He didn't actually deny it, as I remember. But he did consent to sen[d] the $10,000 back to me, and I said, 'I prefer to make it out to the official North Legal Defense Fund, and if you will please send the money back,' and he did." And Ellen Garwood apparently then forwarded the $10,000 to the second North Legal Defense Fund. (Garwood Testim., JHICI, 4/21/87, at 59-62.)		
86/12/03-100 DECEMBER 3, 1986			VICE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE TEXT, Part 1: In a speech at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, Vice President George Bush states: "And so today I'd like to discuss some of the basic concerns that the American people rightfully have about our policy toward Iran, questions of why we tried to open channels, open channels with a regime that all of us Americans despise, questions of how we can have a policy of not sending arms to Iran and then seemingly do just the opposite, in questions about the operation of the National Security Council Staff. "Let me start with a basic concern. "Why did we open a dialogue with Iran? Here was a country that deeply humiliated the United States by kidnapping our diplomats, burning our flag, and we still have vivid memories of blindfolded Americans being paraded around our embassy there in Teheran. And there is, in the hearts of the American people, an understandable

animosity, a hatred really, to Khomeini's Iran.

"I feel that way myself, to be very honest with you.

"And so does the President, who has been vilified time and time again by Iran's radical leaders. We're told that most Iranians feel the same way about us, the country that they call the Great Satan.

"And so why have anything to do with them?

"I'm sorry I didn't bring a map, but if you look at a map, Iran is all that stands between the Soviets and the gulf oil states. It's all that stands between the Soviets and a warm water port. Either a disintegrating Iran or an overly powerful Iran could threaten the stability of the entire Middle East and especially those moderate Arab states, our friends, whose stability and independence are absolutely vital to the national security of the United States.

"We may not like the current Iranian regime, and I've said we don't. But it would be irresponsible to ignore its geopolitical and strategic importance. And that doesn't mean we should simply appease any Iranian regime. It does mean, however, that we can't ignore this looming transition that will soon take place in Iran.

"Khomeini will pass from the scene.

"A successor regime will take power.

"And we must be positioned to serve America's interests and indeed the interests of the entire free world. Apart from the strategic reasons, humanitarian concern about American hostages in Lebanon provided another reason to open a channel

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			to Iran. "The Iranians themselves are not holding our hostages. "But we believe they have influence over those who do hold some of our hostages." (N.Y. Times, 12/4/86, at A14, col. 1. Text of Vice President's speech continues in next 3 entries.)
86/12/03-101 DECEMBER 3, 1986			VICE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE TEXT, Part 2: [Text of Vice President's speech continues from preceding entry:] "But let me add something very important. "In spite of our bitter feelings toward Iran's leadership, we would've tried to begin a dialogue with Iran whether we had hostages in Lebanon or not. "In fact for three years prior to the first hostage kidnapping, this Administration attempted to find reliable, hopefully moderate, Iranian channels through which to conduct a responsible dialogue. "And more recently, we've been receiving intelligence that pragmatic elements within Iran were beginning to appreciate certain sobering realities. To the east, in Afghanistan, we estimate 115,000 Soviet troops are committing atrocities on Iran's Islamic brothers. To the north, 26 Soviet divisions right there on Iran's border for whatever opportunities might arise. To the west, Iran is engaged in a war of unbelievably horrible human dimensions -- war with Iraq.

12-year-old kids, 14-year-old kids pressed into service and then ground up in combat.

"And at home, Iran is te[e]tering on the economic brink right there in its own front yard a 40 percent unemployment rate. Many Iranian leaders understand that their own survival and certainly the rebuil[d]ing of their economy may depend on normalizing ties with their neighbors and with the Western World.

"And so we, for our reasons, and certain elements in Iran for their reasons, in spite of this mutual hatred, began a tentative probing dialogue which brings us to another question:

"How can the United States Government have a policy against countries sending arms to Iran and then turn around and itself send arms?

"I understand, I know the American people simply don't understand this. And when we started talking to the Iranians, both sides were deeply suspicious of each other, and remain so, I might say.

"Those Iranians who were taking enormous personal risks by just talking to us felt that they needed a signal that their risks were worth it. And we were told the signal that they required and we gave them that signal by selling a limited amount of arms, about one-tenth of 1 percent of the arms that have been supplied by other countries.

". . . ."

(N.Y. Times, 12/4/86, at A14, cols. 1-3.)

VICE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
DECEMBER 3, 1986			TEXT, Part 3:

[Text of Vice President's speech continues from preceding entry:]

"But you must remain true to your principles and I can tell you that the President is absolutely convinced that he did not swap arms for hostages. And still the question remains of how the Administration could violate its own policy of not selling arms to Iran.

"Simple human hope explains it perhaps better than anything else.

"The President hoped that we could open a channel that would serve the interests of the United States and of our allies in a variety of ways. Call it leadership. Given 20-20 hindsight, call it a mistaken tactic if you want to. It was risky but potentially of long-term value.

"The shaping of the Iranian policy involved difficult choices. As complex as the public debate on the issue would be, the matter was further clouded by the way in which the President's goals were executed. Specifically allegations about certain activities of the National Security Council staff. Clearly mistakes were made. Our policy of conducting a dialogue with Iran, which was legitimate and arguable, has become entangled with the separate matter of this N.S.C. investigation.

"A week ago Monday afternoon, the President learned of proper, of possible improprieties. A week ago Monday. On Tuesday, he disclosed the problem to the public and instructed the Attorney General to go forward with a full investigation.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			On Wednesday, he created a bipartisan commission, outstanding three individuals, outstanding individuals, to review the role of the N.S.C. staff and make recommendations for the future. And just yesterday, he moved to appoint, have the court appoint an independent counsel to insure a full accounting for any possible wrongdoing. "The President pledged full cooperation with the United States Congress, urging it to consolidate and expedite its inquiry. Yesterday, he also named Frank Carlucci, a seasoned professional with broad experience so well-known to many people here, to serve as his national security adviser. "Now this is fast action in anybody's book. And these are actions I fully support and which I believe the American people will judge commendable. And the President has moved swiftly, stongly. But let me add this: I am convinced that he will take whatever additional steps may be necessary to get things back on track and get our foreign policy moving forward. "As the elected representatives of, of all the people, the President and the Vice President, he and I have a duty to preserve the public trust and uphold the laws of this country and we take, take that duty very very seriously." (N.Y. Times, 12/4/86, at A14, cols. 3-6. Text of Vice President's speech concludes in next entry.)
86/12/03-103 DECEMBER 3, 1986		VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE DIVERSION: "I was aware of our Iran initiative and I support the President's decision. And I was not	VICE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE TEXT, Part 4: [Text of Vice President's speech concludes

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		aware of and I oppose any diversion of funds, any ransom payments or any circumvention of the will of the Congress or the law of the United States of America." See col. 3.	from preceding entry:] "I'd like to say something about my own role in all of this. I was aware of our Iran initiative and I support the President's decision. And I was not aware of and I oppose any diversion of funds, any ransom payments or any circumvention of the will of the Congress or the law of the United States of America. "And as the various investigations proceed, I have this to say: let the chips fall where they may. We want the truth. The President wants it. I want it. And the American people have a fundamental right to it. And if the truth hurts, so be it. We gotta take our lumps and move ahead. "Politics do not matter. Personalities do not matter. Those who've served the President [who] haven't served the President well don't matter. What matters is the United States of America. And we mustn't allow our foreign policy to become paralyzed by distraction. There can be no denying that our credibility has been damaged by this, this entire episode and its aftermath. "We have a critical role to play internationally and I intend to help the President tackle the challenges that lie before us in the last two years of this Administration. Putting U.S.-Soviet relations on a new footing, pursuing a breakthrough in arms reduction, building on the potential that I saw so clearly just this past summer for making new strides for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, working to end apartheid and creating a more hopeful future for all Africans, solidifying the remarkable changes

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			taking place in Asia, combating international terrorism in close conjunction with our allies, and, of course, fostering the development of democracy in Central America. And let me add, the freedom of the people of Central America should not, must not, be held hostage to actions unrelated to them. This nation's support of those who are righting for democracy in Nicaragua should stand on its own merits, not hang upon events related to Iran. "The Marxist-Leninist regime in Managua must not benefit from the errors of some people in Washington. Our Administration has a duty to follow a foreign policy that reflects the values of its citizens. "This sounds simple and yet it is often, as so many of you here know, a very complex matter. It's not easy translating general values into specific foreign policy programs and this is why there's always so much internal debate over our nation's role in world affairs from Iran to arms reduction." (N.Y. Times, 12/4/86, at A14, col. 6.)
86/12/04-100 DECEMBER 4, 1986		BRUNEI DEPOSIT AND FROZEN SWISS ACCOUNTS DoS CHRONOLOGY: "U.S. AMBASSADOR informs Department that Brunei had transferred funds on August 19, and transfer could not be withdrawn. "Department sends diplomatic note to Swiss. Accounts related to Lake Resources and LTC NORTH frozen." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Contras] ends at 86/12/08-100.)	
86/12/05-400 DECEMBER 5, 1986		BRUNEI: DISCLOSURE OF THE SOLICITATION ABRAMS ACCOUNT: Abrams testified he disclosed the solicitation on December 5, 1986, after receiving Shultz' permission and after informing the FBI. (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 241. See id., 6/2/87, at 115; id., 6/3/87 at 130.) Abrams testified he did not tell Congress earlier about the Brunei solicitation because of concern for the Brunei Government, not for the DoS. Shultz knew all about it and the solicitation, according to Abrams, was "entirely legal." (Abrams Testim., JHICI, 6/2/87, at 239.)	
86/12/06-100 DECEMBER 6, 1986			PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON IRAN: The President states in a radio address: "I gave the order to proceed. We had some notable success. . . . And while we are still seeking all the facts, it's obvious that the execution of these policies was flawed and mistakes were made. Let me just say it was not my intent to do business with Khomeini, to trade weapons for hostages, nor to undercut our policy of antiterrorism." (22 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 1629 [12/15/86].)
86/12/08-050	PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS OR CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY	PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS OR CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY	PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS OR CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
DECEMBER 8-10, 1986	FOR POINDEXTER AND NORTH: WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. STOKES. . . . Mr. Regan, during the period of time you were the Chief of Staff, after Poindexter and North had left the White House, did there come a time when there was a discussion with the President when you were present about congressional immunity for Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter? "Mr. REGAN. Yes, there was such a time. "Mr. STOKES. And would that have been around approximately December 15th, 16th? "Mr. REGAN. I think even earlier than that--probably around December 8th, 9th, or 10th, in through there. I recall discussions of that. "Mr. STOKES. And who was present at that time? "Mr. REGAN. Well, I remember one discussion among the President, the Vice President and myself regarding this as to how to get the full story out. Both the Admiral and the Colonel were refusing to talk. We had said we didn't know the story, couldn't find out the story, granted, the Tower Commission was working but still in an effort to hasten this, I believe the President did suggest publicly some time in the period to which I referred that either the Senate or the House or both intelligence committees should give limited immunity to both of these witnesses or to either one of them in order to get a story out. "But both of the committees, the House and the Senate Intelligence Committees, said, no, they	FOR POINDEXTER AND NORTH: WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	FOR POINDEXTER AND NORTH: WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION REGAN ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

didn't want to do that, that there wasn't the proper time.

"Mr. STOKES. Now, either at that particular meeting or any other meeting, was the question[] of presidential pardon for either Admiral Poindexter or Colonel North ever discussed with the President?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes, it was.

"Mr. STOKES. Can you tell us when that was?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes. Somebody brought it up to him. It was shot down right away. That was something the President wouldn't even listen to, the fact that he should grant a pardon. His reasoning went along this sort of line, to grant a pardon means you think somebody has committed a crime; you only pardon for a crime.

"And he didn't know what the crime was. As yet, there had been no evidence brought to him, the Tower Commission report was not out, the Independent Counsel had been put in being, but he had no report, obviously neither the Senate nor the House Intelligence Committees had finished, let alon[e] the fact that this committee would be set up, so the President said not only is it premature, but I will be darned if I am going to accuse them of a crime in advance.

"Mr. STOKES. Was that the extent of the conversation that day, as you recall?

"Mr. REGAN. It never came up again. He put his foot down hard and it never came up again." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 13-15. See id., 7/31/87, at 69, 78-79 [further Regan testimony on the discussion of a Presidential

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	pardon or Congressional immunity].)		
86/12/08-100 DECEMBER 8, 1986		BRUNEI: DISCLOSURE OF THE SOLICITATION DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ABRAMS testifies before SSCI concerning his November 25 briefing. Discloses Brunei pursuant to guidance from the Department. Is heavily criticized by Senators." (JHICI Ex. GPS-A. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. See 86/12/05-100 [Abrams dates his Congressional appearance on 12/5/86].)	
86/12/08-150 DECEMBER 8, 1986			SHULTZ' CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY; AND CASEY CHALLENGES SHULTZ DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS testifies before HFAC. "GPS informed that CASEY questioned GPS assertion that he and POINDEXTER had told GPS that Iran initiative had been 'stood down.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/12/12-100.)
86/12/08-200 DECEMBER 8, 1986		McFARLANE'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: HFAC McFARLANE ACCOUNT: McFarlane testifies before the HFAC that North's role with regard to the Contras was to serve as a liaison with Contra leaders to build their morale. He states that North was not to solicit, encourage or otherwise broker indirect support for the Contras. When Rep. Barnes asks McFarlane if he knows whether North stuck to those guidelines, McFarlane	

testifies, "Mr. Barnes, my firm belief is based on what he told me and that is that he did not do that and he has told me that many times." He also testifies, "I did not solicit any country at any time to make contributions to the contras." (JHICI Exx. 63, 74; McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 5-7, 112-14.)

86/12/08-205
DECEMBER 8,
1986

McFARLANE'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: HFAC McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Mr. NIELDS. Mr. McFarlane, I think it is fair to say that for a considerable period of time, Congress or its committees were trying to find out the answer to the question, where was the contras' funding coming from following the effective date of the Boland amendment[.]

"And I take it from your answers yesterday that at least for the period 1984, 1985, the answer to that question is Country Two.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And, you knew that I take it because you testified to it yesterday.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you had indeed had a hand in two sets of contributions, one resulting from a meeting that you had in May of 1984 with a representative of Country Two, in which you told him of the contras' needs, the Administration's interest, and he responded with a contribution of $1 million a month. [See entries starting at 84/05/00-200.]

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And then again, after the Boland amendment had been passed, you had a meeting in early 1985 with the same person in which you essentially told him the same thing, and later on learned that his country had responded with double the contribution of the previous year? [See entries starting at 85/02/00-390.]

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, Mr. McFarlane, I take it you appeared before a number of Congressional committees towards the end of last year, one of which was the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. That is correct.

"Mr. NIELDS. And that was, I believe, on December the 8th, 1986.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. I have put excerpts of that testimony by you before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the Exhibit Book at Exhibit 63. . . .

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. . . . I will ask you whether you were asked the following question, and gave the following answer. At the bottom of page 65, [']Mr. McFarlane, I would like to try and understand, as we close, what role if any the National Security Council had in the solicitation of funds for the contras.

"[']Earlier this morning, Secretary Shultz indicated that there had been success in soliciting and persuading at least one country to provide funding and presumably it was intended for humanitarian purposes and presumably, he was speaking about Brunei.

"[']Did you or anyone working with you or for you at the National Security Council at any time make efforts at solicitation of other countries for contributions to the contras?[']

"Mr. McFarlane, this is your response, is it not? 'I did not solicit any country at any time to make contributions to the contras. I have seen the reports that various countries have--' then there is a word deleted, and that is a Country Two, isn't it?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't know.

". . . .

"Mr. NIELDS. I will represent to you--you may check it if you wish that the word deleted there is country two, so I will read your answer. 'I did not solicit any country at any time to make contributions to the contras. I have seen the reports that various countries have, country two, third countries, and I have no idea of the extent of that or anything else.'

"Did you make that answer?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes."

(McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 3-7; JHICI Ex. 63 [Excerpts from McFarlane's testimony before the HFAC, 12/8/86].)

86/12/08-206
DECEMBER 8,
1986

McFARLANE'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: HFAC
McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2:

[Continuing from preceding entry:]

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, in fact, you did have a pretty good idea of country two's funding of the contras; didn't you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. In fact, as you have testified

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

yesterday and today, you had a hand in obtaining contributions totalling approximately $32 million from country two?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. But you did not tell that to the Foreign Affairs Committee at that time?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. No. I was trying to use some tortured language, inappropriately, I think, but to comment that I did not know the extent to be technically accurate, I did not and do not today. But I take your point, Mr. Nields, it wasn't a full account.

"Mr. NIELDS. I would like you to turn then to the first page in Exhibit 63. I ask you if you were asked the following question and gave the following answer. At the bottom of the first page, which is marked 57 in the upper-right-hand corner-- 'there have been also press reports that--' --and I will represent that the word deleted is representatives of country two-- '--have been indirectly involved in financing the contras. Are you aware of any such activities?'

"And your answer was, 'I have seen the reports and I have heard that people from country two have contributed. The concrete character of that is beyond my ken.'

"Now, in fact, the concrete character of it was in your ken, was it not?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, it really wasn't precisely. In fact, it is in the context of this investigation that I have learned that the $1 million that was volunteered in the summer of 1984 actually went beyond the end of 1984 into 1985. I didn't know that until I learned it in these hearings and after this testimony was given.

"The estimate that the second contribution would be on the order of twice the monthly rate of the year before turns out to have been not donated in a monthly rate at all but in a very few number of lump sum payments, and the total slightly more than that, but I take it your point as a matter of principle that this is not as full an account as I could have given.

"Mr. NIELDS. Well, in effect, you told the committee that other than what you had read in the newspapers you didn't know anything about that?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I told the committee what is on the paper here and the difference between a concrete knowledge of such matters as I have just explained to you and what I know today is for the reasons I have given you.

"Mr. NIELDS. Just so the record is clear you did know at that time that you had a conversation with a representative of Country Two in May and that Country Two had thereafter contributed a million dollars a month for some period of time?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you knew that you had another conversation with a representative of Country Two in February or so of 1985, and that the contribution for that year had been doubled.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. I believe, however, that it isn't really clear in my mind that I had a meeting at all that preceded the second donation. I am willing to accept that because I am told that I should be as supplicatory as I can. I doubt that it happened.

"Mr. NIELDS. But you did testify to it yesterday?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Because I could conceive that I might have been party to it, but I doubt it." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 7-11; JHICI Ex. 63 [excerpts from McFarlane's testimony before the HFAC, 12/8/86]. See 85/02/00-410 [McFarlane's testimony on the circumstances of the second contribution to the Contras from Country 2].)

86/12/08-309
DECEMBER 8,
1986

McFARLANE'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: HFAC

McFARLANE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. NIELDS. Now, there came a time, did there not, . . . last December, 1986, when you were once again asked by Congressional committees to testify about Oliver North's activities?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. This past year, in '86?

"Mr. NIELDS. Yes.

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. December '86.

"I would like you to turn to exhibit 74. Do you have that in front of you?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes, I do.

"Mr. NIELDS. And is that an excerpt of testimony that you gave before the House Foreign Affairs Committee?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. On December the 8th, 1986?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And Congressman Barnes asks you a question at that time. Does he not?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And what he says is, walk us through Mr. North's activities on behalf of the Contras from the time that you know they began up until your last knowledge of his activities on behalf of the Contras.

"Then he says, I tried to get at that in my earlier question but maybe the best way to get at it is not to ask you specific questions, but to just ask you in a general way just sort of walk us through Mr. North's activities on behalf of aiding the Contras. Tell us what you know about his activities.

"Then you responded. Did you not?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. And you said [']Lt. Colonel North has basically sat on the interdepartmental groups that deliberate over overt and covert policy as it relates to Central America and from the time of the prohibition and Chairman Boland's amendment, that was adopted in 1984, Colonel North's proscription or my proscription of him was that he do nothing beyond the law surely, but that, yes, his role ought to be in his liaison [original document being quoted adds "periodically" here] with the Contra leaders, simply to say that we didn't [original document reads "don't," not "didn't"] have any more authority to supply the money or the hardware, that it is going to take some time for the President to develop the national support, the congressional support to do it again, but that the President is committed to do it. He hopes that they can carry on. In short, kind of a morale

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		building, hand holding kind of thing. "[']Separately, with regard to any other kind of fundraising or indirectly keeping them alive, supporting them, so forth, that he was not to do that. He could not [original document reads "neither," instead of "not"] solicit nor encourage nor otherwise be a broker of indirect support of the Contras.['] "Then Mr. Barnes asks you, in your testimony as [']to your knowledge he never did that?['] "Then you responded, [']Mr. Barnes, my firm belief is based on what he told me and that is that he did not do that and he has told me that many times.['] "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. That is basically the sum and substance of what you told Mr. Barnes North did on behalf of the contras? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 112-15; JHICI Ex. 74 [excerpts of McFarlane's testimony before HFAC, 12/8/86]. For McFarlane testimony following this entry on his appearance before HPSCI on 12/10/86, see below at 86/12/10-005. For McFarlane's responses to Congress, generally, see below at 86/12/10-009.)	
86/12/09-100 EARLY TO MID- DECEMBER 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. SMILJANICH. Now, going forward then to early December, a meeting was going to be held with the second channel that had come up in connection with this Iran initiative. Leading up

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			to that meeting, which would take place in Europe, Director Casey wanted to change something with regard to the talking points that would be presented to the second channel. "Do you recall that incident? "Mr. REGAN. I recall something of it, yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. What do you recall? What did Director Casey tell you? What was he concerned about? "Mr. REGAN. [W]ell, a[s] I recall, there was a very narrow construction that was going to be made of what the U.S. participants in those discussions could discuss and Casey wanted it broadened, I believe, to include the hostages. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Do you recall that the issue also involved whether or not this channel to Iran should include policy matters in addition to intelligence matters? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. Yes. That is what it was. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Director Casey wanted to make sure that this channel allowed the CIA to continue to have this channel in connection with policy matters; isn't that correct? [Sic.] "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. And he asked you to bring this to the President's attention? "Mr. REGAN. Yes. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Did you do so? "Mr. REGAN. Yes, I did. I told him--well, this is a normal procedure. There is nothing sinister about this. Any cabinet rank officer who thought he needed a presidential decision but not necessarily a meeting with the President would

call me up and say, 'Hey, on such-and-such, I think thus and so, why don't you tell the President about it?'

"So I did. I told him what Casey's views were on it and told him that he should consider it and talk to George Shultz about it.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. At any rate, the meeting was held and it was reported back the results of that meeting; is that correct?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Now, this is now mid-December 1986. After all of the front page publicity about this matter for over a month, after the public revelations of our prior negotiations with the Ayatollah, after this had been kept from the intelligence committee for well over a year, until they read about it in the papers, after all of that, isn't it correct that the Iranians were still offering to use their influence to get our hostages out of Lebanon?

"Mr. REGAN. Yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. And isn't it correct that the Ayatollah at that point still wanted to get his hands on U.S. weapons?

"Mr. REGAN. I don't know about the Ayatollah, but those Iranians there were dickering for more arm[s], yes.

"Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, you had no belief that these Iranian moderates were going to shoot their missiles at the Ayatollah, did you?

"Mr. REGAN. I had no idea what they were going to do with it. It may not be a bad idea, but go ahead.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. SMILJANICH. You understood the Ayatollah's army was going to use those missiles to kill Iraqis? [T]hat is why Iran wanted these missiles? "Mr. REGAN. They were always referred to by members of the NSC who were advising the President as defensive weapons. They were never characterized as offensive weapons. "Mr. SMILJANICH. Well, the Iraqi soldier who might be on the other end of the TOW missile might not make that distinction, would you agree with that? "Mr. REGAN. That is true, but if i[t] is on the offense, he has to expect some defense." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/30/87, at 88-91.)
86/12/09-300 DECEMBER 9, 1986		NORTH'S CONTRA ACTIVITIES: C/CATF's SSCI TESTIMONY C/CATF ACCOUNT: "Mr. Boren. Let me ask you to turn to page 33 of your testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee. . . . "You were asked specifically about activities by Colonel North to support the contras, and you said yesterday when North bragged at the RIG meeting about, in January of 1986, about his activities with the [redacted] airstrip, that that was a neon light about North's role. So that made an impression on you. "Yet when you were before the committee, you were asked, would you agree or disagree with the statement it was common knowledge in the agency,	

those associated with him, Colonel North was involved in finding ways to provide appropriate assistance? [Sic.] You, in essence said, it was pretty widely understood.

"'Question. Can you provide for the committee any specifics about Colonel North's activities, can you be more specific?'

"There was a hesitation. Are you aware -- you said, well -- 'Question: Are you aware of any activities by Colonel North specifically directed to raising funds for the contras or arranging for provisions of supplies to the contras?

"'No, not of any specific direction or any specific activities that he undertook.'

"And yet clearly you knew about the airstrip, you had discussed it at the RIG. You s[ai]d that is a neon light that went on about the scope of his activities [see 85/12/09-401], and yet you didn't share that with the committee at that time.

"[C/CATF.] I think that my answer there is I will go back to my initial statement to the 14 October testimony which was also cutting some very tight corners, they asked me if I was aware of specific activities that he was involved in, and my answer obviously turned around the word 'involved'. I knew that he knew about them, I knew he was quarterbacking them, and what I was saying there was I did not know the depth of his involvement and if he was specifically funding them.

"I was being frankly technically correct, specifically evasive.

"Mr. Boren. Technically correct, but

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		specifically evasive. "[C/CATF.] That is my answer. "Mr. Boren. So you understand, in reflecting upon this, it had the effect of not steering the committee in the right direction, that it did not give a complete and accurate impression to the committee? "[C/CATF.] It did not give a complete and accurate answer. It was not as fullsome [sic] as it should have been. It was specifically an effort on my part to answer the question technically right, not perjure myself and not move outside the team work." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/86, at 120-22. See 86/03/00-800 [further on C/CATF's 12/9/86 SSCI testimony].)	
86/12/09-301 DECEMBER 9, 1986		C/CATF's SSCI TESTIMONY C/CATF ACCOUNT: In his testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, the C/CATF did not mention Casey's approach to a third country for Contra funding (see 86/10/18-300), nor did he mention the Contra activities of Gadd or Rodriguez. The C/CATF testified about his statements on December 9: "I am going to be very, very up-front with you, at that point in time I was walking on egg shells. I was walking a line once again as a member of a team, the story, it was a very tense sort of moment in time. I was one of the first ones off the block, I was exposed, I was nervous, and I was not going to perjure myself. I was	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		going to paint the broad strokes, and I was carrying forward still in the same frame of mind that I laid out beforehand. "I would answer the questions, I would not perjure myself and give you the broad outlines that I could fill in with the extent of my knowledge later as necessary." (C/CATF Testim., JHICI, 8/5/87, at 113-20, 117. See id., at 122-31 [C/CATF's SSCI testimony, generally]. See also id., at 118-19 [C/CATF's knowledge of Gadd's Contra activities and North's involvement].)	
86/12/10-005 DECEMBER 10, 1986		McFARLANE'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: HPSCI McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 1: [McFarlane testimony continues from 86/12/08-309.] "Mr. NIELDS. Then can you turn to Exhibit 75? Is that testimony before the House Intelligence Committee given two days later? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. "Mr. NIELDS. And you are asked, are you not[], by Mr. Cheney, 'I am curious about the Boland Amendment and how it was adhered to during your tenure. In your view, did the Boland Amendment apply to the National Security Council?' "And you responded, 'Yes, sir.' "Mr. Cheney then asked you, 'Prohibited NSC personnel from directing aid to paramilitary operations?' "You said, 'Yes'. "And then you were asked [']did you give instruction to those people on how they were to	

conduct themselves in light of the Boland Amendment? Were they briefed, verbal instructions as to how to proceed?'[]

"You responded, 'There [w]as no written instruction made. Biweekly, we had st[a]ff meetings each morning, but the entire staff gathered twice weekly and at those sessions it was made clear that the law applied to us, and that no officers on the staff was [sic (in original document, also]) to conduct activities at variance with the law.[']

"Mr. Cheney then asked, 'Were those instructions given to Colonel North?'

"You responded, 'Yes, sir.'

"Later down he says, 'Do you have any reason to believe he violated that prohibition?'

"And your answer is, 'I don't, Mr. Cheney.'

"And you then give a description of your basis for that conclusion. You testified, 'at congressional request in the form of letters of the subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on this hemisphere, in the summer of last year we ["we" not in original document where sentence lacks subject] went to considerable length to determine whether any activities had occurred that were against the law and specificially to require a review of all the files, memoranda that concerned both [sic (in original document)] policy[,] operations, actions involving NSC people, contacts with contra leadership, and this turned up two or three inches of paper that reported on contacts that did occur between Colonel North and myself, indeed, the

President and contra leaders.

"'These were publicized in a matter of public record when the political leaders of the Congress [sic (in original document)] would visit Washington and have meetings and on occasion, five occasions, Colonel North, we also called for the travel records of the Secretariat[] of NSC officers, where they had gone and what they had gone to do.'

"And then you say, 'And from the sum total of these documents, it was clear that the activities were to meet with contra officials, civilian officials, tell them in so many words where we were, that we did not have congressional support for military help, that we would try to get it, continue working with the Congress, that we couldn't provide it in the short term, but we hoped that they would use the time until we hoped [original document reads "hope"] we could get it to strengthen their political organization, bring in people like Cruz and others to develop a new political program for they were being perceived as knowing more than an insurgency, develop that side of his platform but we couldn't do anything to help them.

"'That was expressed in memoranda, so forth, that were turned up in the search. I asked Colonel North, I asked point blank, you are speaking a lot, I have encouraged you to do that, so do I.

"'What have you been doing on occasions when someone [original document reads "somebody"] asks can they contribute to the contras or other

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		military [original document reads "for military or other," not "or other military"] purposes. He said that occurred a number of times and he told them he could not be party to any transfers of monies and [that] if they wished to be helpful they should go on their own, contact the contra leadership[s]. He had not been involved in brokering that.' "That was the sum and substance of your response concerning your knowledge of Mr. North's activities. "Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 115-18; JHICI Ex. 75 [excerpts from McFarlane's testimony before HPSCI, 12/10/86].)	
86/12/10-006 DECEMBER 10, 1986		McFARLANE'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: HPSCI McFARLANE ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. NIELDS. Now, in fact, you knew that North was actively searching for money, and he sought out blowpipe missiles for the contras. You had obtained money from country two that had been used to supply the weapons in 1984 and 1985. There is a document you have testified about in which North was establishing a contact with a professional saboteur. He was clearly attempting to reward countries for providing false end user certificates for $8 million in arms, and I guess the question I want to ask you, given the relationship that ought to exist between the Executive and the Congress is what did the Congress have to do, what did they have to ask you	McFARLANE'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY ON THE TEHRAN TRIP AND DIVERSION: HPSCI McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

in order for you to tell them what you actually knew about North's conduct with the contras?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. I think, Mr. Nields, if you go on, for example, and read my reply to Mr. Cheney on December 8th or whenever this was, that after having gone through what you did and reading it into the record, Mr. Cheney asked, 'Did what he told you of those trips to Iran leave you with the impression that he was no longer complying with those instructions' [n.b. not a direct quote from Ex. 75], and I said yes, he clearly did give me that impression [not a direct quote from Ex. 75].

"Mr. NIELDS. He is referring to the discussion about diversion that you had on the tarmac?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Whatever he refers to as a matter of acknowledging my own presumption of his non-compliance with the law as of when I knew it, which is what I think Mr. Cheney is asking here, I did acknowledge that, I think.

"Mr. NIELDS. Is you[r] description of Mr. North's conduct an accurate reflection of the documents that you dug out in the summer of 1985?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Yes. Those are descriptions of 1985, and then he asks, well, in 1986, when you had the Iran trip, did that trip--not PROF notes, not conversations. 'Did that trip lead you to believe that maybe he was no longer complying?' And I said yes.

"Mr. NIELDS. I understand, and that had to do, did it not, with the fact that you had just told the committee that North had told you on the tarmac that there had been a diversion of the funds from the Iranian arms sales to the contras?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. It isn't clear from the excerpt here.

"Mr. NIELDS. In any event, my question to you is this--does your description about the sum total of the documents that you dug out in 1985, that you gave Mr. Cheney in response to his question, accurately reflect[] [w]hat it was that was disclosed in those documents?

"Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, no, and I have said that, I think, many times in the last two days. The response that I gave in 1985 and the responses to the Congress in hearings in 1986 were clearly too categorical on my part.

"I did draw a distinction, or [sic] which I accept responsibility between what I believed to be the central concern of the Congress, which was fund-raising, and other activities, which were inconsequential, I thought, and I had misgivings about whether Colonel North was stepping over the line in these areas from advising things like that, but from what I could learn in 1985 on the matter of fund-raising, he wasn't doing that.

"Maybe if I had searched deeper, I could have found that out, but I didn't, and I am responsible for that.

"Mr. NIELDS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of Mr. McFarlane at this time . . . ." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 118-21; JHICI Ex. 75 [excerpts from McFarlane's testimony before HPSCI, 12/10/86].)

86/12/10-009 McFARLANE'S RESPONSES TO CONGRESS, GENERALLY McFARLANE'S RESPONSES TO CONGRESS, GENERALLY

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1985-86		McFARLANE ACCOUNT: "Mr. MITCHELL. Isn't it true with respect to the activities of the staff as reported to Congress, isn't it true that you participated in the deliberate misleading of Congress regarding the activities of the NSC staff? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I think I did not give as full an answer as I should have. "Mr. MITCHELL. No, that is not my question. I know you have said that, you have used the phrase 'too casual.' I'm asking a direct question: Isn't it true that you deliberately misled the Congress regarding the nature and extent of the activities by members of your staff? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I just don't see it in exactly the same terms as you, Senator Mitchell." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/13/87, at 138-39.)	McFARLANE ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
86/12/10-200 DECEMBER 10, 1986			THE IRAN INITIATIVE: VIEWS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION CASEY ACCOUNT: Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, CIA Director William Casey described the views of the President's advisers on the Iran Initiative: "Mr. Lantos. Mr. Casey, you indicated in your initial testimony that in early 1985, in mid-1985, when you first discussed this whole possibility, your judgment was -- and I am quoting you -- 'that it was worth trying.' "Was that your judgment? "Mr. Casey. Yes. The President wanted to try it. I thought it was worth the effort.

"Mr. Lantos. In retrospect, what is your recollection? What were the other players in the discussion saying? What did Mr. Shultz say at that time?

"Mr. Casey. I think Mr. Shultz and Mr. Weinberger were unenthusiastic about it.

"Mr. Lantos. What about Mr. Bush?

"Mr. Casey. I think he thought about the way I did; it was worth a shot.

"Mr. Lantos. Did the President --

"Mr. Casey. Oh, yes.

"Mr. Lantos. And Mr. Poindexter?

"Mr. Casey. Yes. Well, McFarlane and Poindexter both thought it was worth a try.

"Mr. Lantos. So, it is fair to say -- I have made mistakes in judgment in my life --

"Mr. Casey. Everybody recognized it was a long shot.

"Mr. Lantos. But basically, you are saying that Shultz and Weinberger were basically opposed, and the rest of you thought it was worth trying?

"Mr. Casey. I think that is probably right, although there are degrees of opposition.

"Mr. Lantos. Where did Don Regan fall in that spectrum?

"Mr. Casey. I really don't know exactly. I think he was with the President, what the President wanted to do. What the President wanted to do, he was for it."
(Casey Testim., HFAC, 12/10/86, at 116-17.)

86/12/10-201
DECEMBER 10,

THE IRAN INITIATIVE: VIEWS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986			CASEY ACCOUNT: "Mr. Dornan. . . . That question is still unanswered about whether there was ongoing negative advice at the time from the Secretary of Defense and State that this was still a very bad idea. "Mr. Ackerman. Perhaps the Director would answer that question. "Mr. Casey. I think there probably was. "Mr. Ackerman. There probably was -- "Mr. Casey. There was. There were ongoing discussions with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. "Mr. Ackerman. How about the Vice-President, what was his advice? "Mr. Casey. I don't think I want to tell everybody's advice -- the Vice-President, I am not sure. The reason I am not sure, at different time[s] different people had differing views. "The Vice-President generally supported the effort. He said that on television last week." (Casey Testim., HFAC, 12/10/86, at 185-86.)
86/12/10-210 DECEMBER 10, 1986	CASEY'S VIEW OF NORTH AND POINDEXTER CASEY ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	CASEY'S VIEW OF NORTH AND POINDEXTER CASEY ACCOUNT: See col. 3.	CASEY'S VIEW OF NORTH AND POINDEXTER CASEY ACCOUNT: "Mr. Lantos. One final question, Mr. Casey. "It is the impression of some of us that Lieutenant Colonel North is being set up as a scape goat when, in fact, the responsibility for many of the fundamental decisions [is] far above his level. Would you give me your sort of off-the-top-of-your-head reaction to that, because my sense of fair play just revolts against what I

believe is a major scapegoating operation.

"Mr. Casey. Well, it is hard for me to answer that question.

"Mr. Lantos. I know it is.

"Mr. Casey. I think that whatever Colonel North or Admiral Poindexter did, they did with the best of intentions.

"Mr. Lantos. There is no question about that.

"Mr. Casey. And I think that they misjudged or misstepped, that it was kind of a minor misstep.

"Mr. Lantos. I am sorry?

"Mr. Casey. I say, if they misjudged or misstepped, it was rather minor.

"Mr. Lantos. But it is not conceivable to you that Colonel North could have pulled this thing off pretty much single-handed?

"Mr. Casey. He would have had to have authorization and support from others working with him, and a number of us worked with him.

"Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Casey."
(Casey Testim., HFAC, 12/10/86, at 117-18.)

86/12/11-400
SOMETIME
BETWEEN
DECEMBER 11
AND 25, 1986

NORTH'S SECURITY SYSTEM: THE BILL
ROBINETTE ACCOUNT:

North calls Glenn Robinette and says, "[B]y the way, you never sent me a bill . . . for that security installation at my residence" -- the same system for which Secord has already paid Robinette in full.

Robinette sends North two bills back-dated to July and September to correspond with stages of completion of the project. Robinette sends copies

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	of the bills so it will look as though the originals had previously been sent. (No one tells him to do this, he testified. He acts out of concern for North.) Robinette puts the bills in an envelope addressed to North, and places that envelope in another addressed to Brendan Sullivan, North's attorney. Within a week, Robinette receives an envelope containing two letters from North. The letters correspond to the two back-dated bills and discuss the cost and payment terms for the security system. (Robinette Testim., JHICI, 6/23/87, at 30-42; JHICI Exx. 8-A, 8-B [Robinette back-dated bills]; 9-A, 9-B [North letters to Robinette].)		
86/12/11-420 SOMETIME AFTER LATE NOVEMBER 1986	NORTH'S SECURITY SYSTEM: HOW THE BILL WAS PAID NORTH ACCOUNT: "Now, I then went on the trip to Tehran [in May 1986]. I came back. I never got a bill. I didn't ask for a bill, and I never received one. I never asked, where is the bill, until well after it was too late, and I will cover that. "When I didn't get a bill, I basically understood what had happened, and I don't know exactly how it worked out, but I believe that an accommodation was worked between Mr. Robinette and General Secord to make a gift out of that security system[] that I did not pay for. "When I came to the end of my tenure at the NSC, it was, to say the least, a busy time. There were other things to be done besides shredding documents when I left. . . .		

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	". . . But there was one thing that just didn't look right, and that was that for the first time in my life, I had accepted something that I had not paid for, and even though I honestly believe that the Government of the United States should have paid for it, should have put it in, I then picked up the phone and asked for a bill. "I got a bill. In fact, I got two of them. I didn't ask that they be back-dated, but after all, Mr. Robinette is an old hand in the CIA. Right? The bills came with the old original dates, and I think there was another bill with [a] later date on it. "Then, as I told you yesterday, I was going to tell you the truth, the good, the bad and the ugly, this is the truth, I did probably the grossest misjudgment that I have made in my life. I then tried to paper over that whole thing by sending two phony documents back to Mr. Robinette. It was not an exercise in good judgment. ". . . . "I admit to making a serious, serious judgment error in what I then did to paper it over, and I am willing to sit here and admit to that. But I am also suggesting to you, gentlemen, that if it was General Secord who paid the bill, whatever it was--I thought it was $8,000, didn't learn until the hearings started it was more--I also suggest to you that if it was General Secord--first of all, thank you, General Secord--and second of all, you guys ought to write him a check, because the Government should have done it to begin with. "Thank you, sir."		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	(North Testim., JHICI, 7/8/87, at 96-100. See JHICI Exx. OLN 172, 173 [North letters to Robinette, dated 5/18/86 and 10/1/86].)		
86/12/12-100 DECEMBER 12, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS: DoS POSITION DoS CHRONOLOGY: "ARMACOST and CASEY agree on ground rules for upcoming meeting with second channel. The channel will be used for intelligence only. CASEY later calls REGAN and persuades White House to continue to authorize policy discussions in the channel, notwithstanding CASEY's agreement to the contrary with ARMACOST." (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. See Poindexter Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 8/6/87, at 34-44 [the Charles Dunbar memo of 12/14/86 and Poindexter's intercession with the Kuwaitis on the Dawa release]. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/12/13-100.)
86/12/13-020 DECEMBER 13, 1986			FRANKFURT MEETING: THE SECOND CHANNEL SUMMARY: For a narrative account of the Frankfurt meeting, see Iran-Contra Report, at 263.
86/12/13-060 DECEMBER 12-13, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS: DoS POSITION SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. BELNICK. . . . There was then activity aimed at setting up what was to be a meeting which State would now attend for the first time with the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			second channel. The record reflects that on December 12, [1986,] Secretary Armacost and Director Casey . . . agreed on ground rules for the upcoming meeting with the second channel, among which . . . was the rule that the channel would be used only for intelligence and not for policy; do you recall that? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. And this was one of the things that we were very concerned about, and I have been very concerned about for some time. That is the mixing up of intelligence and operations; and so we, as I described earlier, when I authorized this meeting to take place, with a Farsi speaking State Department officer present, we drew up explicit instructions, talking points, for him to use and read out. Don't just use them as a basis. Read them out; and as part of that, we wanted to get across the idea that the policy--no more arms, but this channel is for intelligence, not policy and to get the Agency separated from policy. "That was our object; that was not, I suppose, so important for Iran as it was for us, but nevertheless, we wanted that to be clear. "And so [U]nder Secretary Armacost, in his meeting with Director Casey, worked out an agreed set of talking points. I was--I think I was out of the country at the time. I was on my way back from a NATO meeting, I think. "Mr. BELNICK. And those talking points were relayed by cable, Exhibit [GPS] 49, to Ambassador Dunbar who was to be State's representative at . . . the meeting in Frankfurt that was then to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			take place with the second channel? "Secretary SHULTZ. Right. "Mr. BELNICK. Now, did the ground rules also include that Mr. Cave would be replaced as a negotiator with the second channel? "Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. "Mr. BELNICK. Did you learn that Director Casey had done something to nullify these ground rules after he agreed to them with Secretary Armacost? "Secretary SHULTZ. What we learned was that Director Casey called John Whitehead. In the meantime, Mike Armacost had gone to a planned trip to Southern Africa. He had left the city. So--and so John Whitehead was the senior officer, would have been anyway, but he was there to follow these things; and Director Casey called him and said that he had heard from Keel that there had been a change in the instructions that had been agreed on and he should call Keel to find out what was what. So he did. "And basically what was changed was that the policy came back in again, so he said how did that come about? And the answer was that Director Casey had called Don Regan and told Don Regan that he thought this was not in accord with the President's wishes and he should take it up with the President, which apparently Don did, and Keel was called in and told to get it changed. So it was changed." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 117-19; JHICI Ex. GPS 49 [Shultz cable to Dunbar, re Talking Points, 12/13/86].)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/12/13-061 DECEMBER 12-13, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS: DoS POSITION SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [W]hat was the significance of that change? What did it really mean to say that a channel that you had insisted and thought would be used now only for intelligence was going to be a channel that would be used for both intelligence and policy? "Secretary SHULTZ. I[t] meant that the battle to get intelligence separated from policy and control over the policy was very much in play and the Director of Central Intelligence wanted to keep himself very heavily involved in this policy which he had been involved in apparently all along. To me that's what it meant. "Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Secretary, did it indicate to you that . . . your belief that State had now been given control over the policy towards Iran might not, in fact, be the case, and that, in fact, nothing had changed? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, a lot had changed by this time. It wasn't that nothing had changed; but as you well know, or maybe you don't--you are not a Washingtonian--nothing ever gets settled in this town. You have to keep fighting, every inch of the way. "Mr. BELNICK. But at least on that point, it occurred to you that what might not have changed was that State was still not firmly in the driver's seat when it came to Iran policy?

"Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I felt that we were in the driver's seat all right. On the other hand, obviously Director Casey had managed to go, after having agreed to something, and not calling--he didn't call John Whitehead back and say John, you know we agreed on that, but I think we ought to change it. He went to basically to the President and got it changed; and used a rather, I think, deceptive way of letting us find out that it had been changed."
(Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 121-22.)

86/12/13-062
DECEMBER
12-13, 1986

SECOND CHANNEL CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS:
DoS POSITION
SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 3:

"Mr. BELNICK. . . . [A]t the meeting in Frankfurt, on December 13, after Ambassador Dunbar delivered what you believed to have been the agreed upon message, that there would be no more arms sales, the Iranian representative said lets talk about arms sales, and brought out what's been referred to in these hearings as the Nine Point Agenda, which included a promise to get the Dawa terrorist prisoners released and other promises that affected the foreign relations and war making activity of the United States, and that was the first time the State Department learned of the existence of those accords; am I correct?

"Secretary SHULTZ. That's right. I learned about it via the secure call we got from Mr. Dunbar after the meeting, and he got what he had gotten from the meeting and from his conversations with Mr. Cave. Of course, we then subsequently

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			went to--I went to Mr. Gates and he then found the document which we subsequently, I forget just when[,] came into possession of. But what Mr. Dunbar reported was the essence of the matter. "Mr. BELNICK. Mr. Chairman, members of the panel, Mr. Dunbar's report and other information which the Department received at the time is reflected in memos that appear at tabs [Exhibits GPS] 50 and 51, to which I will refer the panel's attention rather than review them." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 119-20. See JHICI Exx. GPS 50 [Dunbar cable of meeting with Second Channel, 12/14/86], GPS 51 [Raphel memo to Shultz, "The Iran Connection," 12/15/86].)
86/12/13-063 DECEMBER 12-13, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS: DoS POSITION SHULTZ ACCOUNT, Part 4: "Mr. BELNICK. It occurred to you in connection with [Casey's changing the ground rules for negotiations with the Second Channel] and with the revelation about the Nine Point Accord that the deception that you feared had been in progress before was continuing even after November 25? "Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I was worried about it. Of course, I got back after this message went out, and I was sitting in Washington when the meeting that Mr. Cave and Mr. Dunbar had with the Iranian took place. I was in Washington then. And still, you know, trying to struggle, keep track of all this. "Mr. BELNICK. But nobody had told you as they informed you that State could now take over the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			policy, and ground rules would be developed, that there was still a proposal on the table to sell arms to Iran and on top of that, to release terrorist prisoners, to prepare for possible intervention in the war, to undertake opposition to the Government of Iran, nobody had informed the Secretary of State of that? Correct? "Secretary SHULTZ. Nobody had informed me of this so-called Nine Point Agenda. But as far as I was concerned, our policy was clear. No more arms sales under these circumstances. "Mr. BELNICK. . . . [Y]ou reported your discovery to the President on December 14, and based on his reaction, you felt that now at last you had gotten through? "Secretary SHULTZ. The President was stunned, and he was furious, as I have said before, and this just had a big impact on him. He had no idea of this at all, I am sure. "Mr. BELNICK. At that point, Mr. Secretary, the argument which had begun in 1985 was finally over? "Secretary SHULTZ. I hope so." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 122-23.)
86/12/13-100 DECEMBER 13, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS: DoS LEARNS OF THE 9-POINT PLAN DoS CHRONOLOGY: "Meeting in Frankfurt among Iranian, State representative DUNBAR, CIA representative CAVE. DUNBAR delivers message that no more arms will be sold. Iranian reveals the existence of previous agreement with NORTH and HAKIM which contained

nine points. DUNBAR reports existence of the 'Nine Point Agenda' back to Department. DUNBAR returns to Washington, CAVE remains in Europe and holds second meeting with the Iranian, contrary to agreement by CIA that no more meetings in this channel would take place without State representative present.

"On receiving first DUNBAR report (by secure telephone), GPS asks to see PRESIDENT."
(JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] continues at 86/12/14-100. See entries starting at 86/10/08-000 on the 9-Point Plan.)

86/12/14-100
DECEMBER 14,
1986

THE DAWA PRISONERS: PRESIDENT'S REACTION TO THEIR PROPOSED RELEASE
DoS CHRONOLOGY:

"GPS meets with PRESIDENT. Informs him of DUNBAR'S meeting with second channel, including DUNBAR'S discovery of previous agreement re release of Dawa prisoners. PRESIDENT expresses shock, tells GPS that we never agreed to pressure Kuwait."
(JHICI Ex. GPS-C. See Poindexter Testim., JHICI, Executive Session, 8/6/87, at 34-44 [the Charles Dunbar memo of 12/4/86 and Poindexter's intercession with the Kuwaitis on the Dawa release.] On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100. DoS Chronology [Iran II] ends at 86/12/18-100.)

86/12/14-200
DECEMBER 14,

PROPOSED RELEASE OF THE DAWA: CLAIR GEORGE'S VIEW

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
1986			GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. Nunn. . . . There was a memorandum . . . for the record, from Charles Dunbar, State Department, December 14, 1986. I am going to read you a quote from that. I don't know which exhibit that is. Let me read it to you and see if you know anything about this. "'Poindexter told Cave -- ' -- and that reference is to George Cave -- ' -- that he personally asked the Kuwaitis to do something about the Dawa prisoners. Cave believes Poindexter met with the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister here in the fall and may have seen him in the region at some point, as well. "North also met with the Kuwaiti Ambassador and perhaps with other foreign officials as well.' "My question to you is, do you know anything about Poindexter, North, or anyone else in the U.S. Government asking the Kuwaits to release the prisoners or putting any degree o[f] pressure on them to release the Dawa prisoners? "Mr. George. No. [Redacted] in no uncertain terms that it was the intention of the Government of Kuwait to keep those prisoners until they had completed their sentences or whatever. "Mr. Nunn. So all the information you had was precisely the opposite from the import of this memo? "Mr. George. I haven't read this, but from the import of what you read me, yes. "Mr. Nunn. You don't know anyone in government who was actually asked or that actually contacted the Kuwaitis about releasing the

prisoners?

"Mr. George. I know no government official who contacted the Kuwaitis to ask them to release the Dawa prisoners. In fact, to the opposite. I am familiar with a message from the President of the United States to the Sheik of Kuwait urging him not to bend under any pressures.

"Mr. Nunn. Do you know anyone outside Government acting on our behalf, on the Government behalf, that was putting pressure or asking Kuwait to release the prisoners?

"Mr. George. No, sir."

(George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 171-73. See JHICI Ex. GPS 50 [Dunbar, Memorandum for the Record, "Cave/Dunbar Meeting with [Redacted] of the Iranian Government; Frankfurt, December 13, 1986," 12/14/86].)

86/12/15-100
MID TO LATE
DECEMBER 1986

NOTICE TO GREGG ABOUT NORTH'S AND RODRIGUEZ' CONTRA ROLES: THE NOTE LOST IN GREGG'S "PARTICULAR HEAVY SUIT"

GREGG NOTE:

Under a short handwritten section on a sheet of paper, the following is typed:

"This is a note taken during mid-December, 1986 telephone conversation with Felix Rodriguez, in which he told me for the first time that he had been more or less formally recruited by Ollie North to help with the Contra effort. Rodriguez also stated that North had asked him to keep secret his relationship with the Contra effort and, in particular, not to tell me about it.

"The note reads:

"'September, 1985 letter from Ollie was 1st tie to Contra support effort.'

"I found this in a collection of personal notes at home.

"[Signed:] D. P. Gregg

"Don Gregg

"[Handwritten:] 13 April 1987"

(Gregg Dep. Ex. 3.)

86/12/15-105
MID TO LATE
DECEMBER 1986

NOTICE TO GREGG ABOUT NORTH'S AND RODRIGUEZ' CONTRA ROLES: THE NOTE LOST IN GREGG'S "PARTICULAR HEAVY SUIT"

GREGG ACCOUNT, Part 1:

"Q. . . . Did Felix tell you what his role was vis-a-vis this private supply network as of August 8, 1986 other than the plane being repaired?

"A. No, he did not . . . .

"Q. When did [Rodriguez] first tell you that his involvement was more than that . . . ?

". . . .

"A. . . . I think it was probably mid to late December, after the [Gregg] chronology [see 83/11/03-100] had been put out, and it was obvious that what was happening was developing a lot of notoriety. And Felix called me to indicate that he was terribly sorry that this might cause some difficulty for the Vice President or for me. He was very emotionally upset. And at that point was the first time that he told me in any sense that I recognized that he had been formally asked by Ollie to help and then asked by Ollie not to tell me about it.

"Q. What specifically do you recall he told you?

"A. It seems to me -- didn't we turn over a small piece of paper with a scribbled note on it . . . .

". . . .

"Q. Don, what is this document, Gregg Exhibit 3?

"A. Well, it is a note which I took during a phone call which I placed in mid-December in which I guess it became clear to Felix that there was going to be a continuing hue and cry about the entire affair. He called and said that he had received a letter from Ollie in September.

"Q. Of 1985?

"A. Of 1985, and that this had been the start of his involvement and, as he told me this, Felix became very emotionally upset and said I truly hope that I have not caused problems for you and the Vice President. And the unsaid thing, I think, was not telling us before that he had been involved by Oliver North more directly in the contra support effort.

"Q. What did he tell you the letter said, the letter of September 1985?

"A. He did not get specific except to say that he asked me to aid and assist in the effort.

"Q. In what effort?

"A. Well, in the effort to support the contras.

". . . .

"Q. . . . [W]hat about that, the additional material you learned, would have raised the question of illegality, to use your term, that was not raised for you in August when Felix made his disclosures on August 8?

"A. It's hard to answer that kind of question, to recall what you knew at the time.

"Q. I understand.

"A. So that in terms of what I knew in mid-December was an awful lot more.

"Q. What are the additional facts? I understand that it's hard to say what you didn't know in August. But what are the additional facts that you had in December or thereabouts?

"A. Well, the main fact would have been the diversion of funds from Iran, about which I had absolutely no clue in August and didn't have a clue until I heard Ed Meese describe it in the broadcast.

"Q. And Felix didn't talk to you about that?

"A. Absolutely not. He didn't know himself.

"Q. So, taking away the diversion, is there anything that Felix told you about North's role in December that was different than what he had told you?

"A. No. Any change of information that I had had come not from Felix but from what I had learned in Washington.

"Q. So the only new thing that Felix told you really was that he had been told, A, to keep secret from you that, B, he was doing a lot of things under North's direction.

"A. Right."

(Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 43-50; Gregg Dep. Ex. 3.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN

86/12/15-106
MID TO LATE
DECEMBER 1986

NOTICE TO GREGG ABOUT NORTH'S AND RODRIGUEZ' CONTRA ROLES: THE NOTE LOST IN GREGG'S "PARTICULAR HEAVY SUIT"

GREGG ACCOUNT, Part 2:

Gregg testified further on how and when Rodriguez informed him of the role he played, at North's direction, in the Contra resupply operation:

"Q. The note you made of your conversation with Felix in handwriting, which is part of Gregg Exhibit 3, is that the only note you recall taking of the conversation?

"A. Yes. Yes. And Felix called me quite often and frequently it was what I would call sort of combat catharsis. He used to do the same thing in Vietnam. He would come back from an operation in which some people had been lost and he would tell me about it, and he would do the same thing from El Salvador. I very seldom took notes. I did take a note of that because it was so stunning to me.

"Q. What was so stunning?

"A. Well, the fact that Ollie had formally recruited him into this and that Ollie had asked him not to tell me about it.

"Q. The note, however, is simply a note about the September 1985 letter from Ollie, was first tie to contra support. [Sic.]

"A. Right.

"Q. And that's really why I was asking because the stunning part, as you describe it, isn't in this note.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"A. That's right. That I would never forget. I wanted to put down the time frame of the thing. Now I found that, funnily enough, this note in the pocket of a suit that I apparently wore in December and I didn't find it. [Sic.] It was a particular heavy suit, and I didn't find it until several weeks later. ". . . . "Q. And you found the note in a suit pocket? "A. Yes. "Q. Just crumpled up in the pocket? "A. Yeah." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 51-52; Gregg Dep. Ex. 3.)	
86/12/15-107 MID TO LATE DECEMBER 1986		NOTICE TO GREGG ABOUT NORTH'S AND RODRIGUEZ' CONTRA ROLES: GREGG INFORMS THE VICE PRESIDENT GREGG ACCOUNT: "Q. When did you first tell the Vice President what Felix told you in December of 1986? "A. That he had been recruited by Ollie? "Q. Correct. . . . "A. . . . I can't remember. I probably did it quite soon afterwards because it had made enough of an impression on me for me to write a note about it, but I don't remember the occasion. "Q. Do you remember what the Vice President said? "A. I do not remember that it evoked a large reaction." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 68-69.)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
86/12/15-108 MID TO LATE DECEMBER 1986		NOTICE TO GREGG ABOUT NORTH'S AND RODRIGUEZ' CONTRA ROLES: RODRIGUEZ' PHONE CALL GREGG ACCOUNT: "Q. Now with respect to the phone call that you had with Felix [Rodriguez] that you've given us the exhibit [Gregg Dep. Ex. 3] on today . . . . Did that phone call take place after you did your chronology [see 83/11/03-100]? "A. I think it did. I can't swear to it, but I think it was shortly thereafter. "Q. And it was Felix calling you, wasn't it? "A. Yes. "Q. And was it after you had been contacted by the FBI? "A. Yes, because I think, haven't I said it was the same day as the chronology, the 15th, so if it was after the chronology, it was also after the FBI. "Q. And as far as you knew -- correct me if I'm wrong -- as far as you understood when you met with the FBI they were going to be getting in touch with Felix because you gave them his number? "A. That's right, and I called Felix to tell him that they were going to come see him. That would have been the same day, the 15th, and I'm sure I would have called him. I remember calling him to say Felix, I've talked to some people from the FBI. They want to come to you. And he said fine. "Q. But it wasn't on that occasion that he told you -- "A. I don't think it was. I think it was	

after he had talked to them. My sense is whenever that phone call was made that first time the full impact of what was going on had hit Felix in terms of the influence it might have on the Vice President, for whom he has tremendous admiration, and it suddenly hit him that suddenly there was something evolving that might have a very negative impact on the Vice President or on his image and he was very upset about it.

"Q. Now the purpose of that phone call to him that you made on the 15th or shortly thereafter, that phone call was simply just a warning to him?

"A. Not a warning, because I knew, as I've said before, he was in very close touch with the FBI and I said some people came in to see me. They are interested in the August 8 meeting. I said I did not give any of the names that you gave to me, but they are going to want to know about those names, and I have given them your telephone number and they are going to call you soon. He said fine, no problem. I want to cooperate fully.

"Q. And you didn't go into any greater detail than that?

"A. No.

"Q. And you weren't attempting to influence his testimony?

"A. Absolutely not.

"Q. In any way, shape or form?

"A. Absolutely not.

"Q. Did you discuss with him anything about documents or collecting documents or having documents available?

"A. No.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"Q. When he told you about the letter on the phone call that you noted and we have the exhibit on today, did he tell you that he still had a copy of that letter? "A. He didn't tell me that. "Q. Did you ask him? "A. I did not." (Gregg, Senate Dep., 5/18/87, at 77-79.)	
86/12/16-050 DECEMBER 16, 1986	PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS OR CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY FOR POINDEXTER AND NORTH: WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. STOKES. Let me ask you this, Admiral. Either before you resigned or subsequent to your resignation, has anyone in the Administration at any time discussed with you the question of congressional immunity or presidential pardon? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Certainly not a presidential pardon. We never did request congressional immunity. Other people discussed that. I haven't discussed it personally with anybody. "Mr. STOKES. Admiral, are you aware of or have you ever been told of a meeting which occurred on the 16th of December in the White House, before the independent prosecutor was appointed, where a discussion took place [among] Attorney General Meese, Don Regan and the President regarding giving you and Colonel North either congressional immunity or a presidential pardon? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't know anything about that, Mr. Stokes."	PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS OR CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY FOR POINDEXTER AND NORTH: WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS OR CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY FOR POINDEXTER AND NORTH: WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	(Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/20/87, at 228. See 86/12/08-050, 86/12/16-100 [pardons discussed].)		
86/12/16-100 DECEMBER 16 AND 19, 1986	PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS FOR POINDEXTER AND NORTH: WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. STOKES. Mr. Attorney General, you appeared before the House Intelligence Committee on December 19, 1986 at which time I asked you some questions about discussions at the White House concerning immunity or pardon for Poindexter and North. "Do you recall that? "Attorney General MEESE. Yes, sir. "Mr. STOKES. That testimony has not been declassified, so I won't refer to it. I will just ask you the questions again that we talked about at that time. "On December 16, 1986, were you involved in discussions at the White House concerning immunity for North or Poindexter or both and will you tell us what was said and by whom? "Attorney General MEESE. It is hard to answer these questions again without having the opportunity to look at my testimony before the committee at that time. "Mr. STOKES. We have it here if you would like. "Attorney General MEESE. I would like to see it if I may. "Mr. STOKES. The question is, can you tell us what was said and by whom at that time? "Attorney General MEESE. As I recall, that	PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS FOR POINDEXTER AND NORTH: WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS FOR POINDEXTER AND NORTH: WHITE HOUSE DISCUSSION MEESE ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

there was consideration being given at the White House to develop a way in which the information that Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North had might be brought to the attention of the American people primarily to eliminate any doubts that might be extant about the President's knowledge or participation in the diversion, and at that time it was particularly about immunity, although I don't recall pardon being considered, but if it was, it was considered in the context of pardon or immunity as being used to accomplish the same result.

"As I mentioned earlier, at that time I was asked to read a statement that had been prepared, I believe, by White House counsel. I read the statement, made some suggestions that would be a more correct statement of the law regarding immunity.

"I indicated also that anything done along that line should be coordinated with the indpendent counsel and I don't think the independent counsel had been appointed at that time; I think he was appointed a day later or so.

"Also I participated in a general discussion as to the way immunity worked, the difference between transactional immunity and use immunity and so on.

"Mr. STOKES. Who else was present at that meeting?

"Attorney General MEESE. I believe that it included Mr. Wallison, who was the White House Counsel at that time; I believe Mr. Regan, who was then the White House Chief of Staff; I believe at

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	least part of the time the President was present when the discussion was being held or it was being held in his office. "There may have been others. "Mr. STOKES. Can you recall on this occasion or any subsequent occasion where you have given the President any advice with reference to a pardon involving either Colonel North or Admiral Poindexter? "Attorney General MEESE. I don't believe I have ever discussed--I can't recall at least discussing that with the President []or recall him asking me about a pardon as such. "As I say, the only possible reference that might have been to a pardon had to do with essentially the immunity aspects that were being discussed on the 16th of December." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 227-30. See above at 86/12/08-050 [Regan account of a White House discussion on Presidential pardons].)		
86/12/17-100 DECEMBER 17, 1986			COOPER MEMO ON "LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR RECENT COVERT ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN" MEESE ACCOUNT: "Mr. VANCLEVE. . . . [T]hese questions refer to Exhibit [EM] 69, which is a legal opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel, the Department of Justice, dated December 17 and entitled 'Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: Legal Authority for Recent Covert Arms Transfers to Iran.' "I take it that this memorandum was written after the basic factual structure of the 1985 arms

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			transfers was known, that is, although the committee has certainly heard quite a bit of additional testimony as to the details, the basic outlines, factual outlines, were available when the memorandum was written. "Is that correct? "Attorney General MEESE. I believe that essentially much of the information was available at that time as to the general series of events that had transpired, based upon the different revelations by Colonel North to us, Mr. McFarlane, and by the things that had been included in the congressional briefings and testimony, yes. "Mr. VANCLEVE. I probably should ask you that question in a different and somewhat more specific way. "Has Mr. Cooper, the author of the memorandum, notified you of any facts which have come to his attention in the last few months which would require him to modify his conclusions? "Attorney General MEESE. No, I do not believe that he has. "Mr. VANCLEVE. And turning to the last page of this memorandum, which is the conclusion section, this is an analysis--I might mention, for the benefit of the members--of both the 1985 and 1986 arms transfers that occurred, and the department concludes or Mr. Cooper concludes, 'For the foregoing reasons we conclude that a covert intelligence or intelligence-related operation authorized by the President and conducted by members of the NSC staff and/or the CIA could lawfully have included the sale of arms to Iran.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			Such an operation would have been carried out pursuant to presidential powers recognized in Sections 101 and 102 of the National Security Act. An oral authorization by the President would have sufficed to allow CIA participation under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. The use of Israel's American-supplied weapons under an arrangement by which Israeli stocks were later replenished appears not to have violated conditions under which American weapons are supplied to Israel.' "I want to ask you, Mr. Attorney General, do you agree with those conclusions? Is that the position of the Department of Justice at this time? "Attorney General MEESE. This is a memorandum to me that was based upon certain assumptions that are contained in the opening statement here. "I think we--I'm somewhat guided by the fact it says because the exact details of the transfers have apparently not completely transpired, this memorandum will provide a general framework for analysis with reference only to the basic facts that have already emerged. "So I don't think we can consider this memorandum a definitive opinion on whether specific transactions, whether in '85 or '86, were in fact legal. But it gives a general framework for examining those transactions, rather than a specific conclusion. "Mr. VANCLEVE. And with that qualification, would you agree with the basic reasoning and conclusions of the memorandum? "Attorney General MEESE. I would agree with

- the basic conclusion as stated and with that caveat, yes.

"Mr. VANCLEVE. Mr. Attorney General, thank you very much.

"Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions." (Meese Testim., JHICI, 7/28/87, at 206-09; JHICI Ex. EM 69 [Cooper memo to the Attorney General, "Legal Authority for Recent Covert Arms Transfers to Iran," 12/17/86].)

86/12/17-105
DECEMBER 17,
1986

COOPER MEMO ON LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR RECENT
COVERT ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN
MEESE ACCOUNT:

"Mr. STOKES. In another area, Mr. Attorney General, I want to be certain I understand your statement of yesterday concerning Exhibit [EM] 69, a December 17 memorandum written by Mr. Charles Cooper to you.

"You were asked whether you agree with the conclusions of this memorandum and you said that you did with a caveat, and I didn't quite understand what you mean by a caveat, and my question is what was that caveat?

"Attorney General MEESE. The caveat was that the conclusion that is found on page 18 of the memorandum which states for the foregoing reason, and then they give some conclusions, is modified by the initial assumptions that say this memorandum responds to your request for a summary of the legal authorities. Because the exact details of the transfers have apparently not completely transpired, this memorandum will provide a general framework for analysis with

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			reference only to the basic facts that have already emerged. "In other words, this is not meant to be a definitive memorandum on a specific set of facts, but a general memorandum using as assumptions the known facts about covert arms transactions. "Mr. STOKES. One other question, the sentence reads as follows: 'An oral authorization by the President would have sufficed to allow CIA participation under the Hughes-Ryan amendment.' "I suppose they are making reference to an oral finding. So my question would be, is it your view that the President can make oral findings that need not be reduced to writing? "Attorney General MEESE. He can make oral findings because the law only requires that he find that something is in the national security interests of the United States so obviously the letter of the law permits an oral finding. It is not something that I would recommend or have ever recommended to the President becuase I believe that a memorialization of his finding is absolutely necessary in order to make a record." (Meese Tesim., JHICI, 7/29/87, at 230-31; JHICI Ex. EM 69 [Cooper memo to Meese, "Legal Authority for Recent Covert Arms Transfers to Iran," 12/17/86].)
86/12/18-100 DECEMBER 18, 1986			SHULTZ' MESSAGE TO KUWAIT DoS CHRONOLOGY: "GPS sends message to KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER reaffirming that 'the President and I' remain committed to the policy that 'the U.S. Government

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			will never ask Kuwait to release the Da'Wa prisoners in order to get freedom for the American hostages.'" (JHICI Ex. GPS-C. On the DoS Chronology, see above at 84/04/16-100.)
86/12/23-100 DECEMBER 23, 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WEINBERGER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. EGGLESTON. Page 1 [of Ex. CWW 34] is a letter dated December 23, 1986, the version we have is unsigned, but it is a letter, I believe, from yourself to Secretary Shultz. "Secretary WEINBERGER. That is right. "Mr. EGGLESTON. And it encloses or attached to it is a memorandum from yourself to Alton Keel who was then the Acting Assistant National Security Adviser; is that correct? "Secretary WEINBERGER. That is correct. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Could you describe this-- "Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I had heard again from the same intelligence sources that in December, after all of this had come out, that there were still some meetings going on between United States representatives and that there was one scheduled for a few days with the Iranians, I believe in Paris and that the discussions were to re[v]olve around this whole problem of weapons and everything else and I was understandably extremely unhappy with that and I sent a very strong memorandum to Alton Keel, and it goes on for a couple of pages here, and then I sent a copy of it to George Shultz and said that I thought it was very unfortunate that these, while we are making

statements that we are denying that we are making any contacts with the Iranian Government through third country representatives or so on, that is true only in the most technical sense of the term and then I am afraid will cause further adverse reaction when the truth is known. [Sic.]

"And then I attached the memorandum I sent to Mr. Keel protesting this very strongly, and asking for a meeting and asking that no meeting be held with any Iranian representative until we had had a chance to meet over here in Washington and try to stop it.

"I said I am sorry to be so blunt about it, but it seems to me incredibly wrong with [sic (that?)] the precise mechanisms of secrecy and attempts to exclude advisers who may have different views which helped cause so many of our present difficulties are apparently being pursued by the State Department at this time.

"I was told as a result of this that State Department representatives were instructed only to listen and not to negotiate, but I believe that all the meetings were called off and were not formally held.

"Mr. EGGLESTON. The first paragraph of the attached memo, the memo to Mr. Keel, makes reference to congressional testimony by yourself.

"What is that a reference to?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. Let's see--the President announced in late November--I had assumed--the President announced in late November or early December that all further arm shipments to Iran had ceased and after it became apparent

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			the channels we were using to discuss hostage release and other matters were at the very least ineffective and as is apparently counterproductive I assumed that we were through with this entire Iranian episode and so testified to congressional committees last week. "That was testimony I gave to the Special Select Committee on Intelligence at their request covering these matters. "Mr. EGGLESTON. You had testified based on your state of knowledge so far as you knew there were no further deals? "Secretary WEINBERGER. That is right. It was finished by direction of the President. "Mr. EGGLESTON. You later learned that was not correct? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I later learned there was a meeting scheduled which I then urged not be held and which to the best of my memory was not held. I was also told that I didn't need to be quite so strong because nobody was going to negotiate, all they were going to do was sit and listen, but I have to confess I wrote a very strong memorandum here. "Mr. EGGLESTON. But in any event, this was again something you learned and not through official channels? "Secretary WEINBERGER. No, not through official channels[;] through the same sources we had picked up the whole other mess. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Was it your concern that what seemed to be going on was a return to what had happened immediately--

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Secretary WEINBERGER. That was the impression that I had and I convey here, yes." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 147-50. JHICI Ex. CWW 34 [Weinberger letter to Shultz, 12/23/86, with attached memo from Weinberger to Keel].)
86/12/23-101 DECEMBER 23, 1986			THE SECOND CHANNEL: FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WEINBERGER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] Weinberger's testimony on Ex. CWW 34 continued: "Mr. EGGLESTON. And I think that you indicate at the bottom of page 1 of the attached memo and the top of page 2 that you were concerned that [the President's] advisers on security matters were being cut out once again? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, I said I think the President is entitled to have the advice of all of his security advisers, and I must strongly object that the continuation of this practice and secrecy of attempts to exclude various advisers whose advice it is apparently feared may not support the agenda of various people in this case or some other agenda can only get us into more and more difficulty and serves the President very badly. I therefore ask there be a meeting of the National Security Planning Groups so the matter can be discussed properly and presented properly to the President and that our so-called negotiators with the Iranian Government wherever they are be brought home and instructed not to take any further action of any kind and so on and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			so on. "As I say, I had imprecise knowledge because it didn't come from United States sources. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Let me just, the last thing on this document, if you would look to the second-to-the-last paragraph, there is a refernece to your learning apparently for the first time we had given intelligence information. "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. That was a source of further extreme anger as far as I was concerned. "Mr. EGGLESTON. What is it that you had learned? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I said I have now learned thanks to your forthcomingness and by reason of our investigations McFarlane had actually offered the Iranians sensitive intelligence information passed by the United States, as to Iraq and that State plans other meetings with the Iranians on December 27 in Geneva. "I didn't know what was going to happen. I urgently urge no such meetings be permitted until we have the NSPG that you very forthrightly offered. That was to Keel. "Mr. EGGLESTON. This was the first that you had learned? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. Shortly before this memorandum was written which added to the stength of the memo, I guess. "Mr. EGGLESTON. This memorandum was sent, I take it, both to Mr. Keel and to Mr. Shultz? "Mr. Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"Mr. EGGLESTON. Did you hear back from either one of them? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. Mr. Keel called the meeting and said nothing would happen until after the meeting as I had requested. "Mr. EGGLESTON. Did you speak about the memorandum with Mr. Shultz? "Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. "Mr. EGGLESTON. And-- "Secretary WEINBERGER. He said that is what I said, he told me this was a list[en]ing mode only, that the meeting had been arranged before and that the general conclusions seemed to be that it was better to send somebody to listen and not just cancel the meeting, that something might come out of it, but that there was emphatically to be no further negotiations, no further discussions, no further arms, et cetera, et cetera, and I was relieved to hear that." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 150-52; JHICI Ex. CWW 34 [Weinberger letter to Shultz, 12/23/86, with attached memo from Weinberger to Keel]. See Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 71-74, 83 [continued negotiations with the Iranians in 12/86].)
86/12/23-200 DECEMBER 23, 1986			SECOND CHANNEL: FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. SARBANES. You said that the memo that you sent at the end of 1986 about the talks that were going to continue with the Iranians-- "Secretary WEINBERGER. Oh, yes. "Mr. SARBANES. You said you had imprecise

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			knowledge about it because your information had not come from U.S. sources. "Secretary WEINBERGER. That is correct. "Mr. SARBANES. So you were in the position as the Secretary of Defense of obtaining information about an American initiative from foreign sources; is that correct? "Secretary WEINBERGER. From intelligence sources." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 220; JHICI Ex. CWW 34 [Weinberger memo to Keel on continued negotiations with the Iranians, with cover memo from Weinberger to Shultz, 12/23/86].)
87/01/24-810 JANUARY 24, 1987			U.S. HOSTAGES SEIZED IN LEBANON: Three faculty members from Beirut University College--Alann Steen (communications instructor), Jesse Turner (Visiting Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science), and Robert Polhill (a CPA and lecturer in accounting)--are kidnapped in Lebanon. (Wash. Post, 8/19/87.)
87/01/26-100 JANUARY 26, 1987		PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO THE TOWER BOARD: "The President told the Board on January 26, 1987, that he did not know that the NSC staff was engaged in helping the Contras. The Board is aware of no evidence to suggest that the President was aware of LtCol North's activities." (Tower, at III-24.)	
87/01/27-100 JANUARY 27, 1987		THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS: See col. 3.	THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS: On the Iran Initiative, the President states: "I have one major regret. I took a risk with

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			regard to our action in Iran. It did not work, and for that I assume full responsibility. The goals were worthy. . . . But we did not achieve what we wished, and serious mistakes were made in trying to do so. We will get to the bottom of this, and I will take whatever action is called for." (23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 59 [2/2/87].)
87/02/08-100 FEBRUARY 8, 1987		McFARLANE DISCLOSES ADDITIONAL CONTRA FUNDING TO CONGRESS McFARLANE LETTERS: McFarlane writes in separate letters to Rep. Hamilton and to Sens. Boren and Cohen, to add to his Congressional testimony before the Intelligence Committees in December 1986 and January 1987: "This is to add to my earlier testimony before the Committee . . . . While before the Committee, questions were posed concerning my knowledge of private funding efforts in behalf of the Contras. While I took the Committee's interest to be in identifying violations of law, and replied in that context, it seems to me that in the interest of full disclosure I should add the following information although it does not fall in that category. "In May, 1984 a foreign national offered to contribute to the support of the Contras. I did not solicit the offer and when it was made, I should have told him to direct his interest to Contra representatives. I did not, and instead,	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		learned where he should send his contribution in this country and so informed him. I have no knowledge as to the precise amount the individual donated; it was from his own wealth and not from any government. I would estimate it may have come to as much as $5 million. At no time from that moment to this date, have I ever sought, brokered or otherwise managed donations from anyone. Further I provided strict guidance to the NSC staff proscribing such activities throughout the period of the Congressional cutoff. Finally, as I testified, periodic investigation within the NSC staff elicited firm denials of any such activity by any staff member." (JHICI Ex. 60.)	
87/02/09-000 FEBRUARY 9, 1987	McFARLANE HOSPITALIZED: Robert McFarlane is hospitalized for an overdose of Valium. He later recovers. McFARLANE ON RESPONSIBILITY: "Mr. SARBANES. In all of this, who or what are you trying to shield or protect? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Very likely myself, my reputation, my own record of performance. "Mr. MCFARLANE. And only that? "Mr. MCFARLANE. Well, I believe, Senator Sarbanes, that President Reagan's motives and direction to his subordinates throughout this entire enterprise ha[ve] always been in keeping with the law and national values. I don't think he is at fault here and if anybody is, I am." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 5/12/87, at 214.)	McFARLANE ON RESPONSIBILITY: See col. 1.	McFARLANE ON RESPONSIBILITY: See col. 1.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
87/02/09-100 JULY 14, 1987	McFARLANE ON NORTH AND RESPONSIBILITY: "I think, however, that I did expect and that he knew that I expected him to tell me about things that were new, different, potentially illegal. "I have to say, however, that at the end of the day, if he did something that transgressed the margin of law that he did it keeping i[t] quiet from me to protect me and I think ultimately that I am responsible for that." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 267.)	McFARLANE ON NORTH AND RESPONSIBILITY: See col. 1.	McFARLANE ON NORTH AND RESPONSIBILITY: See col. 1.
87/02/26-100 FEBRUARY 26, 1987	TOWER BOARD REPORT RELEASED: The President's Special Review Board -- the Tower Board -- composed of John Tower, Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft, issues its report. (Tower, at i-ii.)	TOWER BOARD REPORT RELEASED: See col. 1.	TOWER BOARD REPORT RELEASED: See col. 1.
87/02/28-100 FEBRUARY 28, 1987	THE WHITE HOUSE "SHOVEL BRIGADE" REGAN ACCOUNT: "Mr. BOLAND. . . . I'm looking at a statement that you made to the Washington Post on February 28 of 1987. I'm quoting: 'Some of us are like a shovel brigade that follows the parade down Main Street cleaning up.' "Mr. REGAN. I was wondering when that would be brought up. I almost got away with it." (Regan Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 29-30.)		
87/03/04-100 MARCH 4, 1987		PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE TOWER BOARD REPORT: "Now, another major aspect of the Board's findings regards the transfer of funds to the	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE TOWER BOARD REPORT: In an address to the Nation from the Oval Office, President Reagan states:

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Nicaraguan contras. The Tower board wasn't able to find out what happened to this money, so the facts here will be left to the continuing investigations of the court-appointed Independent Counsel and the two congressional investigating committees. I'm confident the truth will come out about this matter, as well. As I told the Tower board, I didn't know about any diversion of funds to the contras. But as President, I cannot escape responsibility." (23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 220-21 [3/9/87].) See col. 3.	". . . . "I've studied the Board's report. Its findings are honest, convincing, and highly critical; and I accept them. And tonight I want to share with you my thoughts on these findings and report to you on the actions I'm taking to implement the Board's recommendations. "First, let me say I take full responsibility for my own actions and for those of my administration. As angry as I may be about activities undertaken without my knowledge, I am still accountable for those activities. As disappointed as I may be in some who served me, I'm still the one who must answer to the American people for this behavior. And as personally distasteful as I find secret bank accounts and diverted funds--well, as the Navy would say, this happened on my watch. "Let's start with the part that is the most controversial. A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not. As the Tower board reported, what began as a strategic opening to Iran deterioated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages. This runs counter to my own beliefs, to administration policy, and to the original strategy we had in mind. There are reasons why it happened, but no excuses. It was a mistake. "I undertook the original Iran initiative in order to develop relations with those who might assume leadership in a post-Khomeini government.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			It's clear from the Board's report, however, that I let my personal concern for the hostages spill over into the geopolitical strategy of reaching out to Iran. I asked so many questions about the hostages['] welfare that I didn't ask enough about the specifics of the total Iran plan. "Let me say to the hostage families: We have not given up. We never will. And I promise you we'll use every legitimate means to free your loved ones from captivity. But I must also caution that those Americans who freely remain in such dangerous areas must know that they're responsible for their own safety. "Now, another major aspect of the Board's findings regards the transfer of funds to the Nicaraguan contras. The Tower board wasn't able to find out what happened to this money, so the facts here will be left to the continuing investigations of the court-appointed Independent Counsel and the two congressional investigating committees. I'm confident the truth will come out about this matter, as well. As I told the Tower board, I didn't know about any diversion of funds to the contras. But as President, I cannot escape responsibility. ". . . . "One thing still upsetting me, however, is that no one kept proper records of meetings or decisions. This led to my failure to recollect whether I approved an arms shipment before or after the fact. I did approve it; I just can't say specifically when. Well, rest assured, there's plenty of recordkeeping now going on at

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. "For nearly a week now, I've been studying the Board's report. I want the American people to know that this wrenching ordeal of recent months has not been in vain. I endorse every one of the Tower board's recommendations. In fact, I'm going beyond its recommendations so as to put the house in even better order. ". . . ." (23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 220-21 [3/9/87].)
87/03/16-300 MARCH 16, 1987	NORTH'S SECURITY SYSTEM ROBINETTE ACCOUNT: North calls Glenn Robinette and invites him to lunch at the office of North's attorney on March 16, 1987. Robinette accepts. North asks him to bring along copies of the back-dated bills Robinette had sent North in December 1986, as well as North's response letters. After they eat, North asks if Robinette has the documents. Robinette says he has, and North "immediately [says], 'Let's go see my attorney.'" North takes Robinette to Barry Simon's office and leaves. After a brief conversation, Simon asks for the documents. Simon goes to make copies and, when he returns, asks Robinette, "Did you prepare these documents?" Robinette says, yes. The meeting ends and Robinette leaves. He then goes to a previously-arranged meeting with Secord at the bar at the Capitol Hilton. Secord says, "You sent bills to Colonel North, didn't		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	you?" Robinette nods, yes. Second adds, "Well, you did the right thing." Robinette testified, "And I believe we broke shortly thereafter. I don't even think we finished out drinks." Later that day, Brendan Sullivan calls Robinette and gives him a three-part message: "Mr. ROBINETTE. The first thing he said was, 'Let me tell you, Glenn, don't protect Colonel North. He is a big boy. He can take care of himself.' "The second thing he told me three times was, 'Tell the truth, thell the truth, tell the truth.' "And the third thing he told me was, 'I recommend you get an attorney.' "And all of which sounded rather conclusive to me and threatening, meaning my future--I was concerned. And I think there was a silent period of maybe 10 or 20 seconds and my response to him was, 'Thank you very much for calling,' and that was it." (Robinette Testim., JHICI, 6/23/87, at 43-50.)		
87/03/19-100 MARCH 19, 1987		PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: STATEMENTS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, Part 1: See col. 3.	PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: STATEMENTS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, Part 1: "The President. . . . Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International]? "Q. Mr. President, there have been reports that you were told, directly or indirectly, at least twice, that the contras were benefiting from the Iran arms sales. Is that true, or were you deceived and lied to by Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North? And I'd like to follow up.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"The President. Helen, let me just say, no, that is not true at all. When I went on the air right after the news broke and told what we had been doing and what our policy was in getting into this affair, I did not know at that time that there was any money involved. I only knew that we had received our $12 million for the weapons which we had agreed to sell. Then, a little later, when the Attorney General told me that he had come upon something that indicated that there was something to do with money in Swiss bank accounts--and I couldn't imagine what it could be because, as I say, we got our money--but I said that I thought we ought to go public with that, again, so that you had all the information that we had and not to wait and have someone uncover this and think we were trying to cover up or something. So, that was late on Monday afternoon. Tuesday morning, the first thing, we went before the joint leadership of the Congress and told them what we'd learned, that all we'd learned was that there was evidently some money having to do with this whole arrangement over there and involving some Swiss bank accounts. And then I came into the press room to all of you and told you. "Q. Mr. President, is it possible that two military officers who are trained to obey orders grabbed power, made major foreign policy moves, didn't tell you when you were briefed every day on intelligence? Or did they think they were doing your bidding? "The President. Helen, I don't know. I only know that that's why I have said repeatedly that I

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			want to find out. I want to get to the bottom of this and find out all that has happened. And so far, I've told you all that I know. And, you know, the truth of the matter is, for quite some long time, all that you knew was what I'd told you. "Sam [Sam Donaldson, ABC News]? "Q. Sir, Robert McFarlane, who was then your national security adviser, says that in August of 1985, he called you on the telephone and asked if you wanted to give the green light to Israel to send arms to Iran and have them replenished from U.S. stocks, and that you said you did. And he said that he reminded you in that conversation that your Secretaries of State and Defense were against it, and you said you understood that, but you explained to him the reasons why you wanted to authorize it. Do you have no memory of that, whatsoever? "The President. Sam, all I know is that my memory didn't fail me on the fact that I had agreed to this thing. The only thing I could not recall was at what point was I asked. And as a result of that and not being able to recall when I gave this permission, we now have quite a system installed of people taking notes in all our meetings and all our doings." (President's news conference continues in next 3 entries.)
87/03/19-101 MARCH 19, 1987		PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: STATEMENTS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, Part 2: See col. 3.	PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: STATEMENTS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, Part 2: [Text of President's news conference continues

from preceding entry:]

"Q. Mr. President, if you don't recall, when Reverend Weir was released in mid-September of that year, why did you think they had released him if you couldn't recall that you had authorized Israel to do that?

"The President. Oh, no, no, as I say, I can't remember just when, in all the calls and meetings and so forth, this was presented and when I gave the go ahead. But this was a thing in which the Israelis were willing to sell weaponry--mainly TOW missiles--and wanted to know if they did if we would agree to sell them replacements when and if they needed it.

"Q. A shipment only went the day before he was released, sir.

"The President. I know that I agreed to that. And there are other people that don't remember either, who were present at meetings. One of them was Bud [McFarlane]. And what his memory was--I don't think it was a phone call. He has described it as a visit to the hospital where I was after surgery. But others who were there present--they didn't remember that conversation. But I know that it must have come up, and I must have verbally given the okay.

"Bill [Bill Plante, CBS News]?

"Q. Mr. President, you said that in your heart you still believe that it wasn't an arms-for-hostage deal, but that the weight of the evidence presented by the Tower commission convinced you that it was. In your heart, do you now believe that it was an arms-for-hostages deal

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			from the beginning, as the Tower commission said, and that the policy was flawed? "The President. But it could be that the policy was flawed in that it did deteriorate into what I myself, when I went on the air recently, said was arms for hostages. But let me just as briefly as I can take you through the steps which I did from the very beginning. "We had, by way of Israel, a report that there were responsible people, some from the Government of Iran, but not necessarily in the inner circle with Khomeini, who wanted to see if they could not open a dialog with representatives from the United States that would lead to a better understanding--and I'm sure that they had in mind a future Government of Iran--that we could have the kind of relationship that we'd had once earlier. I thought--because our policy had always been based on trying to restore a relationship with a country that is very important strategically, and also behind the scenes to try and get an end to that war, and end with no victor, no vanquished, both countries retiring to their own boundaries and so forth. So I wasn't going to miss that opportunity, and I approved our going ahead. "One of the first things brought up in the meeting with those who were representing us was that these people said that they, for two reasons, needed something like--and they mentioned the arms sales. It came from them, not us. They said, one, for their own prestige, it would give them a standing with the people that they would have to

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			be dealing with in the future, including the military leaders. And at the same time, it would assure them that the people they were dealing with did have access to our government at the highest levels and they could trust them to deal. And so, our answer to that was that we had a policy of not doing business with a country that supported terrorism and Iran was on that list. "Well, they made quite a pitch that they, too, were opposed to terrorism and that they had even done some things counter to terrorism, terrorist activities, and so forth. Well, our reply to them was there is a very practical way in which you can prove that, and that is use your influence to get the hostages out. Now I have never believed and I don't believe now, that Iran can give orders to the Hizballah; but there is a philosophical relationship there that we thought they might be able to be persuasive. And they've indicated that that was true. "Now with no further information than that until I read the Tower commission report, after appointing the Tower commission to get to the bottom of this thing and see what was going on, then I found that the strategy talks had disappeared completely, and led by the Iranians, the conversation was totally arms-for-hostages. So, I don't see where I could say now that isn't what it degenerated into." (President's news conference continues in next 2 entries.)
87/03/19-102		PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: STATEMENTS ON THE	PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: STATEMENTS ON THE

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
MARCH 19, 1987		IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, Part 3: See col. 3.	IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, Part 3: [Text of President's news conference continues from preceding entry:] "Q. Mr. President, they faulted you in the Tower commission report for caring too much about the hostages. If you had it to do all over again, sir, would you do it again? "The President. No, I would not go down that same road again. I will keep my eyes open for any opportunity again for improving relations. And we will continue to explore every legitimate means of getting our hostages back for the reason that I explained earlier. ". . . . "The President. . . . Chris [Chris Wallace, NBC News]? . . . "Q. Mr. President, thank you. At your last news conference 4 months ago, you said that the U.S. had nothing to do with Israeli arms shipments to Iran when you knew that that was not true. Why did you say that? "The President. Chris, I'm glad you asked that, because I've read at great length references to that and heard them on the air. I'm glad to explain. When I left here after that press conference and went back there, and our people were waiting back there and had been watching on the monitor what was going on, they told me what I had said. And it was evidently just a misstatement on my part. I did not know that I had said it in such a way as to seemingly deny Israel's participation. And when they told me this, and when I finished bumping my head, I said

to them, 'Quick, write down a correction of this.' I didn't realize that in there maybe I'd talked too long. I said: 'I didn't realize that I had said that or given that impression. We've got to get this message to all of you before you went to work on your stories.' So, it was just a misstatement that I didn't realize I had made.

"Q. But the fact is that you were asked it four times in that news conference, and you made this inadvertent statement four times. You were specifically asked about Israel's role. And during that early period, it now turns out that there were a series of statements you made that were misleading. One of the first statements was you said that the whole story that came out of the Mideast was without foundation.

"The President. No, that wasn't at the press conference. That was on November 6th, when you were shouting questions at me. And at that--

"Q. Well--[inaudible].

"The President. Well, right. But then, what I was trying to do--and I think some of you will recall this--I was trying to plead with all of you, hoping that this lead that came from that weekly paper in Beirut could be corralled, because I wanted to explain that we didn't know but what the lives of the people we'd been dealing with would be endangered, and certainly our hostages could be in danger. And so this was all I was trying to say, and I remember saying, 'Please, stop speculating, and stop asking questions.' I didn't know how far we could go before we could get someone killed. And when David Jacobsen came

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			here and met with you in the Rose Garden, he repeated that without knowing that I had said it. He said the same thing, and quite passionately: that you could get some people killed if we kept on with that story." (President's news conference continues in next entry.)
87/03/19-103 MARCH 19, 1987		PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: STATEMENTS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, Part 4: "Q. Mr. President, in view of what you told the Tower board and what they concluded--that you had difficulty recalling the decision and the timing of the decision to send the arms to Iran--is it at all conceivable that you may also have foregotten being told about the diversion of funds to the contras? "The President. Oh, no. You would have heard me without opening the door to the office if I had been told that at any time. No. And I still do not have the answer to that money. The only thing that I can see is that somebody in the interplay of transporting the weapons must have put an additional price on them. We asked for $12 million, which was the cost--no profit on those weapons--and we got our $12 million back. And it was a complete surprise to me to discovery that there was any additional money. And this, I think, is the thing--we're still waiting for that to be explained." (23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 273-77 [3/23/87].) See col. 3.	PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE: STATEMENTS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, Part 4: [Text of President's news conference continues from preceding entry:] "Q. If I make ask my question, sir, do you feel an obligation always to tell the truth to the American people, or sometimes do you feel you may have to mislead, as in that case, saying it's without foundation for a higher diplomatic purpose? "The President. No, there are times in which I think you can't answer because of national security or other people's security. But no, I'm not going to tell falsehoods to the American people. I'll leave that to others. [Laughter] "Q. Mr. President, speaking to young people in your reelection campaign in '84, you referred to government as a sacred trust, and you said we're going to keep this trust. The Tower report says that some of your officials in your administration made untruthful statements, and you've acknowledged here that it became a trade of arms for hostages. Do you feel that you've kept your promise that you made in that campaign to the young people and that your government has?

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			"The President. Yes, I do. And from the very first, I told you all everything I know about this situation. I am still waiting to find out the source of extra money, the bank accounts, and where that extra money went. And that's why I appointed the Tower commission to get to the bottom of this and a special prosecutor. You see, I'm old fashioned; I call these independent counsels--I still call them special prosecutors. "Q. If I could follow, sir: Are you distressed that even your own polls show that a majority of American people, including many who voted for you, believe that you're not telling the full truth on the Iran-contra affair? "The President. Well, in view of what they've been reading and hearing for all these several months, I can understand why they might think that. "Q. Mr. President, in view of what you told the Tower board and what they concluded--that you had difficulty recalling the decision and the timing of the decision to send the arms to Iran--is it at all conceivable that you may also have forgotten being told about the diversion of funds to the contras? "The President. Oh, no. You would have heard me without opening the door to the office if I had been told that at any time. No. And I still do not have the answer to that money. The only thing that I can see is that somebody in the interplay of transporting the weapons must have put an additional price on them. We asked for $12 million, which was the cost--no profit on those

weapons--and we got our $12 million back. And it was a complete surprise to me to discovery that there was any additional money. And this, I think, is the thing--we're still waiting for that to be explained.

"Q. If I could follow in a related element, then, Mr. North is quoted in the Tower report [at B-96] in a memo [PROF] he wrote as saying: 'The President obviously knows why[] he has been meeting with select people to thank them for their support for democracy in Central America.' [Quoted above at 86/05/16-440.] Were you aware that such meetings that you attended were being used to solicit funds from private citizens in the U.S. for Central America for the contras?

"The President. I knew that there were many people privately giving money to things of that kind, in the country here, but the people I met with--and I subsequently found out that some of them were doing this. But when I met with them, I met with them to thank them because they had raised money to put spot ads on television in favor of the contras in an effort to try and influence Congress to continue giving aid. And I thought that was worth a thanks. I've gone to the public many times since I've been here to get the public to help put the pressure on the Congress for us to get some worthwhile cause."
(23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 273-77 [3/23/87].)

87/03/26-100
MARCH 26,

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE IRAN INITIATIVE:
During a visit with Education Secretary

DATE | GENERAL | CONTRAS | IRAN

1987

William Bennett to the sixth grade class of Elaine Hassemer at Fairview Elementary School in Columbia, Missouri, the President responds to a sixth-grader's question:

"Student. All this publicity and the press and stuff, they would scare me out of my mind. I just wonder what is it that made it worthwhile to you?

"The President. That had made it so what?

"Q. Worthwhile to you.

"The President. What had made it worthwhile? Well, this was one of the things why I asked for a commission to be appointed to bring out all the facts. You know, there was a revolution in a country called Iran, and the Ayatollah Khomeini took over and became the dictator of that country. Before that, it had a royal family, the Shah, the King. And he was thrown out of the country. But he had been--well, I knew him personally, and had met him and had been there in Iran. And he was doing what he thought was right for the people.

"Then, this revolution decided that we, the United States, we were the Great Satan, we were the evil force. And yet, that's a very strategic country there in the Middle East, where there is so much trouble. And yet, where so much trouble for the world can be caused. And we got word that some people there in the government would like to talk to us about maybe reestablishing a friendly relationship between the two countries.

"Now, there is a terrorist group in another country, Lebanon, that we believe also sort of may not take orders exactly, but it gets its direction from the Ayatollah Khomeini's government. And they are holding some Americans as hostages. They've kidnaped them, and they're holding them there. They've had them there more than a year.

"And we thought this was an opportunity--if we could establish a better relationship with these people in the Iranian Government who wanted to have a better relationship, or said they did. And, so, we sent some people over to start talking to them. And they wanted us to prove that we really were serious. And, so, they asked us to sell them some weapons. We hadn't been doing that because they're engaged in a war.

"But these people said they were opposed to the war themselves, and they would like to see it ended. So we agreed, but on a basis that we said you can prove your qualifications as you're asking us to prove ours by seeing if you could get this terrorist group to free our hostages. And we would each do this for each other.

"Well, this is what we started. And I'm afraid it wasn't carried out the way we had thought it would be. It sort of settled down to just trading arms for hostages, and that's a little like paying ransom to a kidnaper. If you do it, then the kidnaper's just encouraged to go kidnap someone else.

"And finally, all of this came out into the open. Up until then, we'd had to keep everything very secret because we felt that the people who were talking to us from Iran would be executed by their government if they were found doing this. And it all came out in the public. I don't know

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			what has happened to all those people there or not. And I have to say that I still think that the idea was right to try and establish a friendly relationship, try and bring about peace between the two countries that are at war, and try and get our people freed. But it kind of deteriorated into something else, and as I said the other night on television, I won't make that mistake again. "Well, I know that I've talked too much here and -- "Mrs. Hassemer. Thank you for coming. We really appreciate it. I understand you need to get down to third grade. "The President. Yes. ". . . ." (JHICI Ex. OLN 211.)
87/04/15-000 APRIL 15, 1984-87 [TAX DAY]	SECORD ON COVERT OPERATIONS TAXES: Secord testifying on why he did not pay taxes on the profits of his enterprise: "Mr. JENKINS. Have you and Mr. Hakim paid taxes on this commercial enterprise's profits? "Mr. SECORD. No, sir. We couldn't. It was a covert undertaking, and I didn't believe I had any tax implications. Maybe I was wrong." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/8/87, at 220.)		
87/04/28-100 APRIL 28, 1987	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON POINDEXTER: In an interview with White House correspondents, the President states, "John Poindexter's an honorable man. . . . I am still waiting to find out exactly how did there turn out to be more money and where did the money go. . . .	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON POINDEXTER: See col. 1.	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON POINDEXTER: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	Maybe he thought he was being, in some way, protective of me. I don't know. (23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 441 [5/4/87].)		
87/05/03-105 MAY 3, 1987		PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON CONTRA FUNDING: During an informal exchange with reporters while touring the Ellis Island Renovation Project in New York, the President responds to reporters' questions: "Q. Senator Inouye says you knew about the money--to raise money for the contra military aid. Is that right or not? "The President. No. "Q. They said you knew about outside funding. "Q. Mr. President, Lewis Tambs said he took orders from the White House to help the contras illegally. "The President. Let me just say one thing because of the questions you have been asked and the answers I gave. With regard to whether private individuals were giving money to support the contras, yes, I was aware that there were people doing that. But there was nothing in the nature of a solicitation by the administration, to my knowledge, of anyone to do that. "Q. Sir, were you aware that they were giving money for military aid? "The President. All I knew was that there were people that were raising month to be to help to the contras just as people have done that for other causes in other countries. "Q. But even for military aid, sir?	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"The President. I had no detailed information. I did know and the people I met with, I met with to thank because they had raised money to put commercials on television urging the Congress to support the contras. "Q. Senator Inouye seemed to suggest today that maybe you knew more than that. "The President. No, as the program went on--I listened to him very carefully--he made it plain what he was actually saying: that no, I did not have knowledge of things of that kind. What he had said in the first place was that I was not off some place on an island not paying attention." (23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 470 [5/11/87].)	
87/05/07-000 MAY 7, 1987	POINDEXTER-SECORD CONTACT SECORD ACCOUNT: Poindexter meets with Secord during the week of Secord's JHICI testimony: "Mr. TRIBLE. When precisely did you meet Admiral Poindexter, time and place and day? "Mr. SECORD. It was the day of -- yesterday, after the hearing in my attorney's office. "Mr. TRIBLE. So, you met with Admiral Poindexter after your testimony here? "Mr. SECORD. Yes, sir. "Mr. TRIBLE. And what [sic] meeting also came after the time that Admiral Poindexter met with the counsel of the two committees? "Mr. SECORD. I have no idea. "Mr. TRIBLE. Counsel met, as I understand it, last weekend . . . . Tell us precisely what was		

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	said at that meeting, and why was it that you met? "Mr. SECORD. I don't know that I can tell you precisely what was said. "Mr. TRIBLE. As best you can recollect. "Mr. SECORD. I can tell you that his attorney called my attorney and said that John wanted to drop by if we didn't object to shake my hand. I was flattered. ". . . . "Mr. SECORD. There was no substance of the meeting except what I regard as a very flattering gesture on his part. There were three attorneys there." (Secord Testim., JHICI, 5/8/87, at 164-65.)		
87/05/13-100 MAY 13, 1987		PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON A THIRD COUNTRY'S SUPPORT FOR THE CONTRAS: In an informal exchange with reporters at the Oval Office in the White House, prior to his meeting with President Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, President Reagan responds to questions: "Q. Mr. President, McFarlane says your diary shows that King Fahd and you discussed contra aid when he was here. "President Reagan. Bill [Bill Plante, CBS News], you know we're not going to take questions at a thing like this. But the error there was discussed. My diary shows that I never brought it up, and it shows that the King, before he left, told me that he was doing that and that he was going to increase the aid. "Q. So then, it has been agreed on before at a lower level?	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"President Reagan. There was no solitication that I know of or anything of the kind. I did know, and had been informed, that he was helping, but I never brought it up. "Q. Sir, might you have encouraged him, though, at some point, by thanking him for his support for the contras? "President Reagan. The subject was never broached until, in his leaving, he told me what he was doing. "Q. And what was your response at the time? "President Reagan. Oh I think I expressed pleasure that he was doing that. "Q. Do you know how Bud McFarlane may have gotten access to that information from your diary, sir? "President Reagan. Well, it was in the Tower commission report." (23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 526-27 [5/18/87].)	
87/05/16-100 MAY 16, 1987		PRESIDENT'S QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH REPORTERS: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR See col. 3 and next entry.	PRESIDENT'S QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION WITH REPORTERS: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR "Q. Mr. President, Meredith Oakley with the Arkansas Democrat. Mr. McFarlane has claimed that he briefed you dozens of times regarding the activities that were going on regarding contra aid, and yet you have repeatedly said that you were not aware of any of the nuances of the things that were going on. In light of his testimony, what action have you taken to make sure that your directives that the NSC not be involved in implementing such operations--what actions have

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			you taken to see that those directives are followed out? "THE PRESIDENT. Well, we have taken actions in that, and I know that Frank Carlucci has made a number of changes there in the NSC. But I think something that's gone on in all of these investigations--that could also lead to your question--is this linking of Iran and contra aid. And they've seemed to try to portray me as claiming to be uninformed about everything. "No, in the Iranian situation, in which representatives of their government, not the Khomeini--we were not doing business with him at all. We were doing business with people that could have gotten shot if exposed as dealing with us, and they were thinking in terms of what might be a future Iranian Government in view of the health of Khomeini and so forth. And they wanted to make a contact to see if we couldn't discuss how we could have better relations. I immediately took them up on that. "We've been, for months and months--years, as a matter of fact--trying to find ways to bring an end to that brutal war there that's killed a million people so far. And they were the ones that brought up the subject of arms for them, first of all, to enhance their stature, but also to prove that they were talking to representatives that could reach up to the top of our government--in return for that--because we had put Iran on the 'no trade' list due to their support of terrorists. "Our answer to that was, well, they could do

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			something--we told them we couldn't do business for that reason. They replied that they were opposed also to the support of terrorism. Well, we said there's a way to prove it. Maybe you'd like to use your influence with the Hizballah, which has a kind of philosophical relationship with Iran, to get our people back, our hostages. And so this is what happened in that situation." (President's statement continues in next entry.)
87/05/16-101 MAY 16, 1987		PRESIDENT'S QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION WITH REPORTERS: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR The President states, "As a matter of fact, I was very definitely involved in the decisions about support to the freedom fighters. It was my idea to begin with." See col. 3 and preceding entry.	PRESIDENT'S QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION WITH REPORTERS: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR [President's statement continues from preceding entry:] "It was kept covert to protect the lives of those people we were dealing with. When the news leaked and it suddenly burst all over the world, we were very concerned about that. But out of that, for the first time, we learned that I had not been informed--that our representatives somehow--there was more money than the $12 million that we received and that some of that money was deposited in an account that it was reported funneled aid to the contras. Now, this was all new. I am still waiting to find out the final details of where did that extra money come from, who did it belong to, and where did it go. "Now, the Iranian situation--or I mean the contra situation--and I'm going to start calling them freedom fighters. Contra was a term of derogation imposed on them by the Sandinistas. These are people who are fighting for democracy and freedom in their country. And here there's no

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			question about my being informed. I've known what's going on there. As a matter of fact, for quite a long time now, a matter of years, I have been publicly speaking of the necessity of the American people to support our program of aid to those freedom fighters down there in order to prevent there being established a Soviet beachhead here in the Western Hemisphere, in addition to the one we already have in Cuba. And to suggest that I am just finding out or that things are being exposed that I didn't know about--no. Yes, I was kept briefed on that. As a matter of fact, I was very definitely involved in the decisions about support to the freedom fighters. It was my idea to begin with. "But now--yes? ". . . ." (18 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 531-32 [5/18/87].)
87/05/19-100 MAY 19, 1987		PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR: See col. 3.	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR: In an interview with reporters in Chattanooga, Tennessee, the President states, "I know absolutely that I did nothing illegal." (23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 550 [5/25/87].)
87/05/19-500 MAY 19, 1987		OWEN'S CLOSING "POEM": At the close of his second day of testimony, Robert Owen made a closing statement: "Mr. OWEN. May I make a brief closing statement and I will as before I read it. [Sic.] It is a poem that was written. [Sic.]	

"Chairman INOUYE. Please proceed.

"Mr. OWEN. Thank you, sir.

"Today on the fertile plains of Central America, cattle graze peacefully on the wooded hills and green valleys, monkeys play, parrots fly by, and song birds send forth their music that echoes over a trouble land.

"In this far corner of the Third World, we have known darkness and despair that at times seems almost too much to bear. We have stood by the charred remains of our fallen airmen with head bound and eyes wet with tears and known the hardships and sorrow that must now be borne by their loved ones. We have held the hands of our gallant fighters and prayed with them and for them as their life's blood seeps slowly into the dark, damp earth of the jungle.

"We held in our arms children no more than four years of age shot while trying to flee Nicaragua to a safe haven.

"We have a burning desire to strike back at those whose intent is to enslave us, to stem the red tied that threatens to overwhelm us.

"We have known indifference, even betrayal from political and religious leaders of America. We face an enemy that in manpower outnumbers us more than 20 to 1 and more than a thousand to 1 in firepower.

"Fear, anguish and despair are with us daily. Yet, in our darkest hours, we have three things that help sustain us: Our faith in God Almighty, the love and support of our families, the knowledge that on this troubled earth there still walk men like Ollie North, men that have shown bravery in their youth, wisdom in their adulthood, and patriotism throughout their life.

"Ollie, your enemies are more clever and treacherous than ours. Yet, you have given more than you had to give. Your future, your hopes, your dreams and those things you cherish have been put at great risk, including your family, by your efforts to help others in the fight for freedom.

"We have some very little to give you in return, yet we want you to know that in our hearts and our prayers, you are with us daily. Not only in elegant churches, but at crude alt[a]rs in the jungle, candles burn for you. Beside you and supporting you stands the greatest leader the free world has known for many decades.

"In our lifetime, you have given us a legend. For the future, you are giving our children a chance to live as free individuals and for these things, we say th[a]nk you, Ollie North.

"And I can only add I love Ollie North like a brother and I believe when he comes before you, when he is allowed to tell the American people his side of the story, that he will do it honestly. I want to thank the committee for your patience and understanding with me and for the way you treated me.

"It has been very fair and I hope that I have added something to the American public's knowledge of what went on.

"Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

"Chairman INOUYE. May I assure you, Mr. Owen, that Colonel North will be given every opportunity

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		to tell [h]is story to the American people. "Mr. OWEN. Thank you, sir." (Owen Testim., JHICI, 5/19/87, at 239-42.)	
87/05/27-100 MAY 27, 1987		PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR: See col. 3.	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR: During an interview with foreign journalists, the President states: "I know the damage that's been done to my credibility, but it has not been by anything that has been proven--quite the contrary. It has been the image that has been created by our own, particularly, Washington press corps in describing what took place." (23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 591-92 [6/1/87].)
87/06/16-100 JUNE 16, 1987		PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS: See col. 3.	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS: In response to questions for reporters, the President states: "[W]hen you get a mile and a half awav from the Potomac River, there are an awful lot of people that have gone back to their favorite television shows. And I don't blame them. I've never heard so much hearsay in all my life that wouldn't be permitted in a courtroom for a minute and a half, and it's taken as gospel by those who want to go farther with this." (23 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 680 [6/22/87].)
87/07/07-100 JULY 7-10, 13-14, 1987	NORTH'S LIES AND TRUTHS NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Colonel North, I have what I	NORTH'S LIES AND TRUTHS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	NORTH'S LIES AND TRUTHS NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	regard as the personally painful task of asking you the following questions. You've admitted before this committee that you lied to representatives of the Iranians in order to try and release the hostages; is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. I lied every time I met the Iranians. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. And you admitted you lied to General Secord with respect to conversations that you supposedly had with the President; is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. In order to encourage him to stay with the project, yes. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. And you've admitted that you've lied to the Congress; is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. I have. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. And you admitted that you lied in creating false chronologies of these events; is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. That is true. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. And you admitted that you created false documents that were intended to mislead investigators with respect to a gift that was made to you; is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. No. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. I think I understand the reason for your hesitation. You certainly have admitted that the documents themselves were completely false; is that correct? "Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. They were intended to create a record of an event that never occurred; is that correct?		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Mr. NORTH. That is correct. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. Can you assure this committee you are not here now lying to protect your Commander in Chief? "Mr. NORTH. I am not lying to protect anybody, Counsel. I came here to tell the truth. "I told you that I was going to tell it to you, the good, the bad, and the ugly. . . . But I committed when I raised my right hand and took an oath as a midshipman that I would tell the truth, and I took an oath when I arrived here before this committee to tell the truth, and I have done so, painful though it may be for me and for others. I have told you the truth, Counsel, as best I am able. "Mr. VAN CLEVE. I have no further questions of this witness, Mr. Chairman." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 121-22.)		
87/07/07-130 JULY 14, 1987	NORTH'S LIES AND TRUTHS McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: "Mr. BROOMFIELD: I think after listening to Lieutenant Colonel North now for nearly six days, I have a couple of questions that go on based on this testimony. "I would like to know, in retrospect, do you think your differences of recollection on several key factors with Colonel North [are] a matter of intentional misstatements on the part of Colonel North or an honest difference of opinion? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I don't think Colonel North would ever make a deliberate misstatement or a lie. I don't believe that. That leaves only the	NORTH'S LIES AND TRUTHS McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: See col. 1.	NORTH'S LIES AND TRUTHS McFARLANE RESPONSE TO NORTH: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	possibilities of differing interpretations between us, and I think that must account for these disagreements. They are certainly not ones that are malicious, I am sure, on his part and don't derogate from what were his motives that were entirely patriotic. "Mr. BROOMFIELD. If there were misunderstandings about Colonel North's orders, do you consider that your fault as a supervisor, or did Lieutenant Colonel North intentionally mislead you? "Mr. MCFARLANE. I believe that he is a thoroughly honest man of integrity and would not deliberately mislead me ever. I believe in earlier testimony that I said that if he failed to inform me of something he was doing, which he thought might be questionable, he probably did it to protect me. So I would not hold him to account even if there were voids of information." (McFarlane Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 244-45.)		
87/07/07-135 JULY 7-21, 1987	NORTH'S AND McFARLANE'S CONFLICTING RECOLLECTIONS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. DEWINE. . . . Admiral, isn't it your experience that Colonel North is a good soldier, takes orders, carries them out, and then reports back? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I think that is an accurate description of Colonel North. "Mr. DEWINE. That is his track record, isn't it? That is his very nature? "Mr. POINDEXTER. That is correct. "Mr. DEWINE. So if Colonel North has	NORTH'S AND McFARLANE'S CONFLICTING RECOLLECTIONS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	NORTH'S AND McFARLANE'S CONFLICTING RECOLLECTIONS POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	testified that his activities were authorized and that he reported what was going on, that would be consistent with your own experience with him, would it not? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I believe I have already testified to that. "Mr. DEWINE. How do you then account for the difference in testimony between what Colonel North said and Bud McFarlane in this area? Why do you suppose that Bud McFarlane denies that Colonel North reported to him on his activities? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I can't account for different recollections. I have testified accurately, truthfully based on my best recollections. You know, at the time when you are involved in enormous amount of activity of a global nature, you don't set down and analyze everything that is said or every piece of paper with the fine tooth approach that this committee is taking. Hindsight is always very good. Obviously different people have different recollections of events at the time; and I don't really care to speculate on those recollections. "Mr. DEWINE. I appreciate that. And I understand that. But based upon your--let me phrase it this way: based upon your experience with Colonel North, you have no reason to believe that what he told this committee about that would be untrue, do you? That is not inconsistent? In fact, it is very consistent, is it not, with your experience with him? "Mr. POINDEXTER. My experience with him would indicate that his testimony up here was entirely		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	consistent with everything that I had observed. I can testify how I felt. I felt that Colonel North kept me very well informed of the issues and items that I should be aware of, and I was very comfortable that he was carrying out his mission in a very effective manner." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 83-85.)		
87/07/07-200 JULY 7-10, 13-14, 1987	NORTH'S HEARING TESTIMONY NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. LIMAN. But Oliver North, I hear you saying that if you weren't on the order for the appointment of an Independent Counsel, if there was agreement that there was no criminal liability here, people would expect you to come before Congress and say, 'I did it. It is not their fault. I was that loose can[n]on.' "Mr. NORTH. I did do it. I am not, as I said in my statement, at all ashamed of any of the things that I did. I was given a mission, and I tried to carry it out. "Mr. LIMAN. But part of that mission was to shield the others who were giving you the odds. "Mr. NORTH. That is the part of any subordinate. Every Centurion had a group of shields out in front of him, 100 of them. "Mr. LIMAN. Well, would you agree with this proposition, Colonel: That--and I think you would, because I think those medals represented-- "Mr. NORTH. No. Those medals represent the heroism of the young Marines that I led. That is what they represent. "Mr. LIMAN. You still have those values,	NORTH'S HEARING TESTIMONY NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	NORTH'S HEARING TESTIMONY NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

don't you?

"Mr. NORTH. I never called myself a hero. Those words were used by other people to describe me. I am grateful for those words, but I have never called myself such.

"Mr. LIMAN. Colonel, five and a half years in the White House hasn't destroyed those values?

"Mr. NORTH. Not at all.

"Mr. LIMAN. Nor has this investigation destroyed those values?

"Mr. NORTH. Not in the least.

"Mr. LIMAN. Now, this covert operation that you found yourself in, helping to direct in Nicaragua for the contras, was a different type from the covert operations that you had observed in your term at the CIA--at the NSC, right?

"Mr. NORTH. It was different in perhaps where it was being directed from. We tried to adhere to the normal procedures that one would in the conduct of a covert operation. Indeed, counsel, that is an important reason for why protection was important.

"Mr. LIMAN. Well, let's talk about that, because that is what I want to come to.

"Mr. NORTH. But what I don't want to do is leave you with the idea that the only thing I was doing was trying to protect my superiors. That is indeed an important part, in terms of plausible deniability.

"But part of the destruction and the deception and all the rest of what you have described was to protect those engaged in the operation."
(North Testim., JHICI, 7/9/87, at 230-33.)

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
87/07/10-100 JULY 10, 1987		WHO SHOULD GET THE MONEY NORTH ACCOUNT: "Mr. NORTH. . . . [I]f I were asked to arbitrate as to what should be done with the remaining funds that are in accounts or wherever, once those bills were paid and the liens were covered and the expenses that accrued were taken care of, I think every single penny that is left ought to go to the Nicaraguan resistance and save the taxpayers a couple of dollars. "Mr. JENKINS. We asked Mr. Hakim about that, who has control over it, and he would not agree to that. "Mr. NORTH. Give me 10 minutes with Mr. Hakim. "Mr. JENKINS. You think if you have 10 minutes that you can get Mr. Hakim to turn over that $8 million? "Mr. NORTH. If I can meet with anybody without a bunch of lawyers around, I reckon I could, sir." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 173-74.)	WHO SHOULD GET THE MONEY NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.
87/07/10-110 JULY 13, 1987		WHO SHOULD GET THE MONEY NORTH ACCOUNT (cont'd): "Mr. TRIBLE. Now, the evidence from Mr. Hakim himself from his records establishes that he and Secord amassed over $8.1 million in the bank accounts. Did you know those huge sums of money were being socked away? "Mr. NORTH. Senator, my recollection is that what I testified to is that I did not know the	WHO SHOULD GET THE MONEY NORTH ACCOUNT: See col. 2.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		magnitude of the funds that were remaining in whatever accounts. . . . ". . . . "The important thing is that I did not know that there was that sum remaining. I do not know the purposes for which that sum was set aside. I did not know the accounts or the names or numbers on any of those. And I certainly never considered that a penny of that was mine. And I have also testified that were I to be the adjudicator of where that money went, after all the bills were paid and all the liabilities were covered, I would send that money, every nickel of it, to the Nicaraguan resistance, which was indeed the original purpose for setting up all those non-U.S. Government entities." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 43-45. See id., 7/13/87, at 53-54.)	
87/07/10-400 JULY 10, 1987		CONTRA AID: NORTH'S MILLSTONE APPEAL "My own personal sense is that I would have the greatest burden of all on my soul if what I have done or what I have failed to do as a consequence of supporting the resistance from 1984 through the resumption of U.S. assistance in 1986 resulted in a cut-off at this point, and I would beg you gentlemen all that the cause of the Nicaraguan resistance is our own and that regardless of whether you judge me to be right or wrong, that what we have done is we have decided once again with $100 million to support a cause that is just. ". . . .	

CHRONOLOGY OF THE
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION (JHICI)

LONG-FORM VERSION

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"I am not trying to make a speech, Congressman Cheney. I am making an appeal. "Hang whatever you want around the neck of Ollie North--and I have a few millstones that I have laid before you, and I have tried to do so fully and honestly, as difficult as some of that may be, and it has been difficult--but for the love of God and the love of this nation, don't hang around Ollie North's neck the cut-off of funds to the Nicaraguan resistance again." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/10/87, at 218-19.)	
87/07/10-410 JULY 10 AND 13, 1987		CONTRA AID: NORTH'S MILLSTONE APPEAL MITCHELL RESPONSE: Sen. Mitchell to Lt. Col. North: "Now, you have addressed several pleas to this committee, very eloquently. None more eloquent than last Friday when in response to a question by Representative Cheney you asked that Congress not cut off aid to the contras for the love of God and for the love of country. I now address a plea to you. Of all the qualities which the American people find compelling about you, none is more impressive than your obvious deep devotion to this country. Please remember that others share that devotion and recognize that it is possible for an American to disagree with you on aid to the contras and still love God and still love this country just as much as you do. "Although he's regularly asked to do so, God does not take sides in American politics. And in America, disagreement with the policies of the Government is not evidence of lack of patriotism.	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		"I want to repeat that: In America, disagreement with the policies of the Government is not evidence of lack of patriotism. "Indeed, it is the very fact that Americans can criticize their Government openly and without fear of reprisal that is the essence of our freedom, and that will keep us free. "I have one final plea. Debate this issue forcefully and vigorously as you have and as you surely will, but, please, do it in a way that respects the patriotism and the motives of those who disagree with you, as you would have them respect yours." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/13/87, at 38-40.)	
87/07/14-200 JULY 14, 1987		THE SLIDE SHOW NORTH NARRATION, Part 1: "Perhaps the best way to do that is simply go through the presentation as it exists and I will try to quickly go through the slides and indicate what I would have said had the slides been up on the screen. "The first slide simply demonstrates the geography and why this part of the world seems to be of so much interest to the Soviets. "The first slide shows the effect of Soviet penetration in this hemisphere in the form of a consolidated communist region in Cuba . . . . "The second slide is a photograph of Andre[i] Gromyko, . . . and a quote from Mr. Gromyko . . . . , 'the region is boiling like a cauldron.' . . . "A second quote from Demarshall Ogarkov, then	

the head of the Soviet Armed Forces in Moscow when he was talking to Maurice Bishop, then the head of Grenada . . . .

"There is then a summary of the Soviet policy in the region based on Soviet literature and summarized that their goal is to create such turmoil in the Caribbean Basin . . . .

"A follow-on slide depicts the fact that the Soviets are outspending us in our own hemisphere in a ratio of about 5 to 1. . . . 1984's figures. . . .

"A photograph showing the Soviet warships deployed in the Caribbean . . . .

"A photograph of the Soviet submarines provided to Cuba . . . .

"A photograph of the U.S. Navy F-4 escorting a Soviet Bear F strategic reconnaissance aircraft 13 miles off the coast of the Virginia Capes . . . .

"Then a photograph of the Soviet signals intelligence site at Lourdes, Cuba . . . .

"A photograph showing the militarization of the Cuban children, a sixth-grade class out for their firing exercises.

"Then a photograph showing a map showing where Cuban forces' as the mercenary army of the Soviet Union are deployed . . . .

"And, of course, in October of 1983, the next slide shows some of the Cuban economic aid going to small island nation of Grenada . . . .

"The next slide shows a Chinese rocket launcher probably made in the 1950s, probably captured in Vietnam, shipped to Grenada . . . .

"Then a photograph of the five secret military

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		agreements found in Grenada after the U.S. rescue operation . . . . "The next slide shows simply a map of Nicaragua . . . . The next slide--series of slides--shows some of the military equipment which I have already been questioned on . . . . "This is the armored storage facility at El Tampisca built along the Cuban model . . . . "A photograph of the Soviet and Bulgarian-Cuban construction being conducted at Punta Huete along the Atlantic Coast. . . . "An area [sic] reconnaissance platform photograph of Punta Huete, the largest airfield south of the Rio Grande . . . . "The next slide shows some of the supplies delivered to the Sandinistas during the period of Soviet support, which began not in 1982, but in 1979. "The next photograph is a Soviet Hind helicopter . . . . "There is also a photograph of a [S]oviet AN-30 reconnaissance aircraft flown by Soviets in the hemisphere . . . . "Some quotes from the Ortega brothers in Nicaragua . . . . "Then two photographs of Mr. Ortega and some of his associates, one with Fidel Castro and with other brothers in arms, in this case, the leader of Libya, Muammar Qadhafi . . . . "There is a series of photographs showing the attempt to subvert their neighbors . . . ." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 41-49.)	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
87/07/14-201 JULY 14, 1987		THE SLIDE SHOW NORTH NARRATION, Part 2: [The slide show continues from the preceding entry:] "Then two photographs showing the arms captured after the M-19 assault on the Supreme Court in which the entire Supreme Court of Colombia was murdered . . . . "Then a photograph starting a series on what has happened to the people of Nicaragua . . . . "A photograph from a Nicaraguan schoolbook . . . showing how Nicaraguan children learn to count by counting grenades and AK-47's . . . . "One showing an entire town which fled in their Sunday best across the border simply to go to church on Sunday wearing everything that they had because they could never go back home. "A series of photographs showing the dislocation of the Moskito Indians . . . . "Then photographs showing the Nicaraguan resistance . . . . "It shows the 57-year-old coffee farmer who[m] I described earlier who came home and found his entire family murdered by the Sandinistas because they gave water to a passing contra patrol. "A series of photographs showing how the resistance looks as a consequence of assistance I am accused and admit to having delivered, a photograph showing the leadership of the FDN . . . . "A photograph of a resistance unit crossing into Nicaragua, another of a patrol deep inside	

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
		Nicaragua, a photograph of a wounded resistance soldier who benefited from the support that we provided during the cutoff and then a photograph of what it looked like before that help arrived, a photograph of the emergency aid station and intensive care unit, which is nothing more than a field tent without even [mosquito] netting. "A photograph of the plastic maps that they were forced to draw their own battle plans and patrol routes on because we couldn't even give them that, and finally, a photograph showing the grave of a free resistance fighter and the conclusion of the briefing, gentlemen [sic], is that we have got to offer them something more than the chance to die for their own country and the freedoms that we believe in. "Thank you, sir." (North Testim., JHICI, 7/14/87, at 50-52.)	
87/07/15-050 JULY 15, 1987	POINDEXTER'S NAVY UNIFORM POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: Poindexter testified on his military commission in the U.S. Navy and his political commission as National Security Adviser: "I am very proud of my uniform and I am very proud of the United States Navy, but this issue is not a Navy issue. When the President decided in December of 1985 to appoint me as the National Security Adviser, he gave me a separate commission, a commission essentially as a political appointee filling the position that although not required to be civilian, often has		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	been in the past. "Under this commission, I reported directly to the President on matters that were appropriate, which I will get into later. "In addition to that commission, I also retained my commission as a naval officer, as a Vice Admiral in the United States Navy. "All during my time as National Security Adviser, I tried to make a very clear distinction between the two hats that I wore, one National Security Adviser, the other a Vice Admiral in the United States Navy. "Because these hearings are basically on issues that I handle as National Security Adviser, I chose to appear here in civilian clothes, which I think is entirely appropriate given the nature of the matters under consideration." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/15/87, at 28-29. See Poindexter, Senate Dep., 5/2/87, at 73-74 [Poindexter on his 2 commissions].)		
87/07/21-200 JULY 21, 1987	POINDEXTER'S HEARING TESTIMONY POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Chairman INOUYE. . . . The diversion, for example, has been characterized as being a neat idea, I believe you called it a neat idea. [See 86/00/01-220.] Colonel North also called it a neat idea [see 86/00/01-210], and two members of this panel agreed that it was a neat idea. "Secondly, I believe on several occasions, you responded to questions indicating that as far as you are concerned, it was legal. "Am I correct on that, sir?	DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.	DIVERSION POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: See col. 1.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is correct. I think I described in as a good idea.

"Chairman INOUYE. A good idea, I will take that correction, sir. And you also indicated that this was really just an implementation detail, I think these are the two words you used, of foreign policy that was loudly and clearly announced [sic (denounced?)] by the President of the United States, not on one occasion, but several occasions.

"And you went further to indicate that the President is not afraid to make tough decisions.

"Now, one would think that if you had a neat idea or a good idea, a legal idea, that others concur would be a neat idea, I would like to brag about it. I would go to my boss and say, 'Boss, I have got a neat idea. I have got a good idea. I can show you how we can pay for the contras, provide them with arms, and' as you said, 'it won't cost the taxpayers any money.'

"But instead, you made a decision, according to your testimony, you and you alone, to set up a very elaborate scheme of keeping this secret.

"Well, you decided not to tell the President because it would result in a political explosion. And this was done six weeks after you assumed the high position of National Security Adviser.

"I am certain you were well aware that Mr. Casey was the campaign manager of the President. He was the political brains in the White House. He was an expert on covert activities, and yet here again you felt that you should not discuss this matter with him because, in the case of Mr.

Casey, you didn't want to face that awful possibility of having to withhold information from the Congress.

"Then you decided to withhold this information from members of the Cabinet, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and when asked earlier this morning about the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, well, he is subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, so if you are not going to give it to the Secretary of Defense, why give it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

"Then, needless to say, if you are not going to give information to the above, you are not going to give it to the Congress, which you did not, but more specifically, you decided to withhold information not [only?] from the Congress of the United States, but from the leadership of the United States Congress; it was just a few people, and the members of the Intelligence Committees of both the House and the Senate.

"I think with that type of testimony some of us are justified in asking ourselves, and in this case I will ask you this--you have had about a week to review your testimony, to sharpen your skills of recall.

"Do you have any clarification you would like to make or can you tell us whether information is being withheld from us today or during the past week?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Chairman, absolutely not. I have not withheld any information in this hearing that I can accurately recall or have any

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	recollection of, and what I have testified as I swore at the beginning of these hearings is the absolute truth and the whole truth." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 103-06.)		
87/07/21-250 JULY 21, 1987	CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO A PRESIDENT'S POLICIES POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 1: "Mr. RUDMAN. . . . I really have only one question. "You may wish to turn to a reference page, although it is an opinion, not a fact, Counsel. It is on page 60 of yesterday's testimony, line 1377. I am going to read it to you, Admiral, because I think that these hearings are about broad issues. They are about policy, relations between the Congress and the President, and the American people. . . . ". . . . "Mr. RUDMAN. This is the Admiral speaking [7/20/87, at 60] . . . . "'I think there needs to be a greater acceptance of the fact that the President's power under the Constitution makes him the primary architect of foreign policy; and the American people have a chance every four years to confirm or deny that particular foreign policy. And the President ought to be given an opportunity to carry out that foreign policy that he has campaigned on. "'And if there is greater acceptance of that, then I think there will be more willingness to talk to limited numbers of Members of Congress, that Congress decides are the appropriate ones,		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	and then other people in the Congress ought to stay out of the issue. That is my personal view.' "Now I just want to ask you a couple of questions about that statement, because I think in a sense if I understand what you are saying, it is a--I find it astonishing. But I find a lot of things astonishing other people don't. That is not only remarkable. I just want to find out what you really mean. "As to the second paragraph, starting on line 1384, 'And if there is a greater acceptance of that, then I think there will be more willingness to talk to limited numbers of Members of Congress.' Are you saying if there is not greater acceptance of a stated policy of a President that there will not or ought not to be a willingness to discuss it with the Congress? That is what flows from that statement. Or are you describing what happened? "I guess I want to know if you are talking prospectively, real time, retrospectively? What do you mean by that? "Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, retrospectively, and I think somebody, one of the members of one of these committees, brought it up the other say. We have had problems in the past where either leaks or the condoning of leaks or the threat of leaks has been used to stop something that the President wants to do; and I don't think that is appropriate, and I think that sort of atmosphere leads to an unwillingness on the part of the Executive Branch to be completely candid with the Congress. That is my personal view.		

"Mr. RUDMAN. So your view, I guess, is if there is contention over a particular policy and that contention can lead to results which you and I would both agree are certainly improper, that you would expect there would be less willingness and should be less willingness to talk to Congress under those circumstances?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, whether would or should, I am not sure. I think there would be.

"Mr. RUDMAN. Let me go to the first part of the statement, and the last two lines, 1381 and 1382. Last question I have. 'And the President ought to be given an opportunity to carry out that foreign policy that he has campaigned on.'

"By that, I assume from those words that when the President we elected--and he carried 49 out of 50 states, overwhelming--but whether he carried 49 or whatever, he won. He is the President. You are saying that the Congress ought to give him much greater latitude in carrying out that foreign policy even though the Congress has a role in the Constitution?

"For instance, the appropriations power is probably the most absolute of any power in the Constitution given to the Congress. But you are saying aside from the appropriations power, that the Congress really ought to back off a bit and let the President carry out that policy because he was elected by the people, is that your position?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. That is my position, Senator. And, you know, I clearly recognize the constitutional authority of the Congress to appropriate moneys. But I don't think that that

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	vehicle should be used to try to restrict what the President can do in foreign policy. It obviously will restrict his use of appropriated funds, but I think many members of this committee, based on the statements I've heard, believe that the Boland Amendment applied to the President and that would place those restrictions on him and his personal staff which I don't think is appropriate, and I don't think did apply. And that is my point." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 128-32.)		
87/07/21-251 JULY 21, 1987	CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO A PRESIDENT'S POLICIES POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 2: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. RUDMAN. Well, I understand your point. It surely isn't my point. I am not even sure it is your point. I am going to gell you why. "I am going to give you a hypothetical. It maybe isn't so hypothetical, I regret to say. In my view, it is conceivable, maybe even probable, certainly possible, that a President of the United States will be elected--out of the current field that is running--in 1988 that will take office on January 20, 1989. I would expect that that President could well--this is well within the realm of possibility, and I have a lot of documentation, but I am not going to take the time of the committee, as to the positions these people have taken--take the following positions: One, that the contras were not a solution to the problem in Central Amercia, and they should be cut off totally. Every dime. That is the stated position of a number of candidates running.		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"Number two, that in order to hit rapprochement with the Soviets, particularly in strategic arms control, that there should be no linkage whatsoever, in fact that there might be a backing away from Afghanistan, that there is a global sphere of influence the Soviets have, a global sphere of influence we have, and that the United States would back away from its commitment in terms of an arms control agreement long range. "Third, that our interests in Angola and other places on the African Continent are not proper interests. In other words, Admiral Poindexter, in my view, an isolationist administration. "Now, reading your statement, you are saying, because you are not a Republican or Democrat, you are a member of the United States Navy, and most of the people I know in the service are pretty independent politically, you may support this President strongly, but I would say that independent is probably the best way to describe most members of the service; is that accurate? "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think that is accurate. "Mr. RUDMAN. Well, Admiral, what you are saying in this statement, 'And the President ought to be given an opportunity to carry out that foreign policy', is people like this Senator and a number of others on this panel who would stridently agree [sic (disagree?)] with that President on that policy ought to give him, a 'chance' to let it operate. "And my statement to you, Admiral, is I would do everything I could to frustrate that chance, and I think that is my constitutional		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	responsibility, and I think that is what my constituents would expect me to do. "How do you possibly balance this statement against what this argument is all about? I want to hear your answer. "Mr. POINDEXTER. All right, Senator. I guess I have tried to refrain from answering hypothetical questions. "Mr. RUDMAN. That is maybe not hypothetical, Admiral. "Mr. POINDEXTER. It is getting so near the end of the hearings, and I may get a pinch from my attorney in a moment. ". . . . "Mr. POINDEXTER. I think that I have great trust and faith and confidence in the American people to do the right thing. I don't believe, as I have said numerous times, they want to know all the details, but I just don't see the American people voting for a candidate that takes the kind of positions that you are describing. I just think the American people, and one of the good things, I guess, I will have to admit, that comes out of these hearings is an opportunity for the American people to hear about the problems that we face around the world, this dangerous world that we live in, and I think the message is getting through. They are beginning to understand the problem. I know the President has always felt, I always felt, that if we can ever get the true information to the American people about what was happening in Nicaragua, they would support the President's policy.		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	"But it has been one heck of a time getting that information out. Maybe we should have worked harder. I know there are some members of this committee that think we should have taken a much tougher line from the beginning. "But I think that the American people, and certainly the sample that I have received, indicate they understand very clearly, they are getting the message, they don't want a Communist Government on the Mainland in America." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 132-35.)		
87/07/21-252 JULY 21, 1987	CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO A PRESIDENT'S POLICIES POINDEXTER ACCOUNT, Part 3: [Continuing from preceding entry:] "Mr. RUDMAN. Well, Admiral, I am going to turn it back on again. That is not an answer. You are saying what all of us hope for. We al[l] hope that the American people will always excercise judgment that coincides with our own, because we all think, of course, that our judgment is correct. "My question to you is if the American people, as they have in our history, elect a President with policies that might not have been clear to them at the time the President is elected, and I can quote it chapter and verse--I wonder how you square that with our statement on whether or not you don't agree with me that under those circumstances people have to use their judgment, their beliefs in country, their mandate from their electorate to oppose a President's policy? "We have agreed on the policy that is in		

contention here. We don't have a disagreement on that. But that isn't my question.

"My question is what happens if the worm turns, a different age descends upon us in 1989--are we all supposed to sit back here and simply say, 'Okay, Mr. President, Admiral Poindexter says we ought to give you a better chance to carry out that foreign policy that you campaigned on?'

"I don't think you really believe that. I would like an answer to that question.

"Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I have to say, which is consistent with my testimony and it is what I truly believe, that under the conditions you describe, if the American people indeed vote for such a candidate, then I think we ought to let that candidate try out that policy. That doesn't abrogate or in any way change the responsibility you have over controlling appropriations, ratifying treaties and requesting consultations so that your views can be heard, but I don't think that what I consider to be underhanded tactics should be used to undermine that particular President if the people--that is what their choice was.

"Mr. RUDMAN. That is one piece of your advice that I would guarantee you probably won't be heeded around here.

"Under those circumstances, I dare say that people feel differently about the constitutional role here. And that to some extent is what a lot of this is all about.

"I don't want to discuss the Boland amendment

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	and whether it applied or didn't apply, but it just seems to me that we have got to have more good faith dealing around this town or else a lot that ought to happen won't happen and I firmly believe that every Member of Congress has the right and the obligation, indeed the duty, to strongly oppose any presidential initiative that he believes is not in the national security of this country. "We all take the same oath, Admiral, everybody. I thank you for your answer." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 136-38.)		
87/07/21-260 JULY 21, 1987			WHAT THE U.S. PEOPLE KNEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S IRAN POLICIES POINDEXTER ACCOUNT: "Mr. BROOKS. Admiral, I have got just one question, really. You know, several times today you said that the American people when they vote for a President, they know what his foreign policy is, that they are voting for his foreign policy, he should be allowed to carry out that foreign policy without any interference. "Is that basically what you said? "Mr. POINDEXTER. What I said was that I think that the way our Constitution is written, the President is the chief architect of the foreign policy and the people when they vote for a President recognize the foreign policy position that he represents and that the President ought to be given an opportunity to carry out that foreign policy. "Mr. BROOKS. And you are suggesting that the

millions of Americans that voted for the President were in favor of sending weapons to the Ayatollah? Iran?

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I think that that is a tactical decision, using Mr. Courter's words, that most Americans would think that they didn't have enough information to make a decision one way or the other; and I think that most American people feel that that kind of tactical decision ought to be left up to the President who has the intelligence and who has the information on which to base that kind of decision.

"Mr. BROOKS. One other thing, Admiral. I wanted to observe that the fact is that no Americans, very few Members of Congress, if any, even knew about this Presidential policy in November of '84 []or in November of '85 and it was only in November of '86, because of a story in a foreign periodical, that it was disclosed, and the results of the election that month, in November of '86, are pretty well known.

". . . .

"Mr. POINDEXTER. I want to make two points. One, the policy of the President with regard to the Iran-Iraq war, the fact that we wanted to bring it to a peaceful end, was a very clear foreign policy statement that the President made before. The importance of the Persian Gulf, the security of the oil assets in the Persian Gulf area, was very clear. The President stated numerous times that we, the United States, would take whatever action is necessary to keep the Straits of Hormuz open and the oil flowing, so in

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			terms of the policy, the importance of Iran to the free world, the importance of bringing an end to the Iran-Iraq war were both very public policy positions of President Reagan. "Now what we are talking about here with regard to the Iranian project, those were tactical moves that the President was taking to improve our strategic position with regard to Iran; and I don't believe and I felt that way then and I feel that way now, that the American people recognize that a President to be able to carry out foreign policy, the policy positions that he's stated publicly, often has to take secret action to implement those policies. That's what we were doing." (Poindexter Testim., JHICI, 7/21/87, at 195-99.)
87/07/23-100 JULY 23, 1987	"TRUST IS THE COIN OF THE REALM" SHULTZ ACCOUNT: "I had the great benefit, when I first came here in the Cabinet almost 20 years ago, to have a great American take me under his wing, and many of you know him, Bryce Harlow, a wonderful man, very experienced in the ways of Washington, and, boy, nobody was sharper at figuring the angles and getting things his way. He was sensational. "But everybody listened to him, there was never any mark on Bryce. Why? He drummed it into me when I first came here. He said, 'Remember, George, one thing: Trust is the coin of the realm, trust is the coin of the realm. Be careful when you make a promise to somebody because you want to be sure you are ready to carry it out.		

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	And no matter how tempting it may be if you are trying to persuade somebody to vote for this or that or the other to say yes to something that they want, don't say yes unless you are prepared to work your heart out to do it or think you can deliver it.' "So trust is the coin of the realm. I think Bryce was absolutely right about that. And I think you know very well, as you sort out your own colleagues, they are the people who do their homework, and they are the people who[m] basically, you have confidence in, and those are the ones that count." (Shultz Testim., JHICI, 7/23/87, at 133.)		
87/07/31-100 JULY 31, 1987			THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: IMPACT OF THE ARMS TRANSFERS WEINBERGER ACCOUNT: "Mr. GENZMAN. Did anyone do any formal assessment of the impact of these weapons transfers on the Iran-Iraq war? "Secretary WEINBERGER. I don't know entirely what you mean by 'formal assessment'. The general state of the situation with respect to the Iran-Iraq war was known; many of us get pretty much daily briefings on that as well as other matters, and we knew in a very general way what the state was and roughly the balance of forces at that time and that sort of thing. "Mr. GENZMAN. From the time of these arms transfers to the present, has the Defense Department determined whether these arms transfers have had any impact on the Iran-Iraq war?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. I have never been advised they have had any impact on it, no. The Iran-Iraq war is basically a stalemated grounds situation, the Iraqis have very complete air superiority and we have never had any indications that the Hawk defenses of the Iranians have been particularly effective against Iranian air, and there hasn't been any appreciable change in the ground situation for many months.

"One side will move forward, take a couple of hills or some high ground, and the other side will push them off and it has gone back and forth like that. There ha[s] been very little change in the last couple of years.

"It is essentially a kind of World War I situation.

"Mr. GENZMAN. Has any study been done of any effect that these arms transfers may have on the United States in the event of Iranian-United States hostilities?

"Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, we understand that we--with respect to the TOWs, we don't have any plans for any kind of an armored attack against Iran, so that we hadn't considered that that has changed in any way. The missile itself is, as I said, is obsolete and we have very good information as to ways to deal with it in the hands of other people.

"And those are part of our training exercises and all the rest. As far as the Hawks are concerned, it was not a Hawk missile or a Hawk missile system that was transferred, it was a large number of ground support parts for Hawks

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			that had been given to Iran during the days of the Shah." (Weinberger Testim., JHICI, 7/31/87, at 163-64. See Weinberger, House Dep., 6/17/87, at 64-67, 82, 92-93 [assessment of the weapons transfers].)
87/08/06-100 AUGUST 6, 1987	THE LAST WITNESS OF THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS GEORGE ACCOUNT: "Mr. George. I am told that I could be, sir, a trivia question some day. Who was the last person to ever appear before the Iran-contra committee. "Chairman Hamilton. You might be right." (George Testim., JHICI, 8/6/87, at 199-200. N.b. On 8/6/87, the full Committee hearings ended. John Poindexter's executive session testimony was taken that evening, following Clair George's testimony. Private depositions then continued for several weeks thereafter.)		
87/08/12-100 AUGUST 12, 1987		PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR See col. 3 and next entry.	PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR "My fellow Americans: "I've said on several occasions that I wouldn't comment about the recent congressional hearings on the Iran-Contra matter until the hearings were over. Well, that time has come, so tonight I want to talk about some of the lessons we've learned. But rest assured, that's not my sole subject this evening. I also want to talk about the future and getting on with things, because the people's business is waiting. "These past 9 months have been confusing and

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			painful ones for the country. I know you have doubts in your own minds about what happened in this whole episode. What I hope is not in doubt, however, is my commitment to the investigations themselves. "So far, we've had four investigations--by the Justice Department, the Tower board, the Independent Counsel, and the Congress. I requested three of those investigations, and I endorsed and cooperated fully with the fourth--the congressional hearings--supplying over 250,000 pages of White House documents, including parts of my own private diaries. "Once I realized I hadn't been fully informed, I sought to find the answers. Some of the answers I don't like. As the Tower board reported, and as I said last March, our original initiative rapidly got all tangled up in the sale of arms, and the sale of arms got tangled up with hostages. Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger both predicted that the American people would immediately assume this whole plan was an arms-for-hostages deal and nothing more. Well, unfortunately, their predictions were right. "As I said to you in March, I let my preoccupation with the hostages intrude into areas where it didn't belong. The image--the reality--of Americans in chains, deprived of their freedom and families so far from home, burdened my thoughts. And this was a mistake. "My fellow Americans, I've thought long and often about how to explain to you what I intended to accomplish, but I respect you too much to make

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			excuses. The fact of the matter is that there's nothing I can say that will make the situation right. I was stubborn in my pursuit of a policy that went astray." (President's statement continues in next entry.)
87/08/12-101 AUGUST 12, 1987		PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR ". . . I was aware the resistance was receiving funds directly from third countries and from private efforts, and I endorsed those endeavors wholeheartedly; but--let me put this in capital letters--I did not know about the diversion of funds. Indeed, I didn't know there were excess funds. "Yet the buck does not stop with Admiral Poindexter, as he stated in his testimony; it stops with me. I am the one who is ultimately accountable to the American people. . . ." See col. 3 and preceding entry.	PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION: THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR [President's statement continues from preceding entry:] "The other major issue of the hearings, of course, was the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan contras. Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter believed they were doing what I would have wanted done--keeping the democratic resistance alive in Nicaragua. I believed then and I believe now in preventing the Soviets from establishing a beachhead in Central America. "Since I have been so closely associated with the cause of the contras, the big question during the hearings was whether I knew of the diversion. I was aware the resistance was receiving funds directly from third countries and from private efforts, and I endorsed those endeavors wholeheartedly; but--let me put this in capital letters--I did not know about the diversion of funds. Indeed, I didn't know there were excess funds. "Yet the buck does not stop with Admiral Poindexter, as he stated in his testimony; it stops with me. I am the one who is ultimately accountable to the American people. The admiral testified that he wanted to protect me; yet no

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			President should ever be protected from the truth. No operation is so secret that it must be kept from the Commander in Chief. I had the right, the obligation, to make my own decision. "I heard someone the other day ask why I wasn't outraged. Well, at times, I've been mad as a hornet. Anyone would be--just look at the damage that's been done and the time that's been lost. But I've always found that the best therapy for outrage and anger is action. "I've tried to take steps so that what we've been through can't happen again, either in this administration or future ones. But I remember very well what the Tower board said last February when it issued this report. It said the failure was more in people than in process. We can build in every precaution known to the world. We can design that best system ever devised by man. But in the end, people are going to have to run it. And we will never be free of human hopes, weaknesses, and enthusiasms. ". . . ." (22 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 928-29 [8/17/87].)
87/11/17-100 NOVEMBER 17-18, 1987	IRAN-CONTRA REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES IS PRINTED AND RELEASED: On November 17, 1987, the Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views, is printed. The following day it is publicly released. (Iran-Contra Report, at I.)	IRAN-CONTRA REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES IS PRINTED AND RELEASED: See col. 1.	IRAN-CONTRA REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES IS PRINTED AND RELEASED: See col. 1.

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
88/03/25-100 MARCH 25, 1988	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON NORTH, POINDEXTER, AND PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS "Q. You once referred to Oliver North as a national hero. Now that he has been indicted [on March 16, 1988], are you going to pardon him and Poindexter? "The President. I still think Ollie North is a hero. And at the other hand--and any talk about what I might do or pardons and so forth--I think with the case before the courts, that's something I can't discuss now. But from my--I just have to believe that they're going to be found innocent because I don't think they were guilty of any law-breaking or any crime. ". . . ." (24 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 399 [3/28/88]. See also 24 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 417 [4/4/88] [The President elaborated on March 29, 1988 on whether he still considered North a hero: "But I think I was too short in my remark when I answered the question. It was a specific question: Did I still consider him a hero? I should have augmented that and said why, and that is look at the record and at the honors and the medals that have been awarded him for bravery in combat. And I have to say those were heroic actions and he is a valid hero. And that was what my answer was based on, although, as I said, I should have augmented it as I did here and reminded them of his war record."].) For complete text of President Reagan's	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR: "THE WHOLE EXTENT OF THE SO-CALLED SCANDAL" See col. 3.	PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR: "THE WHOLE EXTENT OF THE SO-CALLED SCANDAL" In response to a question posed during his remarks to members of the Center for the Study of the Presidency at the Old Executive Office Building, the President summarizes the Iran-Contra affair: "Q. You once referred to Oliver North as a national hero. Now that he has been indicted [on March 16, 1988], are you going to pardon him and Poindexter? "The President. I still think Ollie North is a hero. And at the other hand--and any talk about what I might do or pardons and so forth--I think with the case before the courts, that's something I can't discuss now. But from my--I just have to believe that they're going to be found innocent because I don't think they were guilty of any law-breaking or any crime. "I've got to take a second and tell you something that--[laughter]--you know. The whole so-called Iran scandal--I find it hard to think of scandal in connection with it. We were contacted by some individuals, not the Government of Iran. And these individuals--there was great talk at that time that Khomeini was maybe not going to live out the week. They knew that there would be factions striving for leadership. These individuals wanted to discuss with people from our side how to establish better relations with the United States. Well, we, behind the scenes, have been trying for years to get an end to the

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
	response, and his summary of the Iran-Contra affair, see col. 3.		Iran-Iraq war, for example. So I said, yes, we'll meet with them. Incidentally, they came through a third country in the Middle East and that country recommended them to us as being dependable people. Our people met with them. It had to be secret because, obviously, they were risking their lives for doing such a thing. They'd be--I don't know that they haven't been executed. I've never heard of them since this whole thing blew up in the press. But our people met with them. And then the word came back that those people asked if we could make a kind of token sale of arms to them, which they would turn over to the military. And this they said would, first of all, confirm that our people really were representing the top in government but also that it would give them a prestige they might need when the day came that they were going to try to redirect the Government of Iran. "Well, I had told our people when the word came to me to go back that we had a rule that we didn't do business with countries that practice terrorism, and Iran practices terrorism. Well, they came back with the statement that they wouldn't and they didn't, and they gave some individual incidents to show their opposition to terrorism. "Well, I thought about it, and there was a lot of objection among some of our people and all--and debated. And I knew that the Hizballah [radical Shi'ite group operating in Lebanon] has a kind of philosophical relationship with Iran. So, I said, all right, to prove their credentials--the

Hizballah are holding our people hostage--tell them, yes, we'll do this if they will use their influence to see if they can't convince the Hizballah to release our hostages. And it was a token shipment of arms, and they were sent. I didn't put it on there that they don't get the arms unless--we delivered the arms. And they were delivered then by somebody to the--from the other side of the ocean into Iran. They were given to the military, and we got our money back--exactly what we had asked for. At the same time, we had two hostages released, and we were supposed to have in 48 hours another two. And that was when that leak in a newspaper in Lebanon revealed this secret operation of ours, so we never did get the other two hostages back.

"And it wasn't until then that our Attorney General discovered a memo that seemed to indicate that there was more money than we had received, although we had received the price we asked. And I immediately took him and went before the joint leadership of the Congress and told them what we'd discovered--we had no explanation for it, but were going to try to find out; that I'd asked for a special investigator and also that I had appointed a commission to look into this and see what was going on because this money was supposed to be in a Swiss bank account.

"Now, that's the whole extent of the so-called scandal--what our intent was and what happened. And you know something? After all the investigation, today I still don't know who got that extra money or where it came from. I'm

DATE	GENERAL	CONTRAS	IRAN
			hoping to find out. "But I didn't mean to get into that long an answer. But I wanted you to know that I have some definite reason for still thinking that Ollie North is a hero. "All right. Thank you all." (24 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, at 399-400 [3/28/88] [note on Hizballah as provided in original].)